The MSCs have been delegated additional responsibilities in carrying out NATO's new mission in non-Article V operations and cooperation with new PfP Partners. It has been the specific intent to decentralize to the extent possible the work dealing with the Partners from the Major NATO Commands to the MSCs and Principal Subordinate Commands (PSCs). This development has increased the operational duties of the regional commander.
In Europe, SHAPE and the SACEUR have had to be increasingly responsive to NATO's political headquarters in Brussels and serve as a point of coordination. The Bosnia operations beginning with Maritime Guard/Sharp Guard, Deny Flight and Joint Endeavor demonstrated that the regional commander at the MSC level will most logically be selected as the most senior operational theater commander. Based on anticipated areas of responsibilities, the AFCENT (or AFNORTH) commander would be tasked with overall direction of any major peacekeeping or humanitarian operations north and east in the Balkans region and south in Central/Eastern Europe to Hungary. Below Hungary, extending through the Balkans, including the Black Sea and facing south, responsibility would be delegated to the AFSOUTH commander.
Key to the success of any future CJTF non-Article V NATO mission will be the training and exercise of multinational joint forces. The regional commander at the MSC or PSC level will have had the working experience to lead potential participants in geographic regions which are already familiar. The SACEUR's role will be one of a force provider and interface with the organizations under whose political mandate a theoretical operation would be carried on. Should the operation be essentially one delegated under WEU auspices, the Deputy SACEUR could serve the same role.
U.S. command facilitates participation by allies and partners: Arrival ceremonies on board the aircraft carrier USS America commemorate the Russian Navy's 300th anniversary.
Macedonia is a current case in point. A U.S. battalion (Task Force Able Sentry) has been placed under the operational control of the United Nations and assigned to the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force, which is commanded by a Swedish General. Should problems in Macedonia escalate, however, NATO would probably need to engage directly. Under those circumstances, a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH would be best positioned to both draw on America's experience there and to limit the risks of a wider Balkan war.
A decision either to remove the U.S. four-star command billet at AFSOUTH to reduce significantly the profile of U.S. flag officers at AFSOUTH would send an unwelcome signal to the Turks. It would confirm their fear that Washington has accepted the general European view that Southern Europe is simply too complicated and peripheral for NATO to expend much energy there and that Turkey is really not a European ally.
The timing of any decision to cede the AFSOUTH CINC slot to a European could not be worse from a Turkish point of view. It would come as the major NATO European powers have made clear their discomfort at welcoming Turkey into the European Union. Although the interim step of agreeing to Turkish membership in the EU Customs Union has occurred, the process was politically difficult for the Turks, many of whom have resigned themselves to the likelihood that no further integration of Turkey into the European membership structures will be permitted.
NATO members can play a crucial role in the defense of Western interests in the Gulf. Part of that role would be political-European support would greatly ease the political acceptability, both in the United States and in the Gulf, of large-scale U.S. deployment to the region. But another part would be military. European countries could provide forces that would complement what the United States can bring to the theater. Because of the common experience in NATO, those European militaries could be fully and seamlessly integrated with U.S. forces. The contribution of European militaries would permit the United States to retain a sufficient margin of forces, other than those involved in a Gulf crisis, to allow the United States to deter aggression elsewhere, such as on the Korean peninsula; without the European role, the United States might have to commit such a large portion of its forces to the Gulf that its ability to respond elsewhere would be degraded.
By far the most practical route into the Gulf from the United States is via the Mediterranean and its air space. That route faces potential threats from Libya, which could, even with a small force, seriously complicate the free flow of men and material to the Gulf. That flow could also be threatened by terrorists, e.g., in the approaches to the Suez Canal. The assets in the AFSOUTH area could provide the protection needed for timely arrival in the Gulf of sufficient forces to deter or defeat aggression.
Furthermore, the assets in the AFSOUTH area could contribute directly to a war effort. From the eastern Mediterranean, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and carrier-based aircraft could be launched, directed at targets in the Gulf littoral states.
U.S. leadership of AFSOUTH is indispensable for a task vital to defense of the Gulf, namely, reassuring Israel that the West will come to its defense if it is threatened by a Gulf rogue regime. Given the sometimes uneven character of European-Israeli relations, Israel would not have confidence that a European-led command would provide an assured and robust defense. Were AFSOUTH under European command, Israel might well be sufficiently nervous about threats from a Gulf conflict (especially about the threat of weapons of mass destruction) that it would intervene directly in the Gulf, with potentially disastrous political effects on Arab coalition partners.
In light of the importance of the threats to Western interests in the Gulf, a recent RAND study recommended restructuring NATO to respond to the new threat environment. According to that report:
The only penetrating justification for the continuation of NATO is its direct relevance to the commonly perceived security problems facing the United States and its European allies. That elemental redefinition of NATO's missions and of the alliance's current practices would have the following indispensable elements:
Successful U.S. diplomacy in the region is strengthened by U.S. command at AFSOUTH.
The Sixth Fleet represented an important symbol of U.S. presence and commitment during virtually every crisis in the Middle East, beginning with Israel's independence and the earliest Arab-Israeli conflicts. In this regard, it is useful to recall both Israeli and Arab expressions of concern when the strength of the Sixth Fleet has been reduced to meet challenges in other regions.
As the peace process progresses, Israeli security concerns (and possibly Egyptian as well) are likely to grow. Therefore, continued U.S. military leadership in the region and in adjacent theaters would grow more important politically to Israel and Egypt as their militaries sought to reassure themselves that-should the process fail or suffer a major setback-U.S. power would not have retreated permanently from the Mediterranean.
In sum, the United States and its European allies have deeply shared historical and contemporary interests in the AFSOUTH region. Given the breadth of these shared interests and the indispensable contribution the United States makes to defend them, it will be fundamentally important for AFSOUTH to remain a U.S.-led command.