STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION
         Military Forces in the  Asia-Pacific Region

U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS:  Pre-Crisis/Crisis Management
       Ralph A. Cossa

  Introduction

The end of the Cold War has coincided with the dawning of a new, more peaceful and prosperous era in Asia.  There are many reasons for this improved Asia-Pacific security environment.  Paramount among them is the stability provided, regionwide, by the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the forward presence of U.S. military forces that access to bases in Japan helps make possible.  As Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. President Clinton noted in their "Message to the Peoples of Japan and the United States" during the April 1996 Tokyo summit meeting, "Our alliance is central to peace, stability, and prosperity in the [entire] Asia-Pacific region."¹

In order to assess the dynamics of "the world's most important bilateral relationship," this paper will examine the complementary security goals and military strategy of the United States and Japan and discuss how the Mutual Defense Treaty has contributed to, and will continue to foster and preserve, regional peace and stability.  Particular focus will be placed on the ongoing Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines Review and on how this impacts both nations' ability to prepare for and manage potential regional crises.  This paper will also discuss how events on the Korean peninsula both affect and are affected by the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Ralph A. Cossa is Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) in Honolulu. He is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and an Overseas Honorary Research Fellow with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis.  Mr. Cossa is a founding member of the Steering Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and serves as Executive Director of the U.S. Committee (USCSCAP).  

Common Regional Goals and Objectives

Before discussing the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship and its impact on regional security, several general observations about the northeast Asian security environment appear in order.  As Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton noted in April 1996, "Japan and the United States approach the 21st  century as allies and partners with shared values, interests, and hopes."²  Many of the shared hopes or aspirationsmore commonly referred to in security circles as goals and objectivesare also shared with the other two major northeast Asia powers, China and Russia, plus the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) as well.  Some may even be shared by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).

           One goal that the United States and Japan share with their regional neighbors is a desire for stability on the Korean peninsula, not only to avoid another war between the North and South, but also to avoid a sudden, perhaps violent collapse of the North.  Everyone hopes for a "soft landing" for the troubled DPRK economy, although opinions vary on how, or even if, this can be accomplished.³  

All view the maintenance of the currently benign security environment as an essential precondition to sustained economic growth regionwide.  Conflict on the peninsula would directly or indirectly affect the economic as well as political well-being of all in the region.  Perhaps even Pyongyang understands how disastrous conflict on the peninsula would be to its own economic (and political) survival.  As will be discussed in more detail shortly, such conflict would also pose significant challenges to the continued viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In addition, allincluding the DPRKprofess to support a nuclear-free Korean peninsula today and after any reunification, North Korean occasional threats to abandon the Agreed Framework notwithstanding.  All four major powers would also rather see a peacefully reunified Korea than have to deal with either a divided Korea on the brink of turmoil or a seriously destabilized peninsula.  This does not imply that any are in a big rush to see the peninsula reunited, only that they would not try to prevent such an outcome if the two Koreas could agree on a formula for peaceful reunification.

Finally, promoting and maintaining generally harmonious relations among the four major powers in Asia are mutually acknowledged goals.  In fact, for one of the few times in history, relations among the United States, Japan, China, and Russia are generally polite or correct, if not always completely harmonious.  None sees any of the others as posing an imminent threat to its own survival or basic security interests.

This situation must be maintained and improved upon.  The return of a regional bipolar struggle pitting any one or combination of these states against any of the others would serve no nation's fundamental interests and would disrupt regional stability and economic progress.   More specifically, a U.S.-Japan alliance to take on an anti-China orientationshort of some aggressive action by China that would necessitate such a movecould have a profoundly destabilizing effect.

Unlike the Cold War era when the U.S.-Japan alliance was decidedly anti-Soviet, Tokyo and Washington today see their alliance as positively focused, aimed at promoting regional stability and harmony among all the states of Asia rather than being directed against any specific threat.  As such, it should not be seen as threatening by its neighbors.  As will be stressed later, as the United States and Japan jointly proceed to revitalize their alliance to ensure its future relevance, great care must also be taken to ensure that this positive orientation is maintained.

