Appendix B

1. Statement by the Honorable Madeleine Albright,
Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997

2. Statement on NATO Enlargement by the Honorable
William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Committee
on Appropriations, October 21, 1997

3. Statement of General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, October 22, 1997

4. Statement of General Wesley K. Clark, Commander in Chief,
United States European Command, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
October 22, 1997

5. Statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1997

1.
Statement by
the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

October 7, 1997

Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.

Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of America’s modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.

It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the original NATO treaty.

The history books will long record that day as among the Senate’s finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them, and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our discussion.

I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.

As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away quarrels?

We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.

Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms’ extraordinary predecessor, predicted that NATO would become "the greatest war deterrent in history." He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.

This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty, predicted that it would "free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress." Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in Western Europe.

President Truman said that the NATO pact "will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world." And he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.

Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom’s flag has been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at risk.

Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at NATO’s heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on security?

The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our security emanating from European soil.

You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to answer as plainly as I can.

First, there are the dangers of Europe’s past. It is easy to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, Europe’s armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors, not against them; each member’s security came to depend on cooperation with others, not competition.

That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative structure of military planning and preparation.

A second set of dangers lies in Europe’s present. Because of conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century’s great wars.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the dangers of Europe’s future. By this I mean direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe’s horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are not unthinkable.

Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.

We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50 years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with such action as we deem necessary including the use of force, to restore the security of the North Atlantic area.

As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American commitments must serve America’s strategic interests.

Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test.

First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox at NATO’s heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.

Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it in 1949: "[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before they start."

It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I’m sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the "consonant cluster clause," the myth that in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin; Barcelona, but not Brno.

Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because these nations had been invaded.

Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind of choice.

Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.

Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about enlargement will change NATO’s core mission, which is and will remain the collective defense of NATO soil.

At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider this:

When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here are three nations we will always be able to count on.

Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common enterprise of our alliance of democracies.

Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type.

I have been a student of Central European history and I have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see Central Europeans confident enough to improve their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is happening.

NATO is doing for Europe’s east precisely what it did—precisely what this Committee predicted it would do—for Europe’s west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity. This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without it.

In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and protect the gains of stability and freedom in Central and Eastern Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.

NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies in Western Europe.

We often call them "former communist countries," and that is true in the same sense that America is a "former British colony." Yes, the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the ways that truly count.

As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe’s new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them home.

We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.

Why would America choose to be allied with Europe’s old democracies forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable, objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in Central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.

We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting your affirmation.

I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully as well. Let me address a few.

First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary estimate of America’s share. Now that we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.

I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share, because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all about.

I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.

In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.

Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in Central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia’s outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia’s more modern aspirations.

This means that we should remain Russia’s most steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia’s decision to build a close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false—and to base our policies on what we know to be true. When they imply that Central Europe is special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to suggest otherwise.

I believe our approach is sound and producing results. Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of major international lenders.

What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO enlargement by holding up START II.

As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and Russia through dialogue and transparency.

I know that some are concerned NATO’s new relationship with Russia will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO’s supreme decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions. NATO’s allies will always meet to agree on every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to the extent Russia uses it constructively.

The Founding Act also does not limit NATO’s ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, with Central European countries and all the other signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.

Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen.

President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based purely on objective factors—unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still.

Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts.

They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first three candidates.

Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia.

Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and its new partners to the east.

It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian troops can work together.

We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO’s part in achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.

We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger NATO. NATO’s fundamental purpose is collective defense against aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after they stop.

These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today; I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering them all.

This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers’ Group and the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and accept it.

When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many.

We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our democratic community would be possible.

We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a larger NATO—not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. We will owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with America.

Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you and the American people you represent are truly in the driver’s seat.

That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and telling our allies: "This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to decide." I say that with pride because it tells them something about America’s faith in the democratic process.

But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

October 21, 1997

Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, Senator Inouye, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is a great privilege to appear with the Secretary of State to discuss one of the President’s top foreign policy objectives: NATO enlargement. As you may know, we appeared together before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April to discuss this same topic. I welcome the opportunity to continue this dialogue with the Senate.

We are at an historic moment. By working together within the U.S. Government, and within the NATO alliance, we can change the face of Europe forever in the next few years. It is a challenge from which we should not retreat.

