Under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, the use or threat of military force by one State against another, without the latter’s consent, is generally prohibited.¹ However, two main exceptions are contemplated.²

First, it is justified if such action is taken pursuant to express authorization by the Council to maintain peace and security. The drafters of the Charter contemplated that members would contribute military contingents for the Council "on call" to carry out the enforcement actions, and in some instances, that the Council would delegate this task to a regional organization.³ In practice, however, none of the military enforcement operations pursuant to Council Resolutions has been carried out by forces under U.N. command. Instead, they have been carried out by regional organizations or coalitions of individual member nations, and the degree of participation in such military enforcement operations has depended largely on the political will of each nation.

Second, it may be justified, in the absence of any Council authorization, under preexisting "inherent" rights of self help which sovereign States enjoyed under customary international law and which have not been abridged by the Charter, but only the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack is expressly recognized under the Charter.⁴

Article 24 of the Charter assigns primary responsibility to the Council for the maintenance of peace and security.⁵ Chapter VII of the Charter, consisting of Articles 39 through 51, deals with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Under Article 39, the Council is charged with determining the existence of "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Despite the provision in Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter, precluding the United Nations from intervening in internal matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, the term "threat to the peace" has evolved since the entry into force of the Charter, to apply not only to threats of armed conflict by one State against another, but also to unduly repressive measures imposed by a State against a segment of it own population. Enforcement actions authorized by the Council in such cases have been justified on the grounds that the major internal abuses sought to be corrected had an impact outside the borders of the State where these occurred, thereby threatening international peace and security. This interpretive evolution is supported by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter which specifically recognize universal respect and observance of human rights to be one of the objectives to be promoted by the United Nations, and by Article 2, paragraph 7, expressly exempting the application of Council enforcement actions under Chapter VII from the prohibition against U.N. intervention in domestic matters.⁶

Beginning in the mid-sixties, when the Council imposed sanctions to end repressive measures by the white minority Government in Rhodesia against its black population, the notion of human rights as a legitimate subject for enforcement actions by the Council under Chapter VII has gained increasing acceptance. As noted in 1991 by former U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar:

After the Council makes a determination under Chapter VII, Article 39, of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," it has wide discretion in the selection of measures to resolve the situation. Initially, these measures may range from conciliation to economic sanctions under Article 41 that do not contemplate the use of military force. However, if such measures would be inadequate or, after having been tried, prove to be inadequate, Article 42 authorizes the Council to decide on military enforcement actions, including blockades and other operations by air, sea, or land.

In the euphoria immediately following the Allied victory in World War II, the drafters of the U.N. Charter envisaged that armed forces of the U.N. members would be made available to the Council "on call," to constitute a U.N. force, whenever needed to restore international peace and security pursuant to a Council Resolution issued under Article 42. Under Article 43, all members undertook to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities, to the Council; however, this undertaking was to be governed by special agreements between the Council and each member State setting out the terms and conditions of such contributions. The Council established a U.N. Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staffs of the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Council, to be responsible for strategic direction of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Council. In 1946 the Council directed this Committee to determine the size and composition of the U.N. force to be contributed by the member States, but after meeting for more than a year the Committee was unable to agree on fundamental issues, and no special agreements were ever concluded by the Council.⁸ The Committee has remained substantively inactive ever since, although it still gathers periodically for ceremonial meetings.

In 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the United States and the Soviet Union (the latter having been chiefly responsible for the Committee’s inactivity since the beginning of the Cold War) both expressed support for its reinvigoration, but little came of it.⁹ In 1992, in a report entitled "An Agenda for Peace," U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that the time had come for the Council, supported by the Committee, to negotiate the special agreements contemplated under Article 43, so that a military force would be available "on call" for future U.N. enforcement actions. He also recommended that the Committee be given an active role in future military interventions authorized under Chapter VII.¹⁰ To date, the Council has shown no inclination to act on either of these recommendations. Accordingly, U.S. military enforcement actions undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security pursuant to Council Resolutions under Chapter VII, have never involved the subordination of U.S. forces to U.N. command and control.¹¹ Moreover, under the current political atmosphere, it is extremely unlikely that the United States would agree to do so in the foreseeable future.