Statements by Chinese Premier Li Peng after his December 1996 visit to Moscow, claiming that a "strategic partnership" had been created between Russia and China "to adjust the balance of world power" and "offset the influence of the United States,"  are particularly unhelpful and counterproductive in this regard.⁴  While perhaps driven in part by Chinese concerns and misinterpretations regarding current U.S.-Japanese efforts to revitalize their alliance, if taken seriously they could actually help push the U.S.-Japan relationship in an anti-PRC direction, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophesy.

It would be much more advisable, therefore, for all the states in the region to focus on further defining and building upon the above common regional goals and objectives. These can provide a basis for future cooperation regionwide and can help insure that the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to promote and enhance the national security interests of China, Russia, and the Koreas while also serving U.S. and Japanese interests.

  Security Goals and Military Strategy   

The United States remains committed to the Asia-Pacific region; U.S. political, economic, and security interests dictate that this be so.  This commitment will not be pursued to the exclusion of other important regions; U.S. interests have been, are, and will continue to be global.  But, Asia will continue to play an increasingly prominent role in U.S. security thinking.

The 1995 Defense Department report on the East Asia-Pacific region (EASR) clearly defines U.S. security goals and objectives in Asia.⁵   It also stresses the coincidence of views between the United States and Japan on such matters.  This was reinforced during the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit, both in the  "Message to the Peoples of Japan and the United States" and, more importantly, in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed by both leaders during the summit meeting.⁶ 

The Joint Declaration commits both sides to the revitalization of the defense relationship.  It is an effort to ensure the alliance's future relevance, most specifically (and importantly) in a manner designed to be nonthreatening to Japan's neighbors.  It reinforces the EASR theme that the continued viability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is central to U.S. engagement in Asia.  As the EASR stresses, "There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives."

The Pentagon report further identifies the U.S.-Japan alliance as "the linchpin of U.S. security policy in Asia."⁷  The U.S. security umbrella over Japan also makes it easier for Japan to honor its unswerving commitment to its three nonnuclear principles, despite its residing in a neighborhood crowded with actual and potential nuclear weapons states.⁸

The U.S.-Japan defense alliance will be sustained, despite periodic challenges and occasional rough sailing, because it is in the national security interests of both nations to maintain the relationship.  U.S. military forces based in Japan under the mutual defense treaty help promote regional stability, guard against a resumption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula (where the Cold War, regrettably, has not yet ended), increase the U.S. ability to respond to crises throughout the region, demonstrate a U.S. commitment to its friends and allies, serve as a hedge against uncertainty, and avoid a "power vacuum" that others who do not necessarily share our interests might be tempted to fill. 

In short, U.S. military presence is a low-cost insurance policy that helps guard against future regional instability while protecting and promoting American and Japanese as well as Korean and broader regional security interests.

Public support for the defense relationship generally remains strong in both countries. In Japan, local support understandably declined in the wake of the September 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen.  However, a poll taken by the Prime Minister's office showed that the number of Japanese who now rate U.S. Japan relations as "good" had climbed to 72.3 percent, which The Japan Digest noted is the highest reading since the question was first asked in 1988.⁹ Of Japanese respondents,  75.3 percent  said they feel friendly toward the United States  (By contrast, just 45 percent said they feel friendly toward China, down from 70 percent in the late 1980s and 52 percent in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident.)¹⁰  

The U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty commits both sides not only to the defense of Japan but also to the promotion of regional stability.  With the significant reduction (but not elimination) of external threats to Japan's security, the alliance's focus today must shift from defense of Japan to the broader regional goal.  This will require a renewed, reinvigorated alliance and a continued credible U.S. military presence.  It also requires a greater willingness on the part of Japan to increasingly share in the risks and responsibilities, in order to keep the alliance robust and relevant.  Also needed are greater trust and understanding on the part of Japan's neighbors and an increased acceptance in Japan and in the region of a more active, responsible Japanese leadership role.  As Ambassador Richard Armitage, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted:  

The most important issue in the current relationship is not "how many forces?" or "what weapons systems?"' but rather "What are the U.S. and Japan going to do as security partners should the need arise?"¹¹   

This is a highly sensitive issue, given Japan's hesitancy to discuss "collective security" or regional contingencies, but refusing to discuss worst case scenarios prior to the emergence of a crisis can only make crises more likely and surely will add strains to the alliance relationship.  

