Bosnia’s Impact on NATO Command
and Force Structure Requirements

Charles L. Barry

The overriding fact about NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia) through February 1997 is that they have been highly successful. That achievement is underscored by two related truths: one is that Bosnia is NATO's first actual military operation; and the other is that the mission in Bosnia—out-of-area peace enforcement operations—is one for which NATO's military was neither designed nor trained. The success of NATO forces in executing a "new NATO mission" of crisis response (albeit only when long-sought political will finally materialized) suggests that SHAPE and its subordinate elements have effectively adapted to the demands of the post-Cold War era. Notwithstanding, in trying to draw conclusions about the broad topic of future operations from NATO's experience in Bosnia, caution must be exercised not to conclude too much too soon. Analysts will be well advised to heed the time-tested axiom that it is risky to draw conclusions from only one event, and especially from the most recent one. Still, it is appropriate to make initial observations about NATO’s performance to date in the Balkans. It is also possible to suggest lessons learned that might inform near term planning and decisionmaking, particularly on future command structure and force structure requirements.

Looking back at SHAPE’s effort to prepare for Operation Joint Endeavor, the single most important advantage to NATO’s military during that time was the existence of the integrated military structure of Allied Command Europe (ACE). ACE is a fully mature military structure with several decades of experience at close, inter-allied planning and decision making. Officers assigned to ACE staffs at every echelon had served throughout their careers in each others’ military schools, training areas, capitals and operational environments. Then, for more than three years, SHAPE and other NATO headquarters planned for and executed operations to support, reinforce, extract and ultimately relieve the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. By the time NATO deployed its initial enabling forces in December 1995, plans had been vetted and refined to the point that only actual implementation was likely to improve them. The success of NATO’s operations in Bosnia is a sound testimonial for retention of the integrated military structure for a new era and future missions.

A second, albeit far more recent structural advantage for ACE planners was the already highly successful Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP provided the ideal framework for appending the forces of non-NATO countries to NATO military structures, and its success provided an objective standard for participation by forces from countries outside PFP. The PFP experience will assuredly provide the basis for future collaboration by NATO and non-NATO forces for any subsequent military crisis response.

In a broad sense, NATO’s military mission has not changed at all. It is still to protect the collective interests of Alliance members. Of course, the pre-occupation throughout the Cold War and still the fundamental military task is that of protecting the most important interest: NATO territory. That capability must always be credible. However, with NATO members’ survival no longer in immediate danger, Alliance political leaders have directed the military authorities to shift from a static defense capability to a force projection capability, and to be prepared to protect interests beyond NATO territory. Even as NATO’s military structure was in the midst of analyzing its new missions, the call to deploy to Bosnia obliged ACE to respond as if a mature force projection capability was already in hand.

As noted above, the performances of the Implementation Force (IFOR), and now of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), have been overwhelming successes. In no small regard that success can be attributed to the uncommon dedication, hard work and military innovation exhibited across ACE, from the SACEUR down to the lowest tactical level. In itself, the remarkable and laudable performance of ACE is truly historic.

With experience growing daily in Bosnia, institutionalization of successful innovations is essential in order to move away from the strain and risk of "making it up as you go along" and toward a standing capability to project forces. There are many sound reasons for investing in an institutional capability versus reliance on ad hoc arrangements when a crisis arises, not the least of which is the deterrence of crises well before they arise. NATO’s role in implementing the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia is a crucial real-time laboratory for determining what works and what doesn’t for much of NATO’s future command and force structure requirements.

Deciding what military forces are needed for the future is also a pressing matter for those charged with making difficult resource decisions. In spite of years of reductions, the militaries of many NATO nations are faced with further budget reductions. France, who held out longer than any other power in sustaining a strong military, now faces intractable economic woes and has decided to make deep, across-the-board military cuts. The United States has launched its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a process that is likely to generate further (perhaps substantial) force reductions. These examples point to the critical importance of studying Bosnia operations carefully and, to some extent expeditiously, in order to use that experience as an azimuth check on where we are headed—or ought to be headed—militarily, as an Alliance and as nations.

