In a defense-related example, S&T may be performed to invent new air-to-air missile technology, such as discovering new search algorithms or inventing more energetic and stable missile fuel. The R&D program associated with developing this new missile includes the testing, evaluation, and assessment of missile performance, including the cost of fuel that any carrier airplane may use in conducting these tests. Therefore, R&D is a much broader definition of the technological process, pulling in all the supporting infrastructure and administrative support necessary for achieving the S&T goals. 

The roots of defense-related research are grounded in the history of industrial research laboratories. Understanding today's defense research needs and infrastructure directly springs from knowing how industrial research laboratories evolved in the United States. 

Science is crucial to the health and conduct of modern industry. It is the foundation for technology and the fuel that powers the engine of change that advances our economy. Without advancement in science, industry would eventually grind to a halt, stagnating, as technology would no longer provide the impetus for growth. Science begets knowledge, and from understanding and innovation springs economic prosperity.⁹ The next section will show some examples of technology that grew from advances in science.

Science in the Mid-1800s. Science and industry have not always been as tightly intertwined as they are today. Until the 1870s, advances in science largely evolved separately from industrial technology, neither influencing the direction of industry nor significantly contributing to direct technological breakthroughs.¹⁰ This is especially true of advances in the basic sciences, defined as physics, chemistry, biology, and applied mathematics. For example, the explanation given for natural phenomena, such as the motion of the planets around our sun, did not directly contribute to the growth of the mining, transportation, construction or manufacturing industry.

This rang true for nearly all discoveries in basic science. Rarely did unveiling a fundamental truth result in a breakthrough, or even an appreciation, for what the discovery had to offer. In fact, even today the sirens of waste still wail at the worthlessness generated by those performing research in the basic sciences. In the past, advances in various sectors of the industrial revolution such as shipbuilding, engineering, architecture, mining, and manufacturing were based upon experience of the artisan, rules of thumb, and traditions handed down from generation to generation rather than on advances in science.¹¹ There was no systematic way of applying the "scientific method" to advancing industrial technology. In fact, the "feel" for industrial technology is still embodied in the phrases "It's more of an art than a science" or "It's like magic."

But the separation of basic science and industrial technology did not last for long. Soon, they became tightly coupled, with technology relying on basic science as its underlying foundation. Advances in technology no longer happened "just by accident."¹² A rigorous transition began to occur, starting from scientific discovery to technological application.

The Maturation of Technology. Within a few years of 1875, discoveries in the basic sciences made since the 1600s-an incubation process lasting nearly 270 years-started to feed into the West's industrial technology base.¹³ Over this period, the basic sciences laid the ground work for explaining the basis behind the natural sciences, chemistry and physics. These developments culminated in the foundation of rigorous engineering procedures which caused the rapid evolution of technology. Of the hundreds of significant breakthroughs in the basic sciences in the mid-19th century, the following highlights just a few:¹⁴

The application of these discoveries was not immediately apparent; however, from out of Maxwell's equations sprang the basis for radio, TV, electronics, and computers; Dmitry Mendeleyev's work on the periodic table established the basis for modern chemistry; Louis Pasteur's work in food spoilage resulted in the science of bacteriology and modern biology; and other foundations for advanced technology were similarly established. On the surface, it appears that there is a direct connection between discovery and application. Looking in the past, it is relatively easy to show a simple path from creative spark to world-changing technology.

But the path from these scientific discoveries to the technology used in industry was not direct. Rather, it was long and circuitous, rarely linear, and never straightforward. One discovery beget another; a new application yielded a springwell of others. Rarely did an application leap directly from the mind of the inventor; it waited instead to be revealed by the technologist as is an onion's inner core-peeled away, layer by layer.

And that long and circuitous route is the main theme of this chapter, an idea to be trumpeted by every scientific advocate. It is easy to forget that the labors of scientific research do not quickly bear fruit-the applications of basic research are measured in timescales of decades, and not days. For example, the time between Ainvention and innovation" for the fluorescent lamp took 79 years; the gyrocompass, 56 years; the cotton picker, 53 years; the zipper, 27 years; the jet engine, 14 years; radar, 13 years; the safety, razor 9 years; and the wireless telephone, 8 years.¹⁵ So although this long time-scale is a drawback of long-range research, the applications have proven that they can change the direction of society.