Peacetime Contingency Planning

In order for the United States and Japan to respond effectively in the event of future challenges to regional stability, peacetime contingency planning is essential.  Precrisis consultation and coordination are normal features in most alliance relationships.  Such planning has not been a normal aspect of U.S.-Japan security relations, however, except for scenarios dealing directly and exclusively with the defense of Japan.

The Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration was a significant step forward both in informing the general publics of both nations about the importance of the alliance and in paving the way for greater defense cooperation.  It recognized close bilateral defense cooperation as a "central element" in the security relationship and went on to say:  

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.¹²  

Japan can and should accept more of the defense burden and is in the process of doing so, but in a gradual, responsible manner consistent both with its own psychological and constitutional restrictions and with its neighbors' concerns.  For example, at the September 1996 "2+2" Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting (which brought together the foreign and defense ministers of both nations), Washington and Tokyo both reaffirmed their commitment toward "reaffirming and strengthening" the alliance.¹³  The SCC Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation was also tasked to review and revise the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation; the Interim Report was released in early June 1997, to stimulate debate and increase transparency regarding the review process.¹⁴  

Defense Guidelines Review

As Japan and the United States proceed with the Defense Guidelines Review, both sides must remain sensitive to regional suspicions and concerns and send clear signals as to what this current alliance restructuring effort entails.  This is why the "Progress Report on the Guidelines Review" prepared for and endorsed by the SCC meeting, stressed as one of the review's goals "to provide a transparent outline of bilateral defense cooperation," based on the recognition, as stated in the SCC Joint Announcement, of "the importance for both sides to actively provide a clear explanation of this review to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region."¹⁵

Given that many misunderstandings or suspicions about the nature and intent of the revitalization effort still exist, an explanation about what this effort does, does not, and will not entail is needed.

First, the review neither promotes nor requires Japanese remilitarization.  There is no intention in Japan, and no desire among U.S. defense planners, to reverse Japan's 1995 National Defense Program Outline, which details a 25 percent reduction in the authorized strength of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF)a reduction driven in part by the realization that existing, already modest force levels could not be achieved because of a lack of volunteers.¹⁶ 

The focus of the revitalization effort is on how the JSDF, as currently configured, can more effectively accomplish two important goals: defense of Japan and promotion of regional stability, the twin goals contained in the preface of the Mutual Defense Treaty since its inception.  The ongoing revitalization also will not require a formal revision of Japan's Peace Constitution.  The SSC ministers confirmed that the current review "will be conducted within the framework of the Constitution of Japan," as currently written and as currently interpreted.¹⁷

What the revitalization effort does entail, indeed, what it requires, is a willingness for Japan to lay out more clearly what it can and will do, as an alliance partner to the United States and within the context of the Treaty, to help safeguard regional stability.  If a crisis were to erupt in the region that threatened U.S. and Japanese interestsconflict on the Korean peninsula being the most obvious exampleand Japan were to refuse to adequately support U.S. efforts to defend the ROK, this would tear at the fabric of the alliance.   

Defining "adequately support" to the satisfaction of both nations, and in a manner not threatening to Japan's neighbors, should be the goal of the revitalization effort.  The United States needs to be clear about what it desires and requires, keeping in mind that the two are seldom completely synonymous.  Once this is accomplished, the United States and Japan should (to borrow an analogy first used by Dr. Michael Green) divide this list into "green light," "yellow light," and "red light" issues.

Most of the items on the list probably will fall in the "green light" area, because there is a great deal Japan can do even within the framework of the current constitution.  Attention should then be focused on the "yellow light" issues, which some constitutional reinterpretation or, more likely, just a little more political courage than the current Japanese Government has been willing to demonstrate. 

Some "yellow light" items may prove difficult to approve in peacetime even if acceptable in a crisis.  In this case, the potential roadblocks to achieving those "yellow light" line items that are vital in a crisis must be identified, and measures to overcome these roadblocks must be mapped out in advance.  Even if Japan ultimately "does the right thing," if there is an inordinate delay during a crisis between a U.S. request for assistance and Japan's positive responseespecially if lives are lost in the interimconsiderable damage to the alliance will accrue.