Still, before we can draw lessons from Bosnia, and make sound decisions about how those lessons inform the debate about NATO’s future structure, we have to separate the wheat from the chaff. Analysis must show not just what went right and what went wrong, but also must assess what is specific to the crisis in Bosnia and what has broader application for the future. Realistically it will be many years before all the lessons can be drawn from the military mission in Bosnia. Yet, the experience of IFOR/SFOR can, and already has, outlined the major assumptions, tenets and precepts of NATO’s future military role. The fact that NATO undertook to deploy a peace enforcement force beyond its territory, and to continue the operation with SFOR, tells military planners as well as parliaments and Congress what kind of force the allies want to have available in the era unfolding before us.

The mission execution of IFOR/SFOR has been far more informative as to what the Alliance will actually be faced with in the conduct of future operations. Initially, the mission tasks of IFOR were to enforce an agreed cease fire, including the separation of warring factions, monitoring cantonment areas and ensuring freedom of movement against interference by military forces. Secondary tasks related to support for civilian implementation of the peace plan. These included "as available" support for civil police, non-governmental organizations, reconstruction, elections, de-mining, re-establishing political institutions, refugee return, apprehension of war criminals and support of war crimes investigation. In all of these tasks, what has worked and what has not worked in Bosnia have done much more to shape the further adaptation of the Alliance military, especially in the areas of resource allocation, doctrine, modernization requirements and training.

The basic organizational structure of both IFOR and SFOR have been that of a combined joint task force (CJTF). Yet, they are not the finished product intended to be developed when the CJTF concept is fully mature; rather, they should be regarded as working prototypes. IFOR/SFOR testify to the soundness of the theoretical CJTF concept, which has taken years to negotiate politically, and which will continue to unfold through military exercises and doctrinal development in the years ahead. Nonetheless, NATO has proven that it can put new concepts into practice militarily even without full political agreement on the theory.

As originally defined, CJTFs are to be developed as either NATO-only, WEU-led or NATO-led with non-NATO forces participating. Both IFOR and SFOR have been of the third variety, with 19 non-NATO troop contributing nations participating as a combined joint operational task force. This so-called "NATO-plus" version of CJTF may be the most often employed variant. Most crisis response scenarios envision operating in areas where regional nations also have an interest in crisis resolution. Although including non-NATO forces will always pose extra operational challenges, participation by at least some states that are in proximity to a crisis is almost a political imperative. Military leaders realize that NATO forces will be better received by working with regional powers, many of whom can be expected to want to participate in operations.

The PFP program launched at NATO’s 1994 summit is the tool for working with non-NATO forces. It has been equally as successful as the CJTF concept in executing the mission in Bosnia, and has formed the basis for crafting command and support structure arrangements for PFP partner participation in the operation. The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at SHAPE, has been the focal point for planning and coordination for pre-deployment training, deployment, and for actual operations throughout the Bosnia operation. Earlier PFP initiatives established the PCC in late 1994, providing a ready-made mechanism for incorporating Partner country forces into a NATO operation. In addition, the 1994 and 1995 Partnership Work Plans of exercises and military cooperation afforded both Partners and NATO many opportunities to gain a lot of experience and knowledge regarding each others operations.

The practical experience of IFOR/SFOR has quickly eclipsed the original PFP programs aimed at traditional peacekeeping. The opportunity to work together in a bona fide military operation rather than training that focused on non-standard missions has been a bonanza for Partner militaries. Bosnia required NATO to dramatically steepen Partner learning curves regarding practical military cooperation with NATO. Indeed, concerns have been raised that PFP will be challenged in the future to overcome a feeling on the part of Partner militaries that they have achieved all that needs to be accomplished by virtue of having participated in IFOR/SFOR.

