STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION
         Military Forces in the  Asia-Pacific Region

PART II  
Utility of Force


THE PERSISTENCE OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER IN A MARITIME THEATER
    Bernard D. Cole  

Introduction

This article addresses the current security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, a dynamic situation lacking clarity.  Several questions will be used to frame the issue:  

Dr. Bernard D. Cole is Chairman of the Department of National Security Policy and Professor of Maritime Strategy and History at the National War College in Washington, where he focuses on maritime strategy and Asian security issues. Dr. Cole previously served 30 years as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.

For the purposes of this discussion, the Asia-Pacific region includes Russia, Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand.  "Conventional power" is defined as that of military force, not including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Our first concern is the current status of military force in the Asia-Pacific region.  Some of the military capabilities of the region will be discussed, but the focus will be on the role armaments are playing and are likely to play, rather than the armaments themselves. Recent articles on the region tend to address the question of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific area; more important is the issue of how arms acquisition and modernization are affecting the conduct of relations by the nations of the region among themselves and with other states.

The Asia-Pacific states continue to witness rapid, sustained economic growth, with high single rates of increase in GDP common.1  This burgeoning national wealth during the latter Cold War era and the years since has redefined how we classify nation-states in terms of "greatness" and national "power":  Japan is often cited as unique-rising to eminence as one of the world's two most powerful economic states without a concomitant growth of military force.  But this phenomenon has been common among the other Asian states who have emerged as the economic "tigers" or "newly industrialized countries" of the region.  Asia-Pacific national development is losing this character, however, as the states of the region invest in expanded, modern military forces.  

The Asia-Pacific region is inherently a maritime area,   defined by maritime lines of interest and trade.  The ocean offers the primary avenues of economic growth and interaction, and vast nutritional and mineral resources and provides the primary means for both defense and offense, in the event of conflict. The nations of the region recognize that their vital national interests are to a significant degree maritime and that threats to those interests will come by sea.  They are determined to place effective military forces on and over the ocean to provide a foundation for the diplomatic, economic, and political pursuit of their national interest.  

The Transformed Asia-Pacific Security Environment

The end of the bipolar world has freed nations from a feeling of obligation to choose sides between the United States and the Soviet Union.  This choice was never as acutely felt in the Asia-Pacific as it was in Europe, but the bipolar contest nonetheless largely defined the international environment in Asia as it did elsewhere.  Equally significant is the dramatically altered nature of the threat of nuclear warfare in the post-Cold War world.  Although the hands of the atomic "doomsday clock" have moved back from near midnight, nuclear weapon technology is increasingly available (literally on the Internet), and the means of mass destruction are increasingly defined by the "poor man's nukes"-chemical and biological weapons.2

The infamous gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 is only the best-known instance of chemical warfare by terrorist organizations and rogue states. The reduced threat of nuclear mass destruction that accompanied the end of the Cold War has been replaced by the increased threat resulting from the new, relatively widespread availability of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

Hence, as a result of the end of the Cold War, the nations of the Asia-Pacific are faced with less stark choices but many more harsh possibilities.  No longer are they confronted with having to choose between two great powers and opposing political systems, but instead must deal with an environment encompassing a multiplicity of complex situations.  There are factors common to the foreign policy goals and national security perspectives of all the nations of the Asia-Pacific, from tiny Brunei to giant China.

These common ingredients include the economic, political, diplomatic, and military components of national security policy.  The last of these, the use of military strength in the conduct of international relations by independent national actors, is our concern.  

Regional Military Modernization

Asia-Pacific nations are almost without exception engaged in modernizing their military forces to help achieve their most important vital interest: national security.  They are increasing the military instruments of national security by taking advantage of three factors:  

These nations are attempting to take advantage of the putative revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the undoubted revolution in business affairs (RBA).  RMA may be characterized by a reliance on computer-based technology; RBA is marked by a similar reliance on computerization, as well as by the internationalization of global economies.  The Asia-Pacific states are pursuing military modernization while hedging their bets: the drive for technological modernization is tempered with concern for the international political environment and a cautious approach. 

