The authorized size and funding of the ACE MSCs and nationality and service of the MSC four-star commanders are:

			     NATO-Authorized	       Funding

		Commander	Personnel           ($ millions)

AFNORTHWEST	U.K. RAF	   290	 		 7.5

AFCENT		German Army	 2,144			26.7

AFSOUTH		U.S. Navy	   823			36.2

The AFSOUTH command reports to the ACE headquarters (SHAPE) at Mons, which, since the Schaefer Plan was adopted, has been configured at the four-star level as follows:

Supreme Allied Commander		SACEUR		U.S. Army

	Europe

Deputy Supreme Allied			DSACEUR		U.K. Army	

	Commander

SHAPE Chief of Staff			COS		German Army

• AFSOUTH. Of the 23 command flag/general officer positions within AFSOUTH, eight are held by American officers (see chart). The rest are or will be held by Europeans. At the level of Commander, excluding deputies, the United States holds five, or 33% of the positions. Ten of the positions are held by Europeans: four Italian, three Turkish, two Greek, and one British.
• AFNORWEST. Allied Forces Northwest has a total of 11 flag/general officers in command billets. There are no U.S. command positions in this subordinate command; six are British and five are Norwegian.
• AFCENT. Allied Forces Central Europe has a total of 12 flag/general officers in command billets. Three, or 25%, are Americans. The remaining nine positions are held by Europeans: five Germans, two Danes, one Dutchman, and one Britain.
• HQ SHAPE. From a total of 11 flag/general officers on the headquarters staff, of whom three, or 27%, are Americans. European officers hold eight, or 73%, of these positions: four British, two German, one Italian, and one Dutch.

Communication, logistics and lift, and intelligence are three areas where U.S. assets are paramount in the Alliance. All three are crucial components of Article V and certain non-Article V activities, particularly peacekeeping operations. In some circumstances, the success or failure of the operation will be dependent on use of these assets. For example, reconnaissance and intelligence systems have played a significant role in military operations in Bosnia; some of the most modern U.S. assets have been utilized, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Joint Stars aircraft and the Airborne Reconnaissance (AR) systems. Moreover, in some instances, these assets can be used without adding to NATO's cost of the operation. Whether or not the assets are used, having the capability to call on these assets quickly and directly enhances the credibility of the commander. These are all assets of extreme sensitivity available only to American forces without special authorization. The U.S. Congress would have major difficulties approving the deployment of such special technology if the commander was not an American.

The U.S. assets of AFSOUTH are extensive. It is important that the AFSOUTH commander (CINCSOUTH) has the ability to employ them utilizing a single chain of military command. Most importantly a U.S. CINCSOUTH makes it more likely that NATO can get ready access, with a minimum of contentious debate, to the specialized capabilities the United States can provide through its regional assets.

In April 1994, the NATO Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), minus the French, commissioned the Long-Term Study to review NATO command structures even while the Schaefer Plan was being implemented. National defense budgets in almost all NATO countries were already in steep decline, and the CHODs were concerned that the current structure could not be sustained. Terms of reference for the study were approved in November 1994.

It was anticipated that generic models would be available for elaboration and review by the spring of 1996 and a status report on the one or more preferred model(s) be ready for the June 1996 Berlin ministerial of the North Atlantic Council. The range of models under discussion by various countries then included:

• One Major NATO Command (MNC) with four regional commands, one of which would be designated for West European Union (WEU) activities.
• Two MNCs with four regional commands, one of which would be designated for WEU activities.
• One MNC with a deputy MNC for European-led operations and several regional commands, any one of which could be tasked by the deputy MNC.
• Two MNCs with a deputy MNC for European-led operations.
• Two MNCs with an additional supporting command.
• Three MNCs and a supporting command with several deputy MNCs for European-led contingencies.

