DOD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2. INVESTING IN THE FUTURE

Our nation’s security derives from a combination of diplomatic leadership, economic strength and military might. Advances in science and technology underlie this strength, giving rise to the discoveries that lead to new industries and to the improvements that make our industries more efficient and environmentally sound. By engaging economies abroad, cooperation in science and technology integrates into a larger economic and political order that acts against division and conflict.

President Bill Clinton

For the first time in nearly 50 years our nation has not been at war, and for the past 50 years our nation’s military might has been fueled by an ever-increasing growth of technological achievements. But these achievements have fueled more than our military might: Research and Development fuels business, the very engine that drives the U.S. economy, and a pillar of our national power.¹

THE FRUITS OF

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the beginning of World War Two we have seen the introduction of precision-guided weapons, the atomic bomb, the ballistic missile, the laser, computers, jet aircraft, satellites, radar— the list of scientific and technical achievements is staggering. The pace of technology is also increasing, along with the number of those who are making the advances. Although scientists and engineers performing R&D comprise less than 1 percent of the total U.S. labor force, the rate of growth of these professionals outstrips any other profession, rising from 55 R&D scientists and engineers per 10,000 in the labor force in the mid-1970s to 76 per 10,000 in 1989.²

In the millennia since records have been kept, it is estimated that the world has seen a doubling—a 100 percent growth—in knowledge from the dawn of time until the 1950s, and that knowledge has since doubled again since the 1950s.

The growth of knowledge has spilled over to the warfighter. Today’s warrior is now fighting with more technologically sophisticated weapons than in the past, and this has resulted in fewer warriors being needed to fight on the battlefield. Technological advances in warfare have been a double-edged sword, however, for while the number density (the number per square kilometer) of combatants may have decreased throughout the years, firepower has increased. Figure 1 shows the dramatic decrease in number density made possible by the introduction of then state-of-the-art weapons. The firepower increase may be understood by considering the way that technology has enabled few warfighters to levy more damage: the range of a spear was extended by the bow and arrow; that range was extended by a bullet; that range was extended even farther by an artillery shell; and that range was yet extended by missile technology.

INCREASING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

THROUGH SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

In 1945, J. F. C. Fowler enumerated five qualitative parameters to characterize the power of a weapon, of which he gave the "range of action" as the highest priority:³

• Range of Action
• Striking Power
• Accuracy of Aim
• Volume of Fire
• Portability.

Figure 1: Manpower Density on the Battlefield (per square kilometer)⁴

Colonel Simon P. Worden expanded on this concept by deriving the "military effectiveness" as a basic measure of a weapon’s military power.⁵ Effectiveness may be defined in terms of the "brightness" (a term frequently used by laser engineers to measure the capability of a laser) per unit time, or rather the measure of a weapon’s range, accuracy, and power per unit time, all rolled into a single number. Weapon effectiveness is listed in table 1 and is illustrated in figure 2.

Note that the military effectiveness is presented in a compact form as an exponential number—meaning, of course, that bullets have a "military effectiveness" a hundred times greater than arrows, and that ICBMs are 10⁴, or 10,000 times more effective than artillery in 1900. Although military tactics and strategy have played a role in increasing the effectiveness of these weapons, the advances in military effectiveness are chiefly due to one reason: the exploitation of science and technology. Figure 2 shows the

dramatic increase in military effectiveness on a logarithmic scale; that is, the y-axis is shown as exponential powers of 10, so that the maximum value of "25" is not a simple factor of 5 greater than "20," but rather 10⁵, or 100,000 times greater.

Table 1. Weapon Effectiveness⁶

^a"Time" refers to both the time period of battle and the time it takes to get into position to engage the weapons.

The technology present in the battlefield keeps growing. Tomorrow’s battlefield will consist of global networks keeping track of targets, sophisticated sensors, combatants, platforms (including stealth), and long-range, conventional (non-nuclear), high-precision, extremely accurate weapon systems (both manned and unmanned)—all linked with digital computers.⁷

The point of this exercise is to show that there is an exponential increase of military effectiveness due to advancements science and technology. Not just increases in 10 percent, or even a doubling of effectiveness. But true factors of many thousands of times, all due to science and technology.  

The exploitation of science and technology (S&T) is thus a critical factor in producing the next generation of weapons. Advances in S&T do not happen overnight, however, nor do they happen in a vacuum. In the words of a former researcher at the prestigious Bell Laboratories, "Quality work requires sustained support. You just can’t turn on the spigot and have Nobel Prizes overnight."⁸ So as in any other endeavor, S&T needs to be nurtured, looked after, and sustained, or it will die.

