STRENGTH THROUGH COOPERATION
         Military Forces in the  Asia-Pacific Region

C4I TECHNOLOGY                      

Archie Clemins  

How are we capitalizing on the testing and implementation of modern and state-of-the-art C4I technology and how are we developing a more methodical approach to transitioning the good ideas out of the laboratories and industry and into the operational arena for our warfighters to use?

Amounts various sectors of business and the military spend on information technology.  While there is no exact right answer for the amount the Navy should spend, the amount should probably be closer to the computer and utilities sectors.

Admiral Archie Clemins, U.S. Navy, is the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, responsible for the world's largest combined fleet command. He was previously the first head of the Commander in Chief Liaison Division, where he established a worldwide classified electronic conductivity between his staff and all three major fleet commanders.   

The seven habits of effective information technology, stolen from Steven Covey's book.  Let's walk through them. 

1.  If the boss doesn't use it, don't buy it.  Admirals and generals have to adopt and use this technology themselves.

2.  Support systems, such as SNAP, must be integrated with tactical systems, such as JOTS.

3.  Using systems common to what is being sold by the industry will keep us up to date and keep costs under control.

4. Instead of burdening ourselves with many systems working single problems, we must use one system that can work all of them.  Eliminate the single use terminal and allow the work to be done anywhere on the system. 

5. Commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) systems and software should be used whenever possible.  It is generally cheaper and easier to use and replace.

6. The computers and software used at sea should be the same as those used ashore, and transitioning from sea to shore-such as Marines might do when moving operations ashore-must be seamless.

7. Stovepipes, or individual use systems, should be avoided.  Everyone should be able to do any job off any computer.  Let's buy icons, not hardware.  

Networks Give the Advantage.  This graph illustrates the advantages of robust, wide-area networks.

Speed.  For a given level of forces and complexity of operations, the network's web of information exchange allows the commander to synchronize widely dispersed forces for complex operations much faster.  The commander can turn inside the opponent's decision cycle.  This was clearly demonstrated during the tensions between the PRC and Taiwan, as well as during Exercise Tandem Thrust.

Complexity of Operations.  In a given time, the network allows a commander to mount much more complex operations than the enemy.  This would require the enemy to have much larger forces to try and make up for the rapid, precision employment of U.S. and allied forces.

Force Efficiency and Effectiveness.  Support of the commander's intent is optimized.  You may have heard the saying, "Don't send a bomb to do a bullet's job."   No personnel or unit time is wasted.  

This busy illustration drives home the point that the sea-based Joint Task Force must be interoperable across a myriad of missions, AORs and unified theaters.  The flexibility of our forces and their unique ability to carry out the forward presence mission require that our forces be trained and equipped (from a C4I perspective) to operate effectively in any mission anywhere in the world.

The type commanders prepare their forces for the operational cycle.

The numbered fleet commanders meet operational commitments and the global naval force requirements by moving task groups and task units between AORs and unified theaters.

Forward-deployed, globally dispersed naval forces are a primary building block critical to success of a joint campaign.

Our Sea-Based Joint Task Force Command and Control packages are the key to the Unified CINC and NCA use of naval force packages in joint campaigns.  

Systems training must begin early in the workup phase for all battle groups.  It begins with early identification of C4I systems to be installed, tested, and evaluated during the basic and intermediate phase.

All component commanders must understand their role and C4I requirements necessary to achieve an effective interaction with higher authority commanders to properly support all assigned maritime and joint missions.

This must be clearly defined by all levels of the chain of command during the training process.  

This illustrates the close proximity of the Seventh Fleet to the Navy laboratories, universities and industry.  NRAD is co-located in the San Diego metropolitan area, along with industries and universities.  China Lake is located just up the road.  The other labs and warfare centers on the east coast are only a few hours away by air.  With this vast pool of talent so readily available, C3F is in an ideal location for system testing in a shipboard environment and for the testing and validation of new systems and tactics.  We need to move out from here and quickly  transition the appropriate tactics, technologies and lessons learned out to the fleet for operational evaluation and process development.  

This illustrates the basic premise that force level requirements escalate in relationship with the increasing intensity of a crisis or conflict; it could be called the "JTF response continuum."

Our forces must be prepared with an appropriate level of force to a growing range of escalating missions and conflicts.

At the low end of the continuum, our forces provide the critical peacetime presence which enhances regional stability and allows us to work with other navies and forces, to develop closer cooperation, and to "build the peace." 

In the face of natural disasters or very low-level regional civil contingencies, our forces are on the scene to carry out peacetime humanitarian missions while providing a flexible on-scene military force in case military intervention is required.

In the event the crisis continues to escalate,  our forces are on scene to provide the necessary response, establish a foothold for follow-on forces and provide the initial command and control structure that can be shifted to the sea-based JTF commander upon arrival, and then ashore if necessary.  