In fact, beneath the veneer of success, much remains to be learned by Partners before they will be able to pull their weight in the military structure alongside NATO members. It is too early to draw conclusive lessons about Partner performance from the Bosnia experience. However, reports from officers rotating back to their national militaries indicate that Partner forces still require substantial basic support from NATO simply to sustain their forces and to conduct operations. The lesson we can draw for now is that PFP has been crucial in successfully linking NATO and non-NATO forces, and that there are few indications that its work is complete. On the contrary, Bosnia seems to indicate that PFP may have a permanent role in facilitating future operations.

In the months ahead, NATO will at last reach formal agreement on a new command structure. Although debate continues, there is an understanding that the military will be faced with more non-Article 5 contingencies than Article 5 defense, even though it has to be fully capable of Article 5 as well. The experience of AFSOUTH and LANDCENT has helped further the debate and quell the critics that contend that the Alliance has not done enough. The major framework has been tested and found to accomplish the necessary missions. NATO likely has most of what it will need for the future. As to whether NATO ultimately adopts plans for two or three regional commands under ACE, the military issues are not as central as the political ones.

The performance indicators on communications are mixed regarding the Bosnia operation. About the best that can be said is that there is sure to be close scrutiny of communications architecture as NATO’s new force structure is debated. One observation is that NATO’s military is still reliant on resource intensive, line-of-sight communications equipment. The use of satellites, J-STARS and AWACS provided relief, however that has been seen rarely at the tactical level. NATO still depends heavily on the United States for modern communications equipment, especially satellite technology.

The communications demands for external linkages are increasing as well. These ties will grow even more with the inclusion of non-NATO forces. Also, the need to link continuously to more and more civilian agencies in order to accomplish non-traditional missions has caused an explosion of liaisons and functional agencies, all of which increase the burden of transmitting and ultimately using information from numerous sources, near simultaneously. There is also the new phenomenon of detailed political guidance continuing to military commanders, not only pre-deployment, but throughout the operation as well. This is triggered by the desire to use military force for an expanding array of political purposes, many of which demand close, hands-on political-military coordination across the campaign.

Significantly, the often-referenced European shortages of strategic lift resources have been less of a constraint. Bosnia, after all, is accessible by road, rail, sea, and air. Strategic deployment for NATO allies (and PFP partners), is likely to be a different concept than for the United States. That is especially important with respect to the need for airlift, which is the fastest means, but is also the most expensive and least efficient. For Europeans, reliance on U.S.-owned lift assets will be less of a concern, because of the differences in perspective between an insular power like the United States and continental Europe.

How did ACE manage to deploy and employ its forces so effectively on NATO’s first ever operation? A lot of credit is owed to amply detailed planning, repeated exercises and persistent leadership at all echelons. It will be a particularly important lesson for future deployment planners to note carefully the special circumstances surrounding the IFOR deployment. There was time to do it right, and there was no opposing force with which the deploying force had to contend.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO logistics were a national responsibility. Furthermore, as a purely defensive alliance, NATO enjoyed the military logistical advantages of interior lines of communications (LOCs). There was also the unhappy likelihood that some lines would get shorter (at least during an initial Soviet attack) as at least some enemy penetrations forced NATO forces back. Given the survival interests of NATO members, host nation support was unconditional and plentiful. Civil emergency planning (CEP) ensured that all civil resources, from communications to transportation to hospitals would be available to the defensive effort.

In Bosnia there are few if any host-nation support resources or infrastructure. As a result, NATO has employed many creative logistical concepts and organizations, some of which will find their way into new doctrines for future operations. Augmenting national responsibilities (especially for smaller forces and non-NATO contingents of limited means), NATO created "C-Support" in Croatia, a logistics command that coordinates the flow of supplies and provides a host organization for national elements. Essentially a multinational joint logistics command, C-Support serves as the primary logistics command for all of IFOR. Concurrently, U.S. forces operate a large staging base to the north, in southern Hungary, as a support hub for Multi-National Division (North) MND(N) at Tuzla. In addition to national logistics and a multinational command, other possibilities for future operations include the concept of lead nation commodities, specialized agency support, and civilian contractors.