In the past there existed no formal mechanism for directly transferring either knowledge or advances in the basic sciences to industry. Too often, science was viewed as a topic allowing for interesting digressions, more for conversation than for driving technological change, or in particular, not being able to add to the profit base of companies.

Outside of university-derived research, science served no useful purpose other than existing as a tool for the enlightened person. As such, science was viewed as only that knowledge held by a few old wise men. It was not until the scientists were organized to specifically transfer their knowledge to solving the problems of the times that the real power of scientific research bore fruit.¹⁶ The application of the scientific method-one of rigorous examination and experimentation followed by unbiased replication of data-provided the basis for this organization, the establishment of the research laboratory.

The first research laboratories in the United States outside of the university setting concentrated on refining techniques for inserting advances in chemistry into industry. In 1836, Charles T. Jackson and James C. Booth established chemical laboratories nearly simultaneously in Boston and Philadelphia.¹⁷ One field that grew out of these endeavors was chemical engineering, now regarded as the foundation for modern chemical technology.

The number of industrial research laboratories in the United States grew from 2 in 1836, to 139 in 1898, and to over 550 by 1918.¹⁸ These laboratories were nearly always associated with large enterprises; the larger the company and more dependent the company is on technology for producing its product, then the greater the likelihood of a research laboratory presence. This may be explained by the invention of mass production and the resulting economies of scale. Although some may argue that large organizations are just too bureaucratic and inflexible to employ research laboratories, their very size is what makes it possible for research laboratories to flourish.

R&D by its very definition is associated with high risk endeavors. In fact, the higher the risk, the higher the potential payoff for the product that the laboratory may develop. R&D laboratories conductong high-risk research, some of which may not pay off for many years, requires investment in extensive facilities and modern equipment and development of a large infrastructure to maintain the R&D laboratory. These large, up-to-date facilities can be created and maintained onlyby large enterprises. Therefore, the presence of a large corporation provides the fertile soil necessary to maintain an R&D laboratory, as well as the necessary funds to provide the start up capital.

Large enterprises often exploit the technology of mass production and economies of scale to maintain their profit. This was particularly true back in the mid 1870s when the number of research laboratories skyrocketed. In order to improve their product they had to make advances in two areas: first, a near-term or "short time-scale" advance in which their product was "tuned" or improved to work better. The second area was a longer term, or "long time-scale" advance, which resulted in a complete redesign of the product or even a new product line. Large companies could afford the necessary costs needed to field an R&D laboratory that feeds innovations into their product line.

This paradigm of performing long-range research in industrial laboratories drove the structure and nature of science and technology for many years in the civilian sector. The industrial in-house laboratories were expected to provide a long-term base, providing an evolutionary-and sometimes, but rarely, a revolutionary-increase in the production line. This continued until the 1980s when American industry realized that it could no longer exploit its commercial success based on the techniques of mass production. Instead, agile manufacturing, or limited, tailor-made research-hitting problems fast and hard with specialized research teams so that they could respond to short-term market pressures-began appearing.¹⁹ Long-range research now focused on the revolutionary, rather than the evolutionary advances.

The times changed. Industry responded to market pressure and refined the way they conducted business. But throughout the turbulent times, the importance of long-range research remained; it was often sought to provide a revolutionary "silver bullet" to catapult industry ahead of the competition, but mostly it was focused on areas that promised growth.

It is now widely accepted that long-range research in the basic sciences provides the foundation for our nation's technological strength.²⁰ The Clinton administration has strongly endorsed basic science and has prepared an extensive policy on championing this support:

America's future demands an expanding knowledge base, which requires investment in our people, institutions, and ideas and cooperation with international partners to expand our access to data and information. Science lies at the heart of that investment-it is an endless, sustainable, and renewable resource with extraordinary dividends. Today's investments in basic science build a foundation for commercial products and services for the future. The nation's commitment to world leadership in science, engineering, and mathematics created the world's leading scientific enterprise, whether measured in terms of discoveries, citations, awards, and prizes, advanced education or contributions to industrial and informational motivation. Our scientific strength is a treasure we must sustain and build on for the future, and this Administration is firmly committed to its support.

