COOPERATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY

In the last two decades, the United States, Europe, and the former Soviet Union have recognized the vital role arms control and CBMs have played in enhancing security. Although some states are uneasy with the concept that arms control and increased openness can enhance their security, others acknowledge the need to decrease regional conflict and are beginning to consider new options. By limiting the numbers and types of military equipment in European countries, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty reduces the possibility that one country can surprise another with a conventional military attack. In the Middle East multilateral peace process, the Arms Control and Regional Security working group is discussing potential regional arms control and CBMs. In South Asia, India and Pakistan have implemented a hotline agreement and negotiated several other military CBMs such as the notification of military exercises. South America has contributed to the regional arms control process with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, and with the quadripartite agreement for monitoring nuclear facilities among Brazil, Argentina, the Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

These regional discussions involve a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from nuclear arms control to environmental protection. In the initial stages of regional security discussions, it is important to identify issues where progress is possible. Even if the primary regional arms control concern is nuclear weapons, the first series of discussions may need to focus on less volatile issues, such as the environment, conventional weaponry, or disaster response. In regions where tensions are high, limiting armaments or ceasing controversial weapons development programs may only become possible after considerable confidence building in other areas. The following table illustrates potential topics for regional arms control and CBMs.

Regional vs. Global Cooperation

Many regional security initiatives occur against a backdrop of multilateral or global arms control. In such cases, the question of the relationship of the regional to the global agreement often arises. Many arms control analysts emphasize the overriding importance of global agreements, especially those that concern nuclear issues, and stress that regional agreements should be embedded in a global context. However, regional agreements can have advantages over their global counterparts.

Potential Topics for Regional Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures

Nuclear

Conventional

Delivery Systems

Fissile material production cutoff

Demilitarized zones

Missile non-deployment

Reactor closure

Arms reductions or limitations

Missile destruction

Nuclear weapon-free zone

Prenotification/

observation of military exercises

Missile production limitations

Material disposition and safeguards

Incidents at Sea Agreements

Missile test limitations

Test limitations

Arms transfer registers

Missile ban

Nuclear emergency response

Military exchange programs

Prenotification of missile launches

First, where political issues impede participation in global treaties, a regional agreement may be the only viable solution in the near term. The series of agreements between Argentina and Brazil regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon programs provides a good example.

Second, regional agreements can be tailored to meet particular concerns of regional parties. For example, a regional verification regime might be needed for a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone to supplement international measures such as those implemented by the IAEA.

Third, regional agreements sometimes can be negotiated more rapidly than global agreements. The 1991 bilateral Open Skies Agreement between Hungary and Romania and the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding on the destruction of chemical weapons between the United States and the former Soviet Union demonstrate this point.

Fourth, some issues are purely regional. While a third party may be requested to monitor compliance with agreements in some regions, such as the demilitarization of the Sinai between Egypt and Israel, the Israeli agreement to withdraw from occupied territory is an inherently regional issue.

It is important to keep in mind that participation in regional or bilateral agreements does not preclude participation in global arrangements. Indeed, a regional or bilateral regime may be a stepping stone or a necessary first step. It is possible to imagine a global nuclear weapon dismantlement program for which bilateral agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union, such as START and INF, provide a starting framework.

Long-term effectiveness of regional security agreements ultimately will depend on the commitment and day-to-day involvement of regional parties. Although an external presence may remain important in many regions, it will not obviate the need for a strong indigenous infrastructure for both the development and the implementation of region-specific options for arms control and confidence-building measures. An institutional infrastructure is needed to support the analysis of policy options and the process of negotiating agreements. Implementation of agreements will also require a technical infrastructure that could include the development of monitoring technologies, a communications network for exchanging information, data-analysis capabilities, and trained inspectors.

Cooperative Monitoring

Monitoring often plays a role in implementing security and arms control agreements. Monitoring is cooperative when the information is collected, analyzed and shared by parties to an agreement. Cooperative monitoring provides a method of openly documenting compliance with the terms of an agreement and makes any act of noncompliance difficult to ignore. If technical tools are used to collect relevant information, the technologies must be sharable among all parties, and all parties must receive equal access to information acquired by the system. A cooperative monitoring regime also should include administrative procedures for dealing with anomalous data and false positives. Such procedures are necessary for constructively resolving disputes that may arise.

Many monitoring technologies originally developed for national security purposes in the United States and elsewhere are applicable to a broad spectrum of regional arms control and confidence-building applications. Examples of unclassified and exportable technologies are unattended ground sensor systems, aerial overflight systems, commercial satellite systems, and systems for data security and access control. When combined with data management, analysis, and integration capabilities, these technologies provide powerful tools for implementing regional agreements. They enable parties to observe relevant activities, to define and measure agreed parameters, to record and manage information, and to perform inspections.

