Allied Command Structures in the New NATO
At the end of the war, the Americans and British agreed that the Royal Navy would serve as guarantor of Western interests in the Mediterranean. However, British economic difficulties soon made it impossible for the Mediterranean Fleet to sustain such responsibilities. Meanwhile, Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey had begun to mount. By early 1946, it was obvious the U.S. Navy would have to send forces to the Mediterranean. In late September, the U.S. Navy formed the Sixth Task Group and assigned it permanently to the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Over the next 16 months, as Soviet threats and Communist subversion menaced Italy, as well as Greece and Turkey, the Sixth Task Force was reinforced. In January 1948, it was redesignated the Sixth Fleet.
The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 and the start of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 prompted the United States and its NATO allies to create larger military forces to defend Western Europe. In 1952, Greece and Turkey entered NATO, when a more powerful Mediterranean force was assembled to defend those countries. NATO established the Allied Forces Southern Europe Command at Naples, placing it under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). However, the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe remained in London and the U.S. Sixth Fleet was not assigned to Allied Forces South. Instead, the fleet remained entirely under American control, merely being earmarked for NATO in case of necessity.
The command relationships established in 1952 dissatisfied the British. They wanted one of their admirals designated NATO Atlantic commander. But the U.S. Government held firm that this post, as well as SACEUR and commander of Allied Forces South, be held by Americans. The United States did agree that NATO Mediterranean naval forces would be assigned to the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, based in Malta. He would assume command of the Sixth Fleet only in the event of war.
French President Charles De Gaulle disliked NATO command arrangements. Of the thirteen subordinate NATO commands under SACEUR, Americans held seven, the British five and the French one. As a sign of unhappiness, De Gaulle removed the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO in February 1959. At the time, the French naval forces in the Mediterranean already surpassed those of the Royal Navy. As further signs of his displeasure, De Gaulle removed the French Atlantic Fleet from NATO in June 1963 and withdrew French naval staff from NATO headquarters in April 1964. Finally, in March 1966, De Gaulle announced total French military disengagement from NATO and ordered the expulsion of all NATO forces from French soil.
Meanwhile, British naval forces continued to erode. By the mid-1960s, the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean had shrunk to four frigates and six mine sweepers. In consequence, the Mediterranean Fleet was abolished in June 1967, and the British lost the post of NATO Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. All NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean fell under American command, though these consisted of only Italian, Greek, Turkish and the small British naval forces. As before, the U.S. Sixth Fleet remained separate from NATO in peacetime. This arrangement has continued to the present.
CYPRUS
The 1964 Cyprus crisis was precipitated by the quiet buildup by the Greek Government in Athens of more than 10,000 combat troops on Cyprus, in direct violation of the London and Zurich agreements. U.S. involvement in this crisis was high-level from the beginning. President Johnson brought former Secretary of State Dean Acheson out of retirement to manage the negotiations, which resulted in the Acheson Plan. Although never adopted (having been condemned by Greece), it would have created security zones on Cyprus, which mainland Turkey would have controlled, while essentially allowing Greece to annex large portions of the island. In short, the plan would have dissolved Cyprus as a unitary state. The goal of the plan was to meet Greek demands for Greek union with the island (enosis) and Turkish desires for partition (taksim).
Some senior Turkish military officers and politicians remain upset about the U.S. position first articulated in 1964 in a letter from President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. The letter, which all Turks are schooled in recounting, threatened that if Turkey decided to invade Cyprus, the NATO Article V guarantee protecting Turkey against other threats (i.e., the Soviet Union) might not hold.
The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus again directly engaged the good offices of U.S. diplomacy to limit the damage. U.S. congressional concern over the use of U.S.-supplied arms and equipment in the operation resulted in an arms embargo against Turkey which lasted several years, substantially delaying the country's military modernization program. While the Turks were unhappy with the U.S. action, to the Greeks, it restored a balance to a U.S. regional policy, seen by successive Greek governments as pro-Turkish. During the time in which the embargo was in effect, Turkey closed most of the U.S. military facilities on its soil. The damage to the relationship from that episode has largely faded, but as with the Johnson letter, Turkish memories are durable.
U.S. command at AFSOUTH ameliorates
complex Greek-Turkish territorial disputes.
In 1983, Turkey declared the northern part of Cyprus the independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC). To date, only Turkey has formally recognized the TRNC. About 30,000 Turkish soldiers remain on the island.
