Allied Command Structures in the New NATO
U.S. SUPPORT FOR ESDI
The concept of a European Security and Defense Identity as it emerged at the end of the Cold War offered to American policy makers both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, it was necessary to maintain a strong trans-Atlantic link even in the absence of a Soviet threat by ensuring that a European-only command structure would not separate the European military from the United States and lead to America's alienation from NATO. This undesirable development could also happen on a political level if European nations would caucus in the WEU and bring unified positions to the NATO North Atlantic Council without compromise or negotiation opportunities to embrace North American positions. These concerns were presented to the European governments in what became known as the Bartholomew demarche, which left the impression that the United States was unsupportive towards ESDI.
In reality, there was growing recognition in U.S. circles that ESDI was an idea whose time had come. ESDI provided an opportunity for Europe to take a stronger and more effective role in the new security environment of Europe. ESDI permitted more equal burden sharing especially in participating in new Alliance missions encompassing non-Article V operations. However, the experience in Bosnia demonstrated the limitations of Europeans acting on their own and the need for continued American leadership. The WEU remained incapable of undertaking any significant military activities without NATO support. ESDI became firmly imbedded within NATO as part of the "separable but not separate" policy promoted in the Clinton Administration. A stronger European defense capability within the Alliance allowed the United States to continue to invest in NATO. Political changes in France underscored the possibility that a new alliance structure would emerge that could incorporate the French, an enhanced ESDI and NATO's new missions while allowing the effective exercise of U.S. leadership.
During the first 4 years of the Clinton administration, significant efforts were made to strengthen ESDI and to fulfill the requirements for NATO adaptation. The key elements already agreed for NATO adaptation include:
Since 1966, with the French absent from the integrated military command, NATO's command structure has become progressively multinational. By the end of the Cold War, the integrated command had already developed to the point that senior working-level military could be expected to operate in almost any command regardless of nationality. Rank made the difference, not country of origin. NATO planning, for example, has become totally multinational and fully incorporated in the command structure. The Schaefer Plan introduced in 1993 made specific cuts and changes in a number of senior-level positions. The most significant change at SHAPE was the transfer of the four-star Chief of Staff billet to the Germans and the organization of a straight line of command from the U.S. SACEUR through the UK Deputy SACEUR to the German Chief of Staff. The Intelligence Division formerly headed by a two-star Canadian was transferred to a Dutch two-star. Other key positions like the three-star head of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Reaction Force Planning Staff and the Chief of Public Information went to Europeans. Of the five Assistant Chief of Staff positions at SHAPE, only one is held by an American. He is, after the SACEUR, the most senior American officer in the entire SHAPE command. The newly important offices of Military Cooperation and Partnership Coordination were also designated for European officers. Of the dozen Principal Subordinate Commands in ACE, only four are headed by American officers. Further Europeanizing NATO command structure in Europe could, in fact, endanger NATO's trans-Atlantic character and military effectiveness.
NATO has been adapting its military structures and procedures since July 1990, when the allies declared, "The Alliance's integrated force structure . . . will change fundamentally." A major facet of change has been the increased European representation on higher staffs and in senior billets, and the increased structuresC both political and militaryCat NATO headquarters for oversight of the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs). In addition to the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), the Director of the Integrated Military Staff (DIMS) and seven Assistant Directors are Europeans, including the newly established Cooperation and Regional Security (C&RS) Directorate headed by a French two-star general. In 1996, France joined the Military Committee (MC) as a full member, and the protocol governing French participation on the MC and its subordinate bodies has been revised.
Directly addressing long-standing French desires for greater political oversight of the military structure in which the United States plays a major role, NATO has agreed to several initiatives since France declared its intention to move closer to full participation in the Alliance military structure. In June, 1996, the full North Atlantic Council (NAC) met for the first time in 30 years at the level of Defense Minister (the so-called ANAC-D"); this forum reconvened in December 1996, indicating the establishment of a precedent. In addition, the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) was established in June 1996 to provide politico-military advice to the Council in managing and ensuring timely overall direction of Alliance military operations, particularly in a crisis.
Also agreed to in June 1996, as a new feature of the MC, is the Capabilities Coordination Cell (CCC), which is to provide staff support to the MC on contingency-related matters, and to develop planning guidance for approval by the MC and transmission to the Major NATO Commanders. The CCC became operational on 1 October 1996. Finally, the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) was also established. The CJPS will plan for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations as a bi-MNC staff managed by an executive board comprised of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, DSACEUR, and the CJPS Chief of Staff, all of whom are Europeans. The CJPS is being constituted by dual-hatting SACEUR's ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff and Reaction Force Air Staff and making them available to plan Alliance-wide missions, thus eroding SACEUR's exclusive planning capability for non-Article V contingencies.
Since the WEU moved to Brussels in January 1993 to undertake its new roles of strengthening the European pillar of NATO and simultaneously providing an independent European defense capability, the Alliance has taken significant steps to empower the fledgling WEU with real assets to accomplish its tasks. While the process of developing NATO links to and support for the WEU proceeded slowly even after the 1994 Summit due to political factors, it has accelerated noticeably since the French decision to abandon pursuit of ESDI in the WEU and seek it instead inside NATO. Following the June 1996 NATO ministerials, NATO support for the WEU gained substance and continues to grow.
The WEU and NATO meet quarterly in joint Council sessions, the two organizations' secretaries general meet often to discuss matters of common interest, and the WEU secretary general is invited to NAC ministerial meetings. Other ties exist between the WEU's Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) and NATO's Executive Working Group (EWG) and Policy Coordination Group (PCG). Links are growing between the WEU Planning Cell and MC and SHAPE staffs. Recent agreements have been concluded on the sharing of NATO intelligence with the WEU, and the WEU now has access to secure NATO communications. It is likely that in the near future Planning Cell staff members will become permanent members of NATO's CJPS for the purpose of planning WEU CJTF missions and exercises.
At Berlin, NATO agreed to a CJTF concept that includes the provision of CJTF headquarters, as well as NATO assets and capabilities, to the WEU on a case-by-case basis. NATO also agreed to assume the planning responsibility for illustrative mission scenarios submitted to NATO by the WEU. The communique stipulates that the Alliance "will prepare . . . for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces) . . . and work toward . . . elaboration of multinational command arrangements within NATO, . . able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations."
By relinquishing the U.S. four-star Chief of Staff, to European officers, the United States facilitated a command relationship for the deputy SACEUR which had not previously existed. Now NATO has a direct chain to the deputy SACEUR. When the Chief of Staff was a U.S. four star, the two deputy SACEURs (UK and German) were not in the chain of command. In other words, they did not have command authority in the absence of SACEUR and the United States would have named a new SACEUR. Now the UK four star has direct command authorityCa major U.S. concession.
Also, soon after the UK was authorized to fill the deputy SACEUR position, new terms of reference were adopted to include liaison with the WEU. The liaison activity of the deputy SACEUR with the WEU, leading to an expected strategic command position as commander of WEU forces, is a dramatic departure from previous command arrangements within Allied Command Europe. It strengthens the European pillar and gives meaning to the "separable but not separate" concept. The United States considers this to be a major contribution for ESDI.
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