A key piece of equipment featured in Bosnia, both for logistical and operational missions at the tactical level, has been the helicopter. The advantage of the helicopter in rugged terrain and impassible roads is significant, particularly in getting limited amounts of supplies moved quickly. Undoubtedly this reality will help shape the mix of NATO’s future force structure. Look for increased reliance on heliborne operations and airmobile forces. That will also mean an emphasis on "light" forces and equipment, easily moved by helicopter, not ground vehicles.

Civil-Military (CIMIC) operations have taken an unusually high profile in Bosnia, foreshadowing a fundamental new force requirement for NATO non-Article 5 operations. Initially, over 80 percent of specially trained CIMIC personnel in Bosnia came from U.S. reserve forces. Today the situation is little improved. In fact, most NATO nations do not have a separate category of unit for civil affairs. However, in the contingency arena of peace operations, civil affairs are crucial to mission success and, notably, to mission completion and getting military forces out.

Early concepts for NATO’s CJTF include time durations of some years on station without host nation support. However, IFOR/SFOR, at two and one half years total, may exceed expected deployment times, especially if SFOR is replaced by another NATO force. Personnel rotation is only part of the problem. Equipment costs accelerate and overall command structure fatigue can occur. The latter is a likely possibility when a headquarter’s skeleton rear detachment is left with the responsibility for multiple missions normally managed by a full headquarters complement. For this reason, rotation of units and headquarters, such as the consolidation and relief of AFSOUTH and ARRC by LANDCENT in October-December 1996, must be an integral facet of NATO CJTF planning.

NATO’s Bosnia experience is but one of the dynamics influencing how NATO’s future command structure and force structure will be shaped. In addition to the major influence of NATO’s experience in Bosnia, the other prominent factors informing architects of the new NATO structure are:

•A clear disposition by NATO members to consider contingency operations to protect collective interests beyond their borders;

•The impending enlargement of NATO territory;

•A tacit recognition that almost any non-Article V operation will include forces from non-NATO countries, most importantly, Russia and other PFP partners;

•The need to accommodate a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)—that is, a distinctly identifiable European capability to respond without U.S. participation;

•The need to maintain a strong trans-Atlantic bond throughout the structure, horizontally and vertically;

•The potential advantages of accommodating Russian participation at all major echelons and across many functional areas;

•A persistent, vague acceptance that NATO’s new structure must address the revolution sweeping military affairs, a predominantly technology-triggered revolution in information concepts; and,

•The continuing decline in military spending across all member countries.

These nine dynamics will continue to unfold for years to come. Of course, in the force structure arena a host of initial decisions about NATO’s future military have already been taken, and more decisions are imminent. Even after nettlesome command structure issues are resolved and the new structure framework is largely in place, the force will have to be honed and kept up-to-date through continuous training, exercises and force structure modifications. The maintenance phase of the force structure process is perhaps more important than the initial design phase. That is where the mature capability to respond is ultimately honed and kept strong.

In short, the factors outlined above—and most certainly the experience of Bosnia—will bear on NATO’s military for a long time to come. All of these factors are working in parallel, at times in harmony and at times in conflict. Therefore, let us briefly consider the other exogenous factors shaping NATO’s future military structure.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision in December 1995 to deploy forces to Bosnia was momentous insofar as its importance in defining the future missions that the Alliance military structure must be prepared to undertake. By 1995 the question of NATO’s political will to deploy forces "out of area" had taken a back seat to the reality that only NATO could resolve the intractable conflict in Bosnia.

The fact that NATO has demonstrated the will to deploy forces beyond its borders calls for a military command structure and the forces capable of meeting the crisis response expectations of member countries. That means revamping the entire military apparatus from a static defense oriented posture and ethos to one poised to project power on relatively short time lines. The challenge of such an undertaking is easy to under estimate. A mature power projection capability will take many years of training, education and investment to achieve.