The chief factor in this attitude is China, which dominates the Asia-Pacific area.  One reads and hears much about that great nation's campaign to modernize and increase the power of its military. China is expending very substantial resources to build, buy, and attempt to reverse-engineer a technologically advanced navy.  Despite this program's successes, notably Kilo submarines, Sovremennyi guided-missile destroyers, and SU-27 jet aircraft purchased from Russia, the Chinese Navy is still a force of the 1960s. 

          Disputed Claims in the Asia-Pacific Region  

China's military modernization is taking place within significant domestic constraints.  In 1982, the late Deng Xiaoping laid down four priorities for his country's modernization:  agriculture, industry, science and technology, and (only fourth) national defense.3  The Chinese Government appears to be adhering to these priorities, keeping military modernization firmly in last place.  China's civilian and military leaders acknowledge this prioritization under the rubric of "rich country, strong army," an aphorism recognizing that a strong national defense first requires a strong national economy.4

China's military modernization is drawing great attention, but in fact is characteristic of all Asia-Pacific nations (less Russia).  Dramatic denigration in the readiness of Russia's still very large Armed Forces has occurred since 1989.  Some of the former Soviet Union forces went the way of the former Soviet States- witness the very significant naval fleet that accrued to independent Ukraine; other elements of the former Soviet military have withered from lack of funding and resources for training and operations.  The Far Eastern Fleet has been especially hard hit, as this once formidable armada has shrunk to insignificance, a phenomenon repeated to a somewhat lesser extent among Russia's Far Eastern Army and Air Forces.  Russia might well resurrect significant military forces in the Asia-Pacific region, but such an event is far from likely in the course of the next decade.

In direct contrast to the decayed Russian Armed Forces is the modern, capable Japanese military, especially the naval and air Self-Defense Forces.  Japan flies the most modern aircraft, including F-15s and AWACS.  On the sea, Japan has the most potent and capable naval force indigenous to the Asia-Pacific.5

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) includes AEGIS guided-missile destroyers, as well as destroyers armed with the older but still very capable Standard surface-to-air (AAW) missile.  Many are also equipped with Harpoon surface-to-surface (ASUW) missiles.  The JMSDF is air intensive and is quite capable in crucial antisubmarine warfare (ASW), including extensive shore-based air assets.  Perhaps most importantly, the Japanese naval forces are near state of the art in the vital command and control integration area: no other Asian nation, certainly not China, approaches the Japanese level of systems integration.  Systems integration is an important force multiplier and a primary indicator of a modern, sophisticated navy.

This does not describe Taiwan's Navy, built on an obsolete base of ex-U.S. ships but rapidly modernizing.  Especially notable are the new Perry-class frigates and the former U.S. Knox-class ASW frigates, the first equipped with standard AW missiles and both armed with Harpoon missiles.  Taiwan is also acquiring French-designed Lafayette ASW ships.  The island's navy includes two new (and two very old) submarines and is supported by an air force that will soon count over 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000s to go with four (and possibly more) E2T "mini-AWACS," all very capable aircraft.

The nations of Southeast Asia present an almost consistent picture of defense modernization.  The Philippines, with no real seagoing navy, at least has on paper a significant (3 billion pesos) modernization program, although it has yet to be implemented. Even Brunei, on the island of Borneo, has a capable force of small warships, the three most modern equipped with Exocet cruise missiles.  

Brunei's imposing neighbor, Indonesia, has the largest and potentially most capable navy in Southeast Asia.  Recent acquisitions include 16 ASW corvettes and 9 minesweepers of the former East German navy.  Two German-built submarines are on order, to join two boats already in the fleet.    

Additionally, the Indonesian Navy mans an extensive force of amphibious ships, including 12 ex-East German LSTs, equipped to carry some of the nation's 13,000 man marine corps.  This latter capability reflects the military's primary national security concern: internal control and domestic stability.  Nonetheless, Indonesia seems determined to build a maritime force modern and strong enough to protect its vital national interests in the South China Sea, with an air force of dual mission F-16s and British-built Hawks.