Our veterans of the First World War witnessed how even the vast Atlantic Ocean couldn’t protect us from being drawn into the fiery hatreds of the Old World. They marched into battle singing, "We won’t be back ‘til it’s over, over there." But to our lasting regret, when the guns of Autumn fell silent, America ignored the embers of hatred that still smoldered in Europe and we missed the opportunity to prevent another war, the deadliest in human history.

Millions of American sons returned to the very same terrain that their fathers died defending, and thousands of them paid the ultimate price for this missed opportunity. But those who fought in World War II gave us a second chance to build a safer world.

President Truman, speaking of the Marshall Plan, said, "Our purpose from the end of the war to the present has never changed. It’s been to create a political and economic framework in which lasting peace can be constructed." Western Europe embraced the Marshall Plan, built strong democracies and economies, and developed a strong alliance that we call NATO. But the other half of Europe was denied the Marshall Plan when Joseph Stalin slammed down the Iron Curtain and began a separation of the continent which would persist for 50 years.

Today, having emerged victorious from the long winter of the Cold War, we have an historic opportunity and a very sober challenge. We have the opportunity to complete George Marshall’s vision, and the challenge to secure a lasting peace in Europe whose security and stability remains a vital interest of America.

Some question whether making NATO larger is going to make NATO weaker and, therefore, weaken America. On the contrary, our definitive answer is that enlargement must not and will not be allowed to dilute NATO’s military effectiveness or political cohesion. A larger NATO will be a stronger NATO and will provide a wider allegiance in Europe to our values. It was the creation of NATO in 1949 that halted Soviet designs on western Europe. It was the enlargement of NATO, with Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, that helped strengthen the wall of democracy. If, in the future, another direct threat of attack arises, an enlarged NATO would have: additional manpower, added military capability, more political support, and greater strategic depth. More importantly, a larger NATO will help bring stability for the 21st century to Central Europe—the spawning ground of crises throughout the 20th century. We must seize this opportunity to continue to shape the security environment in Europe. In doing so, we will strengthen the political democracies and market economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby enhance stability and reduce the risk that such a crisis will ever emerge. As was the case with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, in this new era NATO enlargement is an insurance policy with an unusual twist: by paying a modest premium, we not only will be protected in case of fire, we will make a fire less likely to ignite.

Formal membership in NATO carries as President Clinton has said, "(t)he most solemn security guarantees." Enlargement must not, and will not, be allowed to dilute NATO’s military effectiveness nor its political cohesion. Sincere aspiration is not enough to guarantee membership in NATO. New members must demonstrate a commitment to: democracy and the rule of law, an open market economic system, civilian constitutional control of their militaries, peaceful resolution of disputes with their neighbors, respect for human rights, and development over time of military capabilities interoperable with NATO.

After discussions with allies, candidate countries, members of Congress and within the Administration, the President decided the United States would support extending invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The President met with the other leaders of the NATO nations in a summit in July, and together they agreed to invite these nations to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.

Enlarging NATO with these three nations will carry the promise of peace and liberty into the next century.

You have heard it argued that by enlarging NATO we are going to create a new dividing line in Europe. That argument fails to appreciate the new dynamic that is underway in Europe, erasing these old lines and avoiding these new divisions. The mere prospect of having NATO membership has unleashed a powerful impetus for peace in Europe. Old rivals have settled their historic disputes: Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic. Without the prospect of NATO enlargement, these smoldering embers—rather than being extinguished—would have been fanned by nationalist fervor. This argument also fails to realize that by not enlarging, we would allow to stand an illegitimate dividing line drawn across the continent by Stalin 50 years ago. Some countries would feel compelled to seek security via other avenues, including ones potentially destabilizing and contrary to U.S. interests. We must move, with Europe, into the future. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are vital, vigorous and dynamic people. They share our ideals. They are making remarkable recoveries from decades of foreign domination. Now they want to return to their rightful place as equal partners in the European family of free and democratic nations. We need them and they need us.

If we are to ensure the achievement of our stated goal that enlargement will not draw new dividing lines in Europe, we must continue to give careful consideration to the security interests and concerns of those states that were not chosen for membership at Madrid. The door is open for future invitations, and no European nation is excluded from consideration. We expect other nations to become members as they meet the requirements. We need to continue to make clear to other aspirant countries that active participation in PFP is the prime pathway to membership in the Alliance, and to a solid security relationship with NATO. At the same time, no state among the non-selects has an "assured invitation" in 1999, or at any time, and future invitees will be held to the same standards as the current three. And, of course, any future accessions will, like these three, require Senate approval.