While Bosnia is unquestionably the immediate measure of both the size and distance for NATO power projection, future operations will be deployed wherever the political will of NATO members deems appropriate to protect their collective interests. Military planners should expect Bosnia to be representative of crisis response requirements for the near to midterm, although long-term requirements might evolve to more distant deployments.

The decision to enlarge NATO membership by several states is a parallel factor in assessing future command and force structure requirements. The additional territory to be included in NATO’s collective defense plans will generate new requirements for contingency plans, exercises, and training. In addition, some investment in infrastructure will be necessary. As a minimum, there will need to be connective communications and information systems installed for effective command and control.

Infrastructure will also have to be created for the reception and follow-on tactical deployment of western-based power projection forces. Staffs will need to expand to accommodate participation of the new member's military, and liaisons will need to be established in their Ministries of Defense (MODs). In sum, the investment is likely to be modest, but still, in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

Still, the cost will be both reasonable and affordable, so long as it is shared by new members and all current members alike—and so long as diplomatic effort to assuage Russian reactions to enlargement are successful. Otherwise a new Cold War-like confrontation could ensue, one that will accelerate both the time table and the cost of defending new members. As regards to the military structure itself, NATO’s initial strategy of power projection for defense of new members has many parallels with the experience of IFOR/SFOR. Two obvious differences will be that projecting power on the territory of new members, should that be necessary, will be faster than the careful casualty-conscience and mine wary approach of IFOR, and better supported by the host nation. Otherwise, the type of flexible, agile command and force structure needed for rapid power projection should be well suited for the type of missions that NATO’s experience in Bosnia foreshadows.

Participation by Russia and other non-NATO countries

It would be easy to challenge the assertion here that NATO’s future structure should allow for participation by Russia at all levels—tactical, operational and strategic—in non-Article V operations. Some would argue that certainly Russia cannot be afforded authority over NATO members’ forces, nor should Russia be accorded the privileges of membership. The clear lessons of Bosnia and the enlargement initiative are that Russian agreement to participate in NATO contingency planning, exercises, and operations is a plus not a minus for European stability and NATO-Russia relations. Therefore it is likely that NATO’s new command structure design will accommodate permanent liaisons from Russia and other PFP partner countries at various levels of command.

The current debate over whether an American should continue to command Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) or whether a European should be given that command as a visible symbol of NATO commitment to the concept of an ESDI is symptomatic of the continuing U.S.-European struggle over ESDI. The AFSOUTH debate should (and most surely will) be decided in favor of the United States. The principal reason is that protecting the collective interests of all the Allies in the volatile southern region calls for the capability and experience that only the United States can bring to bear. However, Washington would be short-sighted to think the debate ends there.

The AFSOUTH issue is but the latest in a series of struggles between the United States and its European allies over ceding a portion of the U.S. dominance of NATO’s military structure in Europe to Europeans. France has been the perennial champion of ESDI, and the ally most chafed by U.S. hegemony over European security affairs. Often undetected in Washington is the fact that Paris enjoys at least enough tacit support for its positions on ESDI from other Europeans (including Britain) that Washington finds it difficult to isolate the French. Hence, NATO (and Washington) should anticipate future proposals to adjust the command structure, or at least to increase Europe’s influence over the guidance NATO provides to its military commanders. In the end, the balance between U.S. and European influence in European security affairs will have shifted toward Europe, as it should. All, however, seem to desire the United States to maintain clear, if more fettered, leadership in the area of European security, at least through the near to midterm.

NATO members have faced heightened concern from time-to-time throughout Alliance history over the issue of trans-Atlantic commitment and cohesion. Typically the issue has focused on the true depth of American commitment to Europe's security, the central but untested hypothesis written into Article V of the Washington Treaty. The end of the Cold War marked the latest round of concern, and the suspicion lingers among European that the United States may no longer see sufficient risks to its European interests to keep forces deployed there.