Across the Malacca Strait, Singapore is building what is arguably the most technologically modern national security force in the region.  The island state continues to develop its integrated air defense network, built around a sensor-weapons system utilizing F-16s and E2Cs.  At sea, Singapore has invested in corvette and patrol-boat-size warships armed with cruise missiles.  A mine hunting force is also being formed, using state-of-the-art Landsort-class ships from Sweden. 

One sign of Singapore's systematic planning is the recent purchase of an older submarine from Sweden, to include training for two crews.  This submarine remains in Sweden; when Singapore purchases modern submarines, the crews will essentially be ready to take them to sea.6

No other Southeast Asia nation is in quite the strategically crucial location as Singapore, but Malaysia is close and has been devoting major resources to building a modern maritime force.  The growing Malaysian Navy exhibits characteristics similar to Singapore's: four modern, operationally proven Italian-built Lierci-class mine hunters, and corvettes and frigates mounting sophisticated electronics suites and cruise missiles.  Additionally, Malaysia has been considering the acquisition of  submarines, although financing the purchase apparently remains in the planning stage. Malaysia has also been paying attention to maritime infrastructure, building a new naval base at Lumut.  Malaysia's developing air forces, which rely on F-16s and MIG-29s, have both air-control and antisurface capabilities.

Thailand's expanding, modernizing Navy is even more advanced than that of its neighbors.  The kingdom has a unique record of maintaining its international independence in even the toughest circumstances of peace and war.  Hence, it is particularly meaningful that Thailand is building and buying such a strong maritime force.  Indeed, the first regional aircraft carrier is Thai, as Spain delivers the Chakkrinaruset, a 12,000-ton displacement ship capable of operating a mix of up to 18 Matador Ajump jets" and helicopters.  The fact that the government describes this ship's mission as disaster control and is reportedly furnishing it with quarters for the royal family does not alter the fact that before the end of 1997 Thailand will have the only navy in the Asia-Pacific able to generate its own air power at sea.  And air power continues to be the operational arbiter of conflict at sea.

To accompany its new carrier, Thailand has cruise-missile- equipped corvettes and frigates, supported by an air force that includes F-16 and long-range maritime patrol aircraft.  The Thai Navy promises to be a very capable force.  

Vietnam does not appear to be developing a modern maritime force.  Its warships are very old and of dubious combat capability-witness their thrashing by the Chinese Navy in 1988.  The future of Vietnam's maritime forces will likely depend on policy choices that ensue from Communist Party and generational changes within a country still trying to recover from almost a century of foreign invasion and civil war.  The summer 1996 Communist Party Congress may well have authorized steps to renew the military.7 Vietnam potentially offers the firmest national strategy of defense and power projection of any of the Southeast Asian nations, including 30,000 "naval infantry" with amphibious lift for about 5,000; how this will translate into modern forces at sea is not clear.

In southern Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand are attempting to solidify their status as Asia-Pacific nations, rather than as European outposts in Asia, by formulating an Asian national security policy.  Both Australia and New Zealand are modernizing their navies with missile-equipped frigates and, in Australia's case, newly designed submarines.  

Common Defense Goals

With the possible exception of Vietnam, then, all Asia-Pacific nations have made the national security policy decision to field modern, technologically advanced maritime forces.  Even the Philippines at least has a plan on paper.  There are several common factors in these efforts.8

First is the mutual defense goal of acquiring multimission jet aircraft, capable of both air superiority and ground support operations.  These are the aircraft that enable a nation to engage in both self-defense and power projection.  Most common are the American-built F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s flown by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia; Russian-built MiG-29s and British-built Hawks are also present.

Vietnam's air strength includes six Soviet-designed SU-27 dual-mission capable aircraft.  This fact shows the nascent state of China's arms modernization program, the most warily regarded in the Asia-Pacific region: China has herself only recently taken possession of SU-27s purchased from Russia.