NATO is also embarking on a new relationship with Russia. There are some who claim that enlarging NATO is going to feed extremism in Russia and jeopardize Russia’s move to democracy and its cooperation with the West. We should not permit these fears to overwhelm the facts. NATO and Russia are erasing old dividing lines every day, not least of which in our interactions in Bosnia where Russian and

NATO soldiers patrol side by side in the cause of peace.

Mr. Chairman, permit me a moment of personal reflection. In February, shortly after I was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, I traveled to Bosnia, and met with some of the American troops serving there. During lunch, a Russian soldier came up to me and gave me his beret as a gesture of peace, saying how proud he was to be serving alongside Americans. Two weeks ago, I was again in Bosnia and met with the new Russian commander, General Krivolapov. He concluded the meeting by declaring, in a Russian version of General Joulwan’s motto for SFOR, "one team, one mission." Our new relationship with Moscow must acknowledge Russia’s changing role in Europe and not be forever bound by the notion of a Russia in confrontation with NATO.

The objectives of NATO’s new relationship with Russia are: to recognize Russia’s inherent importance in European security—after all, they have been a major player in European security for 300 years; to engage Russia in the new European security order; to facilitate a security dialogue and; when desirable and appropriate, to cooperate with Russia. Equally important to articulate are the things that NATO’s new relationship with Russia does not do: it does not allow Russian participation in internal NATO issues; it does not give Russia a voice or a veto over NATO’s decisions; and it does not give Russia a de facto membership in NATO.

And now, let me turn to a topic I know is of particular importance to members of the Appropriations Committee: how much will enlargement cost? And inextricably linked to the matter of cost—in fact the driver of how much it will cost—is a second question: what exactly are the military requirements of enlarging? These are complicated questions on which reasonable people will disagree, and have already disagreed. But let me walk you through the work we have done so far and the work we are now doing.

There are new costs to enlarging, but these costs are affordable. They are modest compared both to our total defense spending—and to the costs and risks of not enlarging. To frame our discussion let me sketch for you the three categories of costs.

First, there are the costs to new members to be able to develop interoperable military forces to contribute to their own defense, the defense of other NATO members and other NATO operations. While they currently make a contribution, in order to be producers of security over time, the new members must re-build, re-equip, and retrain their forces. They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and better led forces.

Second, there are also the costs to current members to meet the requirements of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which is based on power projection rather than positional defense, and which meets the needs of an enlarged Alliance. Current members must do what they already have undertaken to improve mobility, deployability, interoperability, and flexibility. The key need for the current members is to proceed with these efforts.

I want to stress that these two categories of costs are all actions that the countries concerned would have to take to provide for their own defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members would have to spend more. But for NATO to ensure its military potential with enlargement, the capabilities which these other costs will fund, will be needed. So it is important that the commitments actually be met.

Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging, costs which NATO would not have incurred but for enlarging, are relatively modest. These direct costs are associated with enhancing interoperability, extending NATO’s integrated command, communications and air defense surveillance.

From one point of view, these could be considered the only true costs of NATO enlargement since they are the costs that would not be incurred if NATO did not add new members. But we have also thought it right to identify the first two categories of costs that will need to be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to meet its obligations.

So, those are the three categories of costs. As you know, the Department of Defense developed a notional estimate of the costs of enlarging at the end of last year. This estimate was part of the report, requested by the Congress, that the President submitted to you in late February of this year.

Let me begin to make the link between costs and the military requirements of enlarging. Our initial estimate assumed that while there would be a need for serious defense capabilities for an enlarged NATO, there is currently no threat of large-scale conventional aggression in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to develop. This is, of course, the same assumption as we make for our own national planning.

Total costs for achieving all three categories were estimated as $27-35 billion. These costs would be spread over the 13-year time frame of 1997 through 2009—ten years after accession of new members. Now, using the breakdown of responsibility for these costs which I just outlined for you, the three categories of costs, let me give you what we estimated each group would have to bear:

New member costs for restructuring their militaries were estimated at about $10-13 billion over that time frame or about $800 million to $1 billion per year. These costs would all be borne by the new members, except to the limited extent Congress decides to continue limited support to Central European militaries. (As you know, the United States now provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to all PFP countries combined to support their participation in PFP.)

Current allies’ costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were estimated at about $8-10 billion, or about $600-800 million per year. These costs would be borne by the current allies. For decades now, the United States has made no contribution to Allies’ defense budgets (except for some loans to Greece and Turkey).

