NATO1997     Year of Change

Larry K. Wentz

Bosnia is, in many regards, a living prototype of a post-Cold War operation. It is the kind of operation we can expect to see more of in the future and therefore, if we learn the correct lessons from the operation and act upon them, the payoff will be considerable.

Bosnia is, of course, an operation other than war with all of the ambiguities, complexities and challenges associated with these types of operation. These sorts of operations have proven to be frustrating to many because some of the things militaries take for granted, such as unified chain of command and clear, simple rules of engagement, are lacking.

The reality of the operation in Bosnia differs considerably from what the U.S. and other militaries have organized, equipped and trained for during the Cold War. There is a tendency on the part of some to argue that we should not do these sorts of operations unless they conform more closely with what we are most familiar with and understand best. For many reasons, these sorts of operations will always be messy. Furthermore, given that the operations will no doubt also involve ad hoc coalitions of the willing, command arrangements will be politically driven and more often than not will involve, at least in practice, a consultative environment in which key parties will need to develop and maintain a common understanding. Planning a deployment and ongoing operations will be complicated by factors such as short time lines, highly dynamic environments, uneven abilities and experience among coalition members and other key organizations and entities.

In almost all instances, one will not be able to rely on existing infrastructure to support the C2 operations and will need to significantly augment existing capabilities. Given the number of players involved and their need to use systems that they are comfortable with, operations will always begin with a "Kluge of Systems" with the inevitable interoperability challenges and security disconnects. This is the reality.

For the Bosnia operation, the following factors influenced NATO and the coalition members preparation for and execution of the Operation Joint Endeavor mission:

• First NATO out-of-area and coalition operation with non-NATO nations

• Limited NATO capability to deploy out of area (NATO Communi-cations and Information Systems Contingency Assets Pool and CJTF concepts immature, lacked SOPs for peace enforcement operations, an agreed concept of operations, doctrine, etc.)

• The Dayton Accord did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political and humanitarian aspects of the mission which handicapped coordination

• An uncertain planning environment (mission changed from withdrawal of UNPROFOR to peace enforcement at the last minute, national plans on close hold, former warring factions reaction to IFOR deployment unknown, torturous and mountainous terrain, land mines, snipers, potential for civil disorder, inadequate site survey’s of facilities to be occupied by headquarters and communications and information system support activities. . . .)

• Limited theater infrastructure (telecommunications, power, material, facilities. . . destroyed by the former warring factions (FWF) activities)

• Peace enforcement and civil-military operations new for NATO, including working with the Non-Governmental and Private Volunteer Organizations

• Doctrine, culture and language differences of the some 30 participating nations

• "CNN effect" and information operations impact on military operations

• Parallel National C2 structures and systems

NATOs ability to influence events during the early preparation for IFOR helped to avoid problems UNPROFOR encountered and ensure a clear definition of military tasks under a unified chain of command. This is largely attributable to the close involvement of NATO military planners with Contact Group negotiators prior to and during Dayton to ensure that security tasks that could be accomplished realistically were incorporated. Consequently, there is clear language hammered into the General Framework Agreement that IFOR "will operate under the authority of and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command." UNSC Resolution 1031 provides NATO with the mandate and the necessary political authority to direct NATO and non-NATO forces under IFOR. However, NATO's robust terms of reference highlights the paucity of authority for the High Representative. In any future operation that depends on the success of both military and civil tasks, NATO will want to ensure that it’s civil counterpart will also enjoy a commensurate amount of authority to fulfill it’s responsibilities.

The lack of unified political direction of the overall peace implementation process was a risk to the success of IFOR. The General Framework Agreement established three structures for implementation—an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High Representative to coordinate civil tasks and Donors Conferences to stimulate reconstruction. The High Representative was not a UN Special Representative with UN authority. His political guidance came from a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which was not a standing internationally recognized political organization. Given the UN’s reluctance to play a lead role, there was no internationally recognized political organization providing overall political direction. Consequently, the three structures remained virtually autonomous, operating within a loose framework of cooperation, without a formal structure for developing unified policy. The absence of a standing political organization with which the NAC could coordinate policy exacerbated the synchronization of civil-military implementation at the strategic level and NATO’s role in implementing the Peace Agreement.

