Jeffrey Simon

Managing NATO's enlargement process—particularly in defining the criteria so as to justify the choice of new members and to prevent destabilizing the "failed suitors" and to keep them engaged in PFP— will be a major challenge! In other words, NATO faces the danger of creating "failed suitors" and derailing the PFP process. In addition, defining and managing NATO's relationship with Russia and Ukraine will be demanding.

Since PFP's inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO has reoriented its outreach programs and developed new institutions to manage the Partnership program. Despite initial reservation on the part of many CEE states, who had hoped for an early enlargement decision, and the fact that initially PFP was only an embryonic concept, PFP has become a very popular and successful program. Open to all Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members, in just three years, a widely diverse 27 countries—from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, and neutrals—have adopted PFP.

After signing PFP Framework Documents outlining broad policy goals and objectives, 22 Partners developed Presentation Documents, which identified their PFP objectives (e.g., whether they seek NATO membership or only cooperation). Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) were developed to help the Partner meet its specific Presentation Document objectives. In addition, NATO developed a Partnership Work Program (PWP) listing NATO activities that Partners could use to fulfill their own IPPs, and has now initiated a three-year planning cycle for IPPs.

NATO's new institutions to implement PFP on a day-to-day basis have gone far beyond the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, initially created in 1991. In 1994, NATO created a Political-Military Steering Group (PMSC) to manage PFP programs and develop the PWP and IPPs. A separate Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) was established at Mons, near SHAPE headquarters to coordinate military activities of (now 21) Partners with NATO. The PCC helps Partners identify and fulfill military training and exercise requirements to develop NATO interoperability. Efforts have been occurring through numerous PFP and "in the spirit of PFP" exercises that have expanded since 1994 and with the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR), which, since December 1995, in itself justifies the ongoing utility of PFP.

Though the PFP program and activities have been remarkably successful, we have reached a new stage where its activities need to be carefully evaluated and substantially improved in order to accelerate Partner reforms and preparation for membership. To date PFP military exercises have been judged successful just because they occurred. It is now time, though, to realistically assess Partner capacities in PFP exercises. We need to honestly address Partner deficiencies in NATO procedures as well as in general performance standards with the goal being to promote a principle of participants being contributors and not just consumers of security. We cannot continue to gloss over deficiencies out of concern of embarrassing Partners. They know deficiencies exist and we know they exist. By glossing over Partner deficiencies, we discourage their internal reforms. The same applies for their IFOR participation. This means that NATO needs to establish training and performance standards criteria and to critically evaluate them.

In sum, PFP has been remarkably successful, but the time has arrived for developing rigorous criteria for Partners' political compatibility and military interoperability to encourage needed reforms and to prepare Partners for accession to the Alliance. In the buildup to July 1997, the criteria will be needed to justify NATO's decision to the "failed suitors" in order to keep them engaged in PFP.

Partners and NATO have sought to establish a foundation for linking force goal planning and operational interoperability as a precondition for full NATO membership. In essence, operational interoperability simply means assessing the Partner's ability to carry out operations with NATO and participate in NATO's command and control structure. First, a Partner's ability to carry out operations with NATO can be measured by comparing a Partner's ground, sea, and air training with NATO's standards. Of the approximately 1,500 NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGS), about 700 have been released for use by the Partners.

Second, a Partner's ability to operate within NATO's command and control structure requires several necessary conditions. First, it requires adequate language training. Second, it requires education and training of specific "target groups." Each Partner needs an adequate number of staff and liaison officers and functional area officers to work in a NATO multinational headquarters and trained commanders and staffs of Partner units that will operate within a NATO multinational formation. Third, Partners need a minimal technical interoperability in communications and command and control.

Considerable progress was registered in l994-95 through implementation of three approaches: (1) The PFP Planning and Review Process promised a high degree of transparency in defense planning and budgeting; (2) the IPP which stated the individual partner's requirements; and (3) the PWP which outlined what NATO and the specific Allies had to offer for Partner participation. All three processes are intended to establish a dialogue on force requirements and planning.