It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not anticipate any added costs to the United States in this category because U.S. forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe.

Direct enlargement costs for new and old allies were estimated at about $9-12 billion, or about $700-900 million per year. This again, is the cost of items such as communications, reinforcement reception infrastructure, and other interoperability measures. We estimated that about 60 percent of these costs, or about $5.5 - 7 billion would be paid for out of NATO common budgets over the 10 years following accession, that NATO budgets would be increased accordingly, and that the United States would pay its standard 24 percent share of the NATO common budget. With these assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct costs of enlargement would be about $150-200 million per year.

These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet direct enlargement common budget costs is only a fraction of a percentage point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266 billion in 1997). The projected U.S requirement is also modest when considered in relation to total NATO common budget spending. In 1997, these budgets totaled about $1.8 billion. The total U.S. contribution to the three budgets was about $485 million, while the allies contributed the other $1.3 billion. We expect these relative percentage cost shares will stay the same—three European to one U.S.—in the period when NATO is meeting the requirements of enlargement. 

Several weeks ago, this Committee asked me for a refined cost estimate. On 16 October I submitted a report based on our work done to date. Since our work to respond in greater detail to your request will dovetail with work being done at NATO, let me first tell you about what the Alliance is doing. NATO has undertaken a review of the military implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will bring to the Alliance, and any additional requirements for current allies. The United States has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful in pressing that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the military requirements is currently underway by the NATO staff. This level of detailed information, was obviously not available to us when we did our first cost study and it is still being formulated.

These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations to be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December. The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies fill out a DPQ annually.

In an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO’s international military staff have been conducting site visits at various military facilities in the invited countries this summer. They visited airfields and railheads in each country. This month they are visiting other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the first facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of the majority of facilities in that country.

The international staff of NATO will then cost those new requirements. That is part of the work that is to be completed in time for the December ministerials. These estimates will therefore be available to Congress well before any vote on enlargement.

Based on what we know now, I believe that the NATO cost estimates will be lower than those which you received from us in February. First the initial U.S. cost assessed four, not three, new members. Further, the NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded costs. National-costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are separate from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.

But I also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated. Let me share some examples of our experiences during these assessments to show why this is the case.

When the American general heading a small NATO team visiting Kecskemet Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a squadron of NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and detail of the Hungarian response—and the level of installation readiness already achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some excellent research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996, and a United States Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the week after the general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in Hungary as part of a series of PFP exercises designed to improve interoperability. Thus Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at some of their airfields. There is less work that needs to be done—and in turn—less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how PFP has contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO membership.

In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost Study's progress noted that even though communications and information systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and non-secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs had already spent their own money to fund some projects that we had assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole through the common budgets.

Finally, an American general asked a Polish major familiar with the details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The amused major replied by asking the general how many Soviet heavy divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same location when trains were going the other way?

These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted our initial cost study, we assumed a greater need for improving some military bases and equipment. As we spend more time on the ground in the countries of each of the invitees, learning the details of their military forces and infrastructure, we are gaining a better appreciation for just how well prepared they were to fight against NATO. We will be modernizing from an extremely robust foundation. We will not be building airfields from scratch. Accordingly, the direct costs of enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated. In fact, NATO will be inheriting a great deal of usable infrastructure.

During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been bad news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the invitees in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities will contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded improvements once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are generally higher than we assumed in our February study on the requirements and costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve deeper into the circumstances in these countries, we will discover more examples of infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the Cold War or built up over the past three years through the Partnership for Peace.

We will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies—especially regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and the levels of funding for force modernization. While the three cannot be expected to "fix" everything by 1999, each must have a serious program that lays out a defined path toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.

We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training including English language training—for personnel and equipment are meaningless without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a real degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications, logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense.

While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech weapons systems should not be a high priority.

These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are ready for membership in NATO. After the Madrid Summit, I traveled to Budapest while the President and Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw and Prague. We made these trips not only to congratulate them but to remind them that the journey to Alliance membership had just begun, not ended. In the past month, Assistant Secretary Kramer has traveled to each of the invitees to discuss their preparations for membership. Each of these nations wants to be a contributor to, not just a consumer of, security. They are already contributing to the security of Europe by restructuring and modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the Partnership for Peace.

Each country has some work to do. The Czechs for example, in their original DPQ responses to NATO, did not commit enough of their forces to NATO missions but their most recent response commits virtually all of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense budget, currently 1.7 percent of GDP, to 2 percent by the year 2000. While both Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an extensive 15 year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech response to our and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few weeks.