The United States initially leaned toward the two-RC option as a matter of streamlining, efficiency and creating a smaller, markedly different structure. For these and additional reasons, Europeans readily supported the early (albeit not strongly stated) U.S. slant toward two RCs. One perspective was that the natural division of Europe was the Alps, so the two-RC (AFNORTH and AFSOUTH) model follows historic precedent and logic. Another sentiment was that two RCs fostered European cohesion and avoided a situation where Germany was cast in a central region with new partners, while France and the United Kingdom focused on separate RCs to the south and northwest. The United Kingdom took the unexpected position of supporting the two-RC position because it foresaw that its own RC, AFNORTHWEST, would be marginalized anyway and the only alternative was to become fully engaged in the other two commands.

Supporting the three-RC option were those, notably SACEUR, who saw that NATO's military missions (and soon, territory) were expanding, not diminishing, and that the retention of three-RC level commands in ACE was both prudent and defensible. In September 1996, after the French proposal for a European CINCSOUTH and with strong arguments by SACEUR, the United States supported the position for three RCs in ACE, although indicating that two RCs would be acceptable. That position was reflected at the November 1996 Military Committee Chiefs of Staff Session. All European allies continue to support the two-RC option. Although France, Spain, and Turkey see the three-RC option as acceptable, there is no preference for splitting the current AFSOUTH into two RCs. These positions, most recently described in the Chairman of the Military Committee's report to ministers in December 1996, appear to remain unchanged. It is clear, however, that the two-RC option creates nationality-of-command problems that would be solved with the three-RC option.

It is important to reach consensus on the right model. There is general agreement that this latest adaptation will be the final form of NATO adopted to meet both the challenges of enlargement and NATO's post-Cold War mission and doctrine, including its new tasks in non-Article V operations like peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian activities.

A number of broad goals have shaped the U.S. approach to the NATO command structure review: adapting NATO to the changing security environment in Europe, strengthening the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), main- taining U.S. leadership, and promoting the integration of France and Spain into the Alliance's military activities.

Specifically, the new command structure would have to be capable of translating guidance from higher authority into effective military action at all levels while ensuring collective defense as NATO's core mission. It must include a force projection capability, support a strong transatlantic link and permit the contribution and participation of all Alliance members. It should avoid ad hoc arrangements and support non-NATO operations through separable but not separate capabilities. Finally, the new command structure must be financially supportable.

5. Much has been achieved, but now is the moment to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet new challenges. Therefore we are determined to adapt Alliance structures. An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership...

7. In our adaptation efforts to improve the Alliance's capability to fulfill its roles and missions, with the participation of all Allies, we will be guided by three fundamental objectives:

The first objective is to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness... The CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] concept is central to our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations and organizing their command within the Alliance. Consistent with the goal of building the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance...

The second objective is to preserve the transatlantic link... The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.

As an essential element of the development of the identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:

• Identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate Headquarters, Headquarters elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decisions by the NAC;
• Elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

Some Europeans believe that the Berlin Communique supports their contention that Europeans should be offered more senior positions in NATO's command than they currently occupy. They note that the first of three steps the Alliance was expected to take under the communique's article 5 was to adapt Alliance structures to enable all European Allies (that is, including the French) to make a more coherent contribution. Article 7 sets as part of NATO's guiding fundamental objectives a renovated command structure which reflects the strategic situation in Europe and enables all Allies to participate fully. The article also states that there should be arrangements permitting all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures. Finally, the taskings in articles 8 and 9 refer to further adapting the Alliance's structure and to reviewing NATO's military command structure.

The Berlin Communique also affirmed the enduring principles on which NATO is built: the trans-Atlantic partnership, the Alliance's military effectiveness, and the continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure. Nowhere in the communique is there any specific mention of nationality of command at any level. But the French believe the inference is clear and that the timing for the change is now.

These informal exchanges together with the broadly written Berlin Communique form the backdrop to the unexpected letter from President Chirac to President Clinton, elevating the discussion without first holding senior bilateral policy negotiations. President Chirac recommended that NATO's top command be organized around a U.S.-designated super-SACEUR at the head of a single strategic command, with two sub-strategic commands correlating to the current MNCs except that the MNC command position in Europe would be filled by a European.

