DOD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

With the downsizing of defense must come more, not less, risk taking on revolutionary new weapon concepts. . . . Qualitative advantage grows more important as quantity shrinks and more difficult as technology becomes more diffused throughout the world.

Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine

The Defense Revolution:

Intelligent Downsizing of America's Military

The key to successful exploratory development, and to R&D as a whole, is an environment where technically sound managers with entrepreneurial instincts have flexibility to act and the ability to delegate technical decisions to those who are executing the programs. The managers must be able to set goals, select projects, monitor execution, pick winners, and eliminate losers without making the detailed decisions within the projects they supervise.

Gregory H. Canavan and John F. Lilley

Defense Technology

Throughout the years there have been many studies detailing not only what is wrong with the present DOD R&D structure but what should be done to rectify the apparent problems. The studies include Defense Science Board reports, National Research Council studies, the Air Force's New World Vistas, and the Army's Star 21, among others.¹

From this effervescent and sometimes self-conflicting data base of quick-fixes, "silver bullets," and sage advice, a few of the recommendations that best address the problems outlined in chapter 4 have been culled. This is certainly not an exhaustive list, as there is a wealth of advice in the literature for improving the defense science and technology infrastructure. In consideration of the frustrations these recommendations are targeting, the major failings of defense R&D are highlighted. The literature also contains some solid advice for "filling in the holes." This is accomplished by tackling those issues not addressed by the administration's policy of DOD R&D

Chapter 4 highlighted three major failures of national security R&D strategy:

• Failure of the commercial marketplace to step up and completely fill the void left by the dismantled defense R&D establishment
• Failure to effectively exploit the present defense laboratories
• General failure to demand the use of common sense when conducting R&D.

The solutions to some of these problems transcend any recommendations that this book or anyone else can give: they demand attention from the highest leadership in the form of specific policy guidance or legislation. (For example, overturning some Office of Personnel Management regulations requires congressional intervention.) However, there are some problems that can be solved by Laboratory Directors or by individuals at the Assistant Secretary-level-the target audience for this book. It is therefore in the spirit of improving the overall DOD R&D infrastructure-by using common sense and judiciously implementing the following recommendations-that this advice is given.

This chapter lists various "threats" to the DOD R&D establishment, with a particular emphasis on the threats to performing S&T, specifically to basic research. The following addresses the shortcomings of defense R&D strategy as raised in this book and urges policy makers and directors or commanders of laboratories to beware their insidious presence.

RELYING TOO MUCH ON THE

COMMERCIAL MARKETPLACE

The failure of the commercial marketplace to fill a void left by the dismantled DOD R&D infrastructure has already been identified as a flaw in the overall defense S&T strategy. The specific threat is that DOD may be forced to rely on the marketplace, and may not find it always responsive, particularly in times of crisis. Thus, the lesson for policy makers and lab directors is that defense technology needs cannot always be filled by exploiting the commercial marketplace. In other words, industry will not step up to fill a void unless there is a potential for profit.

There are exceptions to this rule, as is always the case where IR&D (Internal R&D) funding may be used. But it is getting harder for companies to justify spending large amounts of their own money to invest in a high-risk area that may not show a profit and in which the government may not later fund. The government cannot expect companies to commit their own money when there is no assurance to recoup losses. Thus, a void will exist in certain technology areas.

It is because of this void in defense-unique technology that DOD must not treat the commercial marketplace as a panacea. One way is for the government to throw money at the problem-give the contractor the unrestricted right to produce whatever defense technology they decide is best for the military. Another, better way is for defense laboratories to partner with contractor, industry, and university alike. In effect, this supplements core competencies found in defense labs with expertise drawn from industry and universities. By partnering, defense labs can pull in experts when they're needed, keep on top of ongoing research, and still direct the final outcome without having to stand back as an outside (and sometimes antagonistic) observer.

But the best way to ensure that services acquire the right technology for the warfighter-be it technology grounded in the commercial marketplace or uniquely defense-is by training and keeping "knowledgeable warriors," the topic of the next section.