The United States has refined a system for selecting excellence in ideas, individuals, and institutions thats extremely competitive and productive. It is a system that achieves quality by emphasizing peer review and promoting creativity. The system cannot always predict the exact areas or nature of scientific breakthroughs or the timeline for fundamental discoveries. Over decades, however, it reliably produces discoveries that enrich the lives and prospects of our citizens and, when transformed to practical cost-effective products, reorganizes old businesses and creates new ones.

The need for defense-related research, specifically both applied (or exploratory) development and advanced development, was established in this country's infancy. It was recognized as early as the Revolutionary War, and a precedent was set by President George Washington in his support for defense-related research.²²

Although a rigorous process for conducting basic research in DOD was not established until the 1960s, some parts of the military establishment became a champion for supporting basic research early in our nation's history. It was recognized that fundamental technology problems must be overcome in order to field different weapon concepts, and the only way to battle these problems was by the use of a systematic research process. Although the majority of the defense establishment did not acknowledge the importance of this process, nonetheless, "pockets" of support for research sprang up throughout the military. These "pockets" ensured that basic research was accomplished when it was needed, meaning that the lack of support in the rest of the defense community was not as devastating as it could have been.

For example, although the military had no funding specifically authorized for basic research, in 1833 the Navy established the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC. At that time the Naval Observatory advanced research in astronomy and navigation. The Navy was also interested in advancing the state-of-the-art in shipbuilding and was one of the earliest Federal institutions to actively promote basic research.²³

A quasi-official agency, the National Academy of Sciences, was established on March 3, 1913 to stimulate and encourage the advancement of science in the United States.²⁴ When it was first established, the Academy was charged with supporting military as well as nonmilitary research. The Academy chartered the National Research Council in 1916 as an official operating arm to specifically promote research related to national defense.

On the recommendation of the Navy Consultant Board, then chaired by Thomas A. Edison, the Naval Research Laboratory was established in 1916. This was the first military organization exclusively devoted to the systematic method of conducting defense-related scientific research. To this day the Naval Research Laboratory remains one of the nation's premier military and nonmilitary research institutions, advancing basic and applied science in fields as diverse as space to high power microwaves.

In 1940 President Roosevelt established the National Defense Research Committee, to "correlate and support scientific research on the mechanisms of warfare" and to "conduct research for the creation and improvement of instrumentality's . . . of warfare."²⁵ Although the National Defense Research Committee had no equipment, personnel, or buildings of its own, it was charged with tasking research to government, industry, universities, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Research Council.

The Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) was established on June 28, 1941, by President Roosevelt to assure "adequate provision for research on scientific and medical problems relating to national defense."²⁶ OSRD was given power to direct, coordinate and oversee research during the war. The success stories of research conducted under the auspices of OSRD include the development of the atomic bomb, the discovery of antimalarial drugs, the invention of the proximity fuze, radar, and other significant discoveries.

In June 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into force an overarching War Department Research and Development policy that would integrate military research with the civilian industrial base. As such, a Joint Research and Development Board was established to act as the coordinating agency for common R&D in the Navy and War departments. This policy was the first formal attempt to consolidate military planning, design and production of weapons using civilian assistance to exploit American industrial and technological capability.²⁷ However, this move was not viewed favorably by all.

CRITICS OF DEFENSE R&D

In its September 1946 issue, Business Week gave a bleak forecast of what it viewed as the role of defense-related science:

Partly by design, partly by default, federal support of pure science is today almost completely under military control. Its general direction is being set by military needs; its finances are coming from military funds. The odds are getting better all the time that pure scientific research will become, permanently, a branch of the military establishment.²⁸

There are still some grumbling that the military presence in science has forever hurt this traditionally bipartisan field-"traditional" only in the sense that the critics do not see the long-standing support of civilian technology by the military. And although critics such as Foerstel keep attacking the perceived problem with such shallow, ill-analyzed "exposes," it is the general consensus that defense-related S&T has attributed to advancing American competitiveness.²⁹

The National Security Act of 1947 set up the infrastructure for exercising centralized control of defense-related R&D. The founding of the National Military Establishment by this act attempted to rid defense R&D of duplication that existed in laboratories by establishing a Research and Development Board (RDB). The RDB replaced the Joint Research and Development Board and was tasked with the following specific functions:

