STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION
         Military Forces in the  Asia-Pacific Region

INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS
      Satish Nambiar  

Introduction

The United Nations was conceived in London in 1941 as the successor to the League of Nations, which was perceived to have failed in its most important function―preventing a second world war. Twenty-six countries at war with Germany and Japan met in Washington on January 1, 1942, where they expressed their faith that the anarchy of international relations must be controlled. The Charter of the United Nations, as signed in 1945, set out a code of behavior by which nations would work together to eliminate aggression and promote economic and social security. The central aim of the United Nations Charter was to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression."

Chapter VI of the Charter regarding pacific settlement of disputes obliges parties to a dispute likely to endanger international peace and security to seek a solution by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Chapter VII of the Charter confers powers on the Security Council to take resort to the use of armed force, should various other measures fail, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security; under this Chapter, member states are also required to provide armed forces and other assistance and facilities. In pursuance of this latter provision, in April 1947, the Military Staff Committee (also provided for in this Chapter), apparently produced a report that agreed that the five permanent members should provide the bulk of the armed forces, but members of the Committee were unable to agree on the size and locations of such forces and the balance of contributions, thanks to the degree of political mistrust that then prevailed. The military arrangements foreseen in the Charter therefore never became reality (perhaps just as well, when viewed in context of  what we witness today), leaving the United Nations without the means of enforcement to promote what is the central aim.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, Indian Army (Ret.), is currently involved in the study and analysis of U.N. peacekeeping operations and national security matters, including defense strategy and international relations.  Before retiring, General Nambiar served on the General Staff Branch at various levels, including the appointments of Additional Director General and Director General of Military Operations at Army Headquarters.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

In the early years of the United Nations, while the use of military personnel on a large scale was being discussed with diminishing prospect of agreement, experiments in using them on a far smaller scale evolved almost by accident. Small groups of unarmed military observers formed part of the United Nations missions in Greece in 1947 in west Asia and India/Pakistan in 1949; this became a regular feature of United Nations peacekeeping missions and continues to this day, even in missions where armed military contingents are deployed.

It is well known that there is no specific provision for peacekeeping in the U.N. Charter. It is an invention of the U.N. Secretary General and his  Secretariat and evolved as a noncoercive instrument of conflict control, at a time when Cold War constraints precluded the use of the more forceful steps permitted by the Charter. During the Cold War, neither of the two super powers was amenable to U.N. intervention against their allies or within their spheres of influence, hence an improvisation: peacekeeping without combat connotations evolved.

As it evolved over the years, peacekeeping became an extraordinary art because it called for the use of the military personnel not to wage war, but to prevent fighting between belligerents, ensure the maintenance of cease-fires, and provide a measure of stability in an area of conflict while negotiations were conducted. To that extent, it is important to distinguish between the concept of "collective security" and peacekeeping in the international environment. Whereas the former is a punitive process designed to be carried out with some degree of discrimination, but not necessarily impartially, the latter is politically impartial and essentially noncoercive. Hence peacekeeping was, and has always been, based on a triad of principles that gave it legitimacy as well as credibility―namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly armed peacekeepers only in self-defense.

The premise on which international peacekeeping is based is that violence in interstate and intrastate conflict can be controlled without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures. Needless to say, there are many theorists, and I dare say, a few practitioners, who are of the view that force needs to be met with force. An objective analysis of the history of conflicts would make it evident that the use of force and enforcement measures, particularly in internal conflicts, tends to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it speedily. This is not however, to suggest that the use of force is to be ruled out altogether; in certain circumstances, use of force may well be called for as a catalyst for peaceful resolution.

Enforcement is subjective and biased toward one side or another and tends to be counterproductive if prolonged, which it invariably will be, particularly in intrastate or internal conflicts.  On the other hand, peacekeeping initiatives, can often ensure only a status quo and thus be equally counterproductive, unless complemented by associated initiatives such as peacemaking (working toward a negotiated political solution) and peace-building (working toward the restoration of an equitable economic and social order, among other nation-building activities). Peacekeeping operations, being more objective and nonpartisan, lay a stable base for the pursuit of peacemaking and peace building. Quite often, however, a measure of stability brought about by cessation of hostilities is not exploited speedily to progress peacemaking activity, and there is a reversion to conflict, for which ironically the peacekeepers are blamed, rather than those who should have exploited the advantage.