Because technology plays an important role in implementing agreements, it can be a particularly useful area for first steps in cooperation. Although many countries have achieved significant technical sophistication, applying technology to the cooperative monitoring of security agreements is often a new concept. For technically less-advanced countries, achieving familiarity with monitoring technologies may require significant investment in education and training. Lack of knowledge about monitoring technology and procedures can undermine commitment to an agreement and impede effective use of monitoring technology. Collaborative projects by regional parties to identify and assess options for technical monitoring can be significant CBMs.

Experimental approaches to develop technology to support cooperation are constructive because they can proceed before formal agreements are in place. A cooperative monitoring experiment is a technical collaboration on collecting and sharing data relevant to a monitoring application. The object is to familiarize participants with monitoring techniques and procedures. Although valuable as a CBM, monitoring experiments can also provide information needed by negotiators during the negotiation process. Experiments provide the opportunity to investigate monitoring options in a neutral environment and adjust procedures and technologies to meet regional needs. Experience from experiments forms a base for a comprehensive agreement when future political conditions permit. Interpersonal relationships resulting from collaboration further support the confidence-building process. The experiments on sharing seismic data internationally, conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts in preparation for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is a good example of a large-scale cooperative monitoring experiment.

The Korean peninsula is the site of one of the world's volatile areas for potential military conflict as North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. troops face each other along the 255-km military demarcation line. CBMs, particularly military ones, that address the security needs of both countries could decrease the danger of conflict and help create an environment where a peaceful regime might be negotiated. In spite of the present mutual distrust, steps can still be taken to prepare for future development and implementation of CBMs.

Arms Control Initiatives

Inter-Korean relations have been quite volatile since the 1953 armistice. Between 1954 and 1985, North Korea made 205 arms control proposals and South Korea made 55.¹ The proposals included CBMs, operational and structural arms control, and disarmament. In some cases, the two countries offered proposals more for political propaganda purposes than for arms control. Because of the political conditions in both countries, none of these proposals resulted in concrete actions. The December 1991 "South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation" (known as the Basic Agreement) appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough. The Basic Agreement, which contains provisions for confidence building, military transparency, and operational arms control, is currently frozen.

There is a consistent philosophical difference between South and North Korean proposals for arms control. South Korean, European, and American analysts have examined the history of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and promoted the application of CBMs and operational arms control to the Korean peninsula. In contrast, Chung-In Moon described North Korean perspectives on arms control as being based on Europe's experience during the 1920s, with little analysis of the last 20 years in Europe.² The South argues that confidence must be built before structural arms control or disarmament can occur. The North argues that arms reduction, primarily in the number of active military personnel, will result in increased confidence.

Opportunities For Military Confidence Building

A feature of arms control in Europe that may have application in the Korean context is transparency. The fundamental purpose of transparency measures is to share selected information about activities that previously were shrouded in secrecy. Transparency does not limit military activities or resources and can be part of a formal agreement or be performed informally as a CBM. Techniques to achieve transparency fall into two broad categories: nontechnical (declarations, onsite observers) and technical (the use of sensors to monitor activity, analysis of physical samples). A benefit to implementing transparency measures is that personal contact between adversaries helps to humanize the effects of prolonged hostility.

Ambassador James Goodby, former Chief Negotiator for U.S./Russian Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility (ST&T) negotiations, assessed the evolving South-North positions in operational and structural arms control.³ Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi examined transparency along with other potential CBMs for the Korean peninsula.⁴ Both studies found a number of similarities in the positions of South and North Korea. South and North Korea agree on the basic principle of constraining certain military operations and dispositions. Their differing views of a threat, however, result in very different applications of that principle. In spite of these different perceptions, the two sides agree that:

The DMZ should be truly demilitarized and made a zone of peace.
Communication links should be established to avoid inadvertent conflict.
Military exercises should be declared in advance of performance.
Both governments should mutually declare their intention to avoid the use of force.

Cha and Choi concluded that transparency measures, accompanied by some constraint measures, are the best choice for future initiatives to develop military confidence between South and North Korea. They recommended that transparency measures be introduced first because excessive secrecy about military status can damage relations by fostering even greater suspicions. Measures that provide transparency in pertinent areas of military affairs help reduce suspicions by providing opportunities for communicating nonhostile intentions.⁵ Although transparency is an excellent first step to take, it does not solve all security concerns nor does it change military realities. The goal of transparency should be a balance between secrecy and the acknowledgment of legitimate mutual security concerns.

