Executive Summary

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Allied Command Stuctures in the New NATO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Progress on NATO's Internal Adaptation has slowed. After extremely promising efforts to strengthen NATO's military structure, progress has been slowed by demands to convert the AFSOUTH command at Naples from a U.S.-led to a European-led position.

2. Theater commands are key. The role of NATO's regional commanders has been enhanced significantly since the end of the Cold War. As NATO broadens it focus, adding crisis management operations to its core mission of collective defense, it is the theater commander who has been called upon to deal with conflict at the regional level. The United States has but one major subordinate commander in Europe, at AFSOUTH. Therefore the proposal to make AFSOUTH a European-led command would weaken the Alliance by weakening the U.S. leadership role in regional affairs at a time when that command is becoming increasingly important.

3. Negotiations have been difficult. The AFSOUTH issue has become difficult to manage for at least three reasons. As a result, a high level effort may be required to break the deadlock. The reasons are:

The United States believes the changes it accepted in strengthening the role of SACEUR's European Deputy, adding other Europeans in command positions, and empowering the Western European Union (WEU) were important enough by themselves to warrant French reintegration into the unified command.

Some Europeans interpreted articles 5, 7, and 8 of the June l996 Berlin Communique, which call on the parties to identify Headquarters to support the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as a de facto pledge to transform AFSOUTH into a European Command. The United States considers that interpretation a misreading of those articles.

The issue was elevated in the autumn of 1996 by an exchange of correspondence between Presidents Clinton and Chirac, with Chirac calling for two regional NATO commands that would be "entrusted to Europeans" and Clinton responding that the United States should retain command of AFSOUTH. The exchange of Presidential correspondence has made subsequent lower level negotiations very difficult.

4. Progress in adaptation. Setting aside the AFSOUTH issue, there has been significant progress in the area of NATO adaptation-that is, in strengthening of ESDI in NATO. For example:

Three-fourths of the most senior NATO general officer positions in Europe are now held by Europeans.
NATO-designated positions at all NATO Headquarters in Europe were reduced from 18,354 in 1990 to 12,919 in 1996. This has resulted in a corresponding budget reduction from U.S. $621.6M (1990) to U.S. $482M (1996).
The WEU has been empowered to lead Combined Joint Task Forces in cases when the North Atlantic Council so decides.
The European Deputy SACEUR could command such WEU-led operations.
Mechanisms have been established to strengthen political control over military operations, something long sought by the French.

5. U.S. military strength remains crucial. The military assets and capabilities that the United States makes available to AFSOUTH warrant a U.S.-led command.

The Sixth Fleet-which includes a Carrier Battle Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and several submarines, all backed by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet-is the single most important asset of AFSOUTH. The seamless connections created by dual hatting the U.S. commander of Naval Forces Europe and CINCSOUTH can be critical in time of crisis.
U.S. air assets in Italy and Turkey have been critical to operations such as Deny Flight, during which in a typical week the United States flew 43% of the air missions.
The importance of U.S. leadership and expertise in managing modern C4I systems was demonstrated in the Bosnia operation.
The growing need for advanced systems to counter ballistic missile proliferation targeted primarily at the AFSOUTH region will require continued American leadership and capabilities.

AFSOUTH, given its strategic importance, will remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve. U.S. leadership will be essential at least until there is evidence that European leadership would be backed by European capabilities and resources commensurate with the importance of the region. Given the recent and projected trends in European defense investments, it cannot be foreseen when adequate capabilities and commitment of resources would become a reality.

6. U.S. leadership is indispensable. A review of recent history in the Balkans, the Aegean area, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East indicates the indispensable nature of both U.S. diplomacy and U.S. military engagement in the key regions surrounding the AFSOUTH area of operation. In the case of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, for example, European powers in NATO were unwilling to undertake the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation without significant U.S. participation. In the case of Desert Storm, AFSOUTH played a critical supporting role which was enhanced by the American command.

7. The region is vital and volatile. An assessment of future prospects for these same areas suggests that they are both highly unstable and vital to both U.S. and European interests. In command of AFSOUTH, the United States is positioned to strengthen its diplomacy with military capability, and a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH will be one demonstration of that military capability. It will be in NATO's interest for the United States to have this combination of diplomatic and military clout. The U.S. command at AFSOUTH enhances NATO's ability to stabilize crises in the Mediterranean basin.

Because of the volatility of the region and the historical importance of AFSOUTH, there is a strong convergence of interests in maintaining an effective U.S.-led command. By its nature, the NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks that threaten the shared interests of all NATO members.

8. U.S. public is concerned. There remains considerable support for NATO among the U.S. public, the Congress and the academic community. There is also support for a U.S. leadership role and for increased burden-sharing. Given the increasingly operational nature of AFSOUTH, and the military and political requirement to have American forces engaged as a key part of future operations, loss of the command would probably be seen by the U.S. public as loss of U.S. leadership. As a result, U.S. public support for operations in this critical region would decline, along with support for NATO in general.

9. Simple command arrangements are best. The U.N. operation in Bosnia reinforces the lesson that complex command arrangements can contribute to failed operations. The thrust of NATO's command structure review has been to simplify lines of command. The solution to the AFSOUTH political problem should not result in complex command arrangements that could fail in time of crisis.

10. Summation of arguments. The key arguments for retaining a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH are:

AFSOUTH has emerged as a very important region in NATO and must remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve and capabilities.
By its nature, the NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks that threaten the shared interests of all NATO members.
This is the only U.S.-led regional command in Europe and losing it will weaken U.S. operational and political support for NATO.
Significant measures have already been taken to enhance ESDI within NATO.
Removing the command link between AFSOUTH and the Sixth Fleet will increase reaction time in crises.
IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the continued need for U.S. leadership in the area.
Successful U.S. diplomacy in this vital region has been strengthened by the U.S. command at AFSOUTH.
U.S. command at AFSOUTH can help stabilize tensions throughout the Mediterranean area.
NATO responses to new ballistic missile proliferation threats against the AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. command.
U.S. command facilitates participation by Partner countries, including the Russians.
U.S. command maximizes the effectiveness of modern C4I assets.
Complicated command arrangements, such as a bifurcated regional and functional command at AFSOUTH, can harm NATO's reponsiveness in crisis.

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