A second common goal of the Asia-Pacific states is to acquire maritime reconnaissance and ASW aircraft.  These range in capability from Brunei's three Indonesian-built CN-235s to the very sophisticated, American-built P3 Orion aircraft flown by Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and New Zealand, to the E2 "mini-AWACS" flown by Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore.  China is undoubtedly working hard to acquire comparable aircraft, especially with AWACS capability. 

Third, all the Asia-Pacific nations are building national defense forces with a maritime element of modern, technologically capable surface combatants-central to the success of maritime presence and control. 

The fourth common factor is sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the weapons systems of choice for modern navies.  They are a "force multiplier," enabling even a small state like Brunei to deploy a force to be reckoned with by a much larger opponent.   American Harpoons and French Exocets are commonly found in almost all the region's maritime forces.  China has developed and exports its own cruise missiles, the C800 series, a variant of the Exocet family.   

Fifth is a widespread desire to buy submarines, which offer the most effective means of sea control.  Submarines are even more of a force multiplier than cruise missiles: just the suspected presence of opposing submarines compels the commander of even the most modern battle group to place primary emphasis on solving the ASW problem before executing his operational mission.  

China and Japan have extensive submarine forces, while Australia, Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia possess smaller numbers.  Submarines are expensive to build or purchase and difficult to operate effectively.  Nonetheless, their potential is such that Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have apparently decided to join the submarine club. 

The sixth area of modernization common to these maritime forces is electronic warfare, both offensive and defensive.  Australia and Japan are clearly the leaders in this mission area, while China has yet to move much beyond a Soviet legacy of 1950s- and 1960s-era equipment.  Other Asia-Pacific countries recognize the importance of this warfare area and are beginning to make strides in equipping their forces. 

Finally, the Asia-Pacific nations are organizing power- projection forces, preferably those with a rapid-reaction capability.  China has been particularly concerned with this area, dating from the 1985 decision to change the national security paradigm from one of global nuclear war to regional war scenarios.  This led to designation of "fist" and rapid-reaction units.  The actual reaction time of such units, which form the core of the PLA, is not as important as Chinese adherence to the concept that caused their organization and increased state of operational readiness.

China has also re-formed its marine corps, approximately 6,000 men trained in airborne or amphibious assault.  This force is stationed with China's South Sea Fleet, near Hainan at the mouth of the South China Sea, indicating China's view of that sea as a potential theater of rapidly developing crises.  Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Australia also field marines or similar rapid deployment units.  

The Question of Strategy

What is not common among Asia-Pacific states, however, is well-thought-out maritime strategy to support national security goals.  China leads the way in this important area, with a three-phase strategy designed to advance the nation's maritime strength from coastal defense, to regional and perhaps global capability built around aircraft carrier battle groups by the year 2050.9  The doubtful viability of this very ambitious plan is not as important as the fact that China has recognized the necessity and benefit of a maritime strategy as an important part of its national security policy-that to be the major (if not hegemonic) power in the maritime Asia-Pacific, China must be able to contest for command of the seas, certainly against other Asia-Pacific nations-and in the long term perhaps against the United States.  There currently appears to be emerging in China a belief that the PLA is capable of defeating the Japanese Defense Force (JDF).  This may be true in the highly unlikely event of a ground conflict, but the PLA Navy and Air ForceCwhich would of course bear the overwhelming brunt of any conflict with Japan-would be handily swept from the sea and the skies by the far more advanced and better trained JMSDF and JASDF.   

No other nation in the region appears to have formulated so clear a maritime element of its national security strategy.  Russia has no apparent policy in its Far East, let alone a clear strategy for its fleet. 

Japan is an island nation almost completely dependent on maritime lines of communication for resources and economic well-being.  Thus, the JMSDF is currently the most capable and potent navy in the Asia-Pacific, able to command the sea anywhere in the region for discrete missions and limited periods of time.  No other Asian navy can do this or is likely to be able to do so for the next decade or more. 