By dividing the five permanent members of the Council (the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union) into opposing camps, the Cold War considerably impaired the ability of that body to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter. It was difficult for the Council to impose sanctions under Chapter VII, even when amply justified by breaches of the peace, because any sanctions proposed by the United States or other members of the Western Bloc were likely to be vetoed by the Soviet Union on ideological grounds. For this reason, during almost the entire duration of the Cold War, from 1945 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Council was only able to impose economic sanctions twice -— in 1966, against Rhodesia, and in 1977, against South Africa.¹² Neither of the Council’s authorizing Resolutions provided for military enforcement, although, in the case of Rhodesia, the Council did subsequently grant Great Britain’s request for permission to "prevent, by the use of force if necessary," tankers from delivering oil which was believed to be ultimately destined for Rhodesia to the port of Beira in Mozambique.¹³

In 1950, frustration over the Council’s inability to overcome the Soviet veto, prompted some U.N. members to seek to give the General Assembly a greater role in the maintenance of peace and security under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. This Resolution provided for convening the General Assembly on 24-hour notice to recommend actions to resolve a breach of the peace whenever the Council was unable to do so. However, this was never really a satisfactory alternative to action by the Council, because the recommendations of the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution were not binding on the U.N. members and, even though such recommendations were not subject to a veto, the required two-third majority vote was difficult to obtain when there was opposition from the third world.¹⁴

During the Cold War, given the aforementioned difficulties in obtaining prior U.N. approval to justify the use of military force, several U.S. military enforcement actions were carried out without express Council authorization, with the United States justifying these as actions taken in collective self defense (Vietnam), or as regional actions "authorized" under novel interpretations of the U.N. Charter (the 1962 naval quarantine of Cuba).

The Right of Self-Defense—Article 51 of the Charter has been so often cited, that the relevant portions warrant quoting:

The purpose of Article 51 was merely to recognize that under international law there existed an "inherent" right of self- defense, notwithstanding Article 2, paragraph 4, which prohibits the use or threat of force in international relations. Initially, some argued that, because of the reference in Article 51 to the right of self-defense arising in the event of "armed attack" against "a member of the United Nations," this was the only circumstance under which it could be invoked, and it was no longer available in other circumstances recognized under customary international law before the entry into force of the Charter. Under this restrictive interpretation, self-defense might only be invoked by a U.N. member, and then, only in response to an armed attack after it had occurred, not justifying, for example, use of a preemptive strike to avert an imminent attack, use of military force to rescue one’s own nationals (e.g., the Israeli raid on Entebbe), or to put down an insurgency in another State at the request of the legitimate authorities of that State. However, the spread of nuclear weapons and the incapacity of the Council due to the Soviet veto militated in favor of a more liberal interpretation of Article 51.

The vast majority of international legal scholars now agree that, prior to Council intervention, the limits of permissible self-defense are still set by customary international law, and not limited by Article 51. However, there is little agreement whether the Charter allows States to take any military measures not authorized by the Council, after the latter has formally intervened. In other words, some have interpreted the language of Article 51 as recognizing the right of self-defense only until the Council has issued a Resolution under Chapter VII, after which, States would be preempted from taking any unauthorized actions in self-defense, even though they believed that the measures prescribed by the Council were insufficient.

If the right of self-defense is truly an inherent right of self-help, it would seem that it should be governed by customary international law, irrespective of whether or not the Council has acted. The Charter should not be interpreted as precluding States from taking additional measures that they deem necessary for their self-defense, but they must assume the risk that the international community may subsequently determine that these additional measures were not justified under the circumstances. This risk of rejection is another argument for a State seeking the support of as broad a coalition as possible, before taking any military action not authorized by the Council.

