STRENGTH
THROUGH COOPERATION
Military
Forces in the
Asia-Pacific Region
BILATERALISM
AND MULTILATERALISM:
Achieving
the Right Balance in Security
Relations
Brian L. Job
Introduction
With
the wisdom of hindsight, analysts of the next century, when reexamining what
has transpired over the last decade, are almost certainly going to remark upon
the resiliency and robustness of the "security architecture"
of the Asia-Pacific region. However
one characterizes the form and functioning of this architecture, the bottom
line will be that the region remained substantially peaceful, both within and
among states, in the wake of changes and events of the sort that have
historically served to trigger major violent confrontation among principal
players. This outcome will appear especially remarkable in light of
the combination of economic, social,
political, and security transformations that took place-for
instance, the dissolving of the ideological superstructure of the Cold War
security order, the dramatic shifts in the relative capability of major
regional powers (China ascending, Russia declining), the rapid takeoff of
economic growth and prosperity, with attendant increases in disparities within
and across states;
large
increases in defense expenditures and power-projection capabilities; and the
threat of nuclear proliferation. It
is likely that the same analysts will look upon the first decade of the next century and come to the same conclusions.
We find ourselves at or near an important transition point or points in
Asia-Pacific regional security. To
date, the regional order has been sustained through a combination of factors-caution
in light of the uncertainty surrounding the unraveling of Cold War mechanisms,
preoccupation with domestic economic and political reform, and satisfaction
with the general parameters of the regional security status quo. The pattern of relationships has been essentially bilateral
(especially in northeast Asia), with incremental development on the
multilateral front-a combination of ad hoc responses to critical
situations and of dialogue and consultation mechanisms (especially in
Southeast Asia.)
Dr. Brian L. Job is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of
International Relations at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver,
Canada. He formerly was
Director of the Institute of International Relations at the University of
British Columbia.
However,
we are about to enter into a different sort of period.
The parameters of the future are beginning to emerge, at least in terms
of the challenges that key states will have to confront and manage.
It is increasingly apparent that an effective regional security order
cannot be created and sustained through application of the same types and
combinations of bilateral and multilateral relationships that have satisfied
in the past. To be more specific,
networks of bilateral ties alone will not do the job; application of
traditional modes of balancing are not going to achieve their desired results.
On the other hand, neither will reliance on multilateral solutions.
A combination of mutually supportive bilateral and multilateral
strategies is called for, involving diplomatic, military, and nongovernmental
players.
This
paper seeks to point out the critical issues that need to be addressed and the
developments, bilateral and multilateral, to be pursued to promote progress
toward a more stable and effective Asia-Pacific security architecture.
Included is a discussion about the paradox that confronts the United
States and other regional players, namely, that while there is no strong
inclination on their parts to upset the status quo, in the short term they
increasingly are aware that the dynamics of broader political and economic
regional developments will ensure that the status quo, in security terms,
cannot prevail in the longer term. The
dilemma is deciding when and how to alter current patterns of bilateral and
multilateral behaviors in ways that promote the necessary redirection and
reorientation required for the future, without provoking disturbance to those
relationships that sustain the central elements of stability of the present.
This
study also discusses distinctions that should be drawn between results and
processes of bilateralism, multilateralism, and confidence building.
The paper then addresses bilateral relationships, highlighting the
critical importance of the Japanese-U.S., Japanese-Korean, PRC-Russian, and
PRC-U.S. dyads; multilateral relationships and multilateralist institutions-their
prospects and limitations; and confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Attention is given to where military-to-military involvement of
different forms might be involved in advancing these various relationships.
The
Asia-Pacific Security Context
Central Elements of the Contemporary Regional Order:
"If
It Isn't Broken . . ."
There
is no need to review the substantive details of Asia-Pacific security
relations over the last decade. These
are well chronicled in periodicals and are receiving substantially greater
attention in journals, monographs, and reports (both official and unofficial)
than was the case 5 years ago. However, when comparing the contemporary Asia-Pacific
regional security to that of the past, and when thinking about the future,
four distinctive features need to be taken into account:
-
Economics
dominates in both domestic and regional contexts.
Analysts use phrases such as "international
relations as economic relations" to describe the global and regional contexts
and "trade
policy is foreign policy" to describe state behavior.