NOT HAVING

KNOWLEDGEABLE WARRIORS

Some have argued that DOD should simply "sow the seeds" for industry by funding the hell out of research, stepping back, and waiting for the magic to happen: watch technological solutions appear like a rescuing knight from the mists of industry. However, arguments presented in chapter 3 show the necessity for DOD to have "smart buyers" and competent technical liaisons, and this is possible only if DOD keeps abreast in the advances in science and technology by having a cadre of competent scientific personnel-"knowledgeable warriors," competent in S&T, able to pierce through the issues, and serve as an honest broker to insure technological progress is oriented toward the warfighter. This means training warriors in science and technology, and putting them in charge of defense-related S&T activities.

Another way to look at this is that the services would not hesitate to put a doctor in charge of medical care, or a lawyer in charge of resolving legal issues, or a pilot in charge of flying an aircraft. Ensuring that the best S&T is tapped for national security demands no less of a scientific professional overseeing S&T concerns. Not having a cadre of scientifically competent personnel in the services responsible for overseeing S&T is akin to putting someone with no acquisition experience in charge of a major acquisition program, and DOD must apply the same analogy to S&T.

Some argue that, because the mission of the military is to fight and win wars, this cadre of scientific personnel should consist only of civilians-leave the warfighting to the warriors and allow this civilian cadre to generate new weapons of war. There is a good point to this argument, that the military should focus on its core competency-serving at the "pointy end of the stick." However, the world has changed from the times when the warfighter could just be handed a piece of equipment and be unthinkingly ordered into battle. Science and technology are inextricably tied to the weapons of war, and a sophisticated weapon system demands that no breaks occur from its birth to its use. The only way to ensure that this continuity exists is for a dedicated cadre of scientifically smart warriors-those who are closest to the warfighters carrying the equipment into battle-to maintain the continuity.

These are the people who can transition a discovery in basic research-a creative concept-to a weapon that satisfies a warfighting requirement. Carrying the fledgling weapon across the "seams" through the sophisticated stages of the development process will ensure continuity. The technically competent warriors need to be scientifically "smart" to recognize the future utility (or futility, as illustrated in the Navy's A-2 debacle) of a discovery, and pull the concept up to become a militarily useful weapon. They must have the authority to keep the weapon focused on it's ultimate use: to support the warfighter. They must ensure that it doesn't start to be burdened with additional requirements, usually put on the weapon by well-meaning but totally clueless bureaucrats. Further, they must follow the weapon from the scientific bench to the hands of the warfighter, providing a seamless transition so that the system doesn't get held up by unnecessary delays. The only way to accomplish this important transition process is to have competent personnel that have credibility both with the science and with the warriors. For only then will the ultimate goal of defense S&T be accomplished-supporting the warfighter's needs.

INSUFFICIENT FUNDING

Although much is being said about preserving the S&T base-and for the last 10 years the S&T budget has remained relatively stable-the fact is that the defense basic research and exploratory research (Program 6.1 and 6.2) budget as a percentage of total federal RDT&E has decreased by over 31 percent in the past 30 years.² This is in spite of the administration's pronouncement that "New technologies have dramatically enhanced our ability to both prepare for and execute military actions." ³

What is occurring is simple to grasp: within S&T, more advanced development programs are being funded at the expense of basic research and exploratory development. Advanced development programs are more expensive to perform than basic research and exploratory development programs, and a larger fraction of money is being diverted into proving concepts that have a military application. Although advanced development programs are indeed the vehicles that will transition the discoveries made in basic science to the warfighter, they are in danger of choking off creative input, and will therefore only produce evolutionary gains, and not true revolutionary or "leapfrogging" advances.