To date, North Korea is resistant to transparency in military matters. Onsite inspections of military activities have been rejected as an infringement on sovereignty; only strong international pressure convinced North Korea to provide the IAEA access to its nuclear facilities. Given the centrally controlled political system in North Korea, transparency measures that are not carefully defined may be perceived by the leadership as presenting a threat to the state. Therefore, proposals to North Korea to implement specific transparency measures should demonstrate pragmatic benefits. Including justification of the transparency proposal would help North Korea recognize the potential benefit of selective openness in military activities.

Four Conceptual CBMs

Bilateral contacts between South and North Korea still occur. The multilateral Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project to build nuclear reactors is progressing. South Korean companies continue to establish commercial links with the North. Military confrontation, however, remains a serious risk. Given the suspension of direct official talks between South and North, are there steps that either might take that would contribute to the long-term goal of building confidence?

Based on the analysis by Cha, Goodby and others of common themes in South and North Korean arms control proposals, four conceptual transparency measures for military activities are presented here. After the presentation of the conceptual CBM, a first step that South Korea could conceivably take is defined for each option. A second step, that could become cooperative, is then defined for each option.

Opening dialogue with North Korea is one of the first steps to begin to ease the current political tensions. For many years, North Korea rejected direct official interaction with South Korea because of the implication that it recognized South Korea as a sovereign entity. Perhaps third parties, such as the news media, can function both as communication channels and advocates. An independent review of confidence-building proposals by a credible third party may contribute to North Korean acceptance. The Internet offers a new mode of communication that can be performed discretely and unofficially in presenting perhaps a draft of conceptual CBMs sent via the internet. North Korea could then access the information, which may give them some "food" for thought without the obligation to make comment.

The analysis of the following and other options for military transparency may present an opportunity for political confidence building. North Korean academics and technical experts might be invited to participate in a joint study of military confidence building options. Alternatively, North Korean academics could perform such analysis independently and present the conclusions in a multilateral forum.

Reduce Dangerous Military Activities In The DMZ

Issue: Military incidents within the DMZ are a source of tension.

Conceptual CBM: Restrict troops to observation posts in the DMZ and declare travel to those posts.

Cooperative Monitoring Option: Use ground sensors to perform the function performed by military security patrols.

Possible First Step: Establish an experiment to assess performance and reliability of a variety of intrusion detection sensors in a realistic Korean environment.

Background Comments:

Security patrols operate routinely in the DMZ. Military intrusions occur that violate the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Such incidents are relatively common and adversely affect bilateral relations. An accidental violation of the Armistice may be interpreted as having greater political significance than the reality. If security troops in the DMZ were restricted to observation posts, there would be far less potential for conflict between rival patrols. The security troops would continue to function as observers at the post and also form a rapid-reaction force to respond to potential violations.

An experiment in monitoring with sensors would contribute to the development of options for transparency. There are several direct benefits associated with monitoring experiments:

Preparation of options for a time when future political conditions are more favorable
Development of indigenous technical capability
An opportunity to assess operational issues in monitoring
Increased confidence with monitoring technology and procedures

The experiment should operate for 6 months to a year) to evaluate the effect of climate and aging on the monitoring hardware. The experiment should also test alternative modes of communication.

Possible Cooperative Step: Establish communication links with interested parties and share data from the experimental system. This step would serve to acquaint the North Koreans with cooperative monitoring and transparency. An impartial review of the experimental system and test results by a credible party could make the transparency option seem more realistic to North and encourage North Korea to participate in future experiments.

Figure 1. Example of Facility for Evaluating Ground Sensors

Transparency in Military Movements

Issue: Military movements raise concerns about preparations for attack.

Conceptual CBM: Permit regularly scheduled or challenge aerial overflights to monitor ground activities.

Cooperative Monitoring Option: Install commercially available sensors on an unarmed aircraft.

Possible First Step: Perform analysis of sample imagery to determine what capability is necessary to monitor activities of concern.