Regarding security matters, economic considerations determine the
definition of national interests and priorities, and economic growth
facilitates increased or decreased defense budgets and weapons acquisitions,
preserving the requirements of a stable market economyCfor
example, access to resources and unhindered air and sea transit routes, are
priorities.
-
Security
policies are determined by domestic considerations.
Desmond Ball
summarizes as follows: "Security
concerns have related more to internal issues
(such as political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion)
than to external antagonisms that inform the security dilemma."
This has been described as the "domestification of national security."
-
New
generations of political and military leaders are emerging throughout the
region. In countries such as
China and Vietnam, these individuals are not motivated by the ideology of
social revolution or the central role of the people's army and people's
war doctrines or the memories and legacies of war fighting, civil or
interstate. Unable to rely on
traditional bases of legitimacy and popular mobilization, appeals to
nationalism and claims of sovereignty become rallying points for leaders, and
in turn become symbolic criteria against which security policy successes are
tallied. In most Asian states,
national security can be equated in practice with "regime security,"
the retention of political power in the hands of the current leadership
cohort.
-
The
Asia-Pacific region has become an open and much less rigidly structured
environment. In economic
terms, the acceptance of the principles and practices of market economies has
been complete-North
Korea, too, being about to embark on transformation of its economic system.
The extent and volume of intraregional trade and investment ties have
burgeoned, with states exhibiting an increasing interest in multilateral
regional consultation (for example, APEC) and subregional consultation and
cooperation (for example, ASEAN and the EAEC).
In political/security terms, the most notable post-Cold War impact has
been the opening of bilateral relationships among virtually all actors in the
region. Russia, China, Japan, and
South Korea now engage each other on security matters in Track 1 and Track 2
channels, including the exchange of visits high-level political and military
leaders. The multilateralism of
the ASEAN community, with its norms of inclusivity and consensus, has been
extended to the formation of the ARF.
Security
and defense experts are led toward two conclusions when summarizing their
views regarding Asia-Pacific regional security.
The first is one emphasizing uncertainty-uncertainty
arising from the structural effects of asymmetric multipolarity, such as the
emergence of regional powers whose geopolitical ambitions and new wealth could
result in their becoming "potential theater peers";
and uncertainly arising from the "domestification"
of national security, from the difficulties that arise when attempting to
understand how and why domestic forces within key states will dictate, in an
idiosyncratic fashion, foreign and security policy behaviors.
This "realist"
perspective tends to be skeptical of the arguments of economic liberals
concerning the mitigating influence of economic inter-dependence on
political/security relations. The
possibilities of multilateral approaches and institutions tend to be
discounted, other than those to be found in the initiation of ad hoc
multilateral coalitions engineered by regional powers to deal with short-term
crises.
The
second conclusion is that the major powers have little interest in altering
the general parameters of the regional status quo.
This is because some states find the present situation generally
acceptable, but also because for some (of the same) states, implementing or
dealing with changed circumstances poses great domestic and external
difficulties. Japan is a prime
example, but for various reasons the United States, China, Russia, and the
ASEAN states, too, all find that the status quo meets their needs.
And, although perhaps controversial, I suggest that the two major
hotspots in the region are likely to be "managed"
such that they are not allowed to destabilize regional or global stability. (The response to the North Korean nuclear threat and the
ongoing negotiations towards a multiparty agreement speak to this point.) Admittedly, this is a more optimistic prognosis regarding the
Taiwan Strait matter. However, in
the postsummer 1996 context, China, if "unprovoked,"
will not move on Taiwan; the United States will attempt to restrain Taiwanese
initiatives.
The
overall result is an interesting one. Policy
makers, by and large, are seeking to shore up the key relationships of the
current system. Operating with
short-term political and strategic horizons, they are understandably reluctant
to move proactively concerning the security architecture of the future.
Albeit that all major players are participating in Track 1 and Track 2
programs, their experiences to date with regional multilateralism, especially
with the ARF, are tentative and frustrating.
Defining Features of the Future Regional Order:
"If
it Isn't Fixed ..."