The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded to Ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to support the Congress’ review of issues associated with enlargement, I will, as I stated in my 16 October letter to Senator Stevens, provide you with an update based on these NATO efforts in early 1998.

Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, "the resources necessary to meet [the costs of enlargement] will be provided." Three weeks ago in Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, I led the discussions on this issue.

I reminded my colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June, we all pledged to play our full part: 1) in preparing the nations invited to join NATO for their future roles and obligations as Alliance members; 2) in providing sufficient resources to maintain the Alliance's ability to perform its full range of missions; 3) in implementing the Alliance's decisions to further enhance its relations with partners; and 4) in acknowledging that, "the admission of new members . . . will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require." These commitments were reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid, where our Heads of State agreed: 1) that there will be costs associated with the integration of new members; 2) that these costs will be manageable; and 3) that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. There was no disagreement on this topic among my colleagues in Maastricht. Still under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs of enlargement which are a shared responsibility must result in a dollar for dollar increase in the NATO common budget—or whether some can be offset by reductions in lower priority programs currently in the common budget. We continue to believe that additional resources will be required.

We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion continues.

Let me turn to the topic of burdensharing. Both the United States and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of the Cold War. But, using the key indicators of burdensharing, as set by Congress, most of our NATO allies still make very substantial contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S. forces.

We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their capability for this sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need to be ready for in the future. Most have already made improvements, and are committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO's only rapidly deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20-25,000 personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario.

France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest troop contributor, after the United States and Britain, and was responsible for one of the three geographic sectors—and continues to be in SFOR.

Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from the army, navy and air force. The first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in 1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating themselves into a mobile, deployable—rather than static home defense—force.

The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F-16s without reliance on the

United States); an amphibious-lift ship to make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16 fleet and their Patriot systems.

Before I leave the topic of costs, I would like to reiterate what the President said in the Administration's February report: the costs of enlargement must be balanced against the costs of not enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we may pay a much higher price later. If NATO fails to enlarge, the risk of instability or conflict in the region would rise, with far reaching consequences for the United States and our allies. The most cost effective way to guarantee the stability of the region is to do so collectively with our European partners through NATO.

The bottom line is that alliances save money. Collective defense is more cost effective than national defense. NATO will allow the three invitees to acquire the same degree of security their western European neighbors already enjoy and to do so at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case and enhance our own security in the process.

Mr. Chairman, if this century has taught us anything, it has taught us that our security is inextricably tied to peace and security in Europe. We must hold up the lamplight of history so that we do not stumble on the footpath to the future. Most importantly, we can promote U.S. interests by increasing the security and stability of Europe. In so doing, we are building the Europe of the 21st century in a Europe whole, free and at peace.

 3.

October 22, 1997

Mr. Chairman, as you are all well aware, NATO has been a cornerstone of our national security strategy for almost 50 years. In recent years, the European and international security environment has changed, and this change must be tied directly into our national security strategy. To be the strong force for peace in the future that it has been in the past, NATO is examining new concepts and new approaches to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

"NATO Enlargement"—the Alliance’s initiative to embrace new partners is fundamental to restructuring NATO for a new century. Every NATO country shares in the costs as well as the benefits of membership in the Alliance, and that will include NATO Enlargement. The Joint Chiefs and I endorse the President’s support for this initiative, because we are convinced that our strategic interests, and the interests of our European friends and allies, are better served with Enlargement than without it. Too often in this century, we have been called upon to intervene in major conflicts on the European continent, at great price to our nation, in blood and in treasure. We learned, the hard way, that we can avoid war by joining hands with our friends, and extending a hand to yesterday’s adversaries, to turn them into tomorrow’s friends. In fact, no NATO country has ever been attacked in the nearly five decades of NATO’s existence.

We have lived through the most dangerous century in world history, and even today, in Bosnia, we can see the legacy of those earlier conflicts. That is why, in my view, we can only gain by encouraging deserving nations to join with us in the interests of peace. But we must be sure that candidates for NATO membership are up to the task.

From the military perspective, it is important that new members bring genuine military capability to NATO, though specific military standards are not required for admission. We must ensure that new members are "net contributors" and not "net consumers" of security. They must be able to conduct coordinated operations with other NATO members. They must participate fully in the defense planning process. And their military forces must reflect the shared values of our Alliance, particularly the imperative of civilian control which is so central to our democratic systems.