Japan is firmly linked to the United States through the bilateral defense treaty, however, which ties the JMSDF the U.S. Seventh Fleet, homeported in Yokosuka.  Should this link weaken, Japan would promulgate a strong maritime strategy as part of a national security design.  Such an eventuality would be a sobering sign of the breakdown of the American role as strategic stabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific arena, and signal to the other nations of the region the need to increase the pace and scope of their arms buildup.

Korea's maritime interests are extensive, with long coastlines and many island possessions, but the inherently continental structure of the Korean national security situation dictates strategic priority ashore rather than at sea.  In the near term, Korea can rely on operating with American naval forces under the U.S.-Korea defense treaty.  In the longer term, the Koreans will be hard pressed to develop a national security strategy to deal adequately with their extremely difficult geopolitical situation, located among China, Japan, and Russia.

Only Taiwan faces a security situation more difficult than does Korea, and it clearly recognizes the value of a strong maritime defense force in the face of China's military.  The island also understands it will not be able to prevail in the face of a really determined assault by the mainland; its strategy is to pose a defense strong enough to make the military option unacceptably costly to China, while relying on United States intervention.

The Philippines are too occupied with internal security matters to develop a maritime strategy, although concern for defending maritime claims in the South China Sea will rank as a primary strategic goal for whatever navy results from the planned modernization program.  The Philippine military's efforts will likely continue to be absorbed by the Islamic rebellion in the south, the New Peoples Army rebellion in the north, and by concerns for domestic stability throughout the nation.

Indonesia likewise confronts internal security problems but also has very important resource concerns and territorial claims in the South China Sea.  Indonesia's situation typifies that faced by developing nations: the national will and ability to develop a navy possessing off-shore capability (power projection)  depend on that nation's confidence in its internal stability.  Hence, Indonesia's drive to develop a major, offshore navy seems somewhat at odds with the situation in East Timor and the uncertainty surrounding President Suharto's succession. 

Furthermore, Indonesia (like Japan and the Philippines) is an intensely archipelagic state: national unity and political well-being are inextricably tied to the government's ability to control the seas that surround and defines the nation.  Any effective national security strategy must be maritime.  

The two smallest Asia-Pacific nations also have primarily maritime national security concerns: almost the entirety of Brunei's wealth resides off-shore, in the form of petroleum reserves and territorial claims in the South China Sea, claims contested by four of her neighbors, including China.  As an island, Singapore is defined by the waters surrounding it, providing both the means for defense and avenues for encroachment.  Singapore seems to have thought through the strategic purposes of its defense forces: air and maritime forces appear equipped and trained for defense of the nation and control of the Malacca Straits, one of the world's most crucial sea lines of communication.

Malaysia's strategic goals are less well defined than Singapore's.  Malaysia clearly has strategic interests in the Malacca Straits area and is also involved in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea.  Hence, while the developing Malaysian Navy seems intended primarily for littoral surface warfare, Malaysia must at least think about possible missions involving encroaching Chinese forces.

Thailand has no territorial claims in the South China Sea; her border concerns are ashore, with Cambodia, Burma, and Malaysia.  Hence, its sea services (navy, coast guard, and a capable 18,000 man marine corps) will likely continue to occupy a secondary position within the military.  Nonetheless, the Thai Navy, with its integral air power and missile-equipped escorts, ranks with the Indonesian navy as the maritime power of Southeast Asia.  Thailand's current national security policy rests on maintaining a strong, positive relationship with both the United States and China, including the acquisition of Chinese weapons and ships.  This is a policy, given Thailand's historic success in the international arena, that may serve as a bellwether for other nations of the region.10

Vietnam has national strategic interests in the South China Sea  but appears not to be pursuing them in other than political and economic venues.  Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are dependent on maritime resources and lines of communication, and all face "continental" security situations will continue to draw national security attention in competition to maritime concerns.            Australia and New Zealand are also dependent on maritime communications, which mandate a credible maritime presence in the region.  The ANZUS pact with the United States has been moribund since New Zealand's 1985 dissent over the presence of nuclear weapons in-theater.  This treaty may recover its vitality but will not divorce these two nations from their geographical neighbors, as evidenced in Australia's 1995 defense cooperation treaty with Indonesia.