The
luxury of the present state of the regional security complex should not be
assumed for much longer. The
general shape of the problems to be managed by the Asia-Pacific security
architecture of the first half of the next century are becoming more apparent-apparent
enough to warrant taking steps to steer developments in directions that are
likely to enhance peace and stability. One
can look to the following as being important challenges:
-
An
altered context for the Korean peninsula that, regardless of the route chosen,
will be evolving within some form of multilateral structure of management
and/or enforcement
-
The
creation of a viable security strategy for Japan that is both domestically and
regionally accepted,
-
China's definition and assumption of its role as the
major Asian power
-
The
United States sustaining a key role and stabilizing influence in the
Asia-Pacific region that is not centered upon a commitment of large numbers of
ground troops stationed in the region
-
Devising
a security architecture that effectively integrates east Asian components, and
has within it processes and mechanisms that facilitate a Northeast Asian/North
Pacific "caucus"
-
Devising
mechanisms and institutions with sufficient resilience that they can continue
to function, perhaps even ameliorate conditions, when a key regional player
experiences traumatic domestic instability
-
Coordination
of efforts, through multilateral planning, for responses to complex
humanitarian emergencies, either natural or manmade.
The
existing patterns of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, as well as the
directions that key regional players appear to be taking with regard to their
bilateral and multilateral strategies, do not give sufficient confidence that
we are moving in the right directions and at a sufficient pace to create a
regional security system that can cope with the provide sufficient insurance.
Certain bilateral relationships require more care and attention than
they are currently receiving. Multilateral processes require greater patience and support.
The anticipation of modest initial returns, and the risks associated
with the failure of some initiatives, should not be allowed to delay or offset
action towards these larger goals. Greater
attention should be given to the role of military-to-military activities in
both bilateral and multilateral contexts.
Process,
Mechanisms, and Results
The
terms bilateral, multilateral, and CBMs are part of every discussion of
Asia-Pacific regional security. These
same debates often prove frustrating because these phrases are used without
sufficient care and precision. What
one analyst describes as a positive outcome of multilateral dialogue, another
characterizes as a failure to attain meaningful results.
This is not simply a matter of seeking clarity of terminology for
academic purposes. Analysts need
to think more carefully and clearly about the strategies they are advocating
and how and why they might logically fit or not fit together.
Very briefly then, some important points concerning the three phrases
noted above.
Narrow vs. Expansive Bilateralism
Bilateralism
refers to dyadic interaction and thus describes a policy or strategy that
proceeds through bilateral ties. States
adopt bilateralism to the extent that there interests are better advanced by
maintaining separate relationships with other actors.
One needs to distinguish, however, between narrow bilateralism and
extended bilateralism. Those
adopting narrow bilateralism regard their dyadic relationships as sufficient
and appropriately self-contained, indeed to be isolated from each other and
not to be entangled and thus compromised in multilateral contexts.
In the current regional security environment, North Korea has sought a
narrow bilateral arrangement with the United States, China has wished to
address its South China Sea disputes using a narrow bilateral approach, and
the U.S.-Japanese relationship during the Cold War was perceived as and
protected by narrow bilateralism.
The
term expansive bilateralism refers to a bilateralist strategy that allows for,
even anticipates, the enmeshing of and perhaps, beyond that, their engagement
in, bilateral links in multilateral contexts.
Expansive bilateralism, for example, would entail moving beyond a hub
and spokes arrangement of separate dyadic relationships to the promotion of
(dyadic) links among the actors who represent the spokes.
The United States, for instance, has made an important transition from
narrow to expansive bilateralism in the post-Cold War period.
The recent reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japanese alliance suggests the
beginnings of a similar alteration in perspective by Japan.
Note that while both sides clearly regard multilateralism as a
secondary and supplementary policy strategy, they articulate their dyadic
relationship in terms of its being a component (or support) in a broader
regional context.
Ad Hoc vs. Institutionalized Multilateralism
The
term multilateral in simplest terms is merely an adjective, denoting the
involvement of more than two parties. As
a security strategy, multilateralism is grounded on the premise that
collective action is advantageous or necessary to achieve desired ends.
Multilateralism encompasses a broad spectrum of behaviors ranging from
coincidental, short-term cooperation to highly integrated, institutionalized
forms of interstate collaboration found in "security
communities."
There
are a variety of forms of the balance of power strategy, all of which could be
encompassed by the term ad hoc multilateralism.
U.S. assumption of a leadership role ( in effect the offshore balancer)
in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and in dealing with the North Korean
nuclear program is one variant. The
maintenance of a balance of power through the concerting behavior of the major
regional powers would be a second variant, also prominent in recent
discussions about the Asia-Pacific region.
In neither variant, however, are there any regularized consultation and
discussion mechanisms, nor any continuing institutional structures.