Despite these early deficiencies, during 1996 the PFP program made very substantial progress in defining interoperability objectives. However, the program remains at a plateau where Partner nations badly need in-depth guidance on interoperability and force planning. Many Partners find that they are at a disadvantage given their limited access to classified NATO documents; those few made available offer little guidance on priorities and conceptual approaches relevant to Partner planning needs. NATO's attempts to provide needed guidance have yielded 20 approved interoperability objectives which are too generalized, and thus offer little promise of significant progress in meeting NATO's 44 interoperability objectives.

On balance, many Partners increasingly find existing mechanisms and channels of available information disconnected, bureaucratically burdensome, and problematic as to the provision of meaningful criteria by which to measure their progress. However, there is some expectation of progress with development of a major NATO command Directive for Peace Support Operations which provides a foundation for the development of education, training, and military exercise activities. Within the same framework, interoperability requirements and tasks are being developed for Air, Land, and Maritime Forces. Also within NATO, there is growing recognition that the PARP should provide the basis for achieving political compatibility in light of potential enlargement.

In establishing criteria to measure interoperability progress, two efforts currently underway will have a significant impact. NATO/ PFP military exercises have achieved measurable momentum. In addition to numerous "in the spirit of" PFP activities, three PFP military exercises took place in 1994, eight in 1995, and 24 in 1996. Held at the brigade-level over the past year, the first joint corps-level exercise is planned for l997. Interoperability objectives are now being incorporated in exercise specifications and final exercise reports are to be included in the PARP. A significant obstacle, however, could revolve around resource limitations and financial constraints in expanding the number of such military exercises and in developing serious evaluations of Partner performance.

Partners, on the other hand, have been tempted to view participation in IFOR as a short cut for admission to NATO, particularly as the operation proved successful. NATO must also consider the following factors: (l) The extent to which Partner military establishments have consulted civilian authorities prior to joining IFOR; (2) the extent IFOR participation has delayed other necessary internal reforms; and (3) the degree to which budgetary distortions have occurred in Partner economic plans. Finally, to be kept in mind, is the amount of pressure felt to "join the willing;" the sense among some Partners that IFOR participation was a necessary criterion for serious consideration for NATO membership.

At the heart of internal NATO concern when weighing new membership is the changing multi-purpose nature of the Alliance. NATO is not only now concerned with peace operations, humanitarian assistance, sea rescue, and peace enforcement operations as mandated by the NAC, but the Alliance is also faced with drastically reduced force levels and greater budgetary constraints. As a result, NATO may have to re-examine and possibly lower the threshold between Article 4 capabilities and the Article 5 (nuclear and conventional) planning level. Within NATO some worry that the organization may be moving in directions for which there has been little preparation, and PFP applications for membership add to existing doubts and uncertainties about NATO future adaptation.

These appear to be the principal reasons why political and military criteria for new members remain undefined. But, as decision-time approaches, their definition will become increasingly essential if NATO is to have credibility with those PFP participants excluded.

NATO's great historic success might be described as having formed the reconciliation between two former adversaries—Germany and France. The institutionalization of transparent defense budgeting and force planning, common defense resource management practices, and communications, command, and interoperability standards have also contributed to building confidence and developing security among European allies. Smaller NATO members, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway, today feel more secure in the shadow of their large German neighbor because of the practices that have been institutionalized in NATO.

Over the past half century, the development of confidence, security, and stability in the Western half of Europe has been NATO's greatest singular achievement! NATO's great challenge for the opening of the 21st century is to now expand that institutionalized zone of confidence, security, and stability to Europe's Eastern half through enlargement and to facilitate their "return to Europe." This remains NATO's challenge and historic mission and is the reason why enlargement should occur. But NATO cannot do this alone; therefore it needs complementary institutions.

These principles and the incentives of NATO enlargement have planted the seeds for reform in Europe's "Eastern" half. Indeed, many have germinated to form the building blocks for developing "real" confidence and security in this region. These building blocks also contribute to a general sense of European stability which is also in Russia's interest.