Careful attention then needs to be given to the remaining "red light" issues to see if any are truly "war stoppers."  In most (if not all) cases, the political and emotional costs involved (both in Japan and within the region) in turning the red lights green will likely outweigh the military benefits to be gained from getting Japan to accomplish these "red light" tasks.  In this case, the appropriate move is for the United States to adjust its wish list.  

The Korea Factor

As stressed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, the U.S.-Japan alliance is "central" to the peace, stability, and prosperity not only of both their nations, but to the security of the region at large.  Nowhere is this truer than on the Korean peninsula.  In many respects, Korea is the 'chilles' heel of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.  The U.S.-Japan alliance has a significant impact on, and can be seriously affected by, Korean peninsula events.

Of primary importance, Japanese support, including but not limited to unrestricted use of U.S. Japan-based forces and facilities, is crucial to the defense of the ROK in the event of hostilities on the peninsula.  The failure of Japan to provide adequate support for any U.S. effort to defend the ROK in the face of North Korean aggression could be an alliance breaker.

Conversely, the American presence in Japan is closely linked to support for Korean (and other) contingencies.  Therefore, the peaceful reunification of Korea, desirable by all measures, would nonetheless put considerable strains on the U.S. ability to justify 100,000 forces forward deployed in Asia (primarily in Japan and on the Korean peninsula).  Even though this forward presence serves many other useful purposes, "defense of Korea" clearly represents the "worst case" scenario and provides the primary (and most politically acceptable and persuasive) justification for U.S. forces remaining forward deployed today.

Should the United States desire to maintain a sizable forward presence in northeast Asia postreunification, the rationale supporting this desire would be more difficult politically to articulate than the convenient, highly acceptable "North Korean threat."  Additionally, the removal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula postreunification (or earlier) would increase pressure, both in the United States and Japan, to reduce or withdraw completely U.S. Japan-based forces as well.

The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence that Japan will not become the future threat.  Anti-Japanese sentiments are already proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. 

The de facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals.  ROK-Japan cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea. 

In sum, one cannot talk about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance without addressing the Korean factor.  This final section will attempt to do just that, by looking further at the interaction of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Korean peninsula security.  It will also briefly touch upon the prospects and rationale for a continued U.S. presence in northeast Asia after reunification, along with a few comments on Japan's relations with both Koreas.  

Defense of Korea

The American presence in Japan and the use of Japanese ports and airfields in support of Korean contingencies add to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the ROK and thus directly support deterrence.  So, too, does Japan's willingness, as embodied in the Joint Declaration, to cooperate more fully with the United States to promote and preserve regional stability.  (It is important to note, however, that the Joint Declaration does not commit Japan to any specific action in the event of hostilities in Korea or elsewhere.  It merely represents an agreement in principle to start talking about what kinds of support might be required.)

The Joint Declaration and the Clinton-Hashimoto summit have, for the most part, been positively received in the United States and Japan and have been endorsed throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region.  In Korea, however, some have expressed concern about the "expanded Japanese regional security role," which has been referenced but not fully explained.  These Koreans fear (incorrectly) that the Joint Declaration foreshadows Japanese remilitarization, earlier assurances notwithstanding.¹⁸

One extreme, but not atypical concern, expressed by a leading ROK Japan specialist, is that the United States may have "deputized part of its role as policeman in the region to Japan."¹⁹  Dr. Song Yong-son went on to say,  

Basically, I don't object to the new U.S.-Japan security pact due to the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that started with Japan's participation in the U.N. peacekeeping operations and will continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.²⁰  

Clearly, Japan has a long way to go before overcoming deep-seated historical ROK suspicions about its future intentions.  Nonetheless, Korean concerns about the Joint Declaration seem ironic, because the Joint Declaration has as one of its primary objectives (at least in the eyes of U.S. military planners) improving U.S. ability to defend Korea, with appropriate Japanese support.  

