NATO1997     Year of Change

Western European Union Operational Development

Graham Messervy-Whiting

One aspect of European security and defense identity is the Western European Union (WEU) that provides political control and strategic direction for Petersberg-type operations as foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty. Such operations include humanitarian and rescue (evacuation and disaster relief), peacekeeping, and crisis management. To execute them, WEU has developed a politico-military decisionmaking process in the Permanent Council, supported by both a politico-military and a military delegates group; strengthened the planning cell under the Permanent Council; and established a situation center (SITCEN) responsible to the Secretary-General via the planning cell director and a satellite center (SATCEN) at Torrejón, Spain (figure 1).

WEU has 10 full members who also belong to both the European Union (EU) and NATO (figure 2). Only these EU and NATO members have the right to make or veto decisions in the Permanent Council. However, although EU membership is mandatory for WEU admission under the Brussels Treaty, NATO membership is a firm albeit unwritten rule. There are three associate members who are NATO but not EU members and five observers who are in EU but not in NATO (except for Denmark). In addition there are 10 associate partners, making a total of 28 WEU nations.

One key difference between NATO and WEU is that no permanent military structures exist within the latter except for the planning cell. This is because no forces, or command and control assets, are permanently assigned. However, this offers a degree of flexibility since WEU has three means of achieving its tasks:

• national Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) which are potentially available for planning purposes and would be employed on a case-by-case basis

• one of five multinational FAWEU—namely EUROCORPS, Multinational Division Central (MND-C), United Kingdom-Netherlands, Amphibious Force, European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and European Force (EUROFOR)

• since the Berlin ministerial meeting in 1996, NATO assets and capabilities, including the combined joint task force (CJTF) initiative.

Once the WEU Permanent Council has decided to conduct a particular operation, national, multinational, or alliance assets would provide a military command and control chain which would consist of the out-of-theater operational commander (OPCDR) and his headquarters with a point of contact who provides the personal link between OPCDR and the Permanent Council; the in-theater force commander (FORCDR) and his headquarters; and assigned national forces (figure 3).

Figure1.   WEU Organization

The four-year-old planning cell is the only military element of WEU that operates in normal times. It provides advice on the strategic level to the Permanent Council and has a joint combined staff of 55 members, of whom 40 are military officers (05s or above) or civilians of equivalent rank including a Norwegian police superintendent and a French coast guard officer. It is important to note that this cell works "at 13"—that is, it only includes European members of NATO (full or associate WEU members). It has six functional sections (see figure 4) making it fully compatible with the nearby NATO headquarters and can be reinforced by additional experts when required.

Figure 2.   Interlocking European Organizations

Figure 3.   WEU Command and Control—Operations

Communications and Information Systems Section. WEU is linked to secure and insecure NATO voice and data networks under the terms of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which became effective in December 1996, immediately prior to phase 3 of the first WEU crisis management exercise (CRISEX). A secure video-conference link was established between WEU headquarters in Brussels and an operational commander with headquarters at Metz-Guise during the exercise. The Permanent Council has approved a comprehensive five-year plan for WEU communications and information technology development.

Coordination Section. This element of the cell is responsible for WEU relationships with other international organizations. Last year a long-awaited agreement was signed with NATO that allowed for the release of documents between the two organizations. Initial exchanges took place between the NATO International Military Staff and WEU planning cell in September 1996. This was followed by an explosion of working-level contacts between WEU functional cells and relevant sections in both NATO headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), as well as a number of outreach programs. WEU modules have been incorporated in the syllabus of the NATO school at Oberammergau and there have been extensive bilateral sessions with the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff at Mons. The informal monthly coordination meetings which have been held for years were formalized in January 1997 and are now co-chaired at the one-star level.

Intelligence Section. Established in 1995 and staffed in autumn 1996, this section receives intelligence from several WEU nations and issues weekly classified intelligence summaries. It has been tasked by the Permanent Council to monitor Albania, the former Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and Somalia. It also maintains close working relationships with both SITCEN and SATCEN.