Background Comments: Large military training maneuvers and movements are destabilizing when there is a low level of trust between countries. Permitted aerial overflight provides a means to implement transparency without restricting capability. Aerial monitoring is less intrusive and creates fewer political implications than ground-based sensors or observers. The Open Skies Treaty between members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact and the 1991 bilateral agreement between Hungary and Romania are useful precedents. Several papers have investigated the concept of cooperative aerial monitoring in Korea.⁶

A country contemplating the use of aerial monitoring needs to understand what technical capability is necessary to make a substantive contribution to transparency. A useful first step would be to assess various methods of aerial sensing to decide which ones should be used. While optical image resolution is a function of the capabilities of the optics and the altitude of the aircraft, the Open Skies regime permits no better than 30-cm resolution. Although the Open Skies Treaty is frequently cited as an example, the monitoring techniques used were negotiated specifically for that treaty. The Open Skies Treaty should not be viewed as the only technical approach. Airborne monitoring equipment is available commercially today that has greater capability than that agreed during Open Skies negotiations. Higher resolution synthetic aperture radar would be particularly pertinent to the Korean environment due to the presence of rain, snow, fog, and haze.

Possible Cooperative Step: Publish and distribute analysis of sample imagery.

The concept of permitted and reciprocal aerial overflight for monitoring is not beyond the realm of possibility since North Korea opened three commercial air routes over its territory in 1996. Even if motivated solely by financial remuneration, this action is unprecedented in North Korea's history.

Publication of a South Korean sensor study and imagery analysis would contribute to North Korea's understanding of this option for transparency. The document could be directly or indirectly distributed to North Korea for review. Third parties can again play a useful role as independent reviewers.

The United States performed a similar project for the Open Skies Treaty. The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) produced a book containing actual imagery along with a description of the monitoring equipment and procedures used to collect the images.⁷ The United States distributed the book to interested parties to increase understanding of the Treaty and provide a reference tool.

Transparency in Missile Production

Transparency measures are potentially applicable to topics as controversial as the production of long-range missiles. Both South and North Korea have an interest in ballistic missile production. The United States has held bilateral talks with North Korea on missile development, production, and sales with the goal of persuading it to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).⁸ The 1980 ROK-U.S. missile development agreement restricts South Korean missiles to a maximum range of 180 km. South Korea has cited the need to modernize its aging ballistic missile force for defensive purposes. This program would involve indigenous development and production. After meetings with ROK representatives in 1996, the United States has indicated that it would relax the restrictions of the 1980 agreement and support South Korea's entry into the MTCR.

Issue: Production of long-range missiles raises regional concern about aggressive intent.

Conceptual CBM: The MTCR does not limit domestic deployment of long-range missiles or reduce regional concerns about their use. A significant CBM would be for both South and North Korea to renounce the possession and production of long-range missiles. Long-range missiles could be defined by the MTCR guideline of 300 km. Under this assumption, production of the North Korean SCUD-B missile and the proposed replacement for the South Korean NHK-2 missile could conceivably be permitted. North Korean production of SCUD-C, No Dong, and Taepo Dong missiles would be banned.

Cooperative Monitoring Option: Install sensors at production facility gates to distinguish between short and long-range (i.e., over 300 km) missiles.

Possible First Step: Conduct a study to define the physical characteristics of missile systems that comply with the range restriction and assess how these characteristics can be detected and measured by sensors.

Cooperation among countries in Asia will be needed to reduce tensions and to solve security problems. Arms control and confidence-building measures, both international and regional, could play a role in reducing threats of nuclear proliferation and conventional military conflict. Developing an infrastructure to support cooperation will be a complex technical and political challenge because there is little tradition in this region for openness about national security activities. Additionally, countries in the region have relatively little experience with technologies for implementing cooperative agreements.

Cooperative monitoring offers an opportunity for countries to engage in meaningful collection and exchange of information that can increase transparency and reduce tensions. Without credible information about relevant activities in other countries, arrangements will not reduce tensions or alleviate concerns. On the contrary, they could form the basis for countries to accuse each other of violations and increase the potential for conflict.

A number of regional security analysts see opportunities for constructive measures to decrease military tensions on the Korean peninsula. To date, political conditions have not permitted the successful negotiation and implementation of any significant measures. This chapter presented four conceptual options for CBMs with first steps that could evolve into South-North cooperation. These concepts for military CBMs are intended to stimulate discussion and require further study.

Parties can experiment with cooperative monitoring concepts to achieve transparency before entering into either a formal or informal relationship. Experiments familiarize participants with both the procedures and technology for monitoring and can be a form of confidence building themselves. Collaborations can provide neutral ground for interaction among technical communities and produce results that will aid national leaders in the implementation of potential future agreements. Collegial relationships that develop among participants can also contribute to confidence.

Success in building confidence is more likely to occur when all parties understand they will not necessarily be worse off as a result of implementing military transparency. Explanation of key concepts and assumptions should be included with proposals. Alternative means to formal diplomatic exchanges, such as the use of the Internet, now exist and may permit a quiet, yet effective, process of information exchange and consensus building.