Before the IFOR deployment, there was no common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, roles and mission of CIMIC units and personnel. As a "new" type of operation, IFOR commanders and staff had to incorporate civil-military tasks into their overall operations based upon the varying perspectives of their personal knowledge and experience. This varying degree of experience can be observed in the IFOR deployment not only by individual commanders, but more importantly, through the various national approaches. For example, the Russian approach tends to be more peace enforcement or counterinsurgency oriented. France and the United Kingdom were much more active in assisting civil organizations with direct support to local "hearts and minds" projects. Nato draft doctrine takes a very broad view and is based on the principles of traditional peacekeeping, with missions of observation, interposition forces and transition assistance. The U.S. perspective is more "high intensity" and stresses the need to achieve decisive "victory" and quick resolution of conflicts through the securing of popular support.

The IFOR deployment illuminated the fact that many traditional ground combat commanders had little knowledge of civilian affairs or understanding of CIMIC activities. This lack of knowledge was demonstrated in many areas, but none more so than in the campaign planning stage. During the development of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) there was only one Civil Affairs officer assigned to assist AFSOUTH in the planning for the IFOR deployment. The campaign plan not only inadequately identified military tasks for CIMIC, but also negatively impacted CIMIC deployment, manning and logistics support requirements.

The civil cooperation situation in Bosnia was unique in that members of the non-governmental and supra-governmental relief and development organizations were already actively engaged when the IFOR deployment commenced. In fact, there were an estimated 530 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in theater at D+1. This situation created it’s own set of problems. First, the CIMIC assets were delayed in their deployment. As UNPROFOR forces withdrew or transferred to IFOR, valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities were lost. Lacking any advanced information, the NGOs assumed that IFOR would continue, if not increase, the same type of support that UNPROFOR provided to them. The philosophy advanced by IFOR, however, was quite different from UNPROFORs. IFOR refused to provide what it thought the NGO community could provide for themselves for fear of creating a dependency on IFOR for essential aspects of support. Paramount in this philosophy was the promotion of self-sustaining activities in preparation for IFOR’s eventual withdraw.

However, CIMIC personnel were able to effectively coordinate with the NGOs. Across the theater, CIMIC officers had high praise for the efforts and working relationships with the NGOs at the tactical level. Successful coordination at the theater level, however, was less forthcoming. The lesson to be learned is that in operations in which the civil implementation of the overall objectives plays a key role, civil affairs assets have an important, timely role to play.

Public information is critical to mission accomplishment. First, a successful public information campaign contributes to building and preserving public support for the operation. Second, public information can help the commander achieve operational goals by influencing parties, resolving crisis, defusing misunderstandings and correcting misperceptions. The use of public information is more critical in peace operations where traditional military tools (weapons) have a less central role in military activities. For Operation Joint Endeavor, public information was a powerful tool in shaping the operational environment.

Upon arriving in theater, IFOR troops faced some serious challenges in terms of public information. IFOR succeeded a discredited UN mission and needed to distance itself from the disastrous image the UN gained during the four years of UNPROFOR. A large number of media were already operating throughout the area of operation independently of the military and were able to report instantaneously any incident, even before IFOR was aware. And finally, in addition to IFOR, there were seven other main organizations tasked with implementing the Dayton agreement. Hence, cooperation was essential to enhance the credibility of IFOR and the international community among the international and local press.

From the outset of the operation, IFORs public information activities achieved a generally high standard. International and national media coverage were generally positive or neutral. Reporters in theater expressed satisfaction with IFORs policies and procedures and the military spokesmen achieved a high standard of credibility. IFOR effectively used public information to communicate to the parties their intentions and might. It was used by the commanders to get the local population to act friendly and to convince them that a brighter future awaits them if the Dayton agreement is fully complied with. Finally, IFOR abundantly used public information to deter the former warring factions from violating the military annex to the Dayton agreement and attacking NATO troops.

In spite of formidable obstacles and a somewhat chaotic beginning, NATO and it’s member nations installed the largest military-civil Communications and Information System (CIS) ever built to support a major peace operation and it worked.

Peace enforcement had never been attempted by NATO so there were no text books or accepted practices to guide the CIS planning and implementation—the NATO CJTF was just a concept and not doctrine. Furthermore, there were multiple NATO and national CIS organizations involved in the planning and implementation activities. AFSOUTH and SACEUR OPLANs reflected differing perspectives with respect to CIS management and the Dayton Agreement assigned frequency management responsibilities to IFOR which had no such established capability. This caused CIS organizational problems at the outset for IFOR CJ-6 and resulted in the ad hoc creation of a Theater Frequency Management capability to address the Dayton Agreement tasking and a Combined Joint Communications Control Center (CJCCC) to facilitate coordination and focus the planning and management of the CIS aspects of the IFOR operation.