TRENDS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Research and Development (R&D) in the United States has typically been funded at greater levels than any other country. Approximately $176 billion was spent in industry, government, and universities in 1994, or 2.6 percent of the GDP.⁹ In 1992 (the last year that comparative data were available), the United States spent over 28 percent more on R&D than Japan, Germany, and France combined.¹⁰

The majority of these funds was spent on defense-related R&D, and the fruits of this effort are borne in the quality of American military technology. The defense share of federal R&D funding reached a peak in 1987 during the Reagan buildup, accounting for 69 percent of the total federal R&D budget. Between 1992 and 1994 the percentage of defense-related R&D slipped from 59 percent to 56 percent—in line with the Clinton administration’s goal of producing an even split between defense and nondefense R&D funding.¹¹

But an even split in federal R&D funding does not imply an even split between Federal Government and industry performing defense R&D (e.g., defense laboratories versus industry laboratories). The nation’s industry is already responsible for the majority of R&D spending in the United States, accounting for $125 billion in 1994, or 71 percent of the national total. Although this R&D spending in industry is highly concentrated—eight industrial sectors account for more than 80 percent of the total industry R&D spending, with the aircraft and communications industry in the top two positions—claims by the present administration that these sectors perform a majority of their R&D in defense-related areas are simply not substantiated.¹²

In addition, industrial firms are continuing to increase their support of university R&D, growing from 3.9 percent of the total funding that universities received in 1980 to 7.3 percent in 1993. Overall, university R&D spending has increased as well, rising from 9 percent of the nation’s total in 1985 to over 12 percent in 1992. ¹³

With the end of the Cold War, the present administration has recognized that maintaining a separate defense and commercial industrial base is not efficient. The Department of Defense is now working more closely with industrial firms engaged in commercial and dual-use production, including performing dual-use R&D. It is the administration’s goal not only to strengthen the civilian industry, but also to promote "the cost-effective development of new technologies for national defense and stimulate the creation of an integrated civilian-military industrial base."¹⁴

However, the administration has realized that commercial technology simply cannot fill all the military’s needs. Tanks, fighter aircraft, nuclear submarines, new stealth platforms, and many other applications require defense-unique technologies. These technologies must be grown through a variety of mechanisms, from a combination of industrial, university, defense and "national" (e.g. Department of Energy, NASA, and other federal agency) laboratories. But for all the infrastructure set up to transition technology to defense, without a "seed" of long-range research, the germination of growth that allows for creative ideas to evolve into new technology, no advances will be made. We will be forever stuck with merely optimizing what is known—a slow, evolutionary increase in efficiency rather than in the promise of explosive growth (figure 2).

The present administration recognizes this and has gone on record by stating,

Some analysts . . . [say] that the Nation is spending too little on basic research that will drive tomorrow’s revolutionary breakthroughs. This concern is supported by empirical evidence that suggests there are large unexploited economic gains to be realized from raising our society’s level of scientific activity and technological research and development; in the past, the social rate of return on such investments has been high. As a central component and stimulus of U.S. innovation, Federal R&D investment can lead technical innovation nationwide and affect the Nation’s military posture, a variety of social objectives, and the competitive performance of U.S.-based firms in domestic and foreign markets.¹⁵

R&D has an impressive payoff history, a propensity of giving back more than what is invested. It is generally accepted that the "Return On Investment" of long-range research will reap large rewards in the future. Onthe average, R&D investment in the United States has exceeded the rate of return available in private industry, performing at levels as high as 423 percent (optical fibers) to an industrywide rate of return between 30 and 80 percent.¹⁶

But if the rates of return of long-range research have remained so consistently high, then why is not more private capital put toward exploiting it, and why isn’t the Federal Government championing it even more than it is? The quintessential reason is that long-range research is risky. There is no guarantee that a winner will be produced for every research project started—but yet, the returns have the chance of being "sky high." An analogy is buying a lottery ticket. The chances of winning are extremely small, and it has a near "infinite" payoff. But no one knows exactly which lottery ticket will be the lucky one. Unlike the relatively low cost of buying a lottery ticket, funding long-range research costs a lot of money—up to billions of dollars a year. To make things worse, the marginal return for long-range research is not linear—in fact, there is no assurance of making a return on the investment at all.

The purpose of this book is to stress the importance that long-range research has to the strength of our nation and the need for a continued strong investment in the future. In particular, basic research and applied research—the generally accepted constituents of long-range research—have a place in our nation’s defense but this fact is often ignored. This could very well prove to weaken our country.

It is with this fact in mind—that long-range research plays a fundamental part as the foundation for our nation’s strength—that a case for long-range research will be presented.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002