As in the case of the sanctions against Iraq, the sanctions imposed against the de facto regime in Haiti may be divided into two phases: Phase I began on October 4, 1991, with the issuance of Executive Order No.12775 declaring a national emergency resulting from the overthrow of President Aristide, the democratically elected President of Haiti, and imposing limited sanctions against Haiti’s de facto regime. Phase II began on June 23, 1993, when mandatory sanctions against Haiti promulgated by the United Nations became effective. The embargo ended on October 14, 1994, following reinstatement of President Aristide, with issuance of Executive Order No. 12932 terminating the national emergency and revoking U.S. sanctions against Haiti, in accord with a Council Resolution rescinding all U.N. mandatory sanctions.

June 23, 1993 is not the date when primary responsibility for resolving the crisis passed from the Organization of American States (OAS) to the United Nations, nor does it mark the date when the embargo began to be enforced effectively. Arguably, the United Nations assumed the lead in December 1992, when U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Dante Caputo, President of the General Assembly, as his special representative to Haiti. The Council did not authorize a naval blockade until October 1993. A serious effort to preclude massive evasion of the trade embargo through the Dominican Republic was not undertaken until July 1994. However, selection of June 23, 1993, as marking the beginning of Phase II is justified in terms of its legal significance, because it marks the date on which the U.N. Council transformed a strictly voluntary program of OAS regional sanctions into mandatory worldwide sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

Following decades of dictatorships, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, a radical Roman Catholic priest, was elected President of Haiti on December 16, 1990 and sworn in on February 7, 1991, after defeating the U.S.-favored candidate, Marc Bazin, in democratic elections monitored by representatives of the OAS. However, on September 30, 1991, after fewer than 8 months in office, he was overthrown and forced into exile in a coup instigated by Michel François, Haiti’s Chief of Police, who was supported by the military and the wealthy ruling class. As President Aristide went into exile he appealed for help from the OAS and the United Nations, but ruled out any military intervention to return him to power. Although the U.N. Council did meet informally on September 30 at the request of the Haitian representative, its members decided not to convene a formal meeting because of the prohibition in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter against U.N. intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

Article I of the Charter of the OAS likewise provides that the OAS "has no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by the Charter, none of whose provisions authorize it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the Member States." However, in contrast with the U.N. Charter which does not advocate any particular form of government for the U.N. member States, the OAS Charter is replete with references to the virtues of representative democracy. Moreover, fewer than 4 months before the overthrow of President Aristide, the 21st General Assembly of the OAS had issued the "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System," and had adopted Resolution 1080 establishing a mechanism to act promptly "in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s member states." Under this mechanism, in the event of a threat to democracy, the Secretary General was to call for the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council of the OAS to examine the situation and to decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly.¹ In accord with Resolution 1080, the OAS Permanent Council met on September 30, condemned the coup, and convened an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.²

On October 3, 1991, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a Resolution in which they called for the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide and recommended that all States "suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti."³ On October 8, the Haitian military regime having ignored their call for the reinstatement of President Aristide, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met again and issued a second resolution declaring null and void any government that might result from this illegal situation and urging all member States "to proceed immediately to freeze the assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid, which "must be channeled through international agencies or non governmental organizations."⁴

In contrast with sanctions imposed by the U.N. Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which are binding on all U.N. member States, sanctions imposed under the OAS Charter against an OAS member are not binding on the other members, much less on States that are not members of the OAS. Moreover, as discussed in the Annex to this paper, Article 53 of the U.N. Charter precludes any "enforcement action" by a regional organization without the prior authorization of the U.N. Council. Accordingly, regardless of how their sanctions might be labeled, the OAS lacked authority to mandate compliance by any nation, and this was one of the reasons why the embargo it imposed against Haiti was widely ignored by many nations within and outside the OAS.⁵

On October 10 the U.N. General Assembly issued a Resolution condemning the illegal replacement of President Aristide and urging U.N. member States "to consider the adoption of measures in keeping with those agreed on by the Organization of American States." However, under the U.N. Charter, resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly are no more binding than those of the OAS. Accordingly, this U.N. resolution had no impact on the States that chose to ignore the sanctions recommended by the OAS.

The Bush administration’s initial reaction to the coup appeared unequivocally to support the reinstatement of President Aristide. On October 2, at the emergency meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker raised the possibility of collective action "to defend the legitimate government of President Aristide," and vowed that "until President Aristide’s government is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah, without friends, without support and without a future."⁶ On October 4, in an exchange with reporters preceding a meeting with President Aristide, President Bush affirmed that "the United States is joining the rest of the world in calling for the restoration of a democratically elected leader who’s sitting right next to me."

President Bush declared a national emergency, finding that the illegal seizure of power by the Haitian military posed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States However, in contrast to the comprehensive economic and trade sanctions imposed by the United States against Iraq on the day following the invasion of Kuwait, Executive Order 12775,⁷ issued on October 4, 1991, pursuant to the IEEPA, merely blocked the assets of the Haitian Government and prohibited financial transactions with the de facto regime. In accord with the requirements of the IEEPA, the President reported the national emergency to the Congress on October 4.

Except for an embargo on the transfer of arms imposed on October 3 and the automatic statutorily mandated termination of U.S.military and financial assistance,⁸ trade between the United States and Haiti was allowed to continue undisturbed for a month after the OAS recommended a comprehensive trade embargo, and no attempt was made until 1993 to freeze the individual assets of the Haitian military responsible for the coup, or until 1994 to freeze those of the prominent Haitian businessmen who supported them.