It cannot be overemphasized that funding for the creative, or "invention" phase-basic research and exploratory development-has decreased as a percentage of defense RDT&E. Therefore, if we are to expect to achieve the same degree of technological superiority in the future as we have in the past, then that percentage must also increase to the historical levels of the past. This does not mean that advanced development should take a backseat to basic research. Rather, in order to ensure a continued robust advanced development effort, the final product (a weapon to the warrior) is only as good as the initial conditions (the basic research)-and production can always be stretched out. So if there is a "zero sum game" to be played with funding, then the decrease should come from the production phase and not from the initial phase. Produce when we need it, develop and refine until then, but ensure only the best creative ideas are pushed forward to develop. Therefore, basic and applied research must be strengthened (and not at the expense of advanced development) so that quality input may be given to advanced development efforts.

CENTRALIZATION

The more DOD centralizes R&D, the more it will control programs from the top. More control from the top not only means the necessity for more layers of management bureaucracy, but it also means less control for individual program managers. This results in a loss of authority for program managers, and a diffusion of responsibility for the program.

The perceived need for centralized control evolves from three reasons:⁴

• A continuing increase in management oversight
• A greater flow of information to the top in response to the increase in management oversight (i.e. the phenomenon of nanomanagement)
• A replacement of normal healthy tension between headquarters and laboratories with an atmosphere of blind compliance.

An increase in bureaucracy occurs naturally for every organization unless specific steps are taken to snarl its growth; this cross-cutting truth is illustrated in every organization fromDOD to NASA. ⁵ The problem was astutely recognized in 1983 by the White House Science Council's report on federal laboratories:

Excessively detailed direction of laboratory R&D activities from agency headquarters . . . has seriously impaired R&D performance in some laboratories. Numerous detailed external directions are given as to how work should be done, while at the same time, the overall missions and goals of the laboratories are inadequately defined. ⁶

 

The solution is to consciously decentralize.⁷ This is best illustrated by a recommendation from the Synthesis Group, a vice-presidential commission led by Astronaut Lieutenant General (USAF, Ret) Thomas P. Stafford, when the group outlined architectures for controlling multiple government agencies that will work on a national program:

Program management must address such functions as systems architecture planning and requirements control. The responsibilities at the headquarters level are to identify key program requirements and review the implementation of programs, but not execute the activities. Such detailed design and development is best accomplished at the field levels.

Consolidating federal resources, where appropriate, and guarding against the effects of institutional aging and development of bureaucratic culture⁸, will be key in deriving the plan. ⁹

 

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

To conclude their landmark text The Defense Revolution: Intelligent Downsizing of America's Military, Adelman and Augustine include several "Memos to Policy Makers." The memos allow the authors the ability to play "if I were King," and give advice to government policy makers in critical positions, including the U.S. President, the President of the Soviet Union (reflecting the text's 1990 publication date, but just as well suited for today's President of Russia), the Secretary of State, Members of Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the defense industry, and to the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition-not only the "third ranking" member of DOD, but the individual responsible for defense R&D. The memos are frank and show a promarket bias; but this is only one approach for refining the Department of Defense R&D infrastructure. Other writers, such as Canavan and Lilley, posit another approach.¹⁰

 

The following is a short compilation of "nuggets," advice culled from government, academic and commercial executives who have worked in the DOD R&D environment for years. They provide an anchor for solving the specific threats listed above.

