PART I

STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION
Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

PART I

Asia-Pacific Regional Overview
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: A U.S. Pacific Command Perspective
Joseph W. Prueher

A litany of statistics demonstrates the pivotal nature of the Asia-Pacific region for the United States in terms of political, economic, and military security. Geographically, the region includes the world's largest ocean and two of the world's most populous nations, China and India. Over 56 percent of the world's population lives in the Asia-Pacific region, and even more if we count the United States, Canada, and Russia, each of which is also a Pacific nation. Politically, the world waits apprehensively for the results of Hong Kong reverting to Chinese control and as uncertainty continues on the Korean peninsula. Economically, the Asia-Pacific region accounts for 36 percent of U.S. trade, roughly equivalent to our trade with North and South America combined and more than double our trade with Europe. Over the next 10 years, it is expected that 60 percent of the world's economic growth will occur in the Asia-Pacific area.

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN, is Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. As the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, he leads the largest of the unified commands and directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components. He is the U.S. military representative for collective defense arrangements in the Pacific and is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Militarily, the world's sixth-largest armed forces operate in the region. Some of these countries have nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and others have the potential to gain these capabilities quickly. The United States has fought three wars in the region during the past century. Five of our country's seven mutual defense treaties are in the Asia-Pacific region. However, there is no formal multilateral structure similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to promote security. Most Asia specialists do not see much appetite for military interdependence in the region in the future, although there is productive multilateral dialogue taking place in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Taken together, these factors represent a confluence of the political, military, and economic elements of national and international power. It is this confluence that defines the importance of the region not only to Americans but also to the global community; that drives U.S. engagement in and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region; and that prompts our national security strategy of engagement, as we seek a more secure, stable, and prosperous global community.

Economic, political, and security interests are intertwined such that we cannot advance them separately. The Soviet Union tried to do so, focusing almost exclusively on security through military power; this was an important reason for its collapse. To align U.S. efforts with the intertwined interests, the State Department and other national agencies. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recognized the special importance of working these issues together in the Asia-Pacific region when she noted that political, economic, and security interests "cannot be separated into discrete boxes. They are reinforcing. The vitality of the international economic system rests upon international political order. Political order depends, in great measure, on military security. And economic stability reduces the likelihood of dangerous conflict. When each pillar is strong, progress on all fronts is possible. If one pillar collapses, stress on the others is multiplied." This has shown to be particularly true in light of the recent economic woes in Asia.

The part of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region the U.S. Pacific Command focuses on is the security piece. While the military alone cannot resolve all issues among governments, it can help set the conditions and buy time and space for other elements such as diplomacy to work. Real solutions must come from within, as in Bosnia. Security is essential for diplomacy and economic engagement to proceed and is the bedrock for broader relationships among countries. Regional security begets the stable conditions that are a prerequisite for mutual prosperity.

Thus, security of the Asia-Pacific region is directly connected with the prosperity of the American people. Senator Roberts, a long-time Congressman who recently filled Bob Dole's Senate seat, confirmed this link of security and prosperity. He noted that the price of grain in Dodge City directly depends on expectations for trade in the region, and that conflict in the Asia-Pacific arena would immediately threaten the livelihood of the wheat farmers and cowboys of our Midwest.

Two figures of speech compare security to oxygen. The first is by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joe Nye, at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Nye said security is like oxygenyou tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but then once that occurs there is nothing else you can think about. The other is by Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, who said security is the oxygen that fuels the economic engine of Asia. Without this oxygensecuritythe stable conditions and expectations necessary for prosperity are not possible. Where security does not exist, such as in the Balkans or parts of Africa, no one thinks very much about long-term investments or 30-year mortgages.

The United States promotes security in the region through a concept of preventive defense, in which conditions are set to prevent armed conflict. Dr. Bill Perry, former Secretary of Defense, authored an article in Foreign Affairs on preventive defense. He used preventive medicine as an analogy to describe the logic and benefits of preventive defense. He was preceded by about 1,500 years by Sun Tzu, who said that the greatest general was the one who could attain objectives without fighting.

In the Pacific Command strategy, the notion of preventive defense incorporates military responsibilities if prevention fails. U.S. strategic framework has three parts: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and if necessary, fighting and winning in conflict. The intent in peacetime engagement is to reassure our friends and allies through various forms of military-to-military contact including training exercises, conferences, and ship visits. Conferences such as this one play an important role. Through peacetime engagement we do more than reassure. We establish the mechanisms to work issues and interact to keep crises from arising.

When a situation occurs that threatens to escalate into conflict, we pursue crisis response. In our response to crisis, we seek to prevent escalation to armed conflict through appropriate and measured military measures, coordinated closely with our nation's diplomacy. American response to Chinese missile firings near Taiwan in March 1996 illustrates the application of crisis response. Crisis response attempts to return the stable conditions necessary for peaceful resolution of difficulties and to deter destabilizing military activities.