Figure 4.   Planning Cell, WEU Headquarters

Logistics and Movements Section. With increased activity among members, partners, and associates in strategic mobility, this section is developing doctrine, expanding medical expertise, and creating a network of logistics experts in both international organizations and national capitals. It has gotten access to the NATO deployment and movement system in cooperation with SHAPE and the new NATO communications agency. A mobility working group was formed for the 3000-kilometer air movement of elements of a force headquarters during CRISEX. Important links have been forged with international agencies including the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the European Community Humanitarian Office.

Operations and Exercises Section. In anticipation of a possible intervention in the Great Lakes region of Africa, this section conducted hot planning on the politico-military level at the end of last year and provided military advice to the Permanent Council on possible options. This advice was developed by liaison officers who visited UN headquarters in New York, the Multinational Force (MNF) planning team in Stuttgart, and MNF headquarters in Kampala. Lessons also have been developed from three small WEU operations in the former Yugoslavia concluded last year: the Danube sanctions operation with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania; the joint Adriatic sanctions operation with NATO; and the Mostar police operation in support of the local EU commission. The section also has monitored both Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations.

This section of the cell conducted a politico-military fact-finding mission to Africa last year, visiting the Organization of African Unity and four countries to determine ways that Europe can help enhance the peacekeeping capability of key troop-contributing nations in Africa. A database was created to identify available training in Europe. Other databases also have been set up, for instance on joint use of training facilities by WEU nations and training in land mine clearance. A council approved exercise policy has been developed in consultation with NATO planners and is based on a three-year rolling program.

CRISEX, the first major WEU exercise, tested crisis management on the politico-military level. The first phase in December 1995 created exercise interplay between the Permanent Council, its subsidiary bodies, and the capitals of the participating nations. Phase II in June 1996 involved a similar exercise but added an operational commander and headquarters. The third was the same but with a force commander, Eurocorps headquarters at Strasbourg. Thus by the end of the year all levels of WEU had been tested in a combined crisis management, command post, and live exercise. In March 1997 a post-exercise seminar in Brussels examined lessons from CRISEX.

Plans Section. Over the past 18 months generic plans for all Petersberg tasks have been completed. These plans include evacuation, humanitarian and disaster relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations. Phase 1 of CRISEX practiced the transition of a generic plan into a contingency plan for a specific scenario utilized by the Permanent Council to prepare directives for selected operational commanders. Under the WEU system, operational commanders and staffs, not the planning cell, carry out detailed planning. This occurred during phase 2 of CRISEX when the commander presented an outline plan to the Permanent Council for approval. In August 1996, generic plans were developed in some 20 illustrative profiles, with an evaluation of each in order to determine what NATO assets and capabilities might be required. The Permanent Council selected six to be submitted to the NATO Joint Planning Staff for assessment.

With regard to defense planning, the cell has been analyzing the returns submitted in 1996 by WEU nations of headquarters and units available for Petersberg-type operations. The database currently lists some 2,000 such units from 24 nations, including associate partners and observers. These are mainly national assets, but the five multinational formations are included and MOUs have been signed with each of them. The potential joint operation headquarters are being assessed and discussions are underway with NATO on how WEU requirements can be included in its defense planning process for non-Article 5 tasks at the higher end of the Petersberg spectrum.

The military aspects of WEU operational development are progressing well and will contribute to a stronger European capability to undertake Petersberg tasks. The WEU role as a bridge between the Alliance and the European Union is strengthening. After all, WEU is the only institution in which Europeans can discuss the full range of security and defense issues among themselves. However, the organization is still small and must develop much further before it can take on more substantive tasks such as the replacement of SFOR in Bosnia. In particular it must test the viability of using NATO assets in a major exercise. To send it into an enforcement-type action prematurely would clearly be a bold and risky decision.