• Develop an annual defense-wide R&D plan

• Provide guidance to all the military services for implementing the R&D plan

• Continually review and analyze defense R&D facilities

• Make R&D budget recommendations

• Assign one military service the primary responsibility for conducting R&D in specific areas in order to avoid duplication, promote efficiency, or achieve economy.³⁰

The RDB operated with committees consisting of both military and civilian personnel, focused on looking at general areas of technology. However, the committees were parochial in nature and gravitated toward parroting their own service's view.³¹ Even worse, critics charged that the inherent make-up of the committees resulted in recommendations that advanced the present state of technology by evolution, rather than recommending that truly "high-risk, long term" research be accomplished.³²

These problems were recognized by 1953 and the RDB was replaced by an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. Although the separate military services were responsible for planning, funding and conducting their own R&D, the Assistant Secretary ensured that the military services coordinated their research into an overall coordinated program.³³ However, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Applications Engineering was also established, and a battle ensued between the two position's responsibilities. The problem was resolved in 1957 when the two positions were combined into the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

In 1958, DOD formalized research infrastructure solidified into its near-present form when the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 established the Defense Director of Research and Engineering (DDR&E), making the DDR&E the sixth ranking member of DOD behind the secretary, the deputy secretary and the three service secretaries. The DDR&E became the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on basic and applied research, development, test and evaluation of weapons and equipment, design and engineering, and reliability, maintainability, and technology.³⁴ Further, the DDR&E is also responsible for the direction and control of all defense-related R&D, as well as formulating policy and developing standards.

The defense weapons acquisition program consists of three phases: concept formulation, contract definition, and acquisition. Research and Development is a major part of the concept formulation phase and encompasses all of science and technology (basic research, applied research or exploratory development), as well as advanced development. As such, R&D constitutes a major part of the entire defense weapons acquisitions process, called "Program 6," in the DOD Future Year Defense Program.³⁷ Congress authorizes and appropriates funding for research, development, test and evaluation under the auspices of Program 6 in the annual defense budget.

DOD has broken up Program 6 into five distinct categories, shown in Table 1, roughly corresponding to the research definitions given earlier in this chapter.³⁸

It is tempting to view the development cycle of weapon systems as a simplistic, well-ordered process such as shown in table 2. And that is what is frequently done by those who have not performed laboratory research, for this is the way that scientists and engineers have communicated the way they have performed creative research. However, in reality the lines between the different areas are blurred and may overlap-or there even may be gaps in the knowledge, where experimental results may show a promising phenomenon, but no explanation is yet known. Or the process may involve parallel (concurrent) developments that transcend one or more of the Program 6 Development Phases.

The quintessential example of this is the "bunker buster" kinetic energy weapons fielded during Desert Storm. The idea of accelerating a massive body to burrow deep into the ground to destroy buried command bunkers was not discovered during a 6.1-funded project; rather, it was borne years earlier from such concepts as "fire from heaven"-massive metal rods gravitationally accelerated from orbital heights to be used for precision strike. The "bunker buster" idea went directly to a 6.3 "Advanced Development" stage to prove the concept. And within days the weapons were hastily assembled and shipped off to combat.

The point is that the development phases in table 1 reflect an established process, set up and validated by DOD. The largest percentage of money may be spent during the last three phases (over 80 percent), but the tone of the program-the direction and promise of a new capability-is set during the first stage (6.1), where until 1966 was typically the first 5 percent of the money spent.³⁹ Table 3 shows the estimated FY96 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) authorizations, with research (6.1) comprising 3.5 percent of the total RDT&E in FY96, a decrease of 30 percent from the mid-1960s.⁴⁰

As the initial stage of development is the most remote (both conceptually and practically) from the warfighter (the person who either directly or indirectly controls the funding), it is absolutely imperative to lay a firm 6.1 basic research foundation. Otherwise, the warfighter-the person who demands results today, but yet is faced with funding investments that may not pay off for years-will always choose to forego long-term research for quick, short-term results.

Therefore, transistioning from 6.1 to 6.2 research -basic research to exploratory development, the abstract to the possible-is crucial for ensuring that technology continues to grow.

Note from table 3 that the lower percentage of 6.1 research (3.5 percent) to the total RDT&E in FY96 as compared to the mid-1960s (5 percent) shows quantitatively how long-range, basic research is regarded as a lower priority by decision makers-in fact thirty percent lower than in the past. The percentage of exploratory research (6.2) has also dropped, from 12 percent in 1966 to 8.2 percent in 1996.⁴¹ Over a span of 30 years, the total S&T (6.1 and 6.2) percentage has dropped 31 percent relative to the rest of RDT&E. For the decision makers, this vividly "puts their money where their mouth is."