There were, of course, significant differences between the two situations: Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait affected access to over a quarter of the world’s known oil reserves, whereas a change of government in Haiti, the poorest nation in the western hemisphere, had no significant adverse economic impact on the United States. With the fourth largest army in the world, Iraq had a formidable conventional military land force and some chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction with missile delivery systems, whereas Haiti’s military force was negligible. Further, Iraq had invaded and occupied another sovereign State, whereas Haiti had overthrown its own head of State in an internal coup, carried out without any foreign support. Finally, as previously noted, the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq by the U.N. Council were binding on all member States, whereas those imposed against Haiti by the OAS were not.

These differences still do not fully explain why the U.S. sanctions were initially so mild. President Bush told reporters that he was not inclined to impose a trade embargo to reverse the coup because "the problem with that one is you start hurting the Haitian people,"⁹ but this explanation was not convincing, because the OAS had recommended that basic commodities needed by the Haitian population be exempted from the trade embargo. Moreover, concern for the welfare of innocent people had not stopped the United States from including foodstuffs in the trade embargo it imposed the day after Iraq invaded Kuwait. U.S. reticence to impose sweeping trade sanctions against Haiti was more likely because of concern with hurting U.S. business interests, and because it did not want to risk jeopardizing the success of ongoing negotiations with the Haitian military for a return to some form of democratic government.

At President Aristide’s request, the OAS had dispatched a mission to Haiti to convince the military to allow him to return to power. It soon became apparent that the United States was more interested in Haiti’s return to some form of democratic government than in President Aristide’s political future. As early as October 7 the news media reported that Bush administration officials were moving away from unequivocal support for President Aristide and releasing to the press "a thick notebook detailing accounts of human rights abuses during his rule."¹⁰ In contrast to the unflinching solidarity demonstrated by the United States toward the Emir of Kuwait, whose own human rights record left something to be desired, Bush administration officials began to suggest that Aristide’s conduct had partially contributed to his downfall. Whether this was deserved or the result of a campaign of disinformation, as alleged by Aristide supporters, attacks on President Aristide’s human rights record intensified in the ensuing months. By December 19, 1991, President Bush was telling foreign reporters, "The answer is to have the duly elected leader of Haiti returned to Haiti. Our interest is not in trying to say who is going to run Haiti" [emphasis added].¹¹

On October 28, with no progress in negotiations with the Haitian military, President Bush finally added trade restrictions to the sanctions imposed on October 4. Executive Order 12779 prohibited U.S. exports to Haiti of goods, technology, and services, except for donations to relieve human suffering, and exports of five basic food commodities: rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, and cooking oil. Several prominent Haitian families held a monopoly on the importation of these basic food products into Haiti and promptly took advantage of the situation to create artificial shortages so as to raise prices. U.S. imports from Haiti were also prohibited, except that products assembled or processed in Haiti from parts or materials previously exported from the United States were allowed to be returned to the United States through December 5, 1991. In accordance with the previously mentioned 1988 amendments to the IEEPA, imports and exports of publications and other informational materials were also exempted.¹²

The OFAC did not issue regulations to implement the sanctions until March 31, 1992.¹³ In the interim, pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order 12779, it issued licenses and directives as required to accommodate special situations, such as needs of travelers to and from Haiti, telecommunications fees owed to the de facto regime, needs of the legitimate Government in exile, exports of medicines and medical supplies, and needs of the "assembly industry" (those U.S.-owned plants that assembled clothing, electronics, and sporting goods in Haiti for sale in the United States to take advantage of Haiti's low labor costs).

In contrast with Iraq, where the purpose of the oil embargo was to preclude Iraq from exporting its oil, the purpose of the oil embargo against Haiti was to deny it access to foreign oil on which it depended entirely for its energy and fuel needs. Accordingly, had the trade sanctions recommended by the OAS been rigorously applied, the oil embargo alone should have had a paralyzing effect within a brief delay. However, the OAS sanctions were ignored, not only by many nonmember States but also by some of the OAS members. Without a naval blockade, oil tankers and cargo ships continued to unload regularly at Haitian seaports, cargo planes flew in and out of the international airport, and with the complicity of the Dominican Government, truck traffic across the Dominican border increased so much that Haiti’s de facto regime had to upgrade the road leading from the border to Port-au-Prince.

Although this porous embargo was having little adverse impact on the military or on Haiti’s wealthy class, both of which were actually enriching themselves through black market activities and drug trafficking, it was blamed by them for causing a substantial shortage and a soar in the price of basic consumer goods, thereby adding to the misery of Haiti’s poor. In fact, as noted previously, basic consumer goods were exempt from the embargo; thus, hoarding by speculators and the lack of any price controls also must have contributed to the shortages and price increases.¹⁴

By the end of January 1992 the OAS sanctions were showing no sign of bringing down the de facto regime, but ongoing negotiations continued to foster hope that a satisfactory peaceful resolution of the crisis would be reached. In the meantime, deteriorating economic conditions and numerous violations of human rights in Haiti were causing thousands of Haitians to risk their lives in open boats to seek fortune and safety in the United States. The forcible repatriation to Haiti of these illegal immigrants was becoming a political liability to President Bush during an election year. Not only was this policy criticized domestically, but it was also being criticized internationally by the U.N. High Commission on Refugees on the grounds that repatriation of these boat people, without a hearing to determine whether their lives and freedom would be in jeopardy upon their return to Haiti, violated the U.N. Convention on Refugees. The U.S. interdiction of refugees on the high seas before they reached U.S. territorial waters was justified by the United States as having been authorized under an agreement signed in 1981 between President Reagan and Haiti’s then "President for Life" Jean Claude Duvalier.