Of course we do not expect new members, right away, to operate at the same levels as members of long standing. Nor do we expect them to bear alone all the costs associated with joining the Alliance. That is why I share the view of my NATO counterparts, expressed to me during two recent visits to Europe, that NATO Enlargement must occur in a deliberate way. We must carefully and prudently assess the costs of bringing in new members, just as we weigh the benefits to us and to NATO as a whole. Part of that responsibility is to capture the military requirements of NATO Enlargement as precisely as we can, to provide an accurate basis for the costing experts. We are doing just that.

As General Clark will tell you in a moment, the major NATO commands are currently conducting a comprehensive study of the military requirements associated with NATO Enlargement. I share the view of Secretary Cohen that these requirements must be the foundation upon which NATO cost estimates are based. The results will be ready soon, but based on what I have seen so far, I am confident that the benefits of NATO Enlargement—a more stable and secure Europe—will far outweigh the financial costs we incur.

Just as we must assess our costs accurately, we are also obligated to apportion them fairly. As Secretary Albright said in testimony before your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, the United States will insist that our allies pay their fair share. And I would note that new members will pay the largest share. On balance, I am confident that the methodology we are using to project future costs is sound. Considering the alternative, the prospect of future instability and conflict, I see the tradeoff between the projected costs of Enlargement, and the value of a stable Europe, as very much in our favor.

I am also encouraged by the military performance of NATO candidates, in Partnership for Peace events, in military operations in the Balkans, and in other operations like Desert Storm. If these operations are any guide, they are well on their way to achieving levels of military competence and professionalism which will enhance NATO. And apart from their military value, these cooperative ventures suggest a willingness to share the risks of collective security that deserves our respect and support.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the choice before us is clear. If we are to avoid the tragedies of this century in the next one, then we must embrace the lessons we learned at such great cost, to achieve the peace we owe to our children, and their children. One of those lessons is that peace is based on closer ties, politically, economically, and militarily—and NATO Enlargement serves those ends very well.

October 22, 1997

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is a privilege and a pleasure to be here today to discuss NATO enlargement.

First, let me note that NATO’s decision to enlarge has been a political decision, made by all 16 allies together. I agree that it is important that we take advantage of the opportunities and address the challenges presented by this unique period in history, and NATO is the security organization best suited for this purpose. As you know, I have two sets of responsibilities, first as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and in this role my staff has been addressing the military requirements of enlargement and is supporting NATO Headquarters by determining military requirements, identifying training needs and conducting operational planning for all missions ins Allied Command Europe. As Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe, I have been engaged in providing U.S. military support and assistance to the three prospective new members.

In considering potential costs of enlargement, it is best to group costs into three categories. First is the cost borne by the new members for their own national security and contributions to the Alliance. Although we do not yet know the full extent of the defense requirements these countries will identify, each has professed its willingness to commit additional resources to live up to its obligations. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, Poland is spending 2.2 percent on defense, Hungary is increasing to 1.8 percent and the Czech Republic is increasing to 2 percent. This compares to the NATO average of 2.2 percent. Moreover, the projected growth rates of their economies is higher than the average for current NATO nations, so the defense budgets will become larger in absolute terms. Clearly, the newly invited members are willing to bear the cost of their own defense. My force planners tell me that their initial assessment of their force proposals indicates that these nations’ plans will be appropriate for the strategic circumstances of the 21st century.

The second category of cost is expenses borne by the present 16 member nations to enhance their own contributions to the alliance in support of accession. As NATO has adapted from a static defense to emphasize more-mobile operational concepts, the operational and strategic deployability of forces has been strengthened. As NATO enlarges, this characteristic is clearly desirable because it offers an alternative to larger permanently stationed forces. These force requirements are routinely developed through the NATO force planning process and funded by each nation. We have established that fulfilling existing force goals will fully prepare all current members for the strategic requirements introduced by NATO enlargement.