I
adopt the term institutionalized multilateralism is adopted to refer to
practices that involve these two featuresCregularized consultation and (formal or informal)
institutional structures. There
has obviously been a substantial transformation of attitudes in the
Asia-Pacific region vis-a-vis institutionalized multilateralism, although
certainly not to the degree developed in other regional contexts. The ASEAN organization would thus constitute the most
institutionalized multilateralist component of Asia-Pacific states; the APEC
forum a less institutionalized component.
At the Track 2 level, myriad consultation mechanisms have developed
throughout the region; almost all have no institutional machinery, CSCAP being
the furthest along in this regard.
Confidence-Building Measures
CBMs
are generally understood as including both formal and informal measures,
whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prevent, or
resolve uncertainties among states, including both military, and political
elements.
The term as used today is rooted in the experience of the Helsinki
process in Europe, where it initially referred to specific agreements,
procedures, and verification mechanisms negotiated regarding military
activities. But the connotation
of the term quickly expanded to encompass a whole range of activities that
might reduce the level of tension and uncertainty among states, including
measures to enhance transparency, constraining measures (such as demilitarized
zones), and principles and declaratory measures.
The acts of meeting, consultation, and negotiation themselves, because
they served to alleviate tension and misunderstanding between parties, came to
be included under the CBM rubric as well.
This has resulted in confusion between process and outcome, especially
as CBMs have come to be understood in the Asia-Pacific area.
Here
there was no prior history and experience of multilateral institutional
mechanisms, record of contact and exchange of information between militaries
of adversarial states, or even common acceptance that transparency was
necessarily to be desired. There
was, however, what Ball and Acharya have identified as a regional "security culture"
that placed weight upon consultation, incrementalism, and consensus
decision-making.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Asia-Pacific policy makers and
analysts, especially those of Southeast Asia, began to refer to Track 1 or
Track 2 meetings themselves as CBMs.
This has engendered the frustration of those who prefer to see the term
restricted to specific sorts of agreements and their mandated activities,
especially monitoring and verification and especially involving military to
military involvement, and those (often the same people) who see insufficient
progress in the ongoing parade of Track 1 and Track 2 meetings to warrant
the label CBMs. Without engaging
the implied arguments of some of these individuals as to the merit of CBMs
writ large,
it is valid to take to heart the call for more careful terminology. Thus "confidence building process"
will be used to refer to any of the general types of activities that seek to
advance Track 1 and Track 2 security-related activities, such as
ARF-related meetings and CSCAP meetings; and "confidence building measures"
will be limited to reference to particular agreements and their arrangements
for implementation (often involving military-to-military enagement), such as
the recently formulated Shanghai agreement signed by China and central Asian
states.
Military-to-Military Cooperation
As
a key agent (and in a number of Asian states the determining force) of a state's
foreign and security policies, the military plays a role in its bilateral and
multilateral strategies. Such
participation can take many forms, to include formal, military alliance
agreements, visits and exchanges of military personnel, military involvement
in peacekeeping, armistice monitoring, etc., military assistance in
humanitarian emergencies, and participation of individuals in the military in
Track 2 activities (where they might be described as "acting in their private capacities").
In
the post-Cold War context, there has been substantial employment of
military-to-military initiatives in the evolution of the regional security
order. The exchange of high-level
military leaders, for instance, has come to be viewed as an important symbolic
CBM and a barometer for the state of a bilateral relationship.
Members of national militaries regularly participate in Track 2
processes with significant impact, both because of their substantive,
practical expertise and because of their focus on achieving clearly specified
outcomes. Expansion of
military-to-military relations among U.S. allies (who have to date had
substantial relationships only with Washington) has begun, a key relationship
being between Korea and Japan. Multilateral
military-to-military activities (beyond those involving alliance partners) are
also on the rise, albeit to this point involving more meetings and seminars
than exercises and other joint operational activities.
A
number of concerns are voiced regarding military-to- military cooperative
activities:
-
In
keeping with the discussion above, some question the engagement of the
military in CBM processes that have
tended to produce few concrete results and that tend, in the opinion of some,
to distract both military and nonmilitary from the hard issues that need to be
addressed.
-
Alternately,
there is criticism that emphasis on military- to-military relations tends to
divert attention from important questions about the role of these militaries
in their own countries.
-
Or,
continuing in this vein, that military-to-military cooperation may promote
cooperation that inhibits overall regional security, as seen in the transfer
of technology, the selling of arms, or the organization of illegal trafficking
networks.