In reality, one would anticipate very little in the way of direct combat support from Japan in the event of a Korean contingency, beyond defense of U.S. bases and facilities in Japan, sea lane surveillance and security, and participation in the evacuation of noncombatants (including Japanese citizens) from the peninsula.  No U.S. defense planner would ever seriously consider the insertion of Japanese Ground Self- Defense Force soldiers into the Korean peninsula battlefield,  nor would ROK military planners request, support, or tolerate such a plan if offered.  As Major General Lee Suk Bok, ROKA (Ret.), and former Deputy Director for Arms Control at the Korean Ministry of National Defense, noted when referring to U.S.-Japanese Korean peninsula-related contingency planning:  

We know the United States Government is encouraging Japan to take a more active role in peacetime.  To this we have no objections. But Japan cannot become involved in wartime or contingency situations. They cannot carry heavy weapons and cannot send combat units. This we will not tolerate.²¹  

Given such concerns, it is all the more critical that the U.S. define more clearly what it desires and the Japanese state more clearly what they are willing and able to provide.  Once- agreed upon roles have been determined, they must be clearly explained to Japan's neighbors, and to the people of Japan as well.  The Japanese then need to develop procedures for overcoming existing obstacles to performing agreed upon support roles; a mature relationship requires nothing less.  The April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration and the ongoing Defense Guidelines Review at least open the door for such discussions.  The bottom line is worth repeating: if the United States were to be engaged in combat on the Korean peninsula and Japan were portrayed as not adequately supporting this effort, public support for the U.S.-Japan security relationship would quickly evaporate, and it is doubtful the alliance could be sustained.  

U.S. Presence, Postreunification

With regard to the continued need for U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula after reunification, it is too soon to rule out this possibility.  But, it is also unwise to assume that a post-reunification U.S. military presence will be supportable either in Washington or in Seoul.  The advisability and feasibility of U.S. bases in a reunified Korea are highly scenario dependent. 

There is certainly a future role for U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula after reunification, at least in the near term, in order to help ensure a secure environment conducive to much-needed North-South demilitarization, if for no other reason.²²  Not all security specialists agree, however.  Even among military professionals fully committed to sustaining Korean peninsula security, there is serious question of the advisability and sustainability of a U.S. military presence postreunification.

For example, when a cross-section of retired and some active duty U.S. military officers were recently polled on their views regarding a continued U.S. presence in Korea, slightly more than half believed that U.S. forces had no role to play on the peninsula postreunification.  Many of these still supported a modest U.S. military presence in Japan and elsewhere in Asia postreunification as a hedge against future uncertainty.  But survey respondents raised serious questions both about the strategic necessity and about the probability of political support (in either Washington or Seoul) for a continued U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula once genuine reunification is achieved.

The April 1996, U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration appears to recognize this and lays the groundwork for possible future adjustments in the number of forward-based U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region.  Instead of repeating the oft-heard pledge to retain 100,000 troops "for the foreseeable future," the Joint Declaration notes:  

On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan [emphasis added].²³  

This declaration clears the way for reassessments based on changes in the security environment (for better or for worse).  Even under the most benign security environment, however, one can argue that some level of forward-deployed forces would remain desirable to promote and protect future U.S. and broader regional interests, although 100,000 troops seem insupportable (and unnecessary) in a postreunification environment.  Even if the rationale were there, it would be difficult to convince an increasingly skeptical Japanese public, especially on Okinawa, that a continued American presence is needed, especially if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Korea.

The one wild card in all this is, of course, China.  It is conceivable that Chinese actions between now and any eventual Korean reunification may convince Japanese (and perhaps Korean) officials that U.S. forces are required.  However, this is certainly not a circumstance to be hoped for.  

Managing Japan-Korea Relations

Japan is attempting to improve relations with both Koreas.  Tokyo generally recognizes that its primary contribution to stability on the peninsula is its continuing effort to present a united front, along with the United States and ROK, when it comes to dealing with the North.  In this regard, it is extremely important that Japan not be seen as getting out in front of, or undercutting, ROK or U.S. efforts, particularly during periods of sensitive negotiations. 