  The Cold War Era

In the first 45 years of the existence of the United Nations, in so far as conflict resolution is concerned, there were many significant instances where peacekeeping was not applied. In super power confrontations like the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the United Nations had only a peripheral role. In situations where Super Power interests were directly involved, as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and some Latin American conflicts, the United Nations played only a marginal role. West European nations did not permit any significant role for the United Nations in conflicts like Northern Ireland, the conflict between the United Kingdom and Iceland over fishing rights, and the Falklands war. Similarly, the United Nations was excluded from a role in a number of conflict situations in Asia and Africa―the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the war in Indo-China, the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, the Chinese action against Vietnam, and the conflict in the horn of Africa.

Notwithstanding these exclusions, U.N. peacekeeping operations covered various corners of the globe in furtherance of one of the primary purposes of the U.N. Charter,  maintenance of international peace and security.

U.N. peacekeeping, in the form of military contingents, had its beginning with the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai in 1956, after a cease-fire had been arranged. The force consisted of contingents from eight countries. The success of the UNEF appears to have induced the Security Council to readily accept a request by the Congo in July 1960 for intervention on attaining independence from Belgium. The United Nations accepted responsibility for ending secession and re-unifying the country. The Rules of Engagement were modified to cater to the use of force in defense of the mission, to carry out humanitarian tasks, and to counter mercenaries.  Other major undertakings attempted by the United Nations during the Cold War era were the Cyprus operation, which continues, and the Namibia operation, which oversaw that country's transition to independence and may be considered as one of the success stories.

  Post-Cold War Era

With the end of the Cold War, U.N. activities in the maintenance of international peace and security increased considerably, the impact being both quantitative and qualitative. As of mid-1996, the United Nations had mounted 41 peacekeeping operations― 15 were established in the 40 years from 1948 to 1988; 26 have been set up since 1989. In January 1988, 11,121 military, police, and civilian personnel from 26 countries were deployed in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and the annual budget for peacekeeping was $230.4 million; in December 1994, at the height of such commitment, 77,783 personnel from 74 countries were deployed and the annual budget was $3.6 billion. However, by November 30, 1996, the total number of military personnel and civilian police monitors deployed had decreased to 25,649, and the number of countries contributing contingents was down to 71.   Of even more significance is the over-riding priority given to a European contingency with a third of the current strength deployed in four missions in former Yugoslavia, despite a sizable multinational deployment, and a U.N. peacekeeping budget of about $500 million for this purpose.

The qualitative change is even more important, in that most of the recent conflicts have taken place or are taking place within states, or between units that were part of unitary states until they began to fall apart. They have not always been fought by national armies; sometimes paramilitaries and irregulars are used, in which process civilians have been the main victims. In many cases, state institutions have collapsed; in a few cases, there are no governments. As a result, humanitarian emergencies have forced the international community to intervene.   This is why the demands on U.N. peacekeeping have gone well beyond traditional peacekeeping to encompass activities like demobilization of troops and armed paramilitaries or irregulars, promotion of national reconciliation, restoration of effective governments, the organization and monitoring of elections, provision of broader support to humanitarian aid missions, including protection of "safe areas" and escort of relief convoys, and so on.  Other major Cold War period undertakings by the United Nations were UNEF II and UNPUF established in the Sinai and on the Golan in 1973 and 1974, respectively, at the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and UNTEA, set up in 1962 for the peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control.  All three were successful.  UNIFIL, established in 1982 to prevent further conflict by Israel in South Lebanon, has been largely ineffective.

  The Dilemmas and the Challenges

The increasing demands placed on the international community for intervention in conflicts across the world today, the wide range of activities that need to be covered, and the greater complexities and dangers of peace operations have thrown up a number of issues, both dilemmas and challenges, that need to be recognized, analyzed, and catered to in the conduct of future peace operations. There are more than enough lessons from the recent experiences of peace operations undertaken by the international community, be they U.N. operations or those under the umbrella of Security Council resolutions on Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.