The shutdown of the U.S. assembly industry in Haiti not only was detrimental to U.S. business interests but it exacerbated unemployment in Haiti, allegedly prompting even more Haitians to emigrate illegally to the United States. Accordingly, beginning on February 5, 1992, the OFAC allowed U.S. firms to resume assembly operations in Haiti, provided this did not involve payments to the de facto regime. This decision was applauded by the U.S. assembly industry but not by the supporters of President Aristide or by the Secretary General of the OAS, who denounced it as an unwarranted unilateral relaxation of the OAS embargo.

However, resolution of the crisis and termination of the sanctions seemed near at hand on February 23, when, after some urging by the OAS, President Aristide signed the Protocol of Washington with the heads of both Houses of the Haitian legislature.¹⁵

This Protocol provided for Haiti’s return to civilian government with a new prime minister, designated by Aristide, who would govern independently; the eventual reinstatement of President Aristide; and a general amnesty for all those involved in the coup. However, this settlement disintegrated the following month when Haiti’s highest Court held that it was unconstitutional and could not be ratified by Parliament. Although the Haitian military had not participated in negotiation of this Protocol, and President Aristide may have contributed to its rejection by comments to the press that seemed to renege on granting general amnesty to the participants in the coup, the OAS placed the entire blame on the de facto regime which it accused of bad faith.

On May 17, 1992, the Foreign Ministers passed a third Resolution urging the OAS members to adopt whatever measures necessary to make the embargo more effective, including coordination with the European Community and any other countries with economic and commercial ties to Haiti. Although they stopped short of recommending a naval blockade, they urged the member States to monitor international compliance with the embargo, to deny access to their ports to vessels found to have violated the embargo, and to deny visas and freeze the assets of those individuals who had perpetrated and were supporting the coup.¹⁶

President Bush’s implementation of these recommendations was slow and selective. In fact, denying visas and freezing private assets were not implemented by the United States during his administration. Under a June 5, 1992, amendment to the Haitian Transactions Regulations, any vessel calling in Haiti after that date would require a license from OFAC to enter a U.S. port.¹⁷ Monitoring of compliance with the embargo was coordinated by OFAC with the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Vessel traffic to and from Haiti was monitored, and vessels found to have violated the embargo were denied access to U.S. ports. Moreover, U.S. Customs inspection in Miami of all vessels outbound for Haiti resulted in the seizure of unauthorized cargoes and even of several vessels. Still, this was a far less effective means of enforcement than a naval blockade of Haiti, and it had no impact whatsoever on vessels that did not enter U.S. ports or on illicit trade by air, or by land through the Dominican border. According to a report released in May 1992 by the General Accounting Office, at least a dozen countries in Europe, South America, and Africa routinely ignored the embargo. Documents obtained by the GAO established that nearly a million barrels of petroleum had been imported into Haiti since the OAS recommended the embargo.¹⁸

In contrast to the defiant and intransigent attitude of Saddam Hussein, the de facto regime in Haiti purported to continue to seek a satisfactory resolution of the crisis, still engaging in dialogue with OAS representatives despite rejection of the Protocol of Washington. In June 1992 it established a so-called "government of consensus and public salvation for the consolidation of democracy" that did not include Aristide or any of his supporters but appointed Marc Bazin prime minister. As mentioned earlier, Bazin, a former official of the World Bank, was the Presidential candidate backed by the United States in the 1990 elections won by Aristide, and his appointment as a figure head by the de facto regime was undoubtedly intended to curry U.S. support for the new government notwithstanding President Aristide’s objections. However, this ploy failed because none of the OAS members would recognize a government established without at least some degree of participation by Aristide.¹⁹

The United States was still not prepared to use force. In December 1992, when the Prime Minister of Canada urged a multinational blockade of Haiti by naval forces from Canada, the United States, France, and Venezuela, among others, he encountered no support from the United States or any of these other nations.²⁰ In short, there was no political will in the United States or in most other nations to use military force to assure compliance with the embargo. Apparently, further negotiations with the de facto regime were still considered a viable option to resolve the crisis.

In fairness to the Bush administration, without a Council Resolution mandating a blockade, the international legal basis for such unilateral action by the United States in 1992 would have been even more tenuous than the basis for the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 or the naval interdiction of Iraq unilaterally imposed by President Bush in August 1990. At least in the case of Cuba there had been a nonbinding OAS Resolution recommending the quarantine and some basis, if the United States had elected to do so, for invoking the right of collective self-defense against an imminent nuclear threat presented by the Soviet missiles.²¹ In the case of Iraq, the United Nations had imposed mandatory sanctions and the Amir of Kuwait had requested military assistance to liberate his nation. However, in 1992, the U.N. Council had not yet imposed any sanctions against Haiti. Unlike the Amir of Kuwait, President Aristide had rejected any use of military force, and there had been no armed attack, or even a threat thereof, against another State by the de facto Haitian regime that could give rise to a claim of collective self-defense.

