NATO1997     Year of Change

Romania’s Interests in the NATO Enlargement Process

Constantin Dudu Ionescu

NATO’s decision to admit other European nations who are willing and committed to promoting the principles of the Washington Treaty and to participating in the Euro-Atlantic defense is an endeavor to shape, in a radical and decisive manner, Europe’s history and future.

It is a credit to the Alliance that it has responded swiftly to geostrategic and political-military changes. The post-Cold War risks and threats to security and stability stem from:

• weapons and military equipment saturation in specific areas, in the aftermath of the superpower confrontation and of the Warsaw Pact dismantling;

• proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with the associate risks of their acquisition by terrorist groups or rogue states;

• cross-border terrorism and organized crime activities (particularly money laundering);

• the collapse of multi-ethnic states, artificially created and frozen as such during the Cold War, but vulnerable to internal claims for cultural identity;

• inter-community violence driven by self-determination claims (ethnic and cultural identity);

• overpopulation, population migration and displacement by terror and violence;

• economic disparities.

Building a stable relationship with the Russian Federation is critical to European security. NATO’s attempt to strengthen a framework for cooperation with Russia is a remarkable endeavor to the benefit of continental security. We do our utmost to support and advance this path. Nevertheless, the Strategic Partnership with Russia should not bear influence upon NATO’s decision to enlarge. This enlargement process, by extending stability and security to Central and Eastern Europe, is fully consistent with Russian Federation security interests.

Romania’s civilization and culture are European, sharing the same values: democracy, rule of law, human rights, free market economy. These values are the basis of our Euro-Atlantic integration policy. The Romanian government is assuming without any reserves all subsequent costs and responsibilities. These major policy goals also command overwhelming public support (the latest independent poll indicated 90% in favor of NATO integration).

NATO membership, seen not only as a collective defense alliance, but as the pillar to the new European security architecture, calls for a common effort to build a climate of peace, allowing member nations to share the same political, economic and cultural beliefs. As Romania’s president, Mr. Emil Constantinescu, has put it: "It is not [for] NATO to move towards [the] East, but the East is moving towards NATO."

Romanians do not see Alliance admission criteria (rule of law, free market economy, civil control over the Armed Forces, defense budget and planning transparency, good neighborhood) as conditions imposed from outside, but as strategic objectives intrinsic to the structural reformation of the Romanian society. That is why NATO integration, for Romanians, is a competition with themselves.

We are looking at democratic control over Romania’s armed forces as a two-way process between the army and society, where politicians are not meant to dictate to militaries, but to understand our country’s real defense needs and to try to meet them through viable political decisions. That is why we are focusing on building modern armed forces (smaller and more efficient) aligned to NATO standards, not only in training and equipment, but also in parliamentary oversight.

We believe that Romania is the missing link to the coherence and stability of NATO’s enlargement process, and in a broader picture, to Euro-Atlantic security. Any acknowledged observer cannot help noticing Romania’s geostrategic contribution and value to the strengthening of the Alliance’s Southern flank. Its human, economic and military potential (second in line after Poland in Central and Eastern Europe) could give Romania considerable "weight" in the light of NATO interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Romania’s open access to the Black Sea might be seen as the future pivot of the Caspian Sea oil and natural gas traffic (Constanta is the greatest European harbor East of Marseilles). Romania also controls the lower third and the mouths of the Danube river, which could be considered the 21st century’s European commercial back-bone if one takes into account the Rhine-Main-Danube and Black Sea-Danube channels.

Romania’s foreign policy is meant to build up a healthy neighborhood system, based on mutual trust and benefit.

Romania has historically sought stability in the Balkans; even in turbulent times—like the current ones—it has adopted a balanced stance. The 1996 Romanian-hosted NATO/PFP exercise Cooperative Determination saw Turkish and Greek units successfully operating together in a peacekeeping exercise.

The importance of Romania to the sub-regional equilibrium is highlighted by the fact that some of our neighbors (Bulgaria, Moldovia, Yugoslavia) support Romania joining the Euro-Atlantic structures as an opportunity to enhance their access chances.

It is worth mentioning that Romania has made new efforts to sign a base treaty with Ukraine. In the same respect we proposed a trilateral military co-operation with Poland and Ukraine for a joint peace- keeping units.

The base treaty concluded with Hungary is just the starting point of an active partnership. Both parties have recently agreed to start implementing a joint peacekeeping unit.

Romania’s participation in UN international peacekeeping operations is proof of our capability and commitment to share responsibilities for security and stability in one of the world’s most troubled areas. Consequently, Romania was ranked by the UN as the 12th leading contributor to such missions (between 1995-1996, 2,500 Romanian military personnel were involved in peacekeeping-type operations). In this respect we highly welcomed the experience gained from UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III mission in Angola involving three mechanized battalions and a field hospital, the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the ongoing Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions we joined with one engineer battalion.