  Sharing Responsibilities

The most important aspect to emerge from the experiences of the last 5 years is that the United Nations was never designed to handle either the combined problems of the magnitude of  Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, or even individual obligations.  It is therefore a tribute to the dedication and selflessness of the U.N. Secretariat and the personnel who took part in these operations that they achieved even what they did, which, despite the criticism, was certainly not insignificant. Hence, there is an imperative need for building institutional capabilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. An appropriate division of responsibilities among the United Nations and other international actors in the spheres of preventive action, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement action, and peace building needs to be arrived at in order to enable more effective and comprehensive responses to conflict situations around the world.  

Such division of labor should obviously take advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organizations, national governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Current experiences indicate that the United Nations may be most effective in the fields of preventive action, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, mediation, and peace-building activities through its various agencies. In time, regional organizations would need to assume a greater responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but for the time being, these organizations could play a role in preventive action, peace making, and confidence building at the regional and subregional levels, while allowing for a more gradual development of peacekeeping capabilities. For the future, it would appear that enforcement action will have to be undertaken by coalitions of "the willing and the able"; inevitably, this option will be viable only when the national interests of key countries are sufficiently engaged by a particular development.

It is, however, important to stress at this stage that the concept of sharing of responsibilities for the execution of missions for the maintenance of international peace and security be clearly understood. It means that the mission is undertaken with a clear direction either by the United Nations, a regional/subregional organization, or a multinational force. There must never be any question of shared responsibility for command and control for any aspects of execution within a mission, as was attempted in the former Yugoslavia at later stages of the operation between the United Nations and NATO, with the disastrous results we are aware of. It is also important to stress that, for an operation to be successful, there will invariably be a need for complementary efforts by other players, in support of the main effort by the designated authority.

Anticipation and Monitoring

Analysis of some of the successful, or even relatively successful, operations in the recent past reveals the absolutely inescapable need for the international community to anticipate events in potential trouble spots to the extent feasible, to monitor the actions of the major players or parties, and to set in motion moves to defuse, or at least minimize the effects of, growing tensions. There is no question that investing in social and economic development is one of the surest ways of building a solid foundation for the long term, within and among societies. This means addressing the roots of the conflict and trying to build a conflict response mechanism into the structure of development projects, particularly in countries where the potential for conflict is high.

This can best be achieved by institutionalizing arrangements for constant collection of data from various regions through all available agencies―United Nations, governmental, and nongovernmental sources, and so on―in regard to the state of affairs, particularly in potential conflict areas. These data would need to be constantly updated, monitored, and disseminated to various international actors/agencies who have a role to play in ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security. Cells could be set up for the purpose on a regional or subregional basis, appropriately manned and equipped. Whereas it would be best for such cells to be set up and run by regional organizations, with the United Nations having access and inputs, given the intense distrust and mutual suspicion that currently prevail in so far as the objectivity of regional organizations is concerned, it may be prudent for this purpose to set up U.N. cells at selected regional centers until a better climate of international cooperation in governance is attained. Needless to say, such cells must be manned by international civilian/police/military staff provided by member states on U.N. payroll (for which, obviously, the international community must provide funding).  

It is indeed a serious reflection on the callousness and indifference of the international community that in the case of developments in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, for instance, neither those responsible for negotiations nor those who were tasked to undertake operations were provided the maximum available information and data on the events that led to the crises, the stances of the political leadership of the opposing sides, the nuances that were to significantly affect the attitudes of the parties to the conflict, the military status of the belligerents, factual details of the mission area, and so on.

The advantages of a cell arrangement are twofold.  Should it become necessary for the international community to get involved in any of the measures toward ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security, current updated data and analysis of the trouble spot would be readily available to the Security Council, the negotiators, peacemakers, and personnel of a mission.  Further, should it be necessary to set up a U.N. (or regional) peacekeeping mission, a nucleus staff of civilian, police, and military personnel could be provided by the concerned cell, to ensure that mission and subordinate headquarters have personnel who have worked together before and are aware of standard operating procedures and provide expertise about the geopolitical dynamics of the mission area, belligerent leadership stances, military status of the various parties, and so on―all important inputs for the successful conduct of a mission.