In order to preserve incumbent regimes friendly to the West from communist subversion and "wars of national liberation," the United States has often relied on liberal interpretations of collective self-defense to justify its military interventions. For example, in 1965, the United States justified military intervention against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam on grounds of collective self-defense under Article 51, notwithstanding that South Vietnam was not a member of the United Nations—arguably, not even a "State," but only a temporary zone established by the partitioning of Vietnam under the 1954 Geneva Accords. Moreover, in contrast to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the involvement of North Vietnamese forces was more covert, raising questions as to whether the actions of North Vietnam even constituted an "armed attack."

In a Memorandum entitled "Legal Basis for United States Actions Against North Vietnam," the Department of State sought to justify U.S. intervention citing: (1) infiltration of North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam through Laos, in violation of the 1962 Geneva Settlement, (2) attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats on U.S. Navy vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, and (3) collective defense provisions of the Southeast Asia Treaty (a treaty which included the United States as a member, but in which South Vietnam was only a protocol State). In rebuttal, the "Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam" relied on a very rigid and literal interpretation of Article 51 to argue that the collective right of self-defense could not be invoked by the United States, because: (1) South Vietnam was never even recognized as a "State" under the 1954 Geneva Accords, much less a member of the United Nations, (2) the conflict between the North and the South was an internal strife, similar to the U.S. Civil War of 1861, and (3) SEATO, an alliance in which the United States had no common link with allies located many thousand miles away, did not constitute a reasonable basis for U.S. intervention as an act of collective self-defense.¹⁶

Although the legal justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam, as the war itself, was the source of acrimonious debates, it was never reviewed by the International Court of Justice. However, in 1986, that Court was called upon to opine on the right of collective self-defense under customary international law, in connection with U.S. military interventions in support of the Nicaraguan "contras." The United States contended that these interventions constituted a permissible act of collective self-defense, in response to Nicaragua’s military assistance to dissidents in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras and Costa Rica. After unsuccessfully contesting the Court’s jurisdiction, the United States withdrew from any participation in the phase of the trial dealing with the merits of Nicaragua’s complaint.¹⁷

Perhaps, in part, because the evidence presented by Nicaragua was not subjected to cross examination by the United States, the majority of the Court rejected the U.S. contention of self-defense, concluding that the subversive acts committed by Nicaragua had not amounted to an armed attack against any of these three States, that the United States had acted in violation of the customary principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another State, and that the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters and certain attacks on Nicaraguan facilities constituted a violation of the Charter’s prohibition against the use of force.¹⁸

Outraged by this decision, the United States refused to be bound by it and withdrew its consent to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Several prominent U.S. international scholars took issue with the legal soundness of the Court’s majority decisions, both as to its jurisdiction over the dispute, as well as to its interpretation of the customary rights of self-defense under international law.¹⁹ Perhaps the most that can be said, whether or not one agrees with the Court, is that this controversy served to remind the international community that the determination of whether particular measures my be justified as legitimate acts in self-defense is still governed by standards of international law, rather than solely by political considerations.

Use of Regional Organization Without Council Authorization—Chapter VIII of the Charter, consisting of Articles 52 though 54, deals with Regional Arrangements. The drafters of the Charter believed that local solutions should be sought for local disputes before involving the United Nations. Under Article 52, international regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) are encouraged to make every effort to achieve a "pacific settlement" before referring disputes arising in their region to the Council. When pacific settlement cannot be achieved and the dispute is referred to the Council, Article 53 requires the latter to use regional organizations "where appropriate" to carry out it’s "enforcement action," but no enforcement action may be carried out by a regional organization without the Council’s prior authorization.