By
and large, however, expansion of the extent and scope of military to military
activities is viewed positively by Asia-Pacific security analysts who see
substantial longer term benefits from opening dialogues among national
militaries, as preliminary steps toward creating understanding, advancing
transparency, and promoting important functional.
(This refers to military-to-military activity as a CBM itself.
Obviously, significant intermilitary cooperation is already going on
among allied states, as well as in the monitoring and maintenance of the
elaborate arrangements set up at the end of the Cold War.)
How
does the rather abstract discussion of this section relate to the present and
future of the Asia-Pacific security environment, in particular the devising to
strategies to cope with the challenges just set out?
The argument would be as follows:
-
The
advancement of narrow bilateralism should be cause for concern; the emphasis
should be on promoting extended bilateralism, especially involving key
regional players such as Japan, China, and Russia.
-
Reliance
on ad hoc multilateralism is a not a satisfactory strategy for the future.
Its track record in the post-Cold War context is decidedly mixed.
It places too much reliance on the interest and capabilities of U.S.
leadership in the Asia-Pacific context. In
the shorter term, the positioning and planning for contingencies that might
require (ad hoc) multilateral responses have proven to be somewhat
dysfunctional in that they have raised concerns regarding balancing and
containment.
-
Regional
multilateralism should be advanced through Track 1 and Track 2 processes,
albeit with some rationalization of the latter to eliminate duplication of
effort. However, this requires a
delicate combination of patience (regarding the pace and progress of
confidence-building processes) and hard-headedness (regarding the need to
insist that states are not simply taking advantage of multilateral fora as a
strategy to advance their unilateral agenda).
-
Certain
institutionalized forms of multilateral security arrangements are going to be
required in the region. The resolution and management of the Korean peninsula
conflict are moving slowly but surely toward this end.
Formalized forms of interstate cooperation among Asia-Pacific states
will be required to meet the functional challenges, such as those involved in
maritime management and protection of the sea lanes, control of illegal
trafficking of persons, money, and goods, and so on.
Establishing
and Reorienting Bilateral and
Multilateral
Relationships
Recent developments in the Asia-Pacific
On
the Bilateral Front.
Since the ending of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific area, regional
security analysts have deservedly spent a lot of attention on multilateral
developments. However, it may be
that developments of a bilateral nature have been even more significant.
These are of four sorts. The
first concerns the reaffirmation and reorientation of existing bilateral ties,
in particular the keystone of U.S. engagement in the region, that is, the
U.S.-Japanese alliance. Its
reaffirmation in 1996 helped to solidify confidence within the region
regarding the continued role and presence of the United States.
Equally significant for the longer term was the reorientation of the
rationale for this relationship as a central element in promoting regional
security. In effect, there is movement in Washington and Tokyo away
from a narrow bilateralist conception toward an expansive bilateralist
perspective-a
transition of substantial import for the regional security architecture of the
future.
The
second concerns efforts in the other direction, to reinforce narrow
bilateralist relationships. It
has not been surprising, for instance, to see North Korea seek to secure a
bilateral relationship with the United States and to attempt to insulate it
from outside interference. While
this is clearly a nonstarter in the longer run, even as the United States has
resisted North Korean efforts to shut out other players, it has (allowed
itself to) become maneuvered into a position that gives the North Koreans
greater leverage regarding benefits for staying at the table than would have
been possible in any multilateral context.
Also of concern, however, has been China's
narrow bilateralist perspective on situations it regards as involving China's
territoriality or internal security. Its
behavior regarding claimant states in the South China Sea dispute is a case in
point. While making statements
that it will not use force to resolve disputed claims and while participating
in multilateral fora that discuss the South China Sea, Beijing has not budged
from its position of only negotiating on a bilateral basis and has not
apparently altered its strategy of challenging individual Southeast Asian
states by taking unilateral, preemptive, and provocative actions.
Third,
and in some contrast to the above, have been the significant steps taken by
China to resolve tensions along its land borders.
These include agreements reached with Russia, a Sino-Indian agreement,
and the so-called Shanghai agreement with the Central Asian states. Apart from their direct substantive relevance in assuring
China's "back
door,"
these bilateral events have interesting and possibly positive implications for
regional security development. As
Amitav Acharya points out, they can provide case studies of how to effectively
engage both military and nonmilitary players to achieve agreement over
contentious issues; they illustrate CBMs that, unlike those found in Europe,
relieve tensions without actually settling exact borders (in the Sino-Indian
case) and without establishing verification or constraining procedures; and
they provide an example of how networks of bilateral ties can achieve a
broader cumulative effect on regional tensions.