The operational scenario for Joint Endeavor was unclear and national planning was being kept close hold. Hence, who was going where, with what equipment and when was unclear to the NATO planners. The in-country infrastructure such as power and telecommunications had been destroyed and there were mines, booby traps and snipers to be dealt with. Hotels, restaurants and stores had been destroyed so caring for, feeding and billeting of the CIS support forces needed special consideration. Incomplete site survey’s had been done on headquarters and communications facilities to be occupied. NATO had never worked operationally with the non-NATO nations scheduled to participate and there were no agreed concepts as to how their needs and CIS capabilities would be accommodated and integrated into the IFOR operational network. There was no indication of how the "former warring factions" would react to the IFOR deployment. Finally, there was a lack of timely political guidance for planning which caused last minute changes to bring the CIS plan in line with decisions as they occurred.

In preparation for the execution of OPLAN 40104, the extraction of UN forces, a leased European digital (E1) network was extended into Croatia and Hungary and by the end of May 95, an integrated digital network exchange (IDNX) based strategic backbone network was fully operational. The NATO transportable satellite ground terminal (TSGT) was deployed to Camp Pleso (Zagreb) and used to extend SHAPE headquarters voice, message and data services to the Zagreb area. With the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14 December 95, the mission changed and Croatia and Hungary became the embarkation points for NATO troops deploying into the region and OPLANs 40105 and 10405 provided the guidance for the deployment of these forces and the supporting CIS infrastructure.

NATO’s existing CIS infrastructure was not able to satisfy the requirements for this first out-of-area operation. Significant enhancements were needed to extend NATO systems to the deployed forces and to improve in-area CIS capabilities. Pragmatic and unconventional steps were taken to procure what was necessary and to constantly improve the quality of CIS support. The retention of key UN communications systems such as the UN very small aperture terminal (VSAT) was invaluable. An extensive military satellite communications network was deployed, using U.S. and UK national terminals. As the operation evolved, commercial VSAT services were extended into the area of operation as well. Other systems were procured through "emergency" Capability Package procedures and leasing. The so-called NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool Concept, which envisages a core of deployable and earmarked national equipment, preauthorized funding for contingency purchases and use of national assets, was not sufficiently mature to support this operation.

IFOR CIS services were provided by a complex mixture of NATO, national, UN and civilian or commercial networks and components. The NATO Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems (CRONOS) Wide Area Network was a valuable crisis response and Command and Control capability. However, it lacked common Standard Operating Procedures and needed more efficient network management. Video teleconferencing (VTC) was used extensively by IFOR and the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as time went on, the VTC usage increased and it quickly became a key element in conducting business. The voice network was an ad hoc integration of NATO and national strategic networks, national tactical systems, the UN VSAT network and access to Croatian and Bosnia in Herzegovina (BiH) postal, telephone and telegraph (PTT) networks where available. Unclassified Internet was also used frequently and demand for service increased throughout the operation. Use of the Internet was not planned as part of the operation, it simply grew with user demand.

The U.S. Limited Operational Capability Europe (LOCE) system was extended to the theater to support IFOR intelligence needs. Access was provided at division headquarters level and above. Nations also provided national intelligence support and services to IFOR through the use of liaisons and National Intelligence Cells (NICs). A mixture of prototype and operational systems were used in an attempt to fuse various land, sea and air pictures into a tactical picture of the situation in order to give the commanders time to act as efficiently as the situation demanded. The maritime and land pictures provided at various levels seemed to have a good standard. The picture in NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center, made up from a variety of sources, was of particularly high quality. However, there was no overall, integrated maritime/ air/land picture.