Political Resolve for Preventive Action and Peacemaking

There can be hardly any disagreement on the assertion that it is better to prevent conflicts through anticipation by institutionalized arrangements, discreet diplomacy, and in some cases, preventive deployment, as in the former Macedonian Republic of erstwhile Yugoslavia. The United Nations and other international actors must therefore invest a great deal more in preventive measures. Successful preventive action can be highly cost effective, saving lives and sparing general destruction; it is obviously considerably cheaper than an operation to restore a broken peace and covers a spectrum of activities that goes well beyond the traditional notion of preventive diplomacy and the new mechanism of preventive deployment. It must encompass a broad range of political, economic, social, and humanitarian measures, aimed at averting or de-escalating conflict. However, there will invariably be the problems of determining whether national sovereignty is being transgressed or should be transgressed, the possibility of misreading a developing situation until it is too late, or a lack of interest or will on the part of the international community at critical moments. Afghanistan and Rwanda are two notable examples.

For negotiations connected with preventive diplomacy or for peacemaking, the international community requires dedicated and trusted envoys, whether they be to pursue the efforts of the United Nations or a regional organization; the Secretary General of the United Nations indicated difficulty in securing the services of such persons. This lacuna must be resolved, as experience has revealed the need for suitable eminent persons to undertake effective negotiations that really provide the basis for the success of a mission.  

It is a matter of record that it is not possible to have successful peacekeeping without a determined and successful peace process. Peacekeeping and peace-building activities are not self-sustainable; they must be nurtured by a process of negotiations or peace making, during which the parties to the conflict are made to redefine their interests and develop a commitment to a political settlement. The fact that most successful missions in the last decade, or even the partially successful ones―Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique―were the result of years of negotiations, in which many third-party international actors is no accident.  Although the wars in these areas went on for a long time, they illustrate that it is better to take the time to get the details of a settlement right, than to initiate a peacekeeping process that is flawed in its concept and content, as so glaringly made apparent in the inadequately planned and prepared U.N. deployment in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

It takes firm political resolve and unified concerted action from outside actors to make the parties to the conflict come to terms with one another and work toward a negotiated settlement.  Regarding Somalia, after a futile effort, the international community washed its hands of the affair and left the people to their fate. In the former Yugoslavia, after a long period of indecision, symbolism, and rhetoric, during which many lives were lost and considerable destruction wrought, powerful third parties, with the United States leading the field, played a critical role in coercing the parties to the conflict to a negotiated settlement, as well as in advancing the peace process after the settlement was reached.  It will remain an eternal shame that the international community, because of utter incompetence, lack of foresight, and poor statesmanship did not secure a negotiated settlement in end 1992, on more or less the same terms as that negotiated in Dayton in November 1995.

Clarity of Purpose and Setting an Achievable Mandate

If there is one lesson that emerges very distinctly from the experience of recent operations, it is the imperative need for the Security Council to deliberate carefully over decisions for the setting up of peace operations. The Yugoslav and Somalia operations were set up under pressure, in the former case from the European Community and in the latter from the electronic media. Because these were set up without adequate preparatory work and a framework of an agreed settlement, both suffered from what came to be known as "mission creep."

In the case of former Yugoslavia, whereas the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was set up with a mandate for tasks connected with three U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, and for which the military, police, civilian personnel, and equipment had not yet arrived in full even by the end of June 1992, the Security Council commenced conferring extensions of mandate without ensuring that the negotiated base for execution of such additional tasks had been laid and without providing for the resources in personnel and equipment. In the 6 months between June and December 1992, extensions of the mandate were received, to include reopening the Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, establishing a joint commission and functions in "pink zones" in Croatia, monitoring heavy weapons around Sarajevo, monitoring immigration and customs functions on UNPA boundaries that run along state borders, deploying escort of humanitarian aid convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina, monitoring demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, deploying observers at airfields and monitoring the "no fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina, controlling the Peruca Dam, and preventing deployment in Macedonia.  Resources for the execution of all these tasks were never provided.  What must be mentioned, however, because it is not often well understood, is that UNPROFOR never had a mandate for "peacekeeping" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  

One gets the impression that the lesson has been learned, but given the propensity for expediency in international politics, it would not be perverse to imagine that should similar situations arise in the future, there may be an inclination to go the same way. Such a situation may well be avoided by some structural reform of the Security Council.  Decisions pertaining to the setting up of missions, the mandates conferred, composition of the force, rules of engagement, reviews of conduct and performance of such missions from time to time, and so on, cannot, and must not, be the sole prerogative of two or three powerful members of the Security Council.  The decisionmaking process must be more broad based and the consultative process even more so. Any reform of the Security Council should seek to achieve four main objectives: clarification of the role and mandate of the Council; recomposition of its membership; broadening of the base of participation and transparency in the work of the Council; and strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of the Council.