The drafters of Article 53 may have intended the term "enforcement action" to refer to any measure which the Council would be authorized to impose under Article 41 as well as under Article 42, but the Council has acted on several previous occasions as if the term "enforcement action" did not apply to non-military actions contemplated under Article 41, such as economic sanctions which are not enforced by the military. In other words, the Council appears to have tacitly conceded that its prior authorization is not required for a regional organization to impose sanctions against one of its members as long as these sanctions do not involve blockades and other operations by air, sea or land forces. Moreover, even when a blockade is involved, the United States has maintained that the prior express authorization of the Council might not be required.

In the case of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba in 1962 to preclude Soviet vessels from delivering medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles to Cuba, (labeled by the United States as a "defensive quarantine"), there was no Council Resolution authorizing this military action, only a non-binding recommendation from the OAS. In the absence of a Council Resolution, the United States relied on novel interpretations of the Charter as to what constituted an "enforcement action" and what constituted Council authorization thereof.

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy advised the nation that: "We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril ...All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from any nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back."²⁰

This was not a "pacific blockade" as the term was defined by the London Naval Conference of 1908 and 1909 because, although the target nation was Cuba, it was directed against vessels of all nations, and it applied to "ships of any kind," that is to naval warships as well as to commercial vessels. Nevertheless, during a hearing held by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services shortly before the quarantine, Secretary of State Dean Rusk offered his own pragmatic definition of "pacific blockades" as "an announcement by the blockading party that these steps you are taking are all that you have in mind. If the other sides [sic] refuses to accept the measure, it is an act of force which would be interpreted or could be interpreted as an act of war."²¹

On October 23 the OAS issued a Resolution recommending that its members take all measures necessary, including use of military force, to "prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The United States reported its announced quarantine to the Council before it became effective, and submitted a Draft Resolution that would have expressly authorized such action, but the Resolution was never submitted to a vote because of the certainty of a Soviet veto.²² The Soviets also submitted their own Draft Resolution to the Council that would have disapproved the quarantine, but by general consensus it also was not brought to a vote because of the certainty of a U.S. veto.

In the absence of Council authorization, the United States might conceivably have invoked the right of self-defense to justify the quarantine, since the installation of medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads ninety miles from U.S. shores might be considered tantamount to a threat of imminent armed attack. However, President Kennedy was anxious to defuse the image of confrontation with the Soviet Union and decided, at the last minute, to justify the quarantine under Article 52 of the Charter, as a measure recommended by the OAS to achieve the "pacific settlement" of a local dispute.²³

According to the then-Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, while the quarantine unquestionably involved the use of military force, it did not constitute an "enforcement action" within the context in which the term was used in Article 53. Rather, it was characterized as a peacekeeping measure not requiring Council authorization, because military interventions may not be mandated by the OAS, and the OAS Resolution of October 23 was not binding on its members. Accordingly, the Legal Adviser maintained that the express authorization of the Council was not required. Moreover, he noted that while the Council had not expressly authorized the quarantine, nor did it disavow it after it was duly reported. On this basis, he concluded that the Council’s lack of disapproval constituted an implied authorization under Article 53, ignoring the fact that the Council was in a "Catch 22," unable to approve or disapprove the quarantine because of the certainty of a veto in either event.²⁴ (The same legal rationale was also used to justify U.S. military interventions without express Council authorization in the Dominican Republic and in Grenada.)

Although this interpretation of the Charter has been criticized, it has never been challenged before the International Court of Justice.²⁵ In short, there is precedent for treating a naval blockade that has been advocated by a regional organization as a contribution to the "peaceful settlement of a local dispute" not requiring Council authorization; and even if it is considered to be an "enforcement action," such authorization might be implied if the Council does not disapprove it after it has been duly reported.

The provisions of U.S. law that govern the President’s authority to order U.S. military enforcement actions are more restrictive than the principles of international law applicable to such actions, but the interpretation of such provisions is also greatly affected by political considerations. Two statutory provisions warrant particular discussion: the War Powers Resolution, and the United Nations Participation Act.

Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress is empowered to declare war and to raise and support armies (Article I, Section 8), whereas the President is Commander-in-Chief (Article II, Section 2). The framers of the Constitution realized that there would be emergencies when the President would have to take military actions without obtaining the prior consent of Congress, but did not specify what these circumstances might be, or whether such actions should be limited in duration. This uncertainty, and the reluctance of the Courts to adjudicate such issues, resulted in a long standing "tug of war" between the Congress and the President over the authority to deploy U.S. Armed Forces abroad and send them in harm’s way, culminating in 1973 with enactment, over President Nixon’s veto, of the War Powers Resolution.²⁶

The Resolution alleges that the President’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities is limited to three situations: (1) pursuant to a Congressional declaration of war, (2) pursuant to a "specific" statutory authorization, as defined in Section 8(a) or, (3) in a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. The Resolution requires the President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The legislative history makes clear that the drafters envisaged the President seeking the advice and opinion of Congress, not merely informing Congress of the decision,²⁷ but the Resolution leaves the President an "out" by recognizing that there will be instances when such prior consultations would not be possible. In fact, over the more than two decades since the Resolution was enacted, Presidents have seldom consulted with Congress prior to reaching combat deployment decisions. When "consultations" have taken place, these have been mostly perfunctory, in the form of advising Congressional leaders of the deployment just as it was about to occur.

In the absence of a Congressional declaration of war or of a "specific" statutory authorization, section 4(a)(1) of the Resolution requires the President to report to the Congress within 48 hours of sending U.S. forces abroad into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Reports are also required under section 4 (a)(2) and (a)(3) after introducing U.S. forces equipped for combat into "the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation," or "substantially enlarging" the number of U.S. combat equipped forces already located in a foreign nation.

According to the legislative history, even when hostilities with the target State are not imminent, deployments of U.S. naval forces for the purpose of enforcing economic sanctions are subject to reporting to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution. The House Report cited President Kennedy’s naval "quarantine" of Cuba as an example of a military deployment which should have been reported under section 4(a)(2), had the War Powers Resolution been law in 1962.²⁸

Section 5 contains the "teeth" of the Resolution. It provides, in substance, that if Congress does not approve the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, the President must terminate the operation and withdraw these forces within 60 days from submission of the report to Congress or from the date on which such report was required to be submitted (90 days, if the President certifies that an extension is necessary). Although reports to Congress are also required for deployments covered under section 4(a)(2) and (a)(3), only reports required to be submitted under section 4(a)(1), trigger this 60-day clock. The withdrawal is mandated unless prior to expiration of the 60-day deadline, Congress has: (1) declared war,(2) specifically authorized this engagement, (3) extended the 60 day period by law, or (4) is physically unable to meet because of an attack on the United States.

This automatic withdrawal requirement has been criticized as encouraging a foreign power to wait out the deadline, hoping that Congress will fail to take any action and "the Yankees will have to go home." It may also be unconstitutional, as a blanket infringement on the President’s inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief without giving him the opportunity to veto legislation mandating a specific withdrawal. Section 5 also requires the President to withdraw U.S forces from hostilities at any time when directed to do so under a Concurrent Resolution of Congress. Unlike Joint Resolutions, Concurrent Resolutions are not presented to the President for signature, thereby also denying the President an opportunity to exercise a veto. This method of mandating withdrawal is even more open to constitutional challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court having ruled that Congress may not exercise a legislative veto over decisions of the Executive Branch by enactments that are not passed by a majority in both Houses and presented to the President.²⁹

Presidents have sought to avoid triggering the 60 day clock or a possible constitutional confrontation with Congress, by omitting any reference to section 4(a)(1) or to hostilities in their reports to Congress, even when such hostilities were in fact imminent. The only instance of a report candidly citing Section 4(a)(1), was President Ford’s notification to Congress in 1975, that he was sending U.S. forces on a lightning raid into Cambodia to retake the USS MAYAGUEZ and rescue her crew.