It has been said that art mimics life. In movies and literature, scientists are never portrayed as benign. They are shown as either purveyors of doom or saviors of the world, whipping up a solution to the hardest problem. In the real world, science is often viewed with the same naiveté.

Such is the stigma associated with the role of science to warfare. It is the advancements in chemistry which made possible explosives and various chemical gases, the horrible weapons of mass destruction; rudimentary aeronautical engineering brought advances in airplanes, which were used first as observation platforms, then to drop bombs; the physics brought the world nuclear fission, which paved the way for first the atomic bomb, and then as a trigger for the world's most destructive weapon, the hydrogen, or fusion bomb.

But the same science which brought destruction also served to counter the march of ever-increasingly sophisticated weapons fielded by our adversaries. For example, anti-missile technology drew on advances in mathematical algorithms, material properties, structural designs, energetic fuels, control theory, sensor technology, and a host of other areas. The antimissile missile offered a chance to counter the missile. Each new advance seemed to bring not only the possibility of a new weapon, but the opportunity to negate, or at the very least render neutral, an older weapon.

Some have chronicled major advances in science and have called them "revolutionary." It is claimed that the world has changed in many ways, and that these advances in science are so fundamental to the treatment of warfare that they have even caused the very nature of war itself to change. Thus grew the concept of "Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA. Each RMA is associated with the discovery and subsequent application of a groundbreaking scientific or technological advance. For example, the bow and arrow was a vast improvement over the spear; the rifle over the bow and arrow; the introduction of tank warfare; the airplane; the atomic bomb; and some say today the computer.

But the world, the nature of warfare, and in particular the essence of science itself does not instantly cause change.⁴² It is not the revolution in science and technology that causes a revolution in military affairs, it is the evolution of science and technology. Immediate, world shaking events that profoundly change war are not invented by a team of brilliant scientists and engineers, whipped up on the spot to handily defeat the enemy. Their weapon served only to accomplish one goal. The real change occurred over a much longer term, but if this is true, then what about the atomic bomb?

The Manhattan atomic bomb project at Los Alamos during World War II was based on work performed by physicists who discovered the process of nuclear fission. The science and technology that resulted in the atomic bomb took only 3 years to come to fruition once the Manhattan project was established-an astonishingly short time, especially considering the massive technological infrastructure that not only had to be assembled, but also had to be invented, concurrently, along with the breathtaking advances in basic science that had to be made. The Manhattan project by any measure was an astounding success.

This work resulted in two different nuclear devices, one based on the implosion or compression method and the other based on a "gun" or impact method. But the true Revolution in Military Affairs was not the invention of these weapons, or even the fact that one device of each kind was used on Japan to expedite the end of the war. It was the evolution of the atomic bomb, and its subsequent diffusion through first the American, then the Soviet Union military infrastructure, that made this a true RMA. Nuclear weapons had to rely on the huge buildup of bomber aircraft and the invention of ballistic missile technology in order to profoundly change the world. Advances in flight control, stability, propellants, triggers and a myriad of interdisciplinary fields were brought together and optimized. It was the growth and maturation of the nuclear weapons infrastructure-including the delivery systems, the warhead design, and production facilities-that caused the Revolution in Military Affairs.

In the same manner, it wasn't the invention of the bullet that overcame the bow and arrow; it was the application of mass production techniques to effectively produce the guns that caused the RMA.

Another example is the addition of precision-guided bombs to aircraft. It wasn't the laser, or the homing device, or even the infrared tracker that precipitated this high-leverage, "force multiplying" invention. It was a synthesis of technologies and discoveries, all matured over a period of time. A period of time where long-range investments were allowed to pay off.

The point to this whole discussion is that scientific discoveries alone cannot profoundly affect warfare. Recall the "invention to innovation" time-scale in an earlier section-it took 27 years to fully develop the zipper. So it is the evolution of these discoveries, matured by interbreeding advances in other fields, that resulted in an innovative use.