Fourth
is the formation of bilateral ties involving states already enmeshed in
multilateral arrangements. For
the small states in Southeast Asia, this is not a new strategy.
While actively promoting the advancement of ASEAN, member states such
as Singapore and Malaysia have sought bilateral relationships with the United
States, in effect "insurance policies"
to assure U.S. attention should their security be at risk.
The more intriguing recent bilateral event is the "alliance"
arrangement between Australia and Indonesia.
The circumstances of the negotiation of this agreement and its exact
provisions remain unclear, as does its logic.
One argument advanced is that the current Australian Government,
concerned about the future of domestic developments in Indonesia, sought the
security provided by a more permanent arrangement with the Indonesian
military. While this might prove
to be a quite idiosyncratic event, it could also presage a type of bilateral
strategizing vis-a-vis countries that, if politically unstable, could engender
larger regional instability.
On
the Multilateral Front. No
survey of the multilateral security activities of the Asia-Pacific area will
be attempted,
but four developments are noteworthy:
-
The
continued progress of ASEAN, whose members have transformed the organization
from an inward-looking exclusive entity to an inclusive, subregional
institution. Reservations
over the inclusion of non-like-minded actors have been overcome with the
conviction that the integrative norms and principles adopted by the collective
will predominate. In part this is
because there is relatively low concern over what have been traditional
security problems, namely interstate conflicts, and much greater concern over
the security implications of internal social, political, and economic
developments. The ASEAN states
view the prospects of amelioration of such human security concerns as being
much greater for themselves and for states like Vietnam, and perhaps even
Burma, if they are included rather than excluded from multilateral contexts.
There are, of course, substantial downside risks in this venture as
well; although ASEAN will become a 10-member organization in 1997, it is
appears that bringing on board Burma, in particular, has already posed
obstacles.
-
The
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, an ambitious attempt to expand the
scope of ASEAN multilateralism to encompass the Asia-Pacific region as a
whole. While the early
returns concerning this institution were largely positive, in effect
dispelling the skepticism that such an organization could be established in
the first place, initial optimism has been dispelled by some events.
In the words of an official attending ARF meetings, the institution is
experiencing a serious reality check. The
reasons, in part, are structural-for
example, major powers will be inherently reticent to cooperate in a
multilateral forum, especially one in which they do not control the agenda.
However, these features of the organization have always been apparent;
members presumably understood them when joining and did so with the believe
that there was long-term value in the existence of a regional institution, as
a CBM. What has been concerning
in the short term has been the stalling of the ARF work program.
States have proven unwilling to take tentative steps toward concrete
activities and unwilling to provide the necessary separate secretariat for the
organization, but on the other hand quite willing to attempt unilaterally to
manipulate and to attempt to control (read stall) the agenda and progress of
meetings.
-
The
formation and initial operation of CSCAP, the Council for Security Cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific. Conceived
in 1992 and announced in 1993, the Council proceeded until last year without
having resolved issues concerning Chinese membership.
These being settled, essentially according to Beijing's
conditions, the Council has embarked on its assumed role of being the Track 2
support vehicle for ARF. Progress
has been made, especially in the establishment and operation of four working
groups. (One of these, that
focusing on maritime cooperation, has presented a memorandum in the form of an
agenda of action to the ARF.) CSCAP,
through its regional bodies and its member committees in individual countries,
has succeeded in engaging the attention of top-flight experts and academics,
as well as officials and military representatives.
It held its first full-fledged annual meeting in 1996; observers will
now look to see if CSCAP can maintain momentum.
-
The
frustrating progress toward a multilateral security dialogue mechanism in the
northeast Asian/north Pacific. This
is not because most of the actors involved, including the United States, have
not been convinced of the seriousness of the challenges arising in the north
Pacific and the necessity of sustaining a minimal set of norms and
understandings among the major regional powers.
During the last several years, getting all of the relevant actors to a
table, including China and now North Korea, has proved to be daunting. The success of two recent developments will be important:
one, of course, is the establishment of a multilateral framework for
managing the direction of events on the Korean Peninsula; the second, at the
Track 2 level, will be the operation of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group-the latter being the only ongoing dialogue
mechanism to include all eight northeast Asian/north Pacific states.
