Allied Command Structures in the New NATO
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the southern flank of NATO, as the region was often called, held secondary importance in Alliance military planning to that of the Central Region. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO's willingness to address threats to its security by engaging in out-of-area operations in Bosnia shifted the locus of military attention to the Southern Region. Additionally, the most pressing threats to the security of the members are now seen as originating in or being associated with the Southern Region.
While various NATO nations maintain significant military capability in the Southern Region, it is the United States Sixth Fleet with its associated Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group backed up by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, that provides the primary military capability to AFSOUTH.
Operating under U.S. national command during peacetime, the fleet includes a flagship, a Carrier Battle Group comprised of one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the embarked air wing of 80+ aircraft, six cruisers/destroyers and frigates with the AEGIS combat system and Tomahawk cruise missiles, and three or more nuclear-powered attack submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles and maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, an Amphibious Ready Group of 1,500 Marines (special operations capable) embarked on three or more amphibious ships is part of the fleet. If NATO were to go to Reinforced Alert, the number of U.S. naval units available to AFSOUTH would increase significantly in all categories of naval forces.
The Sixth Fleet in conjunction with U.S. Army and Air Force units in the region represents the U.S. intention and ability to help friends and allies ensure stability and security in the region. Additionally, these forces possess the military capability to unilaterally or as a part of a NATO operation bring decisive military force quickly to bear on any threat. Having the U.S. naval forces chain of command parallel to the NATO command structure ensures that actions taken by the Alliance include U.S. involvement and in particular that of U.S. naval forces. The seamless connection of U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO's Strike Force South is effected by dual hatting the Commander, as is ensuring that the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe and NATO's Commander in Chief South are the same individual.
Increasingly, military capability in the Southern Region is characterized by joint combinations of Army and Air Force units with naval forces. This is best illustrated in Bosnia, where the ground, sea and air forces of member nations work together to restore stability to the area. As part of the multinational force, U.S. forces bring unique capabilities in the areas of logistics, command and control and intelligence gathering. Additionally, the massive sustainment infrastructure of the U.S. forces also supports allied forces, thereby allowing them to remain on station and operate effectively for a much longer period than otherwise possible.
The United States is the only nation possessing the military capability in the Southern Region necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations required by a complex long- term military mission such as Bosnia. The involvement of U.S. forces enables the other allied forces to achieve their full military potential. The key combat capabilities, especially offensive strike assets, provided by U.S. forces included:
After operations in support of NATO's Decisive Endeavor, the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington transits north through the Strait of Messina.
In comparison to USAF assets in AFCENT, there are few squadrons stationed permanently in the Southern Region, although the region has two of the six Main Operating Bases in Allied Command Europe. The largest permanent basing at a U.S. airbase in the region is Italy, where there are 4,020 personnel. They are primarily at Aviano AB, which has 1 AF HQ, 1 fighter wing, and 2 squadrons with 36 F-16C/D. In Turkey, there are 2,640 personnel, primarily at Incirlik AB, Turkey. While aircraft numbers vary, a representative situation would be 6 F-15, 18 F-16, 5 KC-135, 3 E-3B/C, 2 C-12, 2 HC-130. Air Force assets stationed in Spain would be assigned to U.S. European Command versus AFSOUTH. Air Forces assigned to Portugal come under the command of U.S. Atlantic Command.
As for financial infrastructure considerations, there are 17 NATO projects prefinanced by the U.S. in this region, totaling $62.3 million, $37.9 million of which are in support of Aviano Air Base, Italy. Prefinancing of NATO capabilities projects by the United States provides to NATO and the Southern Region assets which could not otherwise be easily provided by other allies.
Recent AFSOUTH region air activity includes:
U.S. European command could assign additional dual-based units from the Continental United States within the Southern Region. These dual-based units are forces that were previously stationed in Europe and remain available to NATO, at a high degree of readiness, in the event of a crisis in Europe. On an as-needed basis, Army forces stationed in any region of Allied Command Europe can be placed under command in the Southern Region.
Army forces as of October 1996 were:
U.S. C-141B Starlifters in May 1996. U.S. command in AFSOUTH provides quick response capability.