Fleet Battle Experiment Alfa was an excellent example of how the Fleet and the laboratories were able to work together to test new tactics and new technologies.

FBX-A was able to investigate and test new ideas and tactics such as:  

Systems and processes that were considered to be successful in this arena need to be implemented soon at the fleet level in order to start developing the processes to make maximum use of these systems.  

With the Seventh Fleet forward deployed in Yokosuka, they are an ocean away from the technical support required to conduct experiments with new, prototype technologies fresh off the workbench.  Being forward deployed also means that they operate on the front line 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  With the C4I initiatives they have started, such as IT-21, and their high OPTEMPO, they are the ideal candidate to evaluate new systems and technologies in a forward-deployed, operational environment.  Their operational environment has forced them to develop process improvements in using new C4I systems in order to work smarter instead of harder.  They are also able to provide constructive feedback on system performance-which should be used to improve the system, not hammer it.  This puts the Seventh Fleet in the role of the implementer of technology, which has been successfully tested and found to be of value to the Navy.  

Daily operations require robust connectivity with ships at sea and other strategic commands located in Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and Singapore.  Information technology has enabled Seventh Fleet and her Task Force commanders to coordinate numerous exercises and develop new information management processes to make efficient use of all of the data now available.

By being forward deployed, the Seventh Fleet is in an ideal position to evaluate the performance of new technologies and tactics in a full-time operational environment.  They can take existing and new technologies, develop  new operational processes and apply the technology and processes to daily operational problems. The processes are refined by everyday use and from the lessons learned from their busy exercise schedule.  

Network technologies such as IT-21 provide the enabler for the use of new operational processes.  IT-21 establishes a classified global data network-based commercial COTS technology.  This network enables extremely rapid exchange of  a rich breadth of information between all levels of forces, from the small unit to the CINC.  Exercise Tandem Thrust 97 highlighted the benefits of networks:  

An overview of Tandem Thrust 97 provides an idea of the size and scope of the operations in Australia.  Tandem Thrust 97 represents the largest operation in the Pacific since Desert Storm and the largest exercise with Australia since World War II.

An idea of the distances and the large geographic areas that had to be factored into the exercise planning process was needed.  Located on the east coast of in Australia at Shoal Water Bay, Tandem Thrust involved maneuvering forces over an enormous area greater than one-third of the continental United States, as illustrated.  The logistics involved staging forces from as far away as Louisiana (B-52s) and Florida (joint C4I units).

The C4I infrastructure ashore had to be built out of whole cloth.  There was no existing infrastructure to build from in the Australian outback.

Networks were the core of the theater command and control used in this exercise.  The IT-21 installations aboard USS Blue Ridge and the partial implementations aboard USS Independence and USS Essex faced a thorough test and proved themselves again in exercise Tandem Thrust.

It is important to note that the course of action development and operations planning took place while all units were en route to the exercise area.  

The TT97 information architecture enabled the horizontal dissemination of information, while allowing the military commander to preserve hierarchical decisionmaking.  The extensive and rich information exchange between units was increased enormously by the use of web technology. 

The use of COTS software, notably a commercial PC as the user interface, reduces the cost to the point that the network can be proliferated to a much greater extent.  This wide proliferation of network access geometrically increases the quality of decision making by allowing staffs to make their decisions on a broader, near real time knowledge base.  COTS software such as commercial office suites are much more flexible and easier to use than military unique software.  This greatly reduces training required and allows units to integrate allies and new personnel for a crisis, very quickly.

Force efficiency is greatly increased by the near real time sharing of information horizontally between task force member and the CINC.  Better knowledge of the total task force operations greatly increased the probability that all forces will be employed to the best advantage.  This allows optimized support of the commander's intentions.

Maximum flexibility is achieved because the decisions cycle is so much faster.  Factors affecting the decision are more quickly shared and are shared across the total task force.  In Tandem Thrust this allowed the multimonth intricate planning effort for the coordinated live fire of naval guns, shore-based artillery, and aircraft ordinance to be shifted several times to accommodate an unexpected cyclone.  

Cyclone Justin presented a 1-week, hurricane-force challenge to the Tandem Thrust exercise. This photo shows a storm the size of New England and illustrates just the sea-based part of the force employment around the storm.

The detailed planning for the employment of forces, worked out over many months to allow the full utilization and maximum realistic training of all forces, had to be altered almost daily, in real time, to reflect the effects of the cyclone.  The storm did not follow historical patterns, so repeated adjustments to the matrix of synchronized movement and events had to be made. 

Without IT-21 network capability, many of the scheduled events could not have been shifted and accomplished before the fixed exercise end date.