The fact that Congress might be unable to overcome a constitutional challenge to either of these particular withdrawal provisions does not mean that it is powerless to force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from a military operation of which it does not approve. If Congress has the votes to overcome a Presidential veto, it can mandate such a withdrawal in a Joint Resolution. Congress could also bring about a withdrawal, albeit more slowly, through the appropriation process, by cutting off the funds required to continue the military operation.

Section 8 of the War Powers Resolution contains several interpretive provisions. Section 8(a) makes clear that the statutory authorization required in order to commit U.S. forces to hostilities or imminent hostilities for more than 60 days, must be specific, and may not be inferred from any other laws or implementing legislation under a treaty. The statutory provision must specifically authorize each deployment, and state that it is intended to constitute specific authorization under the War Powers Resolution. This was intended to preclude future Presidents from inferring Congressional authorization from broad language in statutory or treaty provisions, such as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which was cited by President Johnson as statutory authority for committing U.S. forces to hostilities in Vietnam. This means that no statutory authorization to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities may be inferred from a Council Resolution under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the Charter, or from a Resolution by a regional organization under treaties to which the United States is a party. In short, the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, including the need for specific statutory authorization, are intended to apply fully to all such military undertakings, whether or not conducted in compliance with a U.S. treaty.³⁰

As indicated by its title, the purpose of this legislation was to provide the required statutory authority for the United States to carry out its international commitments under the Charter, and fully participate as a member of the United Nations.³¹ Section 5 authorized the President, notwithstanding any other laws, to apply economic and communication sanctions imposed by the Council under Article 41 of the Charter.³² In other words, it authorized U.S. participation in a multilateral embargo without a blockade. Section 6 provides for U.S. participation in military enforcement actions authorized by the Council under Article 42, which would include enforcement of an embargo through a blockade. Specifically, section 6 authorizes the President to negotiate pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter "a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or Joint Resolution." As noted earlier, such agreements were intended to establish all the terms and conditions under which a U.N. member would supply armed forces, facilities and assistance, at the prospective call of the Council, for enforcement actions under Article 42.

Section 6 expressly provides that once the special agreement or agreements between the United States and the Council has been approved by the Congress, no further Congressional approval would be required each time the Council called on the United States to supply armed forces, facilities, and assistance, up to the limits and within the terms specified under such special agreement or agreements.³³

The 79^th Congress, which enacted the U.N. Participation Act, was far more trusting of the United Nations and of the Executive Branch than the 93rd Congress which enacted the War Powers Resolution. It believed that, once a basic agreement to contribute U.S. forces to the Council had been approved by Congress, requiring additional Congressional authorization each time U.S. forces were to participate in an enforcement action authorized by the Council "would clearly violate the spirit of one of the most important provisions of the Charter. One of the fundamental purposes of the Charter is to provide forces which will be immediately available to the Security Council to take action to prevent a breach of the peace."³⁴

This does not mean that Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act is incompatible with the requirement under Section 5 of the War Powers Resolution for specific statutory authorization for each commitment of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Section 6 did envisage that the United States would enter into a blanket agreement with the Council which, once approved by Congress, would cover all future U.S. military participations, however it did not preclude the President from negotiating, instead, separate agreements each time one was needed to cover a particular future U.S. military participation. In the latter event, each agreement would then require specific Congressional approval, as contemplated under the War Powers Resolution.

Since no special agreements have been concluded between the United States and the Council, and Congress would be highly unlikely in the foreseeable future to approve introducing U.S. forces into hostilities under a U.N. command, the issue is largely academic. In any event, any inconsistency should be of little concern, given the dubious constitutionality of the two mandatory withdrawal provisions in Section 5 of the War Powers Resolution. Moreover, in the unlikely event that Congress ever agreed to approve a blanket agreement with the Council, it could probably satisfy the requirement of the War Powers Resolution by expressly including a statement in such blanket approval that such approval also constituted specific statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for all future commitments of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

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Last Update:  October1, 2002