DOD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
4. THE PRESENT DEFENSE RESEARCH STRATEGY
We are not the only nation with competence in defense science and technology. To sustain the lead which brought us victory during Desert Storm . . . recognizing that over time other nations will develop comparable capabilities, we must . . . invest in the next generation of defense technologies.
William J. Perry
THE FOUNDATION OF DEFENSE
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Military science and technology (S&T) must contribute to the national security goals of the United States by being responsive to new threats, challenges, demands and opportunities.1 To ascertain specifically how these national goals are addressed, the Joint Staff was tasked by DOD to set up a process to identify future joint warfighting capabilities. The capabilities are evolved from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), an executive-level council made up of the vice chiefs of staffs of the military services. The JROC capabilities serve to guide the S&T investment decisions made by the defense research establishment, specifically by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). This highly interactive process strongly couples future military capabilities with national policy goals.
The JROC has identified five future joint warfighting capabilities, given below.2 These capabilities lay the foundation for the U.S. National Security Science and Technology Strategy, which then sets the requirements that drives the S&T contributions for military needs. Once the military needs are established, a science and technology strategy may then be formed to satisfy these needs.
It is satisfying this S&T strategy through the coupling of long-range and short-range research that is the subject of this chapter. Specifically, problems with the strategy in transitioning from long-range to short-range research will be addressed-and that ultimately affects how the warfighter will have access to the latest advancements in science and technology. But before this coupling may be explored, it is absolutely necessary to know the rationale underpinning defense S&T. The following five future joint warfighting capabilities have been determined by the JROC process.
FUTURE JOINT-WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
To maintain near perfect, real-time knowledge of the enemy and communicate that to all forces in near-real time. Operational forces must know precisely the enemy's location and capability. This information must be transmitted to warfighters in a near-real time manner, along with information as to the status of their own forces and the spectrum of possible responses to defeat the enemy. Included in this information are dynamic data about the weather, geography, topography, the political situation, and the location of civilians.3
The delivery systems for these data-battlefield surveillance, information management, and communications-require a highly coupled, optimized, and efficient means of transmission.4 If these data are not transmitted in a near real-time manner, then disastrous consequences may occur. The shoot-down of Captain Scott O'Grady's F-16 over Bosnia has recently been acknowledged as stemming from a failure of providing this type of information in a timely manner-information had been obtained of the presence of antiaircraft radar and missiles but had not been transmitted to the operational warfighters.
To engage regional forces promptly in decisive combat on a global basis. Regional forces depend on two axioms to bring them rapidly to victory: mobility and decisive combat. Mobility includes rapidly introducing both the operational forces and their supplies into combat.5
To increase mobility, advances in increasing the lift capability of air, land, and sea vehicles are performed in concert with decreasing the weight of what is carried. Science and technology can create advances in propulsion, avionics, materials and structures (for reducing weight and increasing strength), and fuels. Computer simulations can add to optimizing the delivery systems and their routes, as well as numerically testing innovative approaches to solving these dynamically changing optimization problems.6
Decisive victory in combat may be enhanced by feeding the warfighter near real-time information about the battlefield environment, including the location and capability of enemy forces. This includes rapid identification and tracking of targets, as well as knowledge and location of friendly forces. It is enhanced by providing the warfighter with a precision strike capability from an extended range, fielding anti-weapon armor, and giving the warfighter an ability to neutralize or destroy the enemy's aircraft and missiles.7
There are other means to feed the warfighter timely information. New technologies, such as the introduction of unmanned surveillance vehicles, and by deploying sophisticated sensors into the air, land and sea, can provide a means of obtaining intelligence without putting the warfighter in harm's way.8 Science and technology also provide the means to rapidly respond to new, unique threats-such as deeply buried command and communication bunkers in Iraq, numerous tunnels in North Korea, or the millions of land mines in Bosnia.