Without networks, Tandem Thrust would not have been able to accomplish the broad range of very complicated objectives that were established.  

This illustrates just a few of the hundreds of details in Tandem Thrust that had to be rescheduled because of Cyclone Justin.  Anyone will appreciate the difficulty of changing a plan that was designed on events occurring in series to a plan that executes them in parallel.

The network capabilities allowed the task force commander to accomplish all originally scheduled training events to their full extent and joint training objectives in a compressed time period.  This would definitely not have been possible for an exercise of this scale prior to the introduction of networks.  

The Seventh Fleet makes widespread use of networks and web technology in day-to-day operations and during many exercises.  As the Australian embarkees noted during Tandem Thrust, they really do "live on the LAN." 

The lessons learned from this daily familiarity with network technology has enabled participants to develop and then refine their operational processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The process improvements frequently demand system and software upgrades.  The new processes and systems are put to almost immediate use in the next exercise and again refined from the experience gained.

The high OPTEMPO and large number of Joint and Combined Exercises has let the Seventh Fleet become a leader in how to use modern C4I systems daily.  Reliability, robustness, user friendliness, and adapting C4I to support the user's new processes are the characteristics required for customer satisfaction.  C4I that does not meet that criteria quickly falls out under the pressure of Seventh Fleet daily operations.

The extensive and rich information exchange among units was increased enormously by the use of web technology.  Subject experts and departments within units "pst" finished products to web sites (Smart Post), which allowed any other web user to "pull" what they need, when they need it (Smart Pull).  This is different from the Smart Push concept-let the warfighter decide what information he needs and when.

     The Seventh Fleet found that with the very extensive use of the web to share information, "webmasters" who managed the web sites associated with Tandem Thrust as a primary duty were very  valuable.  Each web page was maintained by a designated person in the appropriate organization, and the webmasters supervised these people.  Webmasters maintained continuity and standards throughout the sites, avoided duplication, provided technical advice, shared good ideas on web usage among organizations, etc.  By standardizing the "look and feel" of the many web pages, users were able to find information at a glance.  Webmasters truly improved the process.

     Nonlinear information access lets the warfighter cut to the chase and access exactly the information he needs to accomplish the mission.  

Building on the extensive use of web technology over the last several exercises, the Seventh Fleet developed a Virtual command center, made up of virtual anchor desks.  This is a very new way of looking at information access and needs some explanation.

For example, the meteorologists posted daily, even hourly updates, to its TT97 web page.  This is information gathered by them from a wide variety of U.S. and Australian military and commercial sources regarding the weather, particularly the cyclone, they believed to be of benefit to all participants.  Rather than e-mailing all of this information to all participants or sending reams of message traffic, the web allowed all participants to quickly and easily access the latest weather reports and use that information in formulating and reformulating their plans.  This is the anchor desk principle without having to man the anchor desk.   

Every subordinate command, C-code and specialty area followed this paradigm of posting critical information to the CCTF home page.  The result was a virtual command center, with critical information available on the web at the touch of a button.

This explosive proliferation of information broadened everyone's information horizon and let each person understand the broad scope of the exercise.

In order to build effective web pages, the Seventh Fleet has found that you have to exercise a certain amount of web discipline.  You need to build tight, concise web pages that minimize the fluff, making it easy to locate the desired information and minimizing the scrolling required to look for it.

Standardizing on basic web interfaces will facilitate the look-up of information by people from a diverse group of commands.  The "look and feel" will be the same fleetwide. 

Building templates reduces the time required to stand up web pages in the event of a contingency.

Web technology is flexible enough to allow for dynamic changes in information access as necessary.  

The Seventh Fleet has developed some of the processes or "mechanics" of using networks. The large scope of  Tandem Thrust magnified some of the problems that were somewhat hidden in the past.

The magnitude of assembling and distributing the phone numbers and e-mail addresses of some 28,000 people brought together in a matter of a few weeks cannot be overemphasized.  This is a process that is simple in definition and an "armchair" solution, yet staggeringly difficult to undertake in reality, especially on the short notice required for contingency operations. 

Particularly for e-mail, an automated address look-up and directory synchronization are required.

The 24-hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week operations on networks require that professional network expertise be available around the clock to resolve difficulties beyond the scope and capabilities of those in the field.  This is true for all networks, voice, video and data.  Enough "A-team" people need to be made available for continuous operations.  

The network operations center (NOC) in Hawaii provided excellent support on day-to-day operations of the various networks.  It is a key component for reliable, robust networks.

     There is a missing element in the support provided by the network operations center and the systems commands that should be responsible for network design and acquisition.  There are needed services:  

     IT-21 has developed a proposed organization, the JSEC, that would meet these needs.

  | Contents | Next Chapter |