On 14 August 1996, and again on 26 September, President Clinton wrote Chirac discussing in general terms the need for progress on NATO adaptation but ruling out any change in the nationality of the AFSOUTH Commander. According to press reports, Chirac's response on 10 October was specific and almost entirely devoted to the issue of NATO's command structure. According to press reports, Chirac stated that political and strategic concerns necessitate assigning AFSOUTH to a European. Since the two NATO Strategic Commands were remaining for the foreseeable future in American hands, then it was only legitimate for the two Regional Commands to be delegated to Europeans. According to Chirac, developments in the Mediterranean basin held new importance for Europe, and it was essential that Europeans shoulder their responsibilities in this crucial region. Chirac recognized that there were important operational issues for the Americans but was convinced that innovative solutions should be found to address the different concerns. To underscore the significance of AFSOUTH, Chirac reportedly added a handwritten postscript that described the Southern Command as being of capital importance.

There is no doubt that Chirac wants to engage his personal authority in the debate over the further adaptation of NATO's command structure. His letters echo what he earlier said in his 1 February 1996 speech before the U.S. Congress when describing the changing Euro-Atlantic security architecture:

In this new situation France is ready to assume its full share of this renovation process. This was demonstrated a few weeks ago when France announced its attention to move closer to the military structures of the Organization. I wish to confirm today the open-mindedness and availability with which France approaches this adaptation of NATO, including the military side, as long as the European identity can assert itself fully.

For the Alliance to be strong, Europe must be strong, capable of bearing a larger share of the common burden.

Throughout the discussion, the French have made very clear the linkage between rejoining the military command and a fuller expression of ESDI within the Alliance. For them, a fuller expression could be demonstrated only by their occupying senior military positions.

British views are more circumscribed, although, of all the European allies, a British naval officer would be best qualified to fill in behind an American in AFSOUTH. What is clear is that London is prepared to lose a four-star Air Force position and close the Major Subordinate Command at High Wycombe, providing other nations are prepared to be similarly flexible. Their only other comparable positions are the deputies at SHAPE and SACLANT and the EASTLANT MSC in Northwood.

Spain and Belgium have been reported to support the French position to varying degrees. While several other NATO allies would seem to be supportive of the United States on one or another issue of self-interest, their support might waiver. Alternatively they might make their support dependent on the resolution of some other matters. Turkey, for example, wants to link its status in the WEU to the AFSOUTH issue.

In sum, most Europeans seek a compromise on the AFSOUTH issue and would be comfortable with any arrangement that defuses this contentious issue and maintains military effectiveness.

At the same time, public opinion data suggests that the American public rejects playing a dominant role in world affairs. Consistent with polls since 1993, a 1995 Times Mirror poll shows Americans want to share leadership with other major countries more or less equally (47%), rather than regularly taking the most active leading role (25%). Only a small proportion of the public believes the United States should exert itself unilaterally as the single world leader (13%), or at the other extreme, eschew a world leadership role (9%).

The attitude that the United States should do its fair share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries (74%) continued to be in evidence in September 1996 polling conducted by the University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes. Here, too, only 13% supported the United States being the preeminent world leader in solving international problems and only 12% supported withdrawing from most efforts to solve international problems.

So, U.S. public opinion support for NATO continues unabated. However, there is an occasional contradiction that is often reflected in congressional attitudes toward international engagement. On the one hand, Americans want increased burdensharing among their allies. However, more importantly, Americans insist that when solemn international commitments of U.S. forces are undertaken, as in NATO, Americans serve under an American command.

U.S. think-tank attitudes toward NATO mirror the broad array of attitudes seen in public opinion, ranging from the views of the CATO Institute to those of the Heritage Foundation. The broad array of opinion between these extremes will likely reflect and guide the general debate on NATO's future. Institutions more closely associated with such discourse include the Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Carnegie Endowment, RAND, Institute for Defense Analysis, Center for Naval Analyses, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Service.

In sum, public opinion is not focused, and at times is contradictory. Despite the best efforts of government officials and respected commentators, the transer of AFSOUTH to European command could appear to the American people as a loss of influence comparable to that after the transfer of authority for the Panama Canal. Any claim that volunteering to assume high-level command positions is "burdensharing" would not be taken seriously by the American public unless accompanied by commensurate commitment of resources.