Although the UN has the institutional lead on the Cyprus issue (due to the UN force along the Green line), efforts to resuscitate negotiations over Cyprus have generally come from the United States, including the latest effort by the U.S. mediator, Carey -avanaugh. Until the summer of 1996, when a series of shootings along the Green Line (the UN line of demarcation dividing the island) escalated tensions significantly, the Cyprus situation has been relatively quiescent. The recent decision by the Greek Cypriot administration to acquire Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles (probably SA-12s) is the only example of either side introducing a new variable into the military balance. Here, too, the United States has played a leading role in defusing a potential military crisis.
AEGEAN ISSUES
The history of direct U.S. diplomatic involvement in Greek-Turkish disputes, however uneven, is still unparalleled in terms of the ability to exert positive pressure for peaceful resolution of complex and politically contentious issues. In addition, the list of candidates to replace the United States in this role (nations which both Greece and Turkey would find acceptable mediators) is quite short, as there is essentially no way to please both sides on any of the issues in dispute and therefore volunteering for mediation is politically risky. Put simply, only the United States can perform the function of regional mediator. Allowing the AFSOUTH Commander in Chief to revolve to non-U.S. officers, therefore, would deny the Alliance an important mediating tool. It would also send a signal to both Greece and Turkey that a significant brake had been removed on their tendency to escalate seemingly insignificant issues to the level of political crisis.
An F/A-18C Hornet from the "Wildcats" of Strike Force, attached to the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington,
enforces the "no-fly" zone in the skies over Iraq.
U.S. assets in the AFSOUTH region contributed to the allied war effort in a variety of other ways:
Advanced U.S. techonology employed under U.S. Command contributes to such operations as Desert Storm.
As the fighting in Bosnia continued, civilians faced mounting deprivations and casualties. The members of NATO acted to alleviate such misery. In response to orders from SHAPE, Allied Forces South was placed in charge of Operation Provide Promise. In 1993-94, Provide Promise brought large-scale humanitarian relief to Bosnians of all religions through a regular series of air drops of food, clothing and medicine.
In summer 1995, the NATO Alliance agreed that the Bosnian- Serb armed forces had engaged in widespread atrocities and unwarranted attacks on civilians. The Alliance members decided to prevent further Bosnian-Serb crimes. They agreed to launch Operation Deliberate Force. Allied Forces South was directed to
carry out the operation, a series of air strikes by American, British, French and other NATO air forces against Bosnian-Serb artillery
and mortar emplacements, radar sites and other targets endangering
civilians or allied aircraft. This operation helped to end the war in Bosnia and to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table in Dayton, Ohio.
U.S. command maximizes effectiveness of modern intelligence assets.
After difficult negotiations, the Croats, Bosnians and Bosnian-Serbs agreed to end their war. Operation Joint Endeavor was the name given to the IFOR operation that was initiated in December 1995, following the signing of the Dayton peace accords. Allied Forces South was directed by NATO to supply the air and naval forces component of this peace operation.
In December 1996, NATO initiated Operation Joint Guard to ensure the continuation of the cease fire and the advancement of the peace process. While Joint Guard is directed by SHAPE headquarters, it is directly supported by the Allied Forces South command. The operation is continuing as of February 1997.
From a pragmatic military perspective, there were few senior European commanders with the requisite experience at leading combined, joint and coalition operations at the theater level. Additionally, it would have been a daunting task to achieve agreement within the alliance about the nationality of the single European to whom all other forces would have been subordinated. Since the AFSOUTH commander was a U.S. officer, no European nation had to be singled out for special treatment. The selection of Admiral Leighton Smith was especially apt, since as AFSOUTH Commander, he had extensive experience with Bosnian operations providing air support under Deny Flight and naval patrolling under Sharp Guard. Moreover, the U.S. military commands special respect within NATO. This is also the case with PfP and other NATO troop contributors as well as the Russians. They were ready to participate under a U.S. commander but many would probably have decided not to do so had any other country been in command.
The other enduring value of this command arrangement, however, is in terms of the U.S. political climate. Public and congressional support for dispatching 20,000 U.S. troops potentially into harm's way in Bosnia was tenuous, at best. Indeed, Congress merely acquiesced in rather than approved the IFOR deployment. If the issue had been clouded with additional controversy, such as a non-U.S. commander of AFSOUTH, it is quite conceivable the outcome would have been much less acceptable for Administration policy.