Under those circumstances, a U.S. naval blockade of Haiti might have been justifiably challenged by nations whose vessels would have been intercepted on the high seas while they were under no legal obligation to comply with the OAS embargo. Nor would violations of human rights perpetrated by the de facto regime against the Haitian population have justified the United States to send naval forces to blockade Haiti. In the absence of a finding by the Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that these violations and resulting attempts by substantial numbers of the population to flee Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and security, the United States might have been challenged for intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, particularly when President Bush was responding to domestic criticism of his policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees by asserting that most of these were fleeing Haiti for economic reasons, rather than out of fear of persecution. As noted by a witness testifying before Congress in June 1992 on humanitarian conditions in Haiti: "You call for a blockade. A blockade is an act of war. Has Mr. Aristide called for a blockade? Can you engage in an act of war without the constitutional president that you recognize calling for such an act? Are you also going to blockade the 300-km border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti which is now booming with activity?"²²

On December 11, 1992, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Dante Caputo, a former Foreign Minister of Argentina and President of the U.N. General Assembly, as his special representative for Haiti. The OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs also appointed Caputo as their representative and issued a fourth Resolution 2 days later in a further futile attempt to strengthen international compliance with the OAS embargo. Under this Resolution, they urged OAS and U.N. members to take all necessary measures to implement fully the sanctions previously recommended. The Secretary General of the OAS was directed to explore the possibility of bringing the Haitian situation to the attention of the U.N. Council "as a means of bringing about global application of the trade embargo recommended by the OAS."²³ Although the OAS continued to participate actively in all aspects of restoring democracy to Haiti until President Aristide was returned to power, the appointment of Mr. Caputo by the U.N. Secretary General marked transfer of the lead from the OAS to the United Nations

One month later President Clinton was sworn in. During the campaign he had criticized the Bush administration’s policy of forcibly repatriating, without a hearing, Haitian refugees intercepted at sea by U.S. naval and Coast Guard vessels; however, he continued this policy upon assuming office in January 1993. Mounting criticism of this policy by leaders of the Afro-American community and Haitians residing in the United States provided political impetus for the Clinton administration to press the United Nations for resolution of the crisis in Haiti.

After a U.N.- mediated agreement providing for the return of President Aristide was rejected by the Haitian military in April 1993, the United Nations explored, with President Clinton’s full endorsement, the possibility of sending a multinational peacekeeping force to Haiti. However, this proposal was rejected by President Aristide as well as by the de facto regime. At the urging of the Congressional Black Caucus, President Clinton then directed the Secretary of State and the U.S. representative at the United Nations to persuade the Council to impose mandatory worldwide sanctions against Haiti, including an oil embargo.²⁴

Under the U.S. sanctions, there had been no interference with Haitian assets under U.S. jurisdiction that were privately owned or with the freedom of Haitians to travel to and from the United States and to carry out transactions with U.S. nationals. Thus, assets of members of the Haitian military and of the police who were responsible for the coup, and of those members of the wealthy elite supporting the de facto regime, had not been specifically targeted. On June 3, 1993, President Clinton signed Proclamation 6569, prohibiting those responsible for the coup or directly involved with the regime in opposing a return to democracy, plus members of their immediate families, from entering the United States.²⁵ On June 4, although most of those responsible for the overthrow of Aristide or for opposing a settlement of the crisis had by then moved at least their liquid assets beyond U.S. reach, OFAC issued a list, to be updated from time to time, of 83 such individuals and of 35 business entities owned or controlled by them whose assets were to be blocked and who would be generally precluded from engaging in any transactions with U.S. nationals. This List of "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" included General Cedras and some other senior members of the Haitian military and police and their civilian allies in government, but not those of leading business executives who were members of Haiti’s wealthiest families, although they, too, opposed Aristide and tacitly supported the military. ²⁶

On June 6 the OAS Foreign Ministers issued a fifth Resolution reiterating their concern with the persistence of the crisis in Haiti. In this Resolution they requested the Permanent Council’s Special Committee to Monitor Compliance with the Trade Embargo on Haiti ("the OAS Embargo Committee") to prepare monthly public reports on enforcement, and to transmit these to the U.N. Secretary General.²⁷ The OAS Embargo Committee issued its first monthly report on July 30 and continued to do so until the embargo was terminated in 1994.

On June 16, 1993, acting on a formal request from President Aristide’s U.N. representative and with the support of the United States, the U.N. Council issued Resolution 841, finally imposing a mandatory embargo on the entry into the territory or the territorial waters of Haiti of petroleum, petroleum products, arms and related materiel, police equipment and "spare parts for the aforementioned." Although this Resolution still fell short of calling on the member States to establish a naval blockade to enforce this embargo, the U.S. Coast Guard undertook to board and inspect vessels at sea that were suspected of violating the United Nations and the OAS embargoes. Violations were reported by the United States to the United Nations and OAS Embargo Committees, as well as to the governments of the nations under whose flags these vessels were registered.²⁸

To meet verifiable essential humanitarian needs, Resolution 841 provided, as an exception to the oil embargo, for the entry into Haiti of non-commercial quantities of petroleum products, including propane and butane used for cooking. The lack of propane and butane for essential cooking was proving to be of real concern. In order to cook their food, poor Haitian farmers were cutting down the few tree stands remaining on the island that had protected from erosion the small plots of land still capable of producing food. Resolution 841 also established economic sanctions to block any funds owned or controlled abroad by the Government of Haiti or by the de facto regime, but it did not apply to the personal assets of the coup leaders or of their supporters. Finally, the Resolution established a Haiti Sanctions Committee to coordinate implemen-tation of all these provisions, which were not to become effective until June 23, 1993 to afford the de facto regime a last opportunity to agree to a settlement.²⁹