Romania’s alignment with NATO standards began as early as 1991, with a comprehensive armed forces restructuring and upgrading process. It is our firm belief that Romania’s NATO integration does not call for major additional burdens, since the military’s restructuring was required by domestic needs. It was natural to adopt NATO standards, since the Alliance’s efficiency has passed the test of time. We are too poor to buy something cheap.

In 1993, with the first stage accomplished—by our own efforts—we embarked on to the second and the last one, speeded up by the PFP program. This stage is focusing on the implementation of a NATO interoperable C3 system, reorganization of units and formations according to the modular-type basis, establishment of integrated structures (air bases) and reorganization of the armed forces logistics. Romanian armed forces have developed structural interoperability with NATO, adopting Western organizational patterns in the field (Army corps, brigades and battalions).

In the same spirit, we are fully determined to place a more active emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the process and on improving the efficiency of selection and training of civil and military experts within the Ministry of Defense. Programs like International Military Education and Training (IMET) or Military-to-Military have had a decisive impact in changing attitudes and understandings concerning the place and role of the armed forces in a democratic society, as well as on the democratic approach to national security issues. We will continue focusing on improving the training status of our Planning and Review Process (PARP) assigned units for the second cycle, on upgrading infrastructure and logistic facilities and of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) implementation within the system. We expect to meet the operational compatibility for the PARP assigned units by 1999 and expanded interoperability objectives in the overall Romanian military establishment by 2005-2010.

One of our main objectives for the 1997-2005 time-frame consists in procuring high-tech military equipment and upgrading existing ones to NATO standards. Nineteen such programs are in full swing working toward this purpose. The Romanian government is fully committed to rehabilitating our defense industrial base through a comprehensive privatization program, by attracting foreign investors and by cooperative projects with Western companies. To this end the ongoing project developed with Bell Helicopters to assimilate the manufacturing of Cobra attack helicopter and negotiations initiated with Lockheed (we have already acquired five radar FPS-117 installations) are noteworthy. For the time being Romania is the only partner nation jointly initiating a program with the United States to improve our airlift capability for peacekeeping operation purposes (four C-130 Hercules were procured from the U.S. surplus inventory).

Taking into account future security challenges and the Combined Joint Task Forces concept we thought of establishing a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with the PFP for Peace Support Operations. By the end of this year an airborne brigade, a mechanized brigade, a special operations battalion and other support and logistics units are scheduled to become deployable. Furthermore, we envisage the RRF as the core of the future Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) to become fully operational in the next three to four years.

As a general rule we entirely cover our defense expenditures through domestic efforts and, implicitly, we are considering assuming the integration costs as well (the public is highly supportive to this effort; the above-mentioned poll indicated 70 percent in favor). The overall defense expenditure at this particular time—featured by the upgrading of Romanian military establishment—could cover the immediate priorities set to configure a smaller and more efficient army and meet the interoperability objectives jointly identified with NATO. In this context, Romania appreciates U.S. support under the Warsaw Initiative, IMET, and Military-to-Military programs as highly valuable and helpful. Maintaining or—if possible—augmenting these allocations will significantly speed the upgrading and restructuring process for Romania’s armed forces.

We consider covering these costs in a reasonable time span following a concept to be agreed upon with Allied partners, that will balance medium- and long-term objectives as cooperation deepens. Romania is considering the integration-related costs as a dynamic and cumulative approach. Once started, the enlargement process could generate some self-sustaining resources in its turn.

Romania, which has been one of the most active participants to PFP and PARP, salutes the new initiative of an enhanced Partnership. Although Romanian society fully supports integration with NATO as a means to join the overall Euro-Atlantic value system, civil and military experts have not ruled out the possibility of not being invited in the first—and most certainly the only—wave of enlargement. By our judgement, NATO enlargement should be seen as a continuous process, that is inviting all candidates to membership to initiate negotiations, admission being decided after the criteria are met.

Not inviting Romania to join would void the enlargement process of its substance, for it will create "grey areas" instead of eliminating them.

Under such undesirable circumstances the security risks evaluation process has to be performed following some rather different patterns. To this extent, we consider that the necessary costs we will be compelled to incur for security purposes will be increased. The consequences of this uneasy alternative on Romania’s transition towards a market economy could easily be foreseen as large amounts of money will be needed to cover supplementary defense needs, thus generating other domestic security imbalances. Anyway, there will be a hard choice to make in this respect because we cannot bargain with our independence and deterrence capability meaning that swift economic recovery will be postponed and the corresponding democratic progress delayed. Including Romania in an area of instability would send the wrong signal to foreign investors, adding to dire economic consequences.

In psychological terms, if Romania is not invited, despite the population’s overwhelming desire to belong to the Euro-Atlantic community, it will generate a mass frustration phenomenon.

At the political level, democratic forces in Romania—promoting democratic values—might wrongly be associated with failure to obtain an invitation.

That is why we strongly believe that the Alliance enlargement, meant to extend the area of peace, stability and prosperity eastward, will be concluded according to our supreme aspirations, as well. As far as Romania is concerned, we are determined to assume every responsibility and the costs deriving from full membership status.