The third category of costs consists of the NATO common-funded accounts of which there are two major areas: The Military Budget which covers travel, common operations and maintenance, civilian salaries and pensions, training and exercises, etc. The other account is the NATO Security Investment Program or NSIP. This account, approximately $800M in size, provides for infrastructure improvements and is the area most impacted by enlargement. The NATO Senior Resource Board prioritizes and funds projects to be executed from all these common accounts. The ongoing accession process will recommend projects required to improve infrastructure in the three invited countries to meet the minimum military requirement for an Article 5 response. It is this category of costs that will directly impact U.S. and allied expenditures for enlargement. National contributions to common funds are agreed on at the ministerial level and have remained fairly constant over the years. Presently, the United States provides about one fourth of the NATO common funds. The requirements for command and control, integrated air defense, reinforcement infrastructure, training and exercises, and related projects are the subject of a rigorous study that will be submitted to me in two weeks. I am confident that we have addressed all potential requirements in a comprehensive manner, and that NATO’s final report based upon our requirements will accurately capture costs to NATO through the first decade after enlargement. This report is intended to support the December ministerials in Brussels.

Every year, NATO submits a Defense Planning Questionnaire to each of its members. This DPQ document is used by each nation to provide a self-assessment of its military capabilities and contributions to the Alliance. This year, the three newly invited nations have also completed the DPQ. Because this is their first effort at this process, the SHAPE staff has worked closely with them to produce this detailed document. From this information, we are establishing Target Force Goals for the invited nations. Their force goals are "Targets" for this cycle because we recognize that accession does not occur until all nations ratify the process with a target of 1999. We are in the middle of this process now. NATO and SHAPE force planners have traveled to each of the three nations to assess their military capabilities. By the spring ministerials, NATO will be able to describe Target Force Goals for the new nations.

We welcome the military capabilities that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic bring to the alliance. First and foremost, all three nations have transitioned their militaries to civilian control under democratic political leadership. Although all have inventories of predominantly Soviet equipment, they recognize the need to modernize. As with many other nations, they are downsizing their force structures to finance modernization. We have been active with all three nations in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and they have all contributed units to the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia. Poland and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War Coalition. Hungary has served as an invaluable staging area for NATO forces in Bosnia. In working with the invited nations, we have learned to respect and value their capabilities. All three are moving to adopt NATO standards and doctrine. Through the Partnership for Peace Program and our Bosnian interface, we have built a solid foundation for interoperability. During our survey of military facilities in the three new nations, we have been pleasantly surprised by both the quantity and quality of the infrastructure we saw. Let me expand on what they have found.

Poland. By far the largest of the three, Poland’s military is downsizing from 214,000 to 180,000 troops. They have 1,700 tanks, 1,400 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs), 340 fighter aircraft, and a modest navy. At the recent ministerials in Maastricht, their Defense Minister pointed out that NATO membership is broadly supported in Poland by all political parties and 90 percent of the population. Key priorities are to enhance interoperability with NATO forces with modernization of equipment, starting with command and control elements and education in the English language and professional military courses. They have developed a 15-year plan to upgrade their military and are financing it with 2.2 percent of their GDP allocated toward defense. Our survey team was especially impressed with the infrastructure located in the Malbork area which featured a superb airfield, expansive training complex, extensive rail support to both and proximity to Baltic ports. This could prove to be an excellent NATO training complex comparable to Grafenwohr, Bergen, or Irwin.

Hungary. Hungary has 67,000 troops, 800 tanks, 1,300 ACVs and 150 fighter aircraft. They are weaning themselves from conscription and developing a professional corps of non-commissioned officers. At Maastricht, their Defense Minister said that Hungary recognizes its requirement to finance its proper share for NATO membership. They are prepared to commit the bulk of their forces to the common defense and are ready to participate in other Alliance missions such as peace keeping and humanitarian operations. Hungary is initiating a comprehensive defense review in 1998 to posture its military to fully integrate into the NATO structure. They are emphasizing interoperability, especially in command and control, air defense and air control. The government has pledged to raise their defense expenditures by 0.1 percent of their GDP annually until 2001 when they will be spending 1.81 percent of GDP on defense. Hungary’s NATO accession is supported by all political parties and they have launched a campaign to increase public awareness and support. Hungary has already demonstrated its ability to support major NATO force projections. Taborfalva and Taszar, the bases that supported IFOR and SFOR deployments have been used by thousands of NATO troops.

Czech Republic. The Czech military has 65,000 troops, 950 tanks, 1,360 ACVs and 140 fighter aircraft. They committed to the challenge of meeting NATO standards. Their Defense Minister has identified the priority areas that they need to fix such as increasing the budget, defense planning and interoperability. Despite funding recovery from devastating floods, they are increasing their defense budget and by the year 2000 will be spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense. They have formed a high-level committee to address integration issues, chaired by the Prime Minister. They have pledged 90 percent of their forces to NATO’s use and are aggressively pursuing language training, interoperability of air defense as well as command and control functions. They have recognized the need to build public support for NATO integration and are working a media campaign to inform the public. We can in fact see the momentum building in the Czech Republic, as evidenced by their energetic efforts to bring communication and information systems up to NATO standards even prior to accession.