No agreement having been reached by June 23, the Council’s mandatory economic sanctions and the mandatory oil and arms embargoes became effective on that date, marking the end of Phase I and of voluntary sanctions against Haiti. Thereafter, the OAS Embargo Committee maintained close coordination throughout the duration of the sanctions with the Haiti Sanctions Committee established by the United Nations under Council Resolution 841. These two committees continuously exchanged information and ideas, and always sent one of their members to attend each other’s meetings.³⁰

The prospect of worldwide mandatory sanctions brought Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, to the United States for meetings with President Aristide and U.N. Special Representative Dante Caputo. These meetings began June 27 on Governors Island in New York Bay, "far from the madding crowd" of Haitian-Americans demonstrating at U.N. Headquarters in Manhattan. While these negotiations were ongoing, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12853 on June 30, implementing all the provisions of Council Resolution 841, but also expanding OFAC’s authority to block assets held by any Haitian national determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be providing material support or doing substantial business with the de facto regime.³¹

On July 3, President Aristide and General Cedras ended their negotiations with the signing of the so-called "Governors Island Agreement," which called for Cedras to resign; for Aristide to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief to succeed Cedras and a new prime minister to succeed Marc Bazin, who had resigned on June 8; for Aristide to grant an amnesty to those involved in supporting the de facto regime; for the return of Aristide to Haiti on October 30; and for suspension of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and of those adopted by the OAS. The U.N. Secretary General recommended to the Council that the sanctions be suspended immediately after the new prime minister designated by Aristide was confirmed by the Haitian Parliament and assumed his functions in Haiti. However, there would be automatic reinstatement of the sanctions should the parties or any authorities in Haiti fail to comply in good faith with all terms of the Agreement.³²

On July 24, President Aristide notified the Haitian Parliament of his intention to nominate Robert Malval as the new prime minister. Malval was duly confirmed by Parliament and assumed office in Haiti. On August 27, the Council implemented the U.N. Secretary General’s recommendation by issuing Resolution 861, suspending the oil and arms embargoes and economic sanctions it had imposed under Resolution 841, and requesting all States "to act consistently with this decision as soon as possible." At the same time, the Council confirmed its readiness "to terminate immediately the suspension," (i.e., to reimpose these embargoes and economic sanctions) if at any time the parties did not comply in good faith with the Governors Island Agreement.³³

To implement this suspension, OFAC amended the Haitian Transaction Regulations on August 31. Under this amendment, all assets of specially designated Haitian individuals and private entities were unblocked. However, assets of the Government of Haiti that were already blocked remained blocked, subject to unblocking upon request on a case-by-case basis.³⁴ As subsequent events would demonstrate, the Council’s suspension of the sanctions was ill-advised and premature. Violence continued to be rampant in Haiti and included the political assassination of several officials in President Aristide’s new government.

Acting on the recommendation of the U.N. Secretary General, the Council had approved the establishment of a 6-month U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), including military and police components, to help implement the Governors Island Agreement.³⁵ On October 11, a detachment of some 200 U.S and Canadian military trainers and engineers, mostly U.S. Navy Seabees, arrived at Port-au-Prince aboard the U.S.S. HARLAN COUNTY to teach the Haitian army the skills needed to repair and develop Haiti’s infrastructure. Their landing was opposed by armed civilian "attaches" who staged threatening demonstrations at the docks with the tacit support of the Haitian military and of the police, ultimately causing the U.S.S. HARLAN COUNTY to turn back and the United Nations to withdraw the advance elements of UNMIH from Haiti.

On October 13, having been advised by the Secretary General that the military authorities in Haiti, including the police, were not complying with the Agreement, the Council issued Resolution 873, terminating the suspension as of 11:59 p.m. on October 18 (reimposing the oil and arms embargoes and economic sanctions initially imposed under Resolution 841) and confirming its readiness to consider additional measures if the Haitian military continued to impede implementation of the Agreement.³⁶ In a letter to the U.N. Secretary General dated October 15, President Aristide requested the Council "to call on the member States to take the necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of Security Council Resolution 873," which was a diplomatic way of requesting the imposition of a blockade to enforce the oil and arms embargo.

At his Press Conference of October 15, presumably with advance knowledge that a Council Resolution authorizing the blockade was forthcoming, President Clinton announced that he had ordered six U.S. destroyers to the waters off Haiti so as to be in position to board and inspect merchant ships when the U.N. oil and arms embargoes were reinstated. When asked by a reporter how this naval action would differ from a "blockade" which is an act of war, the President noted that it would only interdict ocean traffic in oil and arms, rather than ending all ocean traffic with Haiti.³⁷

On October 16, the Council heeded President Aristide’s request by issuing Resolution 875, calling on member States, whether acting individually under the military enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, or collectively under the regional arrangements of Chapter VIII, to ensure strict implementation of the oil and arms embargo "and in particular to halt inward maritime shipping as necessary in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations." The Council also warned that it was prepared "to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance." ³⁸