The third aspect of our Pacific Command strategic framework is our preparation to fight and win and to restore international peace and security, should deterrence in crisis response fail. We are prepared to fight and win in a major theater of war, multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary. In valid military logic, our capability and willingness to operate successfully in this third levelto fight and winallows us to work primarily in the firstpeacetime engagement.

The tools that allow us to work successfully in peacetime, in crisis, and in war are our forward presence in the region, our strong bilateral relationships with friends and allies, and our credible war winning forces. Because the United States does not have a formal multilateral security structure in the region, it relies heavily on bilateral relationships, including defense treaties with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.

U.S. capability includes the forward presence of about 100,000 military personnel, consisting primarily of forces stationed in Japan and Korea, and afloat naval forces. This forward presence positions the United States closer to potential trouble spots and is a visible indicator of U.S. commitment to regional security. While many observers regard the number of personnel as a metric of U.S. commitment to the region, the number is less important that the capabilities these forces havein the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, the Fifth and Seventh Air Forces in Korea and Japan, the Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, the Seventh Fleet, and our Special Operations Forces.

In addition to forward deployed military forces in the region, the capabilities of the Pacific Command also include approximately 200,000 more personnel forward based in Hawaii and Alaska or stationed on the west coast of the United States. These forces have a regional focus, and many spend considerable time in the countries of the region executing peacetime engagement tasks.

Let us now turn to some regional observations that highlight our concerns and our objectives throughout the region. While many issues in the region draw our attention, the U.S. security relationship with Japan is pivotal to the entire region. Our united efforts are the foundation for peace and security throughout the Pacific. The tangible Japanese support for U.S. forces gives us the strategic reach necessary to deter war and to prevail in conflict. In reviewing the Defense Guidelines, both countries revalidated the importance of this relationship and our mutual interests in sustaining it beyond the Cold War. Our efforts are not directed against any nation. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security and stability for the Asia-Pacific region.

China is the backdrop against which the region's activities and decisions are played. While sharing the regional concerns about China's military modernization and lack of transparency on security objectives, the United States and Japan are cautiously optimistic that the opportunity exists for a good working relationship. The trend is generally upward, although many perturbations can be expected. U.S. engagement with China will require steady work over many decades. America does not view China as an immediate threat to its interests, believing that China can best be dealth with from a position of strength and resolve, focusing on our interests while respecting theirs.

The Korean peninsula is our most immediate security concern. North Korea is an anomaly in the region, not sharing in the prosperity brought by mutual trade and engagement. While it is under economic pressure, North Korea retains a major military capability to lash out if cornered. Commitment of U.S. forces to Korea and solidarity with the Republic of Korea deter that possibility. Although North Korea has the capability to cause serious harm, the United States would prevail if attacked and the North Korean state would be destroyed. The shortage of food and economic deterioration in North Korea are serious, but their military efforts continue. Providing emergency food assistance to alleviate starvation is appropriate as a humanitarian interest and helps stabilize the situation on the peninsula. In responding to North Korea's economic difficulties, it is believed that the goal of a "low approach" is in everyone's interest, rather than a "hard" or "soft landing." This will take steady work, as the North Korean Government is a difficult partner with which to negotiate.

Southeast Asia is of growing economic, security, and diplomatic importance to our interests. The United States supports the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It is an important venue to discuss security issues. The ARF has important potential to make considerable contributions to regional security. It is in our interests also to develop and strengthen further U.S. bilateral relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia is a vast country. Its security forces are coping with a tough situation, trying to maintain stable conditions among its 17,308 islands and 300 cultures and subcultures, and doing so largely in responsible ways. Externally, Indonesia plays an especially important role in the region. Singapore is doing all it can to support U.S. efforts for regional peace and security. U.S. relations with the other states of Southeast Asia are also important for the future and generally developing well.

What will be the U.S. role in the Pacific in the future? As the sage Yogi Berra said, "It's tough making predictions, especially about the future." Nevertheless, a number of recent reexaminations of our efforts demonstrate that we are on the right course and will remain involved militarily in the region. U.S. efforts in the Asia-Pacific area continue to be successful in furthering peace, security, and prosperity.

The importance of U.S. engagement and forward presence in the region to broker the peace and stable conditions is widely recognized and reinforced by the statements of regional leaders and leaders of our government. One President, two Secretaries of State, and two Secretaries of Defense each confirmed that the United State is a Pacific nation and committed to stay engaged in the region.

Reexaminations of the past few years include Dr. Joe Nye's East Asia-Pacific Strategy, the Defense Guidelines review of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Each has validated U.S. presence in the region as the right course.

The QDR has been the "hot button" not only within Washington but also in Pacific Command headquarters and in the defense establishments of our regional neighbors. The QDR was the first major scrub of our national military strategy since the end of the Cold War to take a look not only at the amount of forces needed but also at the tasks they can expect to face.