The United States used massive airlift, rail, and wheeled assets to support operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Hungary IFOR deployment. In the initial deployment of December 1995 - February 1996, the United States deployed approximately 35K passengers and 230K short tons. The United States flew 1,893 airlift sorties, accounting for 73% of the airlift sorties. The United States organized 368 trains consisting of 7,432 rail cars, amounting to 97% of the trains. It also organized 53 truck convoys, comprised of 2,508 trucks. For the current Stabilization Force operations, there is a standing pool of 23 passenger and cargo airlift assigned to AFSOUTH (under AIRSOUTH) which supports SFOR, of which 4, or 17%, are from the United States.
The United States made major manpower contributions to key IFOR movement agencies. The United States provided 26% of the officers and 29% of the enlisted personnel for the ACE Mobility Coordination Center (SHAPE). From the Regional Air Movement Coordination Center in Vicenza, Italy, the United States coordinated all traffic in and from FRY; the United States provided 83% of total action officers. U.S. manpower contributions to Commander for Support, Zagreb (responsible for all logistic support to COMIFOR/ SFOR) initially included providing 135 positions out of 379, or 36%. The United States initially provided the commander (a major general) and the Chief of Staff. The United States currently fills 94 of 356 positions, or 26%.
Another U.S. role in the Southern Region is its security assistance programs for Greece and Turkey:
The task was made more difficult in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the circumstances under which NATO forces deployed under AFSOUTH command. The region lacked such critical infrastructure as communications and power. The terrain and weather conditions were extremely challenging. Minefields were everywhere. The forces had to plan with a minimum of guidance and a lack of established requirements for the C4I capabilities.
Furthermore, NATO lacked the C4I infrastructure to deploy out of area and the organization structure and staff to plan, implement and manage the deployed C4I systems. As a result, they had to turn to the member nations to provide leadership, staff and capabilities. The timely and effective response of the United States in particular, enabled AFSOUTH to quickly react to the signing of the Dayton General Framework Agreement and rapidly deploy enough C4I systems to take command and control of the operation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, thereby leading the coalition into Bosnia.
In order to plan, implement and manage the IFOR C4I systems, it was necessary for AFSOUTH to put a new organization structure in place. AFSOUTH created the Combined Joint Communications Control Center (based on U.S. JTF concepts) and staffed it with augmentees from the Southern Region Signal Support Regiment, U.S. Army Europe, SHAPE and AFCENT. Liaisons were also provided to the Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center (CJCCC) by EUCOM, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the French. The CJCCC was initially heavily staffed with U.S. personnel, whose job was to integrate the C4I planning activities of NATO and participating national elements and monitor and coordinate the implementation including interfaces with both the NATO Integrated Communications and Information Systems, the AFSOUTH Communications and Information System, the ARRC Communication and Information System and the national Strategic and Tactical systems. It was also necessary for the CJCCC to take on the responsibilities of frequency management for IFOR and the C4I theater network management and system control, including the appropriate integration of the management and control elements of the supporting national and IFOR strategic, operational and tactical level systems.
U.S. leadership, expertise, experience, and systems were the keys to success. Without this support, AFSOUTH would not have been able to take timely action to meet its C4I support requirements for the coalition operation. U.S. tactical systems (like the TRI-TAC joint command control system) were deployed quickly and provided the strategic-level infrastructure in country, and MSE provided the Tactical-level infrastructure for Multinational Division North. The TRI-TAC system also played a key integration role because of its ability to interoperate with NATO members' tactical systems such as PTARMIGAN, RITA, SOTRIN and AUTOKO and commercial systems such as the UN VSAT and local Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) networks. Hence, TRI-TAC facilitated the ad hoc interconnection and integration of the disparate systems deployed in country. The U.S. MILSATCOM system was the major provider of both Ultra High Frequency and Super High Frequency capabilities. Without these capabilities, it would not have been possible to establish timely and effective military communications connectivity into Bosnia. Intelligence dissemination for coalition partners was provided by the U.S. Limited Operation Capability Europe (LOCE) system, which was extended into the AOR to support IFOR operations. U.S. STU-IIBs (secure voice telephones) were provided to facilitate secure communications with the PfP nations and the High Representative in Bosnia for civil matters.