As the SHAPE staff works with NATO in assessing capabilities and requirements for the new nations, one area that I have directed them to examine closely is the area of training. Although we have a solid record of combined operations and exercises with the three nations, we have not fully exploited the capacity of structured command training to teach and reinforce NATO doctrine and standards, particularly leadership and decision making. We have found it very successful in economically training our own forces, and I think it will have a direct application to rapidly enhancing the interoperability of our NATO allies. My goal is to make the new nations providers of security rather than consumers of security as quickly as possible.

Let me share how some of our major NATO commands have been interfacing with the three new nations. From an air perspective one of my components, AIRCENT, the air arm of NATO’s Central Region, has been interfacing with the air forces of the three new nations. Because flying safety demands close cooperation of all users, AIRCENT has developed a graduated and disciplined program to address interoperability with the new nations. They have prepared an Air Interoperability Handbook with separate sections on Flight Safety, Air Defense, Logistics, Air Refueling, etc. They are also pursuing an Air Operation English Course to supplement basic English courses. They have supported the European "Regional Airspace Initiative" to provide a common picture of air traffic in the region, with standardized command and control. This air picture will be exportable to NATO air command and control centers throughout Europe. All three invited nations have fully subscribed to this initiative.

On the ground, LANDCENT is even further along with respect to integration due to their long cooperative experience in Bosnia. Forces from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been full participants in both IFOR and SFOR. The Poles have been key players in the Nord-Pol Brigade where English is the language of command. The Czechs have been full partners with the Canadians and British. The Hungarian engineer battalion has been so useful and effective, our force planners are requesting that Hungary provide it permanently to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force. There remains a lot of work to be done of course, but the combination of Partnership for Peace and Balkan Peacekeeping have already welded a great deal of ground cooperation with the newly invited countries.

From a maritime perspective, only Poland has a navy, so less integration is required than in the above cases. Poland has been active in PFP naval activities and has successfully accomplished a number of exercises with NATO, particularly with their German and Danish counterparts.

These examples, demonstrate the range of activities we are pursuing to enhance our present activities with partner nations and when political guidance is received, to rapidly integrate the new nations. These initiatives serve to invest first "between the ears" rather than for additional hardware.

The U.S. European Command also has significant involvement with the three new countries. In 1992, we started a Joint Contact Team Program with Poland and now have the same in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In addition to numerous engagement activities common to all countries in the region, EUCOM has intensified the exercise schedule with the three invited nations and has increased their opportunity to attend courses at the George C. Marshall Center where the role of the military in a democracy is emphasized. The State Partnership program matches U.S. National Guard units from Illinois with Poland, Ohio with Hungary, and Texas with the Czech Republic. All of these activities, as well as bi-lateral security assistance efforts have accelerated the progress of interoperability and reduced the remaining tasks for full interoperability with NATO.

Throughout the remainder of this century and into the next, the United States has the historic opportunity to help expand security and democracy in Europe. Adapting NATO to the present day realities is the most important step we can take toward making this possibility become reality. NATO will continue to set the conditions for peace in Europe well into the 21st century, and, as in the past, U.S. leadership will remain key to success. Any assessment of costs should include the potential costs and risks of not taking advantage of these rare circumstances.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee and I look forward to answering your questions.

October 30, 1997

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before this committee on a matter of such importance to America’s future. If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is inextricably linked with Europe’s. NATO, the institution expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to Rome—the only outstanding question being whether America or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius. Without Europe, America’s path would be lonely; without America, Europe’s role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of Europe that is historically valid—that is, which includes the nations of Central Europe.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them.

I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man’s land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America’s leadership role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is opting for progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective security, not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties’ "shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free" and refers to the parties’ "allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior." But Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist. Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act consist?

The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only once) the euphemism "commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the nature of these commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes—not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers’ level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where—as the Founding Act repeatedly states—decisions are made by consensus.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act. ‘

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO’s primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare that the United States expects Russia—after the qualitative changes that we have made—to desist from all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO’s expansion comes into being years before expansion occurs.

If the administration does not want to be remembered as having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this century, it should welcome efforts to clarify the many ambiguities in the Founding Act. In this way, a truly bipartisan approach to American-European security relations can be restored.