To employ a range of capabilities more suitable to actions at the lower end of the full range of military operations which allow achievement of military objectives with minimum causalities and collateral damage. From 1950 until the early 1990s the U.S. military was built and positioned to respond to an overwhelming monolithic threat-the expansion of communism fueled by the Soviet Union's military machine. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disappearance of an overpowering foe, the main threat forecast to the United States over the next several decades will come from small regional conflicts and the dangers associated with conducting Special Operations, assisting humanitarian efforts, and conducting peacekeeping operations.9
Achieving military objectives while conducting special operations or while providing humanitarian assistance calls for using another metric for measuring success-obtaining minimum causalities with little or no collateral damage. Nonlethal weapons such as high-power microwaves, "sticky foam," or sonic weapons, among others, show great promise for achieving military objectives. The use of nonlethal weapons that have the capability to neutralize, stun, disable, disorient, or confuse the enemy without having lasting effects is therefore highly desirable.10
However, intrinsic to these "low end" military options is the real threat to the U.S. warfighter. These hostile situations can be dangerous, as crowds may turn against them, or they may open themselves up to attacks by terrorists. In addition, exotic weapons such as chemical and biological warfare may be used against U.S. forces. Advances in information technology can be used to give the warfighter a heightened degree of battlefield awareness; biological and chemical advances may afford protection that heretofore had been impossible to obtain.11
To control the use of space. The United States holds a monopoly in the free world's (i.e., excluding Russia) use of space, having launched 1,018 spacecraft to Earth orbit or beyond from 1957 to 1994, compared to 175 launches for the European Space Agency, Japan, China, India, Israel, France, Italy, Australia, and the United Kingdom combined.12 However, this is less than half the number that the former Soviet Union had launched in the same time period. Furthermore, the U.S. continues to launch approximately half the number of spacecraft Russia launches today.13
However, no matter what the present relative U.S. ranking, in Desert Storm the importance of space to national security was brought solidly to the front. Space assets provided the United States with intelligence, positioning information and communications that greatly added to its ability to win the war. The United States clearly held the "high ground," and if the Iraqis had had access to the same intelligence as the United States, the war might have turned out differently.
In fact, this almost happened. The French, while participating as part of the Coalition Forces in the Gulf War, provided Spot satellite overhead data (10-meter resolution) to the Iraqis. With great credit to U.S. prodding, the French "reconsidered" what it was doing and cut off Iraq's access to a potentially dangerous windfall of intelligence data. This demonstrates just how fragile the U.S. claim to the "high ground" of space actually was.
Currently, numerous countries have launch capabilities and have operational satellites in place. The European Space Agency Ariane, the Russian Proton, the Japanese H-2, the Chinese Long March, and other countries' launch vehicles (such as India) are all capable-or will be in the near future-of launching satellites to low earth orbit or higher. Countries as disparate as Indonesian have communication satellites to orbit. With the proliferation of smaller satellites weighing mere hundreds of pounds-or even microsatellites weighing tens of pounds-and the availability of "low cost" launchers (in the $10-million range), more countries will be able to launch and control their own satellite assets.14 And even if a country does not have its own indigenous space capability, U.S. commercial companies, under a recent Presidential Decision Directive, are now allowed to sell hyperspectral satellite data to foreign countries down to one meter in resolution.
With these emerging capabilities, the United States must position itself with the judicious use of science and technology to rapidly and efficiently control the use of space during future conflicts. This includes protecting U.S. military satellites and launch capabilities, denying foreign countries the ability to threaten these assets, and even protecting friendly non-military satellites, such as communication links. This may be accomplished by investing in technologies that optimize launch (either through low-cost expendable launchers or developing a single stage to orbit capability), substantially reducing the time from satellite design to launch (from 10 years to 18 months) and developing an antisatellite capability.15
To counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction and future ballistic and cruise missiles to the CONUS and deployed forces. The United States lived through the threat of global annihilation, brought on by the possible use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Enormous quantities of warheads existed on both sides. Unclassified sources claimed that as late as 1993 the numbers ranged from 10,000 weapons in the U.S. inventory to over 30,000 in the four major countries that made up the former Soviet Union.16 But the terror invoked by the use of nuclear weapons actually worked successfully to end the Cold War: no atomic bombs were dropped and the two superpowers did not go to a "shooting" war, at least not directly against each other. So one may conclude that the very existence of nuclear weapons brought about stability.
However, with end of the Cold War and the slow dismantlement of the superpower's nuclear arsenal, there still exists a very real danger of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In fact, there now may be even more of a danger, in that the "stability" of a bi-polar world has evolved into that of a single superpower surrounded by allies, regional wackos, and an undercurrent of chaotic factions existing in third world countries.
Nuclear weapons are not difficult to make, in a relative sense.17 The basic physics behind nuclear weapons has been known for several decades: slap two pieces of fissionable material together to make a "critical" mass of fissionable matter, which then releases its energy in an atomic explosion. A hydrogen (fusion) bomb, up to a thousand times more powerful than an atomic (fission) bomb, works simply by rapidly fusing hydrogen together to make helium. The fusion process is actually driven by first detonating an atomic bomb, but the fact is that producing a hydrogen bomb is a well-known, relatively simple problem in physics.18
The heart of the matter in building a nuclear weapon lies in the engineering details-the materials and correct manufacturing processes that lead to a completed device. This demands a sophisticated infrastructure. In practice a nuclear weapon is extremely difficult to build, but it is quite within reach of several countries-such as Iraq or North Korea, for example.
And chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction are easier to manufacture than nuclear weapons. Although certain growth media are need to produce biological weapons, chemical and biological weapons do not require the sophisticated supporting infrastructure as does their nuclear counterpart. Witness the recent gas attacks on the subway system in Japan.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that weapons of mass destruction will not disappear, and that the United States must be prepared to both stop their proliferation and to be able to actively deny their use. Science and technology may play a role in this, through sophisticated detection mechanisms such as neutron activation of materials, or in neutralizing their effects, such as through the focused application of concentrated ozone, or intense X-rays to kill biological entities.19
THE CHARGE TO DOD
With these five future warfighting capabilities identified, the President has charged the U.S. Department of Defense with ensuring our future national security remains intact:
The Administration is committed to a sustained investment in the technology base needed to ensure that our nation maintains the best-trained and best-equipped forces in the world. Our investment strategy involves long-term research as well as near-term applications as it is only in hindsight that we are able to discern the revolutionary military capabilities provided by breakthroughs such as radar, digital computers, semiconductor electronics, lasers, fiber optics, and navigational systems capable of great accuracy.20
As the executing agent for the DOD science and technology program, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) uses the five future capabilities to focus the overall content, quality, and direction of defense-related R&D to accomplish the administration's goals. The DOD S&T program is organized in three overlapping categories: basic research, exploratory development (applied research), and advanced technology development. The quintessential core of military strength is anchored on this foundation. This remainder of chapter will examine the present defense research infrastructure and illuminate its strengths and weaknesses.
NATIONAL SECURITY SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
S&T CONTRIBUTIONS TO MILITARY CAPABILITY NEEDS
The success of the U.S. National Security Strategy is directly linked to the nation's commitment to science and technology.21 Specifically, the success ultimately depends on the efficiency and timely exploitation of S&T to develop and deploy sophisticated weapons systems to counter and defeat the enemy. Some authors have pointed out that this policy involves the United States embracing a "technology-intensive" strategy rather than a "manpower-intensive" strategy.22 The differences may seem slight, the but consequences are large.
As an example of a technology-intensive strategy, the United States brilliantly responded to the Soviet ICBM threat of immense boosters capable of lifting multi-megatons to fractional (ballistic) orbits. The United States developed highly accurate warheads with relatively small nuclear yields, on the order of hundreds of kilotons. It was a classic response of using finesse to counter brute strength: what the United States lacked in brute strength (massive rockets and megaton-class warheads) it overcame with lower-yield weapons lifted by modest size rocket boosters.
But the U.S. reliance on technological finesse went further than merely responding with sophisticated weaponry. A philosophy of "quality over quantity" was constantly espoused and adhered to. It became a national mantra and permeated our culture. The U.S. response to the massive Soviet in Western Europe was based on this philosophy. National policy dictated that the United States would respond to a "manpower intensive" threat by investing in our educational system, increasing the funding of our scientific infrastructure, and strengthening our industrial base.23 This philosophy explicitly surfaced through many programs: the Apollo program and the Strategic Defense Initiative, to name a few.
Thus was defined the US's "technology-intensive" paradigm for responding to "manpower-intensive" threats. In addition to its ethereal benefits of precisely countering the Soviet problem, it also allowed policy makers to avoid the messy issues associated with wide-spread conscription.24 The timely and intelligent use of technology was viewed as a move away from the "attrition based" warfare of the past to "information based" warfare of the future-exploiting technology to produce unmanned, precision, brilliant weapons. This is stated eloquently by Gansler, "Constant development and deployment of new weapons will be needed to stay ahead."25
Therefore, a principal challenge of the United States maintaining its military advantage is to ensure technological superiority over present and future adversaries.26 In maintaining this superiority, a major requirement is that defense-related research must ultimately satisfy the national vision.
A "bottom up" structure for achieving this requirement is to ensure that basic research advances science and technology. Basic research must be "focused" but done so in a general enough field that it is likely to produce advances in the S&T desired for future weapons systems. For example, it is extremely unlikely that performing basic research on economic models will result in a significant advance in materials science for submarine propellers; or it is unlikely that performing basic research on fresh cow milk will produce an advance in rocket propellants. However, the techniques pioneered in these disparate fields may well be applicable to defense-related S&T. For example, techniques solving a diffusion equation used for stock market analysis may be applicable to the flow of laser energetics. Therefore, advances in S&T may contribute to advanced technology demonstrations that exploit new or refined discoveries.
Once a successful S&T demonstration has validated a new weapon concept, the system undergoes development to focus and optimize the system. If more than a few of these systems are required in the field, then the system undergoes a production phase so that it may be transitioned to the field to exploit its operational capabilities.27 The operational capabilities of this new weapon system should satisfy the national security S&T strategy, if in turn it is to ultimately satisfy the vision set out by national policy makers.
VISION
The Department of Defense Science and Technology Vision has been established to provide technological superiority for our nation's military services. Encompassing all defense-related research conducted by DOD, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering published the following vision in it's September, 1994 Defense Science and Technology Strategy:
Develop and transition superior technology to enable affordable, decisive military capability and to enhance economic security.