To implement Council Resolution 873 and reimpose the U.S. sanctions against Haiti, on October 18 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12872,³⁹ and OFAC amended the Haitian Transaction Regulations, effective 11:59 p.m.⁴⁰ On that same day, the President advised the press that with the authorization of President Aristide he had ordered U.S. naval forces, which included some Coast Guard cutters, "to move closer to the shore so that they will be in plain sight."⁴¹ Joint Task Force 120, which had been established by the U.S. Atlantic Command following collapse of the Governors Island Agreement for the contingent evacuation from Haiti of U.S. nationals and key officials of the Aristide government, coordinated the multi-national Maritime Interception Force. On October 19, U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships of JTF 120 posted at the approaches to Haitian ports began to board and inspect on the high seas (and in Haitian territorial waters) vessels of all nations inbound for Haiti. The MIF was later to be joined by naval units from Canada, France, Argentina, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Humanitarian shipments of food were often transported to Haiti from the United States and other nations in containers stacked tightly on vessels to minimize shipping costs. This made inspection at sea difficult to impossible and could delay delivery of critically needed foodstuffs while the vessel was diverted to a third country where the containers could be unloaded and their contents inspected for possible arms and petroleum products. To avoid such delays, several nations, including the United States, adopted a preclearance procedure under which vessels engaged principally or exclusively in humanitarian relief could avoid the need for inspection at sea by having their cargo inspected and certified by Customs authorities at the ports of loading.⁴²

On October 20, the President reported the U.S. naval deployment to congressional leaders, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution . . . pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive."⁴³ On November 7 the President appeared in a special interview on "Meet the Press," during which he was asked whether the time had come for the United Nations to expand the oil and arms embargo to interdict all imports into Haiti. The President responded that he preferred to target Haitians who were the source of the problem by freezing all their assets rather than to shut the country down and increase the pain of innocent Haitians who were already suffering, but that he was not ruling out any options. When then asked whether he would consider invading Haiti to reinstate Aristide, he reiterated that he was not ruling out anything, but that both President Aristide and prime minister Malval did not want the United Nations or the United States to police Haiti.⁴⁴

At his November 12 Press Conference, the President was asked to comment on reports that the embargo was causing the death of children in Haiti. He noted that food supplies sent to Haiti, which were excepted under the sanctions, were feeding 650,000 persons a week, and that the de facto regime, rather than the embargo, was to blame for any suffering because of this regime’s refusal to comply with the Governors Island Agreement. He added that he had ordered improvements in the delivery of medical supplies and medical care to the population of Haiti.⁴⁵

On January 27, 1994, OFAC added the entire officer corps of the Haitian Armed Forces to the list of blocked individuals. A comprehensive list was published on April 7.⁴⁶ Despite this trend toward stricter U.S. sanctions, it should be noted that exemptions from the U.S. trade sanctions for U.S. assembly operations in Haiti were still being repeatedly extended by OFAC, allegedly because of humanitarian concerns about throwing out of work the innocent Haitians employed in these assemblies, rather than out of concern for U.S. investors in these industries. Notwithstanding these exemptions, on April 25, 1994, President Clinton reported to Congress that the number of Haitians still employed in the assembly industry was only 10 percent of those so employed prior to the embargo.⁴⁷

On May 6, 1994, at the urging of the United States, the Council adopted Resolution 917, which expanded the original sanctions (oil and arms embargo) to a sweeping embargo on imports and exports conforming to the trade embargo previously recommended by the OAS and, for the first time, sought specifically to target the individuals responsible for the coup, their families, and their supporters. Specifically, Resolution 917 required all States to deny access to aircraft to and from Haiti except for regularly scheduled commercial flights; to deny entry into their territories to any Haitian military officers and other major participants in the coup, as well as to their immediate families; and "strongly urged," but did not mandate, the States to freeze their assets. Also, effective on May 21, this Resolution imposed a comprehensive embargo on all exports from Haiti and imports into Haiti (other than medical supplies or foodstuffs, and shipments of items when specifically approved by the Sanctions Committee as exceptions on humanitarian grounds). The naval blockade already in effect on imports of oil and arms into Haiti was to be expanded to enforce this comprehensive embargo.⁴⁸

U.S. implementation of the provisions of Resolution 917 was fragmented. On May 7 the President issued E.O. 2914 that implemented, effective May 8, the provisions relating to freezing the assets of all officers in the Haitian military, the major coup participants, and their immediate families, as well as the prohibition on all air traffic to and from Haiti except for flights of regularly scheduled airlines.⁴⁹ On the same day, the President issued Proclamation 6685, which suspended the entry into the United States of all aliens barred under Resolution 917, as well as of those "who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that are impeding the negotiations seeking the return of constitutional rule in Haiti."⁵⁰

The President waited until May 21, the effective date of the expanded embargo under Resolution 917, to issue E.O. 12917, which prohibited the importation into the United States of any goods exported from Haiti after May 21, other than informational materials and any items licensed by OFAC.⁵¹ On May 22 OFAC finally revoked licenses for the importation into the United States of products assembled in Haiti. However, on May 25, the press complained that the United States was still allowing the wealthiest families who dominated the Haitian economy to control the food trade by failing to freeze their assets, and "By allowing this elite to continue to trade in cooking oil, flour, rice and sugar, these families stand to make a lot of money, even as they oppose American policy. In what is widely considered one of the most flagrant examples, the Mevs family has reportedly been building a huge oil depot here to help the army defy the embargo." The press went on to report, "Diplomatic and business critics also say there has been a hesitancy to pursue Haitian officers for what Administration officials have asserted is their role in lucrative cocaine trafficking."⁵²

The following day, a representative of the U.S. Department of State responded somewhat lamely to this criticism: "We continue to work with the Treasury department to define criteria for putting business executives who fall into the category of supporting the regime onto the assets freeze list. . . . The number of people now targeted on that list exceeds 600, and the names could include members of the business community as information on their activities accumulates."⁵³