Attention to Key Bilateral Relationships
Taking
the arguments presented above, and looking forward to the next decade,
attention needs to be given, in general terms to ensuring that narrow
bilateralism does not introduce rigidities and bifurcations within the
regional security environment. In
more specific terms, four key dyadic relationships need to be carefully
managed:
-
Russia-PRC:
That these two states have improved their relationship is, in
principle, a positive development for the overall regional security context.
However, two potential concerns arise.
One is that the transfer of technology and weapons from Russia to China
seen to date will grow into a partnership relationship for the development and
production of increasingly sophisticated hardware and software. Second is the concern that a Chinese-Russian relationships
will develop as a counterpoint or defensive bulwark against the rest of the
region, which Beijing and Moscow view as U.S.-dominated and opposed to their
longer term interests. Preventing
this may be difficult; for domestic, nationalist reasons both Russia and China
have sought to mobilize around an anti-U.S. hegemony theme. However, policy makers in the United States and the rest of
the region need to take care that their rhetoric and their defense policies do
not become self-fulfilling. That
is, that calls for strategies to hedge or balance or contain China do not
provoke counter responses from Beijing that will tend to polarize the region.
-
United
States-PRC: This dyad holds
the key to the future of the Asia-Pacific's security architecture. Beijing and the United States must develop clearer
understandings of their mutual interests in assuring the stability of the
region. This does not mean that
their relationship will necessarily be a friendly one, but both capitals need
to realize that a better working relationship is required in order to manage
critical tension points in the region. In
particular, the United States and Beijing need to develop understandings
concerning the Taiwan Strait matter. As
matters now stand, the deadlock and contest of will between the two major
powers have effectively shifted the initiative into Taiwanese hands-an
unhealthy situation for regional stability.
Moving matters forward between the United States and the PRC will not
be easy. Promotion of greater
understandings at the highest leadership levels will be prerequisite to
establishing new directions for the relationship.
In this context, continued high-level military to military meetings can
play a useful role.
-
United
States-Japan: Over the last 2
years, this relationship has begun to receive the careful mutual attention
that it deserves, in large part because Washington and Tokyo have succeeded in
disentangling their security relations from their trade relations.
Both sides have accepted the need to create greater openness and
flexibility in their relationship in order for it to adjust both to changing
regional circumstances and to changing definitions of U.S. and Japanese roles.
There remain substantial challenges, in particular arising from the
rigidities in the Japanese political and bureaucratic cultures.
Going beyond the first phase-
involving statements of great generality about reorientation of the alliance
and Japanese development of a broader understanding of its global and regional
security roles-to
taking any specific steps, even at the planning stage, has proved difficult.
Despite the close working relationship between Japanese and U.S.
defense agencies and forces, analysts are critical of the absence of effective
planning for changing regional contingencies.
-
Japan-Korea:
While the Korean peninsula situation could evolve in several different
ways, regardless of the route chosen it will be important for an effective
Japanese-Korean relationship to develop.
With the U.S. role in the region evolving, (inevitably toward a lower
profile and smaller physical presence in Asia), the Tokyo-Seoul dyad will
increasingly become the dyad that must meaningfully complement their
respective ties with the United States. Military-to-military cooperation,
having moved forward tentatively in the last few years, will need to expand
considerably in the future for this to take place.
Advancing the Multilateral Agenda
As
discussed above, the general parameters for a multilateral regional security
framework have been established-at the Track 1 level with ARF, at the Track 2 level
with CSCAP. For the next several
years at least, states will work within these contexts to advance and protect
their multilateralist agendas. The
extent of progress achieved will depend upon:
-
The
continued willingness of the major regional powers to participate in these
institutions, without seeking to control or stymie their consideration of
relevant security issues
-
The
willingness of the smaller states in the region, especially the ASEAN states,
to cede their prerogatives regarding membership criteria, agenda setting, and
secretariat management to the broader membership of these institutions
-
The
patience of key members to understand the slow, incremental pace of ARF and
CSCAP developments as representing a confidence-building process
-
The
ability of ARF and CSCAP to demonstrate that their efforts have achieved
actual results, albeit in relatively noncontroversial areas
-
The
development of mechanisms, within or outside the ARF and CSCAP contexts, for
dialogue and consultation in the northeast Asian/north Pacific.