In June 1996, as NATO defense ministers met to make major decisions about the Alliance's new force structure, they stressed the need for ". . . continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure . . ." That is, in fact, the status quo, with the United States represented at every level in both the Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). A key issue in the on-going debate over American versus European command of AFSOUTH is that AFSOUTH is the only remaining U.S. command in Europe at the operational level of ACE. Trans-Atlanticism will continue to be the essence of NATO’s military structure.

Russia's influence on NATO is not only about adding selective connectivities for the eventuality of working together with Russian forces. Russia's permanence and greatness in Europe must be accounted for in all NATO decisions, including military force structure design. For example, in adjusting to the requirements of a larger Alliance, structures and even exercises on new territory will have to consider Russian sensitivities about NATO’s eastward expansion. Delicate diplomacy will have to be backed up by military dispositions and procedures aimed to avoid increased tensions, without creating the impression Russia can dictate NATO’s force posture.

However, a non-threatening posture is not enough. NATO will need to construct conduits for highly developed Russian liaison wherever opportunities for collaboration are indicated. An obvious area, already being exploited in support of operations in Bosnia, is General Shustov's liaison staff at SHAPE. Perhaps more important than the structures will be the uses for which they are employed. Opportunities exist for a whole new level of confidence building through the development of routine teamwork in an ever expanding array of military subjects. The investment in NATO-Russia relations will likely be manifest in structural ways still incubating, and that requires force and command structure planners to keep watchful and open minds.

NATO’s venture into new command and control and force employment concepts coincides with the much-heralded revolution in military affairs (RMA), a forward-looking phenomenon rooted in the impact of information technologies on warfare. Whether NATO’s command structure concept for the future can harness the fruits of that revolution will be a huge factor in its operational success. Yet, if NATO’s military structure is to remain relevant it has no choice but to invest in modernization much more so than at current levels.

However, simply buying modern and more capable equipment is not revolutionary. The Alliance must invest in technologies and concepts that render superior battlefield situation awareness, the capacity to rapidly convert information into superior knowledge and faster decisionmaking, and that place itself at the leading edge of RMA concepts. NATO military staffs are beginning to see the importance of these issues, and have begun to address them. Yet, there appears to be little effort thus far toward convincing NATO legislatures of the critical need to fund investments in new technologies.

The continued decline in military spending dictates how large a force NATO will have, although not what capabilities the force needs to include. Reduced budgets mean smaller forces and reduced capabilities due to more modest acquisitions of modern equipment. While Bosnia will go a long way toward defining what kind of force capability NATO needs in the future, the pressure of constrained resources will determine the quality and quantity of that force in terms of size, modernization and readiness. Invariably, commanders are biased toward maintaining "tooth" combat power rather than "tail" support capability. However, for a new force dependent on deployability and sustainment at distant bare bases, the pitfalls are readily apparent. Fortunately, military leaders have a growing appreciation of the linchpin of logistics. They know that the mix of militarily relevant factors is not a precise science, but calls for informed judgement and tough decisions.

Of course, military budgets only dwindle as nations make informed decisions about what is important. Indeed, there is no shortage of capital and the GDP's of NATO members continue to grow, albeit more slowly than in the 1980s. It is the percent of GDP that members are willing to devote to defense spending that is in decline, and that is a function of political priorities.

Many factors in addition to NATO’s experience in Bosnia will continue to influence the design of NATO’s future military command and force structure. All those factors will come together repeatedly, in the deliberations of the various staffs and decisionmaking bodies of both NATO and member's capitals. None will be able to dominate the outcome for long before other factors must be given due consideration. The result is likely to be a military that addresses all these factors in a balanced way, neither ignoring nor fully satisfying any of them. Over time, the lessons of Bosnia will be examined and incorporated in the design of structures as well as contingency plans for future crisis response operations. As NATO’s first and only operational military experience, Bosnia can be expected to be the yardstick by which what works and what doesn't is measured for some time to come. Thus far, NATO’s military has adapted admirably and measured up in Bosnia in a most commendable way.