In their New World Vistas report detailing critical areas targeted for investment, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board posited seven general guidelines.⁴³ These guidelines were meant to put the revolutionary concept in context for warfighters who expect miracles from long range research:

• The relationship between revolutionary and evolutionary concepts is complex and complementary. As shown above, rarely is a scientific discovery completely revolutionary, in the sense of causing a paradigm shift-that is, altering the world-view, or focus of how Abusiness" is conducted. Instead, it is the associated advancements in technology, the nonlinear cross-feeding of inter-related fields that allow for the evolutionary growth that may someday be perceived as revolutionary. For what is revolutionary to one may be viewed as evolutionary to another-one may merely have not been able to adjust to the changes.

• Revolutionary ideas often point the way to later applications which are far more useful than the original idea. Forecasting the eventual use of a technology is beyond the ability of anyone because of the myriad casual forces and the inability to know fully all the boundary conditions necessary to make an accurate judgment. This philosophy was the foundation for the Bush administration's policy of not implementing a national industrial policy. It was felt that the government could not pick the "winners" in a free market environment, because the commercial marketplace would (and should) determine both the winners and the losers.

The standard example is GPS-Global Positioning Satellites. No one accurately projected the myriad uses of this now critical resource. Another, but more infamous anecdote of the inability of individuals to predict the application of a technology is the "aerogel" case at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). As one of the two nuclear weapon design laboratories run for the Department of Energy, LLNL developed "aerogel" as part of its nuclear weapon program. A wispy, transparent substance made partially from seaweed, aerogel is extremely light yet very strong. Efforts at LLNL to transition aerogel to the commercial sector failed because no one could think of a viable commercial use of the substance. However, when turned over to the commercial market place, a heretofore unthought of use appeared-using the aerogel in cigarette lighters to make ultralight but extremely strong reservoir for lighter fluid.

• Early application of revolutionary concepts should not be required to be complete and final weapon systems. Expecting too much too soon from an unproven concept may lead to disaster. Scientific experiments are littered with stories of failure, and applying requirements to revolutionary concepts may actually do more harm than good.

The SSTO (Single-Stage-To-Orbit) spacecraft is an excellent example of what could happen if operational requirements are levied on a revolutionary concept. The concept of building a fully reusable spacecraft that would only have one stage is driven not by magic, but by the rocket equation, a sophisticated expression of momentum conservation. There are several formidable obstacles to building an SSTO (mass fraction, heat resistant materials and propulsion among them), but the fact remains that although the engineering problems are huge, they are not impossible. Scientifically there is no reason for an SSTO not to work; technically there are plenty of reasons.

The point is that for such a formidable project, the only rationale way to solve the problem is to first show that an SSTO can work-that is, that the problem is technically possible. Any attempt to make the SSTO a weapon system without first showing that it works dooms the project to failure. The requirements levied on a weapon system are different from the easier problem of showing it works. This is precisely what happened to the National AeroSpace Plane (NASP), the "Orient Express"-an SSTO capable of carrying passengers from one part of the world to another, as envisioned by President Reagan. By the time the NASP became a program, it was overburdened with military requirements in order to gain the support across the military services, and the requirements demanded enormous capability from a plane when it was not even known if it was technically possible to get to orbit.

And that is why the new NASA SSTO project is so exciting-it is an attempt to prove a concept, build an "X-rocket" much like the X-series of experimental aircraft built in the 1950s and early 1960s to prove the technology. No military requirements were levied on the X-planes; it was only after the technology was proven possible that the requirements came.

A modern example of how this succeeds is with the F-117 stealth fighter. Originally built as a technology demonstrator under the classified Have Blue program, it was only after the feasibility of stealth was proven that the F-117A was built.

Just as there are exceptions to every rule, there is an exception to this one as well. Certainly, if the very existence of the nation is at question, such as in World War II, when it was thought that Germany was close to obtaining the atomic bomb, then a last-resort crash program is justified. Even in the post-Cold War era, there may be some threats that are of the magnitude that requires disregarding this axiom-such as chemical or biological attacks by a rogue state.