Availability of Forces for Peace Operations

There is no greater legitimacy for the use of military forces, and for that matter, civilian police, than for the maintenance of international peace and security. It should therefore be a matter of honor and privilege for countries to provide such forces for peace missions. However, the practical experience in this context is rather dismal. The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops in the mission area was a most frustrating feature of the missions that were set up for the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and to some extent, Somalia.  Even more inexcusable was the inadequate response for Rwanda. One of the measures that has now been instituted to overcome this inadequacy is the earmarking of stand-by forces by member states.  However, it is a moot point whether such forces would, in fact, be available immediately on demand; the Rwandan experience indicates that political expediency and domestic compulsions will always dictate the responses of member states.

Needless to say, because of the increasing dangers inherent in the conduct of peace operations, there is greater reluctance on the part of contributor nations to expose their troops to what is perceived as "some other parties' war." This attitude is perverse. In a world that is shrinking every day in terms of communications, mutual accessibility and interdependence, we owe it to succeeding generations to make it a safer place.  Further, no self-respecting soldier, sailor, or airman would have any reservations whatsoever in participating in any peace operation provided the mandate is clear and achievable and adequate resources are provided, and he is assured that it has the political backing and support of the international community. The very reason for sending military personnel into a mission area is that there is an element of danger, which by their training they are reasonably well equipped to face; if there were no danger, there is no reason why civilians cold not undertake the task. Having stated that, however, it needs to be emphasized that because the military as a well-disciplined force undertakes an allotted mission without questioning the political merits and demerits, a greater responsibility devolves on those who confer the mandate.  

The only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces is to raise and maintain a standing U.N. force of a defined composition, properly organized and trained and adequately equipped, to be available to the United Nations for immediate deployment when authorized to do so by the Security Council.  Reservations about costs, and possible biased utilization at the behest of the more powerful members of the Security Council, are aspects that need to be resolved in context of the restructuring of the Security Council. Utilization of such a force is premised on its early replacement by another force duly constituted by the United Nations, by regional organizations, or by a multinational force, as decided by the international community.

Rules of Engagement

This is one of the more misunderstood aspects of U.N. peacekeeping operations. It is generally well understood that traditional peacekeeping operations do not preclude the use of force in self defense, but what is not generally well known is that the use of force in self defense can be extended to such use in execution of the provisions of a mandate, subject to clarity in this regard and an acceptance by troop-contributor countries of some inherent dangers of retaliatory action by belligerents.

The rules of engagement for each mission are drawn up by the Force Commander or Head of Mission based on the mandate for the mission, the resources available to the force, the terms of the agreement arrived at with the parties to the conflict, the prevailing ground situation, and so on. In all operations other than those that fall in the category of Chapter VII operations, it is to be assumed that the use of force will be restricted to the minimum necessary to deal with a given situation. In the light of recent experiences of dealing with intrastate conflict situations, it would, however, appear prudent to ensure that all future peacekeeping contingents be equipped for the "worst case" scenario, so that they can respond with appropriate force in self defense when attacked.  

Command and Control

Command and control of U.N. operations (or regional or multinational operations for that matter) are vital aspects that need to be understood by all member states and governments, in as much as there can be no compromises. There is only one option in so far as command and control of an operation are concerned.  All forces deployed in a mission area must take their orders from the Head of Mission or the Force Commander and implement them in the correct spirit. It is for the Head of Mission or the Force Commander to be careful and discreet in decisions that are sensitive; some guidance from U.N. Headquarters in New York may be necessary on occasions, but backing for the Mission Headquarters must be unqualified. All this, however, means that the U.N. hierarchy and the mission headquarters, must be so organized and structured to breed confidence in contributor nations and personnel who form part of a mission.  