Their strategic interests in Southeast Asia are pursued through participation in regional forums such as ASEAN, APEC, and ARF.  Bilateral and multilateral military exercises with regional states offer Australia and New Zealand another vehicle for fostering cooperation and discussion of mutual strategic interests.

The advent of these regional forums, especially ARF, raises the question of joint or cooperative military action by the ASEAN states.  These nations' naval and air forces, if operated together, currently have the capability to deny use of the South China Sea to an outside power, even China.  The political will to send joint task forces to sea presently is not evident, however.  

Potential Maritime Points of Conflict  

Strategic maritime interests and the force to defend them are important in times of both peace and conflict.  The maritime strength to achieve strategic interests may be expressed in terms of navies, location with respect to sea lines of communication, ship-building and shipping capacities, fishing fleets, known and suspected offshore mineral resources, and national objectives.  The most crucial maritime interest in the Asia-Pacific, especially for Japan, Korea, and China, is the reliance on oil from the Middle East.  This commodity by itself is sufficient to define the importance of the Asia-Pacific sea lanes.            Navies are the central conventional military forces in the conduct of relations among the nations of the Asia-Pacific.  We have only to scan the potential crises, or "hot spots," in that vast theater to appreciate the importance of the maritime element. 

              In the north, Russia and Japan remain unable to agree on the status of the southernmost Kurile Islands (Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri), occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945 but historically Japanese.  These islands, essentially uninhabited, are valuable for three reasons.  First, they form part of a natural island barrier across the Sea of Okhostk, the prime operating area of Soviet and now Russian ballistic missile submarines.  This barrier also serves as a primary location for Russian forces defending the natural approach to the Russian Far East.  Second, the islands sit amid rich fishing grounds.  Third is the islands' importance as a symbol of national strength and character: Japan considers them historically Japanese, Russia views them as legitimate gains from the "Great Patriotic War." 

Immediately to the south, the tense situation on the Korean peninsula continues to present the most acute source of large-scale conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.  Essentially continental in nature, this potential conflict nonetheless has important maritime overtones, as the recent North Korean submarine incident shows.

The status of Taiwan is also potentially disruptive on a global scale, in view of the direct interest of China and the United States in its outcome.  As an island, Taiwan's reliance on the maritime element of national security is obvious.

The potential for international conflict in Southeast Asia centers on the South China Sea, with contesting territorial claims by China (and Taiwan, which echoes its larger neighbor's claims), the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam.  This almost enclosed body of water is important because of its value as a sea lane of communication, it contains rich fisheries and potential petroleum reserves, and there is the matter of historic claims and national hubris.  Resolution through other than diplomatic means will necessarily be maritime.

Additional territorial disputes abound among the Asia-Pacific states, including those between Japan and Korea over the Takeshima (Tak-do in Korean) Islands, a small group of barren rocks, often awash, in the Sea of Japan; Japan and China over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku Islands in Japanese), another small group of barren rocks, this one northeast of Taiwan; the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah State; China and Vietnam over their common border; Vietnam and Indonesia over their demarcation line in the South China Sea; Vietnam and Cambodia over their common border; Malaysian claims on islands also claimed by Singapore or Indonesia; and a border dispute between Thailand and Malaysia.  None of these disputes has the serious  potential of those on the Korean peninsula, on Taiwan, or in the South China Sea, but all involve maritime rights and claims.  They form the backdrop for the conduct of relations among the nations of the Asia-Pacific.11  

Conclusions  

How, then, do we answer the questions posed at the beginning of this essay?  Conventional military force is currently, and will remain, a mainstay in the conduct of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.  Military forces throughout the region are growing both in size and capability; all Asia-Pacific nations have decided to devote significant portions of their newfound wealth to increasing their national defense capability, especially at sea and in the air.  Furthermore, comparing the emerging Asia-Pacific maritime forces is made difficult by the force-multiplier effect of modern technology and systems integration: sea-air forces now pack far more punch for a given size than previously.  Even a small state such as Singapore is able to base its security policy on a military significantly stronger than previously available.