Bosnia illustrates the need for U.S. engagement in serious disruptions of European security. To quell the fighting and obtain a peace accord, U.S. leadership was eventually necessary, especially as pertains to palliating the Russians and bringing them inside the proverbial tent. U.S. leadership alone was certainly not sufficient, and the Europeans also made vital contributions to creating the conditions for negotiations and IFOR's successful deployment. The lesson of this phase of the Bosnian experience is not that the Europeans are incapable of resolving their own security problems and must, therefore, look to America for intervention (and, thus, the need to keep the United States engaged via command of AFSOUTH). Rather, the lesson is that the United States continues to have vital security interests in Europe and that to address these adequately, both the United States and European allies must be collaboratively engaged. Sustaining U.S. support for such collaboration depends on preserving the opportunity for the United States to exercise command.
IFOR/SFOR demonstrates need for U.S. leadership: Secretary of Defense William Perry and a group of journalists walk across the bridge over the Sava River during his visit to Bosnia, January 1996.
THE U.S. ROLE IN AFSOUTH
THE U.S. COMMAND TRADITION
Prior to the November 1942 Allied landings in North Africa, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed General Dwight Eisenhower commander of all Allied forces in the Mediterranean Theater. Command of all Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean was assigned to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet. This arrangement continued until Eisenhower's departure for England in January 1944 to assume command of Allied forces in the Normandy invasion. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson became Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, with General Sir Harold Alexander as commander of Allied forces in Italy and with Cunningham remaining as Allied naval commander.
Greek-Turkish disputes have centered on both Cyprus and the Aegean. The United States has been the key to preventing war between Greece and Turkey since NATO's inception in 1949.
Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest broker.
Over the last decade, the most serious Greek-Turkish crises have involved maritime and air jurisdiction and boundary issues in the Aegean Sea. These disputes over territorial sea and airspace boundaries have on occasion severely constrained NATO operations in the area, restricting the scope of (and sometimes forcing cancellation of) Alliance naval and air exercises. Periodically, the AFSOUTH Commander in Chief has become directly involved in resolving these issues, since they could affect his operational readiness and certainly his force planning.
The January/February 1996 dispute over a small, uninhabited pair of islets, known to the Greeks as Imia and to the Turks as Kardak, illustrates the potential for a seemingly insignificant issue to quickly escalate into a crisis. The consensus of observers is that the Imia/Kardak episode, which highlighted the sensitivity of territorial sovereignty, brought the Greeks and Turks closer to hostilities than any incident since the late 1980s. Were it not for the quiet but effective intervention of senior U.S. officials, conflict would likely have occurred in January over these small off-shore islands. The Imia/Kardak episode was precipitated by a Greek attempt to enforce its decision to extend its territorial sea from six nautical miles to twelve. In 1994, Turkey publicly warned Greece that attempting to enforce this unilateral extension of the sea boundary (which Greece claims it may do under the Law of the Sea Treaty) would be regarded by Ankara as a casus belli. While Turkey understands the legal justification for the Greek action, Turkey argues that such an extension would transform the Aegean into a Greek lake, and could cut off several high seas corridors to Turkish ports and access to the Turkish Straits. Should the Greeks seek to enforce this extension, NATO and U.S. naval forces could find themselves operationally constrained.
During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, at the direction of NATO headquarters, Allied Forces South created a multinational destroyer and mine sweeper flotilla under a Greek vice admiral. This group of warships deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its major tasks were to deter Libya from mining operations that could disrupt the sea lanes to the Gulf and to protect the Mediterranean coasts of Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Israel and Egypt. The flotilla also was used to escort Coalition naval vessels and merchant ships to and from the Suez Canal, which were bound for or returning from the Persian Gulf. As a secondary mission, the destroyers carried out surveillance of shipping sailing toward the Suez Canal to prevent any freighters from bringing supplies or equipment to the Iraqis. The admiral commanding the flotilla later expressed complete satisfaction at the outstanding cooperation he had received from all his captains during this 8-month NATO operation.
The fact that AFSOUTH (and SHAPE ) were commanded by a dual-hatted U.S. commander had significant political (rather than operational) impact on this support to Desert Shield, Desert Storm, OPC I, and OPC II. These contributions include:
U.S. command facilitates response to missile proliferation as illustrated by the deployment of Patriot missiles to Israel
during the 1991 Gulf War.
In 1992, after Yugoslavia had dissolved in ethnic bloodshed, Allied Forces South directed Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight. The former operation was for the purpose of carrying out a naval embargo in the Adriatic, in order to prevent the import of arms into Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia. Deny Flight was an air operation to impose a no-fly zone over Bosnia primarily to stop air attacks by the Serbian Air Force.
The political and military utility of U.S. command of AFSOUTH was demonstrated in events leading up to the U.S. decision to join the IFOR intervention.
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