The system followed in the past whereby commanders and staff were gathered together at short notice (as in the case of UNPROFOR), and whose allocation was based on equitable representation related to troop contributions, may have worked in the years when the pressures on operations were not as significant as they are today.  That system is not workable under present-day conditions, increasingly dangerous as they are. Heads of Missions and Force Commanders must be appointed early and be associated with the negotiating process that precedes the setting up of the mission and with the framing of the mandate for the mission by the Security Council.  This would assist considerably in ensuring that an achievable mandate is given to the force, and realistic rules of engagement are drawn up. Equally, a nucleus staff of military, police, and civilian personnel for the headquarters must be drawn from existing U.N. organizations, where personnel would have worked together for some time and therefore understand one another and have a working knowledge of U.N. procedures.  This would be feasible if there are some U.N. organizations oriented toward peacekeeping activities, such as regional cells for data collection and monitoring, or regional training centers in selected locations, or a U.N. staff college, to provide the bank from which to draw on the personnel when required.

Use of Force in the Conduct of Peace Operations

As mentioned earlier, U.N. peacekeeping operations allow for the use of force by peacekeepers in self-defense. This provision has considerable flexibility in application and has been more than adequately demonstrated in the conduct of missions in the past. There have been many instances where troops on U.N. missions have resorted to the use of force ranging from the classic interpretation of protecting one's own person from attack, to using armed force against those who attempt to interfere with the execution of the mission, whether it be protection of a designated area, a convoy carrying humanitarian aid, dealing with mercenaries acting against the lawful government, or any other such operation. The main point to be stressed in this context is that the Security Council mandate setting up such an operation must very unambiguously state that such use of force is authorized and, most importantly, ensure that the force is equipped for the purpose; of course, troop contributors need to be aware of the heightened dangers to their personnel. The rules of engagement must then include this provision for dissemination to all personnel in the mission. Parties to the conflict must also be made aware of the fact and application of the principle always done in an unbiased manner.

In cases where enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is considered the appropriate response following a major breach of peace, or an act of aggression, certain parameters need to be understood and catered for. There has to be adequate political will, including the will to bear the possible human cost of the military operation; the will and capacity to absorb the financial burden; and the availability of troops well prepared and equipped for the task. This is a rather tall order for the United Nations to be expected to fulfil, which is why it has been suggested that, for the future, it would appear more practical for such operations to be farmed out by the United Nations to coalitions of  "the willing and the able."

Experiences over the last few years have revealed that there are some developments peculiar to the type of intrastate, ethnoreligious conflicts the international community is being increasingly called upon to deal with. These developments seem to fall between the two well-defined modes of response to conflict situations, peacekeeping and enforcement actions. Commanders at various levels must learn to recognize the nuances of such situations and be trained to deal with them in an appropriate manner under given sets of circumstances. Some of the examples of such contingencies are:  

Coordination with Aid Agencies

As discussed earlier, international peace operations envisage, among other functions, assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid. In this context, the interaction between the U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia, and aid agencies (such as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR, and nongovernmental organizations, NGOs) merits some reference. It took some time for an institutionalized arrangement to be set up, primarily because of the magnitude of the problem and the fact that all organizations were struggling to cope with their own internal dynamics in the early stages, under fairly adverse conditions. In the process, some very serious reservations about one another developed, and it took a great deal of effort at various levels for it to dawn on all concerned that they were in fact working to a common purpose.

Insofar as aid agencies are concerned, it is essential that their efforts be coordinated, both in terms of aid effort as well as the assistance desired from the military.  The best arrangement would be for the UNHCR to be the lead agency, but then, most NGOs appear to have an agenda of their own and are reluctant to subordinate themselves to any other organization.  They argue that they have to show results to those who fund their activities, and their aims and purposes may not totally coincide with that of the international community. At a seminar at Oxford University in October 1995 on the subject of the role of the military in humanitarian emergencies, it was surprising  to note the intense distrust of the military by most NGO personnel, as a result of their interaction in the field in various mission areas.  Sadly, at the end of the 3-day seminar, it seemed that the gap between the military and the NGOs may well have widened. This is a factor that senior commanders, U.N. Headquarters, and other international actors would have to consider to correct the wrong perceptions that seem to persist on all sides.  