As in the past, whenever the naval interdiction rules changed, the United States issued a new "Warning to Mariners" to inform them that: "In accordance with U.N. Security Council 917 (1994), from 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time on May 21, 1994, allied naval forces, including U.S. naval forces, participating in the Haiti Multinational Interception Force (MIF) will begin enforcing the comprehensive trade sanctions on Haiti." This notice went on to describe in detail the scope of the embargo and the procedures to be followed by the MIF in enforcing it. For example, in order to discourage vessels from selling some of their fuel during a stop over in Haiti, mariners were warned that their fuel and ballast tanks would be sounded both inbound and outbound by MIF boarding parties.⁵⁴

On June 9 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS issued a Resolution reiterating the need for OAS and U.N. member States to reinforce the embargo, including the freezing of individual assets of members of the Haitian de facto regime and its supporters, and to suspend commercial flights to and from Haiti.⁵⁵ On June 10 the President further tightened U.S. sanctions by expanding the prohibitions on air traffic to and from Haiti to flights by regularly scheduled airlines⁵⁶ and by issuing E.O. 12920, to prohibit transfer of funds and assets to Haiti through the United States⁵⁷ On the same day, he announced to the press, "At the invitation of the Dominican Republic," in order to assist in enforcement of the U.N. embargo along the Dominican border and the coastal waters adjoining Haiti, the United States would monitor this border as part of a Multinational Observer Group to be stationed there, and would dispatch U.S. naval patrol vessels to interdict illicit traffic through these coastal waters.⁵⁸

The President of the Dominican Republic, Joaquin Balaguer, had close ties with Haiti’s military and business elite and never supported the embargo, although he professed to enforce it. Accordingly, one can only speculate as to the spontaneity of the Balaguer Government’s "invitation." Allegedly, Venezuela had to threaten to cease selling petroleum to Santo Domingo at a discounted rate before the Balaguer Government made even a token show of policing traffic across the border during daylight hours, but at night heavy truck traffic across the border continued unchecked. At the end of May, after inspecting the activity on the border with the Dominican Republic, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti was quoted as saying, "It looks like a staging area for some of the contraband coming across."⁵⁹

On June 21 the President finally tightened up the freezing of individual Haitian assets by blocking the funds and other assets of all Haitian citizens and entities residing in Haiti.⁶⁰ On July 11 the situation in Haiti escalated when the de facto regime ordered the departure from Haiti of all the U.N./OAS-sponsored international human rights observers still remaining there. The following day President Clinton, who was in Berlin attending a meeting with European Union leaders, noted that this validated his position that a military operation to end the crisis should not be ruled out. He then told the press that an invasion to throw out the military regime might be easy but to remain there subsequently as peacemakers was a role that the United Nations could do best, and that the countries of Latin America did not want a unilateral intervention by the United States except as a last resort.⁶¹

With a growing number of countries now cooperating in enforcing the embargo, its success still depended on closing the border with the Dominican Republic, which not only constituted a major means of evading the embargo but a source of illicit profits from smuggling and black-market operations controlled by the Haitian military and their supporters. Accordingly, in late July, with the prospect of an invasion of Haiti becoming more and more likely, the United States finally obtained the Balaguer Government’s authorization to patrol the Dominican side of the border with military helicopters.⁶²

At the request of the Council, the U.N. Secretary General had outlined three options to carry out the terms of the Governors Island Agreement. Recognizing that to ensure a stable and secure environment would require an initial armed force of some 15,000 military and their equipment, the first option involved expanding the UNMIH force to carry out the invasion under U.N. command. This option was never seriously considered because it would have taken too long to muster a force of this size through military agreements with a number of States, in conformity with the principle that no single State should contribute more than one-third of this force.

The second and third options both contemplated that the Council would authorize a group of member States to constitute a multinational force to carry out the invasion under the unified command and control of those members. However, once order had been established in Haiti, the second option provided that this multinational force would also oversee the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, whereas the third option provided that the United Nations would take over that "peacekeeping phase" with a modest contingent of military contributed by the members to serve as part of UNMIH.⁶³

On July 31, given U.S. refusal to be the peacekeeper after Aristide’s return, the Council adopted the third option. On that date the Council issued Resolution 940, authorizing Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control "to use all necessary means to establish a stable and secure environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement." Once such an environment was established, the Resolution provided for the multinational force to terminate its mission and for UNMIH "to assume the full range of its mission."⁶⁴

In the Defense Appropriation Act for FY 1994, Congress had included a "sense of Congress" provision precluding the use of any appropriated funds for military operations in Haiti, whether under U.S. or U.N. command, unless it were authorized in advance by Congress; required to evacuate U.S. citizens from imminent danger; vital to U.S. national security interests and time did not allow advance Congressional authorization; or preceded by a written report to Congress.⁶⁵ At the signing on November 11, 1993, President Clinton did not express any reservations about this provision, probably because he was well aware that expressions of a "sense of Congress" are not legally binding on the Executive.⁶⁶

On August 3, 1994, during his press conference, a reporter asked President Clinton whether he would ask Congress to approve the invasion now that the United Nations had authorized it. He replied: "I would welcome the support of the Congress, and I hope that I will have that. Like my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it." The President then went on to add that while the use of force was on the table, it would be premature to go beyond that at this time. When asked what were the national security interests that would justify the United States invading Haiti, the President replied that these were tied to preserving respect for human rights and democracy in the region.⁶⁷

In a last-ditch effort to reach a peaceful settlement, on September 17 the President sent a delegation to Haiti led by former President Carter. On September 18, with no progress reported by the Carter delegation, consistent with the "sense of Congress" expressed in the Defense appropriations for 1994, President Clinton notified congressional leaders of the U.S. military deployment to Haiti which he had ordered for the following day.⁶⁸ However, the leaders of the de facto regime finally signed an agreement with the Carter delegation on the evening of September 18, and Operation Restore Democracy, the multinational coalition almost entirely composed of U.S. forces under U.S. unified command, was able to land on September 19 without any opposition from the Haitian forces.