U.S. ability to bring off-the-shelf technologies to bear to improve operational capabilities was also evident. Data network technology such as the Integrated Digital Network Exchange (IDNX) was used to provide both U.S. and NATO strategic theater communications backbone connectivity. U.S. video teleconferencing technology was employed to facilitate collaboration and coordination within the command structures of SHAPE, AFSOUTH, IFOR, ARRC and MNDs and within the U.S. command structures supporting the operation. The U.S.-Bosnia C2 Augmentation and Joint Broadcast Systems were provided to IFOR HQs, the ARRC, the MND HQs and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to facilitate intelligence dissemination, support collaborative planning, and provide direct broadcast services for imagery, weather and other information services. The United States also introduced new capabilities such as the UAV Predator, which used the BC2A/JBS for distribution to the commands. The CAOC also served as an advanced technology testbed to introduce enhanced air command and control capabilities. In fact, without the U.S. participation, the air campaign would have been much more risky for all the allies than it was during the early portions of the Bosnia operation.
Libya is actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons, as demonstrated by their construction of chemical weapons production plants at Rabta and Tarhunah. It is currently assessed to possess at least 100 tons of chemical agents. While its biological program is today assessed to be in the R&D phase, Tripoli is seeking to transform this program to produce weaponized agents. Regarding ballistic missiles, in addition to its 300km-range SCUDs, Libya has reportedly arranged to buy extended-range SCUD-Cs and, perhaps, NODONG missiles from North Korea. If deployed in Libya, the 1,000km-plus NODONG could strike Italy proper, possibly including Naples. Iran is embarked on a significant arms buildup across the board, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile programs. Although Tehran signed the Chemical Warfare Convention, it has subsequently expanded its CW program and is capable of producing hundreds of tons of agents annually. Its biological warfare program has advanced to the point that it probably has produced and weaponized at least a small quantity of agents. Iran is also actively pursuing nuclear weapons, and could have them in as few as 5 years with external assistance or 8 to 10 years on its own. Iran has already acquired the extended range SCUD-C from North Korea and is expected to receive the NODONG, which could threaten the southernmost mainland of Europe as well as critical assets in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Although Iraq's NBC and missile programs suffered a major setback with Desert Storm, Baghdad remains a proliferation threat and is likely to be able to resume its chemical and biological programs soon after UN inspectors leave.
NATO members have recognized that proliferation can undermine the Alliance's ability to conduct essential defense missions, both in protecting NATO territory and in out-of-area regional conflicts. Under U.S. leadership in the Defense Group on Proliferation and in the Military Committee, allies have agreed on an assessment of the risks, and on the security implications of, and the military requirements to meet, the growing threat. Allies have identified a set of capabilities-intelligence, active and passive defense, and command and control-needed to give NATO the ability to project power and to conduct operations in an NBC environment. Yet, the success of the NATO initiative to counter the proliferation threat will only be assured when allies make national and collective commitments to field the necessary military capabilities and embed the threat in the Alliance planning process. In this context, continued U.S. leadership is essential.
Despite the Alliance's progress to date in moving to counter the threat, European allies will continue to lag behind the United States for the foreseeable future in a number of areas that will be key to deterring and defending against the proliferation threat. These range from intelligence and hardware to doctrine and training. In the near term, NBC and missiles have the potential for disrupting coalition presence and operations, particularly in areas outside of the traditional area of operations, such as the Gulf. In this context, at the operational level, U.S. command will be the best means of overcoming recognized shortfalls in joint and combined operations. U.S. command will be a vital ingredient to bring to bear the full spectrum of counterproliferation capabilities to include counterforce, as well as the full range of active and passive defenses. There is a high degree of shared interest in countering the NBC challenge. Until NATO can overcome existing deficiencies, U.S. command will remain the best guarantor of effective alliance capability to respond to those threats.
U.S. command will also best facilitate the integration of new capabilities, such as ballistic missile defenses, into NATO defenses whether as a national U.S. asset or as an Alliance asset such as AWACS. A U.S. commander is best placed to make counterproliferation a command priority and integrate NBC training and operational concepts into Alliance defense planning. Moreover, for those operations which may carry substantial political consequences for our European allies, such as the potential requirement to ensure that the Libyan chemical warfare facility at Tarhunah does not go into production, an American in command may well be essential.