• Identification and development of revolutionary concepts require intuition, innovation, and acceptance of substantial risk. The aircraft industry has a rich history of funding high risk development efforts for experimental aircraft.⁴⁴ The industry realizes that to be competitive, it must take risks to advance the state-of-the-art; evolutionary advances of improvements may strengthen the profitability of a product line and is commendable in a "quality" environment, but unless new ground is broken, a competitor may change the state of the industry overnight. The Boeing Company undertook substantial risk that involved immense technological challenges to develop the 777 aircraft, but the upturn of the commercial market coupled with increasing demand for the new aircraft validated their gamble of accepting this risk-a gamble involving nearly 5 billion dollars for Boeing.⁴⁵

The antithesis of this is the rocket launch industry, primarily because of a hedge "to protect any investment against losses."⁴⁶ Often viewed as "risk adverse," some in the launch industry argue that the cost of losing a launch vehicle (on the order of tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars), and also losing the associated payload (as much as a billion dollars) prohibits risk. Therefore, to decrease the risk, more money is spent on the launch system to increase the reliability, but this requirement in turn makes the launch more risky because of the increased amount of money that now at stake if the rocket is lost. So even more reliability is needed to decrease the risk, which paradoxically increases the risk.

And one can see easily see, this tightly coupled, ever-increasing death spiral of risk begetting reliability in the launch industry only results in more cost for the consumer-in this case, the U.S. Government and the commercial marketplace who desire to exploit space. Risks must be taken if any substantial advance is to be made. This is true of every other industry, and there is no reason why this should also not be true for the space launch industry-and all of science and technology research-as well.

• We must be prepared for a failure rate greater than 50 percent. During the early development years of the U.S. intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program, rockets routinely failed at a rate approaching 60 percent.⁴⁷ In the scientific field, scientists routinely learn more from their failures than from their successes. With the understanding that defense-driven science and technology may have literally millions of dollars funding an advanced technology demonstration, a policy of allowing for no failures will only result in costly, meaningless "performances" that do little to advance the true state-of-the-art. Emphasis will be put on reducing failure and not "pushing the envelope," resulting in slow, evolutionary increases in performance, rather than in true revolutionary advances.

• Most revolutionary ideas will be opposed by the majority of decisionmakers. Many decisionmakers have risen to their position because of competence in some area, be it managerial skills, technical savvy, or the ability to win a political appointment. When they are confronted with a new situation it is easy to fall back on what has gotten them through past situations. In Boleman and Deal's text, Reframing Organizations, they elegantly states, "Too often [leaders and managers] bring too few ideas to the challenges that they face. They live in psychic prisons because they cannot look at old problems in a new light and attack old challenges with different and more powerful tools-they cannot reframe . . . the lack of imagination is a major shortfall between the reach and grasp of so many organizations."⁴⁸ Another way of expressing this is that "you lead what you know," and therefore new ideas, especially revolutionary ones, are viewed as a threat to the status quo.⁴⁹

• We must remember that science and science fiction are related only superficially. Here the Science Advisory Board tries to ensure that the defense official who sees a flashy pseudo-science feat achieved in the movies (or for that matter reads about it in a book) does not automatically try to develop that capability for DOD. Their point is that it is the realm of science fiction to break the laws of physics, not the acquisition official.

However, Dr. Gene McCall, the chairman of the AF Science Advisory Board, has pointed out that there are some things that can be gleaned from science fiction. He calls this the "possible" and the "impossible" aspects of Star Trek: some "possible" uses of technology include the communicator (that can be used as a point-to-point communication device anywhere in the world), the medical "tri-corder" (that can give internal medical assessments of humans without touching them), and the universal translator. Certainly these examples of technology do not violate any of the known laws of science and might be possible to manufacture given sufficient technological advancement.⁵⁰

In the same vein, however, the "impossible" aspects include "warp drive" (traveling faster than light), the use of a "transporter" (beaming matter, including people, instantly from one spatial point to another), "sub-space communication" (faster than light communication), and Atime travel." Certainly if a fundamental discovery was made that overturned the laws of physics, these aspects might be revisited, but the chances of exploiting them for practical use is vanishingly small.⁵¹ However, it should be noted that many scientists and engineers were steered into their profession because of the lure of the fantastic, be it possible to achieve their dreams or not.

SUMMARY

The Department of Defense has a tradition of support for long-term research. A majority of the defense establishment may only grudgingly acknowledge the critical role that research plays, but the importance of scientific advances is seen throughout the modern arsenal: stealth platforms, high precision weapons, extremely accurate navigation, communications-and the list goes on.