• Assign first priority to research and early exploratory development that promise major breakthroughs in capability or lead to entirely new conceptual approaches for performing important mission.¹¹
• Do not rely only on university and industrial ("commercial") basic research when reducing the government's in-house overhead structure. Recognize that government laboratories play the key role in performing research where there is no commercial market.¹²
• Once the key role of government labs is recognized, do not either take over or absorb the military departments research, development, and production activities into a centralized DOD organization.¹³
• Seek to apply new technology not only in the traditional manner-to increase operational capability-but also to decrease cost.¹⁴
• Make it demanding to initiate new full-scale development programs, insisting on truly significant potential military benefit from all programs that are approved.¹⁵
• Draw as heavily as possible on the country's commercial (non-defense) production base by standardizing commercial components wherever practical, and designing to use our commercial manufacturing base, especially in times of emergency.¹⁶
• Increase substantially the effort to build R&D prototypes. R&D prototypes cost much less and have greater flexibility, all the while preserving critically important design teams.¹⁷ In other words, invest in "X-Programs" that prove concepts.
• Carry no system beyond R&D prototyping (that is, into engineering development) unless there is a firm intent to manufacture and deploy it.¹⁸
• Pursue "breakthrough systems" based on new concepts and on new technology into engineering development and production-but insist on "fly-before-buy" demonstrations.¹⁹
• Produce those systems that do in fact receive production go-ahead at the most efficient rate and then shut down the lines, preserving tooling, and in some critical cases stockpiling limited numbers of components that have particularly long lead times.²⁰
• Prolong the life of "platforms" (aircraft, ships, tanks) as long as possible by introducing new technology from time to time as system upgrades. This appears to be the only way to keep platforms that must last 40 or more years moderately current with technology that has a half life of 10 or fewer years.²¹
• Seek cooperative programs to buy and sell hardware from and to allied nations to stretch defense dollars and help keep production lines warm where practicable. Be prepared to add our own countermeasure provisioning to these systems. On the other hand, avoid joint development projects-such projects are hard enough with a single customer.²²
• Employ only the amount of concurrency (overlap between consecutive phases of a program) that is needed to maintain an efficient program plan, since time is less critical in the new geostrategic environment.²³
• Establish an office to address and eliminate impediments to potential wartime reconstitution of a large-scale defense industrial base-mobilization-should it again be required.²⁴
• Once programs have passed the new, exceedingly stringent go-ahead gate, fire the first person or organization that meddles with funding, schedule, or requirement-including Congress, if multiyear funding cannot be approved. Tough out the problems and finish things once started.²⁵
• Guard against procurement's four horsemen of the apocalypse: turbulence, adversarialism, inadequate personnel, and insufficient margins. ²⁶

CONCLUSIONS

The strength of our nation relies on its economic and military might, and underpinning this strength is the health of the American industry, for it is industry that drives business, the economy, and ultimately the quality of our military's weapons of war. Just as science is crucial to the health and conduct of modern industry, science is also the foundation for technology-the fuel that powers the engine of change that advances our strength.

The military victories of the past owe much to the scientific and technological edge our armed forces have assimilated, striving for quality over simple quantity. Much investment has been made to ensure this technological edge, and to a large degree, it is the advances springing from long-range research that have made the difference. These advances have taken years to come to fruition, but ultimately, investments in long-range research have always paid off.

The nation has a long and rich history of supporting defense- oriented research and development. For years there has been a tight coupling between scientific advances and sophisticated weaponry, and for years we have seen an ever-increasing march of technological achievements: precision-guided weapons, global positioning satellites, stealth-weapon platforms. However, with a renewed emphasis put on supporting the warrior and paying attention to the ever-present bottom line of cost, it is generally realized that things must change, for we live in a different world, one where we are not at war, and one where the priorities of our nation have changed. But they must not change so much as to impair our future warfighting capability by cutting long-range research.

In a year of study of DOD's post-Cold War S&T strategy, great strides have been made to ensure that a well-poised, robust R&D infrastructure exists in DOD. Little by little the obstacles are chipped away and the system is made "better," sometimes not as fast, or as not as much as some people desire, but things are changing. Times are changing, and for the best.

Every person interviewed for this book was concerned about the present and future state of defense R&D. This is encouraging. No one is willing to accept the status quo or willing to coast, to go on without trying to change things for the better. Everyone knew that there are problems with "the system," and everyone voiced a different solution.²⁷

The problems are not new or unique, but they are not insurmountable. This book has attempted to make sense of the defense R&D infrastructure-a short history behind long-range research, the rationale for it, the structure it has taken, and some recommendations for using common sense for keeping it going. As stated at the beginning of this text, if there is any one thing that our generation can improve to ensure our children's freedom, it is by investing in the future-by sanely supporting long-term research in the basic sciences.

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Last Update:  September 30, 2002