The Media and Public Information System

The importance of the media, both electronic and written, in whatever activity is undertaken cannot be overstated. There is possibly no other single factor that has a greater influence on the evolution, preparation, and conduct of a peace operation than this. Some operations in the recent past were rushed into, without adequate preparation and thought, purely because of pressures generated by media reports.  In other cases, conduct of operations in mission areas has been influenced by media coverage, even to the extent of being against the better judgment of commanders on the ground. It is therefore imperative that the international community recognize the impact of this vital aspect and, while using it to good effect to further the cause of international peace and security, have the strength to resist its pressures for deployment of forces without all implications having been taken into account, and full preparations made.

A related aspect is a recognition of the equally vital importance of providing qualified staff and essential equipment for running an effective public information system as part of any peace operation, as it is being set up.  Wherever this has been done well the mission's success has been largely assisted, and where it was conspicuous by its nonexistence for many months, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia, the mission was seriously handicapped, because truth is invariably the first casualty. In fact, in such operations, this vital tool is required from the outset in order to deal with the disinformation put out by the parties to the conflict and by unprincipled media persons.  

The Way Ahead

The end of the Cold War and the relative success of Operation Desert Storm induced a sense of euphoria that the international community was geared to deal with dangers to international peace and security in a more effective manner than before. However, the experiences in Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, and some of the former republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union quickly dispelled these expectations and in fact may well have induced a sense of retrenchment in regard to peace operations. Even so, there is hardly any doubt, that the international community and belligerents will turn to the United Nations for attempts at resolution in times of conflict. Hence operations for the maintenance of international peace and security will continue to be required and must therefore continue to receive the attention they deserve, both in terms of political support and military preparation.

             International peace operations, whether under the aegis of the United Nations, regional organizations, or multinational groupings, are the only answer to conflict resolution, when all else fails. But it must be emphasized that the root of most conflict lies in deprivation in  society.  Maximum efforts, therefore, need to be directed toward preventive action by the international community; in this effort, whether it should be the United Nations or regional organizations, is a matter of statesmanship. The United Nations has its limitations and hence there is a greater role for regional organizations.

An analysis of current trends on the world scene suggests that the international community needs to concentrate on three specific areas in terms of a possible requirement for intervention at a significant level. The first is west Asia, where no player other than the United States can contribute to lowering the temperature and assist in resolution of the conflict situation. The second is Europe, best left to the machinations of the European Union or the NATO. And the third is Africa.  Dr. Ali A Mazrui, the Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, and Albert Schweitzer, Professor in Humanities at the State University of New York at Binghampton, proposed during a seminar in Vienna in March 1995 that the United Nations place a moratorium on any peacekeeping operation outside Africa for the following 15 years; he argued that the United Nations could make a bigger difference in Africa than in any other place in the world.  

International peace operations are the best area for effective and increased military-to-military cooperation, which, if properly orchestrated, could lead to better understanding and appreciation even between otherwise hostile armed forces. A significant case in point is that of the cooperation between the Indian and Pakistani contingents during their concurrent participation in the United Nations operation in Somalia. There are any number of examples of the understanding and camaraderie built up between otherwise antagonistic armed forces personnel when operating under the U.N. flag.

With the nomination of stand-by forces by member countries for deployment in U.N. peace operations, the scope for periodic interaction and training increases, laying the foundations for more effective joint participation in international operations. Compatibility of equipment, particularly communication equipment, will make for greater understanding of common operating procedures.

Should the suggestions for establishment of regional cells for data collection and activity monitoring within regions find favor with the international community, there will be closer interaction among representatives of neighboring states, who may well form the nucleus of mission headquarters set up at short notice when required; alternatively, such staff may be found from regional training centers or a U.N. staff college, if set up. The investment would more than pay for itself in terms of better understanding and rapport among personnel of countries of specific regions.

With the political situation developing in the manner it is, the preference in terms of assistance or mediation for resolution of regional disputes may well devolve on regional organizations, in which case it is inevitable that the military-to-military cooperation within regions will increase.

As we look into the 21st century, it is essential that we do not allow the perceived inadequacies of some recent operations to cloud our judgment and swing from one extreme of attempting to undertake too much, to undertaking too little. There is so much the international community can do to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, and there is no way it can absolve itself of that responsibility. 

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