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Contents | Next Chapter
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Notes
.
What is important and notable has been the increase in the output of
material from Asian countries, as indigenous communities of security
analysts become established and as their members are allowed to participate
and publish in open contexts.
.
Robert Scalapino,"North
Korea at a Crossroads,"
Essays in Public Policy (Menlo
Park, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
1997).
.
Desmond Ball, ed., The
Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region (London:
Frank Cass, 1996).
.
Brian L. Job, "The
Evolving Security Order of the Asia Pacific,"
paper presented at the International Studies Association-Japanese
Association of International Relations Conference, Makuhari, Japan, 1996,
typescript.
.
What is at issue is when this economic transition will begin, not
whether or not it will be undertaken.
.
Susan Shirk, for instance, has referred to the operation of a
regional concert of powers in the Asia-Pacific region, with reference to
management of the North Korean situation.
.
The South China Sea is also a critical issue.
Events here are unlikely to provoke a major crisis, with the Chinese
pursuing a classic "salami
strategy"
by strategically making moves vis-a-vis individuals opposing claimant
states.
.
With regard to China, I tend to discount the possibilities of
fragmentation and dissolution of the Chinese state, believing that while
there will be downturns in economic growth that will result in serious
challenges to Beijing's
leaders, these will be "managed,"
albeit involving soft (and hard), authoritarian measures.
.
A key case in point would be Indonesia.
While there is growing concern for the difficulties that may lie
ahead within the domestic political scene in that country, insufficient
attention is being given to the impact that such circumstances would have on
the capacity of ASEAN to function effectively.
.
These distinctions are spelled out more fully in Job.
.
In a bilateralist mode, even if B and C are perceived as friends by
A, A will regard sustaining A-B and A-C links as more efficacious that
forming an A-B-C (multilateral) arrangement.
.
See Paul Evans, "The
Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia/Pacific Region," in
Ball, 201-218.
.
This definition is taken from Amitav Acharya, The
ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence
Building (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
1997), who in turn adopted it from a recent paper on CBMs done by Indonesia
for the ARF.
.
See Acharya and Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking
Confidence-Building Measures, Adelphi Paper no. 307 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997).
.
In the early post-Cold War years, some Asian leaders objected to even
the use of the terms CBM, arguing that it perpetuated the idea of importing
models of international relations from Euro-Atlantic.
.
Desmond Ball, "Strategic
Culture in the Asia Pacific Region"
Security Studies 3, no. 1 (1993):
44-74, and Acharya.
.
See, for instance, Desjardins, who highlights the downside of CBMs
and regards them as being often "obstacles
to progress."
.
China particularly comes to mind.
The establishment of military-to-military contact came to be viewed
as a critical step in the repair of post-Tienamen incident relationships.
China therefore has made a point of promoting such initiatives.
For instance, Willy Wo Lap Lam reports that by the middle of 1994,
the PLA had established links with armies in over 30 countries and hosted
visits by more than 60 military delegations and ground troops from almost 30
countires. Quoted in Christian
Dinwoodie, "Changing
Part-Army Relations in China: From
an Army of the Party to an Army of the State?"
(Canada: Department of Political Science, University of British
Columbia, 1997).
.
Exercises such as RIMPAC, for instance, remain bilateralized, that
is, the United States invites a number of navies to exercise with it. While
these states themselves might engage in bilateral exercises, this does not
become a multilateral event, largely because of the proscriptions on
Japanese participation.
.
Surveys of the extensive Track 1 and Track 2 agendas of Asia- Pacific
regional security can be found in Evans and in Nicholas Eberstadt and Ralph
Cossa, "Multilateralism
and National Strategy in Northeast Asia,"
Analysis 7, no. 5 (December 1996).
.
Michael Leifer, The ASEAN
Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (London: International Institute
of Strategic Studies, 1996). As Liefer points out, ARF has inherent
limitations-in part because of its operating principles but more importantly
because, as a Southeast Asian initiative managed by a set of small states in
the region, it lacks the "engine" of a
major power concert.
.
The ARF meeting on confidence-building measures, co-hosted by Beijing
in 1997, has been cited by various participants as a case in point.
.
To cite one example, "The
Japanese Government has not been able to base its planning on political
controversial potential threats. That
inability makes already constrained bilateral planning almost impossible."
Strategic Assessment 1997:
Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington: National Defense University
Press), 59.