Second, NATO has planted the seeds of military and political cooperation and confidence building not only in the Partnership Coordination Center at Mons, but in the Planning and Review Process at NATO Headquarters. The PARP process forms the institutional basis for transparent force planning and developing real confidence in Europe's Eastern half.

To conclude, NATO's enlargement represents a further extension of NATO's historic achievements to the half of Europe that has been denied the benefits enjoyed by the West and facilitates its "return to Europe." By creating incentives through enlargement, NATO has created, at bargain-basement cost, the building-blocks for developing real confidence, stability, and security in Europe. This will be NATO's 21st century challenge and historic mission.

The Alliance has been addressing one issue at a time when there is a pressing need for a broad strategic approach preferably before the July l997 Summit when Partners anticipate announcement of the first tranche of candidates for NATO admission. In particular, Partners expect that specific political, economic, social, and military criteria will be made clear. President Clinton's speeches, Secretary of Defense Perry's "five principles," and the Study On NATO Enlargement provide a useful starting point. But the NAC will soon be required to design links in three critical areas:

1. The processes by which political compatibility between NATO and PFP partners should evolve (from NACC to an Atlantic Partnership Council—APC);

2. The ways in which NATO should strengthen ties with the EU and Western European Union (WEU);

3. The need to define how military interoperability is to be achieved in light of the limited economic and financial resources available to PFP partners.

Also NATO needs to answer a number of ancillary questions: Notably how do we ensure the integrity of Alliance consensus once membership is opened? How do we ensure that enriched-PFP costs do not "come out of NATO's hide?"

The NATO outreach program to excluded Partners could become stymied by other factors. Some Partners not included in first tranche admission could well conclude that NATO has no intention of proceeding to a second or third stage, thus raising doubts about the advantages of reorganizing and modernizing their military at considerable cost if NATO membership is a chimera. In short, the Alliance must address not only criteria, but also how to deal with a "failed suitor" syndrome on the part of disappointed applicants.

What needs to be to done? First, it is clear that the Partnership needs a strengthened political component to address and offset the imbalance between the well-developed military and the under-developed political components of PFP. A major step would be to establish a permanent Partnership staff element at NATO HQ in Brussels as a political counterweight to the military PCC at SHAPE in Mons. The International Partnership Staff (IPS) would be equivalent to the NATO International Staff (IS) which reports to the NAC and the International Military Staff (IMS) which serves the Military Committee. The IPS would provide the necessary political balance for PFP and would focus on and coordinate Partnership activities.

What the APC's relationship to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will become remains unclear, in part because its concept is as embryonic as was the PFP concept in January 1994. But if the APC were to become really effective politically (as PFP has become militarily), it should be more selective than the NACC in its membership. Indeed, one of the reasons for the NACC remaining moribund has been the fact that the decision to include all successor states from the former Soviet Union diluted its political utility from inception.

The APC, though, should be more exclusive and act as a political training institution for aspiring NATO members. Therefore, as a result of Partner self-selection, the APC might be limited only to those PARP Partners who desire "immediate" NATO membership. Hence, if Bulgaria were to change its policy and decide that it wanted to join NATO (as its new government appears to have done), Bulgaria could join the APC.

The APC, in marked contrast to the NACC, would be the institutional forum in which the political integration of PARP participants would occur. The APC could meet monthly in consultation with the NAC (as do WEU Associate Partners and Associate Members with the Council). Political integration of potential new members could be furthered and improved by expanding their access to NATO STANAGS and Interoperability Objectives to further develop their force planning processes.

This new initiative could serve as a launch pad for tying NATO and PFP Partners more closely together with the EU, particularly in establishing economic planning and internal order criteria. Enhancement of ties with EU could help overcome the existing political and economic compatibility shortfalls in NATO's criteria dialogues with PFP Partners, helping to establish recognized standards for full membership in both institutions. Compatibility of interests already exists in that the Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991 and the EU Maastricht treaty were actually worked out side-by-side.