The agreement provided for the immediate deployment of the coalition and implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, with President Aristide scheduled to return to power in Haiti on October 15. This successful outcome was not brought about by the sanctions or the negotiating skills of the U.S. delegation. As President Clinton conceded in his address to the nation immediately following the signing of the agreement, "It is clear from our discussions with the delegation, that this agreement only came because of the credible and imminent threat of the multinational force. In fact, it was signed after Haiti received evidence that paratroopers from our 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had begun to load up for the invasion."⁶⁹

Although conditions among Haiti’s poor had become critical, the extent this was due to the embargo was never clearly established. In 1993 the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies extrapolated data on child mortality from one region to the entire nation and estimated that the death of 1,000 children each month was mainly attributable to the sanctions. However, it is difficult to determine with any degree of confidence the true impact of these sanctions on the population, because of the lack of reliable data and the many other factors contributing to the dismal living conditions in Haiti such as pre-existing marginal economic and health standards of the poor, corruption and mismanagement by the Cedras regime, the atmosphere of political violence and repression, and price and shortage manipulations by the business community.

In any event, it is unlikely that the plight of Haiti’s children or of its poor would have been of much concern to the Cedras regime, much less an inducement to agree to give up power. The piecemeal incremental manner in which the Haitian sanctions were imposed and enforced certainly minimized whatever coercive impact these might have had on the coup leaders and their supporters among the wealthy families in Haiti. In fact, as previously discussed, it provided them some additional opportunities to enrich themselves through illicit transactions.

Now began the process of dismantling the complex array of U.S. sanctions against Haiti. President Aristide having requested on September 25 that sanctions be relaxed, President Clinton advised the United Nations the following day that the United States would suspend all its unilateral sanctions, including those which blocked the assets of Haitian nationals, except for sanctions targeted against the Haitian military leaders and their supporters.

With all Haitian seaports under the occupation and control of the coalition force, there was no longer any reason for the MIF to continue to blockade access to these ports. Accordingly, all MIF operations were officially terminated on September 28. By the same token, with all Haiti’s airports under control, on September 29 the President directed the Secretary of Transportation to lift the ban on regularly scheduled passenger service to and from Haiti. On that same date, the Council issued Resolution 944, directing that all sanctions imposed by the Council under preceding Resolutions be terminated on the day following President Aristide’s return to Haiti.⁷⁰

On October 14, President Clinton issued E.O. 12932 to terminate the national emergency declared in 1991 and to implement the terms of Resolution 944. This Order specified that, effective at 12:01 am, on October 16, 1994 (the day following President Aristide’s scheduled return to Haiti, and 3 years and 2 weeks from the declaration of national emergency with respect to Haiti), this national emergency would terminate and that all preceding Executive Orders under which sanctions had been imposed would be revoked, as would all U.S. sanctions still in effect including the ban on air transportation of cargo.⁷¹

Having received a complete amnesty as provided under the Governor’s Island Agreement, and having recovered their personal assets, the coup leaders departed Haiti for a comfortable life abroad shortly prior to President Aristide’s return on October 15. As an incentive to induce the departure of General Cedras, the several homes he owned in Haiti were leased from him by the U.S. Department of State. On October 21, when a reporter asked President Clinton whether it was necessary to impose this additional burden on U.S. taxpayers, he replied, "When you make people leave their home, something arguably should have been done. The only instruction I gave was that nothing could be done that would exceed the fair market value of the property."⁷²

It is easy with hindsight to determine what measures would have been required to promptly resolve the crisis in Haiti. Located on an island shared with only one other nation, Haiti would have been particularly vulnerable to a comprehensive naval blockade of imports and exports that should have been applied also to the Dominican Republic, unless the latter agreed to participate fully in the sanctions and allowed monitoring of its land border to verify compliance. Had such a blockade been imposed at the outset, along with freezing the personal assets of General Cedras and his supporters, any privations endured by the population of Haiti would have been of brief duration. Either the Cedras regime would have resigned or, if necessary, an overwhelming military force could have been despatched to Haiti, as was done in Panama to get rid of General Manuel Noriega.

It is also easy to understand the reasons why these measures were not carried out for 3 years, which took such a toll on the Haitian people. It should have been obvious from the very beginning to all those who participated in the sanctions against Haiti that mild unenforced measures would not be effective in removing General Cedras from power. Yet, there was initially no support in the United States, the OAS, or the United Nations for strong effective measures, and even President Aristide strongly opposed a military intervention.

There are several lessons to be learned from the Haitian sanctions. First, sanctions imposed at the outset without any political will to make them effective or to use military force as required to enforce them, may do more harm than good in achieving a prompt resolution of a crisis. Second, regional organizations must have the legal capacity to mandate and enforce economic sanctions if they are expected to use them effectively. Third, in light of the general prohibition against interfering in the internal affairs of a nation, there is need to clarify the circumstances under which military force may be used to correct situations not involving an armed attack against another State.

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Last Update:  October1, 2002