 The Asia-Pacific's maritime character makes naval force the military implement of choice, and the region's states are investing in new and expanded forces on the sea and in the air.  They recognize this new flexibility and have determined that strengthened maritime forces are the answer to ensuring their security in the new global environment.

The end of the Cold War has changed the international environment in the Asia-Pacific region.  These nations now must deal with more uncertainty, both about their neighbors' behavior and the "staying power" of the United States in the area.  Also, as a result of the end of the bipolar Cold War, nations may feel freer to employ armed force to settle disputes, no longer fearing immediate American or Soviet reaction.

A classic arms race is not underway in the Asia-Pacific area,  a situation due not so much to the views and needs of the area's nations, but rather to the continued presence of American forces in the region.  A relatively low portion of this presence is represented by ground troops-one understrength army division in Korea and an understrength Marine brigade on Okinawa.  Rather, the U.S. presence is commonly seen by the Asia-Pacific nations in the ships and aircraft of the American naval and air force units that steam through, fly over, and exercise with the states of the region. 

This American presence is a crucial stabilizing factor in the international environment of the Asia-Pacific region.  Barring development of truly effective multilateral organizations, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, either because of resource allocation decisions in Washington or at the behest of the region's nations, the maritime Asia-Pacific states will experience a true arms race, with Japan and China leading the charge and an increased risk of armed conflict developing.   

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Notes

1. Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress February 1997 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997).  For differing views of Asian economic growth, see Yoichi Funabashi, "Bridging Asia's Economics-Security Gap," Survival 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97): 101, and Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 62.

2. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists publishes on its cover its famous "doomsday clock," recording its estimate of the proximity of nuclear holocaust.  The "clock" read 3 minutes to midnight in January 1984 issue, at the height of the Cold War.  It moved to 6 minutes in January 1988, 10 in April 1990, 17 in December 1991, but then advanced back to 14 minutes to midnight in March 1996 (where it remains today), perhaps indicating the increased threat from the spread of nuclear weapons.

3. See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1990), 656, for a concise explanation of the origin of Deng's four priorities.

4. See Funabashi, 103.

5. Information about Asian maritime forces is garnered from The Naval institute Guide to the Combat Fleets of the World 1995: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament, compiled by A.D. Baker III and derived from "Flottes de Combat," Jane's Fighting Ships, 1995-1996, ed. Bernard  Prezelin (London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1995); Bernard Blake, ed., Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, 1994-95 (Guilford, United Kingdom: Biddles Ltd., 1994); Anthony J. Watts, ed., Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, 1994-1995 (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1994).  Evaluation of those forces' capabilities is also based on the experience of the author, who served as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy from 1965-1995, almost all of it in the Pacific, and who exercised at sea ashore with the navies and most of the air forces of Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and, under adverse circumstances, Vietnam.

6. See Military Technology 20, no. 3 (1996): 78, and Asian Defence Journal, no. 418 (January 1997): 14, for descriptions of Singapore's probable plan to develop a submarine force.

7. Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Developments of a Military Nature," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter: 1997 Annual Reference Edition (Prahan, Victoria, Australia: Peter Isaacson Publications, Ltd., 1997).

8. Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94): 81, offers a similar categorization.

9. This strategy is discussed in detail in Alexander C. Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond" (Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 1994): 99; also see Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea," The Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1994): 191.

10. Thailand, alone among the nations of South/Southeast Asia was able to maintain its freedom during the period of 19th and early 20th century imperialism; during World War II, Thailand managed to coopt Japanese aggression; more recently, Thailand managed to fully support the U.S. war in Southeast Asia without antagonizing China-and has since maintained both an American defense commitment to the kingdom (although denying America permission to station pre-positioning ships in the Gulf of Thailand!) and a friendly civilian and military relationship with China.

11. See Ball, 88-89, for a comprehensive list of these disputes.