The EU has also outpaced NATO in seeking to broaden ties with Central and Eastern European countries. For example, it has offered the Central European "democracies" full membership in principle while concluding association agreements in the interim. These agreements permit 10 Associate Partners and three Associate Members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) to participate in Western European Union institutions. Since nine of the 11 PFP Partners aspiring NATO membership are also WEU Associate Partners (Albania and FYROM are the two excluded), the EU and WEU can be effective in "softening" the blow of NATO exclusion for many of the "failed suitors."

Third, NATO political restructuring is necessary. To draw the various levels together in a viable whole, NATO might create an assistant secretary general (ASG)-level position for PFP to oversee external coordination with the EU/WEU and internal International Partnership Staff activities. The precedent for this has already been established on NATO's military side, when the Berlin NAC ministerial in June 1996 established a deputy SACEUR to act as liaison with the WEU.

The viability of such a position would depend on the willingness of NATO members to support internal realignment of functions and responsibilities, as well as support for the ASG to serve as NATO's primary point of contact with the EU. Part of the ASG's responsibility should be to enhance Partner understanding of NATO-WEU strategic thinking and to integrate NATO interoperability criteria with a Partner's force planning. Most particularly, the ASG for PFP would require an individual prepared to discuss realistically with the EU and WEU how to establish a common standard for the assessment of a Partner's progress. In addition, the PFP ASG must make clear that an invitation to join NATO does not grant automatic admission. Programs of objectives and clear time-lines should be negotiated with Partners.

Fourth, political and military principles as necessary but not sufficient conditions for NATO membership, which have evolved over time, must be made clear so as to justify NATO's decision of "who" NATO actually invites, and to credibly explain why certain Partners have been temporarily excluded. Political and military principles also will be necessary to keep Partners engaged in their reform programs.

The invitation "formula" is likely to be the result of a bargaining process within the Alliance as it attempts to develop consensus on "who" to invite. The opening salvo in NATO's "bargaining" process has been advanced by France's support for Romania in the first tranche and by Italy's support for Slovenia. In addition, Turkey has further complicated the process by holding its admission to the EU as its price for supporting NATO enlargement.

If NATO were to extend an invitation to these "five" Partners, NATO programs would need to be established for the six "failed suitors" to keep them engaged in their internal reforms, involved in deepening cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions, and interested in making continued contributions to general security issues as in IFOR/SFOR. Enhanced PFP packages and Atlantic Partnership Council participation will be necessary and helpful, but may prove inadequate. In this regard, if NATO had an International Partner-ship Staff and ASG for PFP and institutional and cooperative links with the EU (and WEU), stabilizing Slovakia and the three Baltic states would be made easier and their "landing" after the Summit would be softened.

Dealing with Albania and FYROM will be more difficult because of the absence of an EU "safety-net." Hence, NATO policy and Allied bilateral policies will become more important and essential as tools to keep these two "failed suitors" engaged. Bulgaria's qualification as a "failed suitor" is unclear because NATO membership may or may not be a goal on its immediate horizon, but it is tied to the EU and an Associate Partner in the WEU. Therefore, these additional tools are available to engage and stabilize Bulgaria.

NATO's post-enlargement summit relations with Russia and Ukraine might also be improved. In addition to what evolves in NATO's strategic relationship with each of these two states through Charters and/or treaties, Russia and Ukraine also might participate in the monthly NAC/APC sessions to further develop confidence and advance their understanding of NATO affairs.

In summary, a coordinated NATO-EU enlargement strategy would help NATO to establish Article 4 and Article 5 compatibility and interoperability criteria to facilitate real Partner reform. It would help NATO overcome the "failed-suitor" syndrome that would likely result from those Partners excluded from a first NATO enlargement tranche. It would provide the catalyst for needed internal NATO structural reform to enhance Partner political cooperation and integration. Finally, it would provide Partners with realistic goals (of what they need to do and to assess costs) so each Partner government can turn to its respective society to choose which among its economic/political (EU) or defense and security (NATO) priorities should take precedence in the nation's agenda to "return to Europe."