This vision recognizes that maintaining technological superiority is not enough; it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure our military superiority. Coupled with the necessity for ensuring technological superiority is the dual condition of producing affordable weaponry and enhanced economic security. These two conditions extend the vision to account for the post-Cold war environment, demanding that DOD pursue research with a new mindset. Further, the vision recognizes that both economies of scale and technological innovation of the commercial sector play a vital, central role in defense-related research.28
The vision's bottom line is to improve productivity and reduce costs while producing effective weapon system's capabilities.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
The U.S. National Security Science and Technology Strategy stands on three pillars. These pillars define the foundation of our national power, and lie at the heart of the Clinton administration's definition of national security:29
These pillars are maintained by focusing our investments to allow for their growth and health. The investments that the nation can focus on are neither monetary nor personnel-driven; rather, they are in specific, critical high-leverage areas that can ensure that the nation continues to be strong. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering has identified four critical investment areas:
Investment in each of these areas, discussed in detail below, are critical for ensuring the health of the national security science and technology strategy.
Maintain technological superiority in warfighting equipment. The United States cannot afford to fight its next war with the technology from the last war. The rate of technological growth is accelerating throughout the world-as measured by R&D expenditures (including universities, industry and government), after adjusting for inflation, the total outlays for R&D more than doubled in the United States alone between 1960 and 1984.30
Nations can now obtain technology from U.S. and other commercial markets that only a few years ago was considered state-of-the-art. Cray supercomputers in the late 1980s had internal "clock" speeds of 4 nanoseconds (250 MHz) and were once restricted for sale to foreign governments. Today, similar processors cost under $5,000 and can be bought at many stores in the US. Even access to sensitive GPS satellite information, once reserved for the military during threat conditions, will no longer be "scrambled," and will instead be opened for use by the public-and to foreign governments, as well.
The upshot is that other nations need no longer make large investments in R&D if they have access to products generated from the U.S. R&D infrastructure. In order to produce new weapons based on advances in science and technology, other nations simply have to wait for the United States to provide them access to the new technology.
Our nation's response to date to this threat is to ensure that it doesn't stop making advances. This doesn't mean that the United States should be performing military-related R&D for the rest of the world while they ride our coattails in technological breakthroughs. Rather, the United States is making the R&D advances to support the third of the three pillars of our national power-the strength of our economy-and marketing the advances commercially. As a result, the technological edge that the United States once commanded-the argument of quality over quantity-can only be maintained if a continuing investment is made to ensure our technological superiority.
A drawback to this strategy is in the way that other countries view technology transfer. For example, it has been said that the United States treats technology as a commodity-we will sell technology, and in effect the fruits of our R&D, to make a profit. On the other hand, countries such as Japan view technology as a national asset-it keeps its technology and instead sells products based on that technology. Which strategy is best? One can look at the growing strength of Japan's economy and the subsequent trade imbalance with the United States to draw one's own conclusion.31
Provide technical solutions to achieve future joint warfighting capabilities. Admiral William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "Technology will never be a substitute for courage or human touchness in conflict, but it will increase the likelihood that the tough and courageous will be successful."32 To do this, it is imperative that the technology created in the laboratory be efficiently transitioned to the warfighter. The best technological advance in history is of no use to the person fighting America's war if that discovery is not made available in a useful way. For example, Ernico Fermi's ground-breaking validation of the nuclear chain reaction process was of no value to the soldiers in World War II while Fermi's laboratory experiment remained under a football field at the University of Chicago. It was only through the advanced development program conducted by the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos-the atomic bomb project-that gave the United States its first nuclear weapons.
The S&T accomplished for the warfighter feeds into joint technology programs called technology demonstrations. These demonstrations are designed to demonstrate that the concept developed during the S&T phase satisfies a militarily significant goal. By increasing the level and the scope of the technology demonstration, some of the practical problems that always arise during operational use are ironed out.
In the next section a specific program (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations) is discussed that accomplishes part of this goal. Irrespective of the specific program, the people participating in defense-related science and technology must work with the warfighters at every opportunity throughout the R&D phase. They must understand the warfighter's needs, and they must move their most promising concepts rapidly to satisfy the warfighter's requirements. This is accomplished only by keeping in close, continuous contact with the warfighter and keeping in focus the ultimate purpose for conducting defense-related S&T: to win wars.
Note that this ultimate purpose supports the first of the three "pillars" (capability) that serve as the foundation for our national power: ensuring the readiness and capabilities of our military forces, engaging with other nations to prevent conflict from occurring, and strengthening our economy. It may be argued that these three pillars are merely stopping points along the path of winning a war, or even that the real purpose of defense-related S&T is to "develop options for decisive military capabilities."33 However, it must be remembered that just as the commercial marketplace has as its bottom line the profit of its endeavor, in the same respect-but more powerfully, for the survival of our nation may depend on its degree-the bottom line, the ultimate purpose of defense-related S&T, is winning that war. No matter what policy makers may say, if they subscribe to any other result, than it is not the warfighter they are supporting, but rather a beguiling veil of hidden political agendas.