The end of the Cold War allows America to pursue a Pacific Command strategy that is not directed against any other state and supports the mutual success of all. Of course, the strategy requires resources and careful stewardship to sustain it over the long haul. The QDR was a careful review by our Defense Department of our national efforts to ensure our strategy is appropriate to the international environment and to ensure the proper balance of today's requirements with the potential demands of an uncertain future. The national challenge the United States faces is to balance current readiness with readiness for the future, 10 to 20 years from now, under a constant Defense Department budget of about $250 billion in real terms. Adequate future readiness capabilities will require an increase of investment in modernization by about $15 to $20 billion per year. Although there are differences in budget lines, many other nations are faced with similar challenges of balancing resources for today and tomorrow.

The QDR started with an assessment of what the world might look like in the future. As General Shalikashvili said, there is some good news and some bad news. The good news no peer competitor appears on the horizonas the Soviet Union was during the Cold Waror as Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, the head of our Defense Intelligence Agency, described it, ANo global military challenger on the scale of the former Soviet Union for at least the next two decades." While relative global peace can still be expected, the bad news is it will not be a conflict-free world. There will still be multiple regional hotspots, transnational dangers such as terrorism and drugs, and concerns about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We can take comfort in the QDR assessment that our resources, if well managed, and our actions, if supported by allies, are up to the tasks before us.

The national military strategy that the QDR establishes mirrors much of the U.S. Pacific Command strategy, from which parts of the national strategy were developed. As a nation, the United States will seek to employ peacetime engagement activities to shape the international environment, promoting our interests and keeping crises from emerging. We will maintain the capabilities to respond to crises or multiple theaters of war in accordance to our interests, but mostly with the goal of prevention, according to the logic described earlier. And we will seek efficiencies in order to prepare for an uncertain future through modernization.

Of special interest to all of us is the QDR reaffirmation of America's commitment to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, to include the determination to continue maintaining approximately 100,000 military personnel forward deployed in the region. As a result of the QDR, the United States will seek efficiencies, mostly in our domestic infrastructure, but our regional commitment will be undiminished. These efficiencies are important, for they help provide the fiscal basis for the future capabilities needed to sustain the U.S. commitment.

Over the coming years, there will be discussion about defense. The QDR is only a first step in planning and programming our resources. Congress is likely to debate intensively QDR findings and recommendations. Congress has also empowered a National Defense Panel to give another examination of these issues, focusing on alternative choices. These discussions will focus primarily on how we can pursue efficiencies, not the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, for which there is broad and strong support.

Let us now turn to the "prepare" element of our national strategy: modernizing U.S. forces today for an uncertain future. One of the ways to prepare is to take advantage of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA.

The RMA has been hailed as something that will transform the battlefield of the future. It promises essentially three things: improved sensors and uninterrupted flows of information that will greatly enhance our knowledge of the battlefield; dispersed, highly maneuverable ground forces; and precision firepower, often delivered from stand-off distances, by naval, air and ground forces. The RMA promises reduced risk to our forces and potential for reduced collateral damage, things every commander wants.

Proponents of the RMA tend to focus on high-tech opponents on a "conventional" battlefield and argue that the synergy of these three capabilities on the U.S. side will give us a huge advantage against adversaries in the future. However, this notion of the RMA addresses only one part of the spectrum of potential challenges we may face in the future, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Insurgencies have had some success historically in waging war with low-tech methods. Some otherwise second-rank countries have sought to offset disadvantages in conventional weaponry with weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, high technology is not a panacea. It has vulnerabilities that could become liabilities. In the future, America may face information operations directed against it. Reliance on high-technology communications and computers might make the United States especially susceptible to disruptive attacks on our information infrastructure.

The U.S. notion of the RMA is that a broader, more balanced concept is needed. America needs to address the threats we face at the lower end of the spectrum of military operations and make use of low-technology solutions that complement the new technologies. It also will need to employ technology fully to assist in countering threats such as terrorism, insurgencies, and weapons of mass destruction. RMA capabilities and technologies can provide some assistance to the generally low-tech forces we maintain to confront these threats, such as special operations forces. Low-tech solutions that can complement emerging high technologies include improved doctrine and procedures and more effective use of our joint capabilities. A new concept of jointness is needed beyond the integration of military forces at the national and theater levels to encompass our interagency, nongovernmental, and coalition partners.

In looking toward modernization for an uncertain future, picture linebackers on a football team. The forces needed most are those flexible enough to be used in a wide spectrum of situations; the United States should not try to leapfrog our capabilities to high-tech solutions that can address only a narrow set of problems.

To summarize, a few key thoughts need emphasis. The United States needs a confluence of solutions to the problems of the Asia-Pacific area: military, diplomatic, and economic approaches working hand in hand. The presence of strong, responsible U.S. military forces is essential to the stability of the region. The United States is committed to the region's peace and international security for the long haul. The forces needed will be balanced and flexible and will have application over a wide range of circumstances. The solutions to the region's problems are long-haul solutions.