The Payoff of Long-Range R&Dt

DOD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

1. THE PAYOFF OF

LONG-RANGE R&D

A hiatus exists between the inventor who knows what they could invent, if they only knew what was wanted, and the soldiers who know, or ought to know, what they want and would ask for it if they only knew how much science could do for them. You have never really bridged that gap yet.

Winston S. Churchill

The Great War

Investments in science and technology are critical to military preparedness, enabling us to stay at the cutting edge of new developments so that our Armed Forces remained the best trained, best equipped, and best prepared in the world.

Our strategy of investment and international cooperation in science and technology will better assure our success today and in the future.

President Bill Clinton

National Security Science and Technology Strategy

The Gulf War fought by the United States-led coalition forces in 1991 was a remarkable display of firepower and bravery. The Iraqi military was relentlessly pounded by airpower for 4 weeks before the 100 hour ground war brought the devastated and crushed enemy to their knees. The Gulf War has been called the "First Space War" by some, and the "First War in the New World Order" by others. Even more laudatory, it has been hailed for showcasing the readiness, the training and morale of America's fighting men and women. And there are many remarkable feats of bravery chronicled that contributed to the decisive victory of the coalition forces.

However, as much as bravery, training, and morale contributed to this overwhelming victory, it would be a slap in the face of every patriotic veteran to say that the men and women of the 1990s displayed more professionalism than the soldier-citizens of our earlier wars. The quick reaction of fighter pilots, the coolness of head and situation awareness shown by both the soldier and naval personnel-these were not due to biophysical advances that had evolved over decades of fighting. Certainly they were important in the Gulf War, but these reactions were also important in earlier conflicts, and they have not increased substantially over the years, despite the best training in the world. To be blunt, our airmen, our soldiers, and our seamen are good, even great-but they are not that much better, either mentally or physically, than the veterans who preceded them in the past.

So then, what was it that made such a decisive victory possible? What was the miraculous stuff that enabled the U.S.-led forces to flatten and destroy Saddam Hussein's military like a steam roller running amok in a bed of flowers? To pound him from the sky, relentlessly at will? And in any weather, at any time of day, and with astonishingly accurate precision?

The obvious answer was the equipment. The tactics and training certainly contributedCthe 1975 Israeli-Arab war showed how tactics and training can provide the winning edge. And General Schwarzkopf's famous "Hail Mary" offensive surely contributed to a quick, decisive victory in the Gulf War. But the telling difference in Desert Storm was not the tactics, the American psyche, morale, or even machismo. It was a myriad of things, but with one common underlying thread: the breathtaking accuracy of precision weapons, dropped by all-weather fighters in the dead of night and guided by infrared sensors; the Tomahawk missiles launched from Navy ships; the awesome firepower and agility of American tanks; the mindboggling advances from exploiting space: GPS navigation, communications and remote sensing. This was the stuff that overwhelmed the Iraqi army, and it was all due to scientific advances and the resulting technology that allowed these weapon systems to be produced.

The U.S. military's overwhelming technological advantage of its weapons systems is directly due to research investments made 15 to 20 years ago. This well-substantiated claim includes such examples as the F-117 stealth fighter, the B-2 stealth bomber, cruise missiles, lasers, micro-electronics, submarine and land platforms, and space assets to include a few. A direct link can be traced from scientist to warfighter, and the power of keeping a finely honed technological edge has inescapably been proven. It pays off to invest in science and technology, and America has reaped the benefits.

But the barbarians are at the gate, ready to storm the city, intoxicated with budgetary fever, downsizing, and a charge to exploit the commercial marketplace. Some of these strategies are necessary and, if applied prudently, will strengthen our national defense. As with all good strategies, however, there are some implementors who take their tasks to the extreme. The seed corn of tomorrow's weapons, the R&D investment of today, is in danger of being starved before it can germinate, lay root and sprout to feed tomorrow's military. And all in the name of "focusing on the warfighter."

This is not an all-encompassing view. The long-range benefits of basic research are not lost on U.S. National Security Science and Technology Policy, written by the National Science and Technology Council and fully endorsed by President Clinton:

Research sometimes pays immediate dividends, with a transition directly from laboratory bench to defense systems in the field. But most often the full impact of research is not apparent until much later. It is only in hindsight that the patterns of research which spawned revolutionary military capabilities-radar, digital computers, semiconductor electronics, lasers, fiber optics, and navigation systems capable of great accuracy-are discernible. Thus, in planning our research programs, we focus not only on immediate needs but also on opportunities that will sustain our technological edge far into the future.

Winning the war is the whole purpose of having a Department of Defense: To ensure for the continuing national security of the United States. But preparing for the next war is also a priority, and the crime of not preparing for today's war is just as heinous as forcing our children to fight the next war with today's technology simply because of a non-wavering focus on today.

Those in the present do not have a lock on shortsighted vision. Circa 1800, Napoleon lectured Robert Fuller on the futility of powered ships: "What, sir? Would you make a ship sail against the wind and currents by lighting a bonfire under her deck? I pray you excuse me. I have no time to listen to such nonsense." In 1930 the eminent physicist Ernest Rutherford exclaimed, "The energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a very poor kind of thing. Anyone who expects a source of power from the transformation of these atoms is talking moonshine."

Some people exposed to visions of the future may be too tied to the past, such as Secretary of War Newton Baker, who, when told of Billy Mitchell's claim that airplanes could sink battleships, growled, "That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I'm willing to stand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit it from the air." Then there was Major General John K. Herr who said in 1938, "We must not be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the tried and proven horse." Or as late as 1939, when Rear Admiral Clark Woodward sniffed, "As far as sinking a ship with a bomb is concerned, it just can't be done."

It is easy to concentrate on today while putting off tomorrow, but the lessons of the past show that we would not be where were are today if it were not for forefathers' vision. We cannot ignore the future, a lesson that must be learned every generation. Jacques S. Gansler eloquently summarizes this view:

To get the maximum for its R&D dollars, DOD will have to stop pushing traditional weapon systems and will have to focus more on "breakthrough" technologies that can make a qualitative difference in military advantages-for example, inexpensive, "smart," non-nuclear weapon systems ... At present there is little institutional support for less traditional systems. Special organizations will have to be created to work on such systems.

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, there is some talk that the United States will not have to face any formidable enemies for at least two decades. It is generally believed that Third World countries do not have the necessary infrastructure to mount a credible threat. However, in April 1990, Mu'ammar Qaddafi, speaking to fellow Libyans, thundered, "Did not the Americans almost hit you yesterday when you were asleep in your homes? If they know you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States they would not be able to hit you. Because if we had possessed a deterrent-missiles that could reach New York-we would have hit it in the same moment. Consequently we should build this force."

Our adversaries are not as content as we are to stumble toward the future. Even today, 5 years after surrendering to the coalition forces, Iraq is vigorously trying to keep its high-tech edge in missile technology and biological and chemical warfare. This is clearly an advanced development effort having a focused military use. Furthermore, reports appear weekly in the mass media of weapon proliferation to Third World countries.

Technology made the difference in our military strength and got us to where we are today, but technology did not miraculously appear. It is grounded in a foundation of science, creatively generated by the long-range research efforts of thousands of people over decades. It is this foundation for technology that this book addresses, and that foundation is long-range research in the basic sciences. Merely supporting long-range research won't hack it; it has to be done smartly, with common sense.

This book gives insight to the history behind long-range research, the rationale for it, the structure it has taken, and some recommendations for using common sense while keeping it going. For if there is any one area that our generation can improve to ensure our children's freedom, it is by investing in the future by (sanely) supporting long-term research in the basic sciences.

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Last Update: September 30, 2002