Balance basic research and applied technology in pursuing technological advances. The National Science and Technology Strategy commits the United States to expanding "fundamental scientific knowledge that may lead to future warfighting capabilities."34 Furthermore, DOD acknowledges that the technical superiority that leads to these future warfighting capabilities is grounded in scientific advancements and thus broadly invests in "defense relevant scientific fields." As such, the objective of DOD investments in basic research is first to discover new knowledge and second to invest in and support a community of world-class scientists as they research the latest and technically superior weapons of war.35
By its very definition, basic research provides the foundation for both military and non-military applied research. Because basic research is not directed toward specific goals, the DOD basic research program also supports the strength of our economy. This then strengthens our economic security as well as our national security.
DOD has four investment strategies in maintaining the quality and excellence of its science and technology programs:
DOD's goal is to support first-rate scientists in universities (where traditionally over 50 percent of the basic research is performed), industry, defense laboratories, and other governmental laboratories such as those managed by the Department of Energy, Department of Commerce, and the national security agencies. Through its program of providing "6.1" funding as competitive grants, DOD is committed to supporting the best researchers based on merit, regardless of organization or location. 37
Modern research is conducted in teams. A perusal of an esteemed publication such as Physical Review Letters, arguably the top peer-reviewed journal in physics, shows that research teams consist from three to over a hundred people. The larger teams are consolidated around "big science" projects, such as Tokomaks for magnetic fusion, or large particle accelerators for work in elementary particle physics. The point is that all these teams revolve around a few key individuals, who cannot be easily replaced. If team leaders and a significant number of members leave the teams because of layoffs, or even budget uncertainties, then the project is not just put on hold until another team can be assembled but usually scrapped, sometimes for many years. These highly trained individuals are true national assets, not interchangeable parts.
The reason for this situation is grounded in economics. There is an extremely small supply of top scientific talent (Noble laureate class), and if the demand for that talent is large, then the talent will pursue other activities. Finding key individuals to direct world-class basic and applied research is not the same as massively hiring engineers. The number of talented individuals on a scientific team does not decrease linearly as funding decreases; rather, there is a sudden drop to zero if a threshold is reached and the funding drops below a certain level.38 Therefore, the ability to sustain research funding at a stable level is critical for keeping key scientists, ensuring continuity, and ultimately ensuring the research remains world class.
Today the United States has the world's best universities for producing future scientists and engineers. A recent study conducted by the National Academy of Engineering concluded, "The superiority of advanced technical education in America is recognized throughout the world, as attested by persistently large enrollments of foreign students in doctoral level engineering and science programs in American universities."39 As a result, American universities command a large percentage of the nation's total R&D budget and a majority of the foreign students educated in America remain due to the enhanced economic conditions as compared to their homes of birth. However, because of the poor state of America's primary and secondary education system, the number of U.S. citizens graduating with advanced technical degrees has been decreasing throughout the years.40 Therefore, although American universities are the best in the world, we are also decreasing the number of our own science and engineering graduates. This is contrary to what existed in the 1960s when our schools were not only the best, but we also had a pool of competent secondary education graduates which went on in record numbers to become technically trained individuals.
One reason the aerospace industry underwent explosive growth in the 1960s was because of the U.S. response to Sputnik and the spinoff opportunities presented by the rise in new jet airplanes.41 Universities pumped out engineering graduates to meet the demand for ever increasing numbers of engineers, and times were heady for new scientific talent.42 During the same period, the defense industry also attracted young scientists and engineers, as new weapons of war demanded ever-increasing scientific acumen. However, the huge number of layoffs during the economic downturn of the early 1970s of science and engineering workers showed people that the science and engineering field was not an infinite source of jobs.
Another example of drought where scientific talent once reigned is in the rocket engine and nuclear weapons industry. In the 1960s American rocket engineers built the largest and most powerful rocket known to man-the F-1 liquid oxygen kerosene-fueled engine that powered the giant Saturn V launch vehicle.43 The F-1 engine produced over 1.5 million pounds of thrust and provided the massive first-stage lift capability to launch a moon vehicle and return capsule to orbit. However, because the Apollo program was scuttled and the F-1 manufacturing line was stopped, the infrastructure to build the F-1-the workers, machines and even the blueprints-are no longer around. It is estimated that it would take 10 years and over a billion dollars just to rebuild to the same level achieved by our engineers 30 years ago. If cheap access to space is ever realized, perhaps through a true single-stage-to-orbit vehicle, then this era may have just served as a stepping stone; but if heavy lift rockets will again be built, then we will have to relearn this critical technology. Therefore, a key question is whether or not this expertise is even needed.