Japanese security specialists express concern about nuclear developments and attitudes in both South and North Korea.  It is true that there is little talk emanating from official channels about the ROK reinstituting an indigenous nuclear weapons program in the face of the potential North Korean challenge.  However, talk in Seoul about the prospects of the South one day "inheriting" a nuclear weapons capability when it eventually absorbs the North²⁴ is particularly unsettling to the Japanese, as it is to anyone favoring nuclear nonproliferation and a nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula.  

Japan-ROK Relations

Japan and the ROK have made steady progress in improving relations, despite occasional flare ups normally associated with inopportune and inappropriate remarks made by Japanese politicians regarding the Japanese occupation of Korea or Japan's role in World War II.  Of particular note was the decision, announced in mid-September 1995, that the two nations would begin holding regular high-level defense consultations.²⁵ This has now been followed by periodic summit meetings between Prime Minister Hashimoto and ROK President Kim Young-Sam.  Such cooperation is essential to peace and stability in North Asia.  

On the negative side, lingering territorial disputes, most recently over Tok-do/Takeshima Island (a ROK-occupied island claimed by both sides while defining their respective exclusive economic zones), remain a source of irritation.  Also, ROK President Kim's harsh criticism of Japan during the historic state visit to Seoul of Chinese President Jiang Zemin remarks no doubt encouraged and reinforced by Jiangreveal deep animosities South Korean political leaders seldom resist capitalizing upon.²⁶

Public opinion of Japan in Korea has always been low, and the present young generation of Koreans appears even more anti-Japanese than their parents.²⁷  Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion of the ROK has also declined. The earlier-referenced survey of Japanese attitudes showed that only 36 percent of Japanese felt friendly toward Koreans, the lowest rating since this survey was initiated in 1978.²⁸  

Japan-DPRK Relations

Relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang remain strained. Pyongyang seeks immediate diplomatic recognition from Japan (as it does from the United States).  In fact, after both Koreas joined the United Nations, and Beijing and Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul, the DPRK expected that both Washington and Tokyo would soon follow suit by recognizing the Pyongyang government.²⁹  North Korean actions have justifiably delayed this from already occurring but, ultimately, Japanese (and U.S.) recognition of North Korea seems necessary and appropriate.  Over time, Japan can be expected to play a major role in assisting in the economic development of the North in order to help pave the way for the "soft landing" that everyone seeks, although Tokyo's effort must be closely coordinated with that of the other major powers and, most importantly, with ROK efforts.  Japan's leading role in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), including critical Japanese financial support for the light water reactor project and other aspects of the October 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, is also of major significance.  While Tokyo coordinates closely with Seoul and Washington in its dealings with the DPRK, many in the ROK remain extremely nervous about any Japanese overtures toward Pyongyang.  

Conclusion

U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, based upon strong bilateral alliances and a credible forward military presence, has played a positive role in establishing the currently benign Asian security environment.  The United States appears committed to remaining engaged in Asia and to maintaining its alliances and presence.  The continued viability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is central to this effort.  While vital in its own right and important to stability regionwide, the U.S.-Japan alliance also has a significant impact on, and can be seriously affected by, Korean peninsula events. 

Most importantly, the failure of Japan to adequately support any U.S. effort to defend the ROK in the face of North Korean aggression could be an alliance breaker.  Japan must overcome its reluctance to discuss what "adequate support" would entail.  It is hoped the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration and ongoing Defense Guidelines Review have paved the way for this to occur.  Precrisis coordination is essential if the United States and Japan are to effectively respond jointly in the event of regional contingencies that impact the national security interests of both nations.  

Because the American presence in Japan is also closely linked to support for Korean (and other) contingencies, the eventual reunification of Korea could put considerable strains on the U.S. ability to justify the forward deployment of its military forces in Asia.  Should the United States desire to maintain a sizable forward presence in northeast Asia postreunification, the rationale will be more difficult to articulate.  The temptation to use "containing China" as a future rationale must be avoided (unless Chinese actions leave no other option).

Finally, the de facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK is important to long-term stability in Asia. Steps must be taken now to improve ROK-Japan relations while paving the way for improved  post reunification three-way cooperation.  

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