The nuclear weapons industry is quickly following suit. Established as the Manhattan Project and having produced an unparalleled technical achievement that won World War II, the infrastructure that maintained the atomic weapons industry has ground to a halt. With the threat of a massive nuclear attack from nuclear weapons abating worldwide, the United States is moving out of the nuclear weapons business. As a result, the number of experienced scientific talent that designed, validated and nurtured the weapons has been decreasing throughout the years. The average age of the nuclear researcher has increased, and little new talent has been brought in to act as scientific guardian of the nuclear genie.44 As a result, the dominance of nuclear weapon S&T once held by the United States is in severe danger of disappearing. And again, the key question is do we really need to maintain this dwindling expertise, or will new technologies demand us to train scientists in other areas of expertise?
With these analogies directly applicable to our present situation, if we are going to continue our dominance in defense-related S&T, we must invest in our future by educating the highest quality people to become scientists and engineers. Moreover, it is not enough merely to provide high-quality education al opportunities for these people; they must also be motivated, through the use of various incentives, to follow a career path in defense-related research.
The John and Fanny Hertz Foundation had a vision for providing such motivation for high-quality undergraduates. The foundation established a set of highly competitive scholarships purposely designed to bring the best and the brightest undergraduate science and engineering students into the competitive arena. The prize-a full scholarship with stipend to some of the best universities in the nation, with the motivation to study in the applied sciences. The scholarship recipients are funded to work all the way to their Ph.D. and are fully cognizant of the fact that they may be exposed to national security-related S&T. The Hertz Scholarship is a shining example of motivating our future scientists by exposing them to a favorable view of defense-related S&T. Graduates of this program include Dr. Peter Hagelstein, inventor of the X-ray laser, among several other luminaries.45
Another vision for producing scientists and engineers motivated to work on defense-related research is through the use of the scientific equivalent of "land grant" colleges. Established in the 1890s, the agricultural (A&M) state universities were responsible for an explosion of agricultural advances. In the same manner, nationally supported schools focusing on the applied sciences and engineering, might someday produce graduates that have been exposed to unique defense-related requirements. And similarly, as in the A&M schools where the graduates are not forced to go into agricultural-related jobs, there should be no mandatory requirement for these graduates to go into defense jobs. The point is to produce self-motivated individuals. Just as it would be foolish to try and establish an engineering school to compete with the MITs of the world, scholarships and other directed programs might prove to be the acceptable path rather than building new buildings and campuses.
Therefore, to ensure that the highest quality of scientific work is performed, the DOD research program envisions partnerships of defense laboratory researchers with their colleagues at Universities, industry, and other national laboratories. The teams would be drawn together to use common facilities, and would exploit the strengths of various team members-a national laboratory may be particularly strong in large scale supercomputer simulations, while several university teams might be able to provide the analytic support, and a DOD laboratory may well have the proper equipment to perform a crucial experiment to validate the theoretical results.
There is a parallel to this in American industry. A shift occurred in the commercial market place when corporations downsized during the 1980s and 1990s. The corporations concentrated their energy in their core competencies-the things they did best. What this meant was that instead of being able to be fully independent, and existing in isolation from other companies by possessing everything internal to their organization-artwork, film processing, technical editors, messengers, machine shop, etc.-the companies cut to the core of what they did best, their "core competencies," and contracted out everything else.46
In the same manner, defense laboratories must focus on their core competencies and do what they do best. They must exploit the expertise of others in getting their product-the technology for new weapons of war-out the door and to the warfighters. The downside is that those laboratories who have chosen the wrong core competency-either through politics or through internal agendas-will quickly discover that they cannot compete in this new "marketplace" of defense-related S&T.
As an example, consider a laboratory that excels in scientific field "A." If, because of politics, that laboratory declares it is now competent in field "B" and drops "A," then no matter how good it thinks it can perform "B," it is still second rate. It has not correctly chosen its core competency, and when cuts are made, this lab will be ripe for cutting.
The remainder of the national security science and technology budget is spent by Department of Energy (DOE) and other national security laboratories. In the 1980s, the "big three" DOE weapons laboratories-Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories-had budgets in excess of $1 billion a year and employed on the order of 7,500 full-time equivalents (FTEs) apiece, not including contractor personnel that substantially added to the manpower. In FY 1995, the DOE Defense Programs involved 59,794 FTEs, including 7,321 at Lawrence Livermore, 6,960 at Los Alamos, and 8,495 at Sandia National Laboratory, excluding contractors.48 Note that the substantially greater number of FTEs at Sandia includes both Sandia's Livermore (mostly energy-related) labs as well as the bigger Albuquerque labs. And although all three of the DOE weapons laboratories conduct national security science and technology as well as research and development, Los Alamos is generally considered more of a "basic research" lab, Lawrence Livermore an "applied research" lab, and Sandia an "engineering" lab.
FY1996 Defense Science and Technology Budget
| Air Force | $1.4 B |
| Army | $1.1 B |
| Navy | $1.4 B |
| Advanced Research Projects Agency | $2.6 B |
| Washington Headquarters Services | $0.7 B |
| Defense Nuclear Agency | $0.2 B |
| Other Defense Agencies | $0.4 B |
| Total | $7.8 B |
Source: Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
The Department of Defense procurement budget has dropped by two thirds from 1985 to 1996, with the science and technology budget remaining relatively constant over the same period.49 Although this does not take into account the one-third drop in S&T budget from the mid-1960s, the fact is, money is scarce.
As a result, DOD has established that is critical for S&T programs to adopt cost-cutting measures in current and future weapon and support systems and that this should be a primary objective in for all acquisition activities. As nearly 80 percent of the life-cycle cost of a weapon system is determined during the concept and preliminary design phase (corresponding to approximately the first five percent of the life cycle cost), it is even more critical than before that cost-cutting measures be adopted as a design objective.50 The DDR&E has initiated several cost-cutting measures and is actively championing the services to institute them.
Because the present funding situation drives every S&T decision, it is useful to explore how this affects DOD S&T strategy. Below are six major cost-cutting thrusts deemed critical by the Clinton administration.
Horror stories abound about the inordinate cost of "mil spec" tissues: the length of time needed to get it in stock, and the harsh texture, in comparison to the availability of commercially available tissues. In his effort to Reinvent Government, Vice President Gore coined the phrase, "If it makes sense, and it's not illegal, immoral or unethical, and the cost benefit is there, then just do it." Procuring commercial tissues is the quintessential example for getting away from mil-spec and doing what "makes sense." This is but one example of the savings realized by adopting commercial standards and practices, and S&T research must strive to make similar savings.
However, DOD does not procure only tissues. On weapons systems there exist the possibility that the military requirement for a critical capability might be degraded if "exceptions" are not made. For example, if a logic chip is needed for a satellite that has a mission to survive a nuclear EMP blast, then it does not make sense to use a commercially available chip that has not been tested in that environment. This then requires that the concept be thoroughly "shaken out" at the requirements stage to ensure that the requirement is really needed, and if so, then the exception can be made.
One way to look at this is by using the concept of marginal returns. For example, is a 10 percent improvement in capability worth the investment? And if not, are the requirements still satisfied? It is necessary to understand what capabilities drive the cost of the system-and if those capabilities are really needed.
Not only is it possible to simulate how new technologies may be used to help the warfighter, but it is also possible to evaluate a wide spectrum of consequences brought about by the introduction of that technology to the battlefield. All this and more can be accomplished in the early phase of science and technology development, before costly decisions are made in the acquisition process. Simulation can feed into producing better requirements, improved cost-benefit analysis, comprehensive tradeoff analysis, optimized designs, and improved test and evaluations.
Simulations can be used in all phases of the acquisition process, with particularly strong savings at the beginning of the R&D cycle. Simulations provide the means to conduct an extraordinary amount of "numerical experiments" to hone down the parameter space of possible paths. For example, at the basic research level, ab initio simulations of the quantum interaction of light with matter yields insight into nonlinear phenomenon, resulting in new theoretical models at a macroscopic level; at the exploratory development stage, simulations of radiation-matter coupling validates the macroscopic theories and may point to a application; parameter studies may then be conducted to optimize initial engineering designs at the advanced development level.
Manufacturing in the United States has undergone a major change in the last two decades. Rising to the threat of international competition and, a decaying infrastructure, and fueled by investments made by DOD in the 1980s, manufacturing is rapidly instituting changes to reduce cost, enhance quality, and add new capability to make it more agile and flexible.
In the past, economies of scale enabled costs in manufacturing to be held low. With today's shift away from keeping large inventories and moving toward a "just in time" delivery system, manufacturing runs are becoming smaller and more unique. As a result, an effort is being made to institute new technology so that it is easy to reconfigure manufacturing lines. This will allow smaller, more economical, and variable-volume manufacturing runs.53 Some example of these new technologies include:54
-Smart materials-Materials that incorporate sensors and actuators that may dynamically respond to stresses, temperatures, electromagnetic radiation and the like.
-Aggregation processes-Includes the ability to produce items close to the final production form. For example, in stereolithography, prototype parts are made "directly" from computer files using droplet jet-spraying, chemical vapor deposition, sputtering and other processes.
-Microelectromechanical systems and molecular manufacturing-Microelectronic devices (at the micron scale and below) are being invented using microfabrication and micromachining processes. A recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment, Miniaturization Technologies, forecasts the first version of molecular-scale devices within the next 10 years.55
Other more conventional advances such as numerical manufacturing allow metrics to be established. This enables low production runs, reduced test and evaluation phases, and earlier detection and correction of manufacturing errors.
DEFENSE STRATEGY IN ACTION
Think of it as evolution in action.
Niven and Pournelle, Oath of Fealty
PARTNERING AND EXPLOITING EXPERTISE
The Department of Defense no longer drives R&D in the United States. Industrial investment in U.S. military R&D has decreased from a high in 1985, with the trend in all military relevant R&D (including non-military S&T, industry S&T, IR&D, and military S&T) decreasing from $18 billion in 1986 to just under $12 billion in 1996, a drop of one-third.58 With this downward trend, it is incumbent on the U.S. Government to "smartly use" its remaining R&D resources.
The President's charge to "Develop and transition superior technology to enable affordable, decisive military capability and to enhance economic security," clearly has as its bottom line to improve productivity and reduce costs by working with commercial industry.59 The present administration has chosen to do this in three ways: 1) leveraging funds; 2) increasing the level of knowledge in the industrial sector; and 3) diffusing new technology.60
"Leveraging funds" means to exploit areas of excellence of R&D either in the public or private sector; it also means reducing any redundancies that may exist, especially in the public arena. For example, it is widely believed that DOD should not be performing the same research as the private sector, such as in computer chips. Rather it is up to DOD to focus its research on those areas that have no commercial market, yet underlies defense S&T. In the past, up to 40 percent of military R&D was conducted by defense or DOE laboratories; this ratio is expected to decrease as the commercial marketplace is "leveraged."61
Specific vehicles such as CRDAs (Cooperative Research and Development Agreements) with industry is one way to "leverage" the commercial marketplace by transferring technology from government labs to the private sector. Another vehicle, the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP), was established to integrate defense and commercial production facilities, deploy technology to and from commercial industries, develop dual-use technologies, and diversify from defense to commercial products. In FY94 the TRP received $404 million out of a total $1.7 billion total targeted for defense conversion and dual-use technology.62 However, the TRP concentrated on developing technology and not on transitioning basic research to a higher development stage. In addition, many questions remain as to how the technology areas are selected. The next chapter will return to this question and illuminate other concerns.
"Increasing the level of knowledge in the industrial sector" is the second key to reducing costs and increasing productivity. This will be accomplished when DOD and industry understand defense technology needs. Much work has been done in this area, and the DOD Key Technologies Plan, released in 1992 and tied to the defense S&T Strategy, marked the beginning of defining DOD technology needs. The present needs are grounded in national S&T security strategy and flow from the JROC future warfighting capabilities, as shown at the beginning of this chapter.
"Diffusing new technology" is the final key for reducing costs and increasing productivity. Again, much work has been accomplished in this area, and programs such as CRDAs are but one means for diffusing technology. Government-commercial consortia such as the Great Lakes Composites Consortium or the Army's National Automotive Center address sectorwide capabilities.63 Broad area concerns are addressed that affect both defense and commercial needs. Program-specific actions such as the DOD Manufacturing Technology program (MANTECH) or the Manufacturing Operations Development and Integration Laboratories (MODILs) promote process integration at the industrial-sector, firm and facility levels.64
In general, a wide-area, broad-based strategy would best enhance both defense and commercial industry. A DOD advisory group on materials processing concluded in 1993 that "the most important government roles in advancing the technologies of manufacturing systems are to provide seed money for promising technical opportunities that would not otherwise be pursued and to bring individual companies together for mutual leveraging in areas of common need."65 The group found that programs aimed at enhancing a particular weapon system or company would not permeate throughout industry-the risks are too high, the development costs are to costly, and the payback time is too long to take a chance on any one system.
TRANSITIONING FROM BASIC RESEARCH: ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS (ACDTS)
There is an absolute necessity for the scientist and engineer to be in constant communication with the warfighter throughout the R&D phase. The warfighter can provide the requirements for the eventual capabilities that the weapon may have, and therefore indirectly influence the direction of technological advance. Close communication between the scientist and warfighter will thus ensure that technological opportunity will be matched with the warfighter's required capability.
A program has been developed in DOD to exploit such an exchange of information between the warfighter and the technologist. Called the ACTD (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration), this program allows the warfighter to "experiment in the field with new technology in order to evaluate potential changes to doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, modernization plans, and training."66
The administration fully endorses the DOD ACTD program for "capturing and harnessing innovation for military use rapidly and at a reduced cost."67 ACTDs are focused on four principal objectives:
The intent of the ACTD program is to provide the user with detailed interactions with the proposed weapon system very early in the development cycle. Typical ACDTs last from 2 to 4 years, thus providing a means to rapidly and cost-effectively introduce new capabilities to the warfighter. If successful, ACTDs are then transferred to one of the military services or a defense agency for acquisition.
SUMMARY
Defense science and technology strategy is ultimately grounded in the national security goals of the United States. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has determined five future warfighting capabilities that will satisfy the national security goals. From these projected capabilities spring four requirements set by DDR&E, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering:
The defense science and technology strategy "clothes" these requirements to ensure that the mainstay of the Administration's policy-improving productivity and reducing costs by working with commercial industry-is first and foremost on the minds of DOD. This then concludes the discussion of the present defense research strategy. The next chapter highlights specific concerns not addressed by the strategy and points out some flaws in its logic.
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Last Update: September 30, 2002