The pervasive use of commercial off-the-shelf products and services propelled NATO and IFOR into the "information age" and a new way of doing business. Some examples include the following:

• Extensive use of electronic mail and less reliance on formal military message traffic

• Daily use of VTC by IFOR and the ARRC command elements

• Powerpoint briefings became the norm for informing

• Collaborative planning using the data networks

• Wideband information distribution such as images for Intelligence

• Information sharing and collaboration in a coalition environment, including non-NATO partners

Although extensive use was made of the VTC and data network services, voice communications still played a major role in conducting the IFOR operation. Furthermore, the information revolution largely stopped at the division level. The CIS support to the warfighter, who was actually executing the peacekeeping mission, did not change much and they continued to operate much as they had in the past—Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 5040 was still the norm for interfacing strategic, theater and tactical voice systems. The Interim Digital Interface Program, designed by the UK, was used to provide a digital interface between the UK Ptarmigan and the U.S. Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Joint Service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) tactical communications systems (TRI-TAC).

Historically, interoperability has been one of the most difficult areas to deal with and this operation has had it’s problems in this regard. However, exercises such as Interop 95 served to help work out many of the integration and interoperability issues in advance of the deployment and also provided excellent training for the organizations that deployed in support of the operation. Progress is being made but there is still a long way to go to achieve seamless integration of CIS systems and services.

For operations such as this one, "learning on the job" is expected but the urban environment in which they deployed and the extensive use of commercial products and services created a higher demand than anticipated. The CIS staff had to be prepared to operate in both a fixed and tactical environment, they were required to operate across multiple discipline areas, and the use of commercial technologies, such as, VSATs, IDNXs, VTCs, routers, digital switches and other data network products and services added demands to their training needs. In fact, a special training program was established at the NATO Latina training facility for the IDNXs. Dealing with contractor’s and the Croatian and BiH PTTs also provided new challenges.

Since the beginning of IFOR, and certainly during the early phases, CIS was in a permanent state of flux. The sheer task of establishing a clear idea of the CIS architecture for analysis was a major challenge. CIS personnel at all levels improved the CIS infrastructure with remarkable enthusiasm and initiative, and the system realized was much to their credit. Pragmatic and unconventional steps were taken to procure what was necessary and to constantly improve the quality of CIS support. The establishment of CRONOS was probably the most prominent example. For future similar operations, however, NATO should find a more structured and efficient way of providing a capable CIS satisfying the overall military-civil requirements.

U.S. commanders, in particular, reported that deployment to Bosnia was accompanied by a virtual "flood" of technologies. These new technologies were generally inserted incompletely and imperfectly.

Many of the new systems and technologies were deployed without doctrinal support or concepts of operations. As a consequence, they could not be fully employed. Moreover, because they had not been through full and systematic development and testing, trained military operators were not available. Both initial operations and maintenance capabilities had to be provided by contractors or research personnel. Even so, these new technologies reportedly made excessive demands on operator personnel who had to find the time to train on them, learn proper maintenance and develop concepts of operation. In many cases, this meant that new systems were under utilized because their full functionality was not understood.

Hence, deployment of advanced technologies are of military value only to the extent that they are accompanied by coherent doctrine, organizations, equipment, people and the ability to effectively integrate them into the operational environment.

With the transfer of authority from AFSOUTH/IFOR to LANDCENT/IFOR on 7 November 1996 and from the ARRC to Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) on 20 November 1996, a large personnel change occurred along with changes in the CIS infrastructure. LANDCENT had been planning for the transition for several months with "right seat" handover training being initiated in late September 1996 to prepare the staff for the transition. In spite of all attempt to get up on the learning curve, LANDCENT still experienced many of the CIS implementation and procurement challenges of IFOR’s initial deployment.

In addition to the withdraw of the framework nation CIS systems, the transfer of authority to LANDCENT also required some reconfiguration and redeployment of other CIS infrastructure some of which was for AFSOUTH’s use. Therefore, CIS equipment essential to the headquarters of the LANDCENT component commander had to be replaced and NATO headquarters staff needed convincing arguments why equipment already procured for IFOR could not be used to meet LANDCENT requirements.

This raised the significant and on-going challenge of equipment accountability. Despite the questions of eligibility, NATO common funding of CIS infrastructure was agreed and procurement initiated. For the strategic and theater CIS connectivity, a rationalization and re-balancing of the networks was necessary to reflect the move of the operational center to Sarajevo and the greatly reduced role of AFSOUTH.

IFOR’s plan for the commercialization of its communications network was aimed at reducing the costs to NATO, allowing for the timely withdraw of tactical systems and reducing the dependence of IFOR on the UN VSAT network. The evolution of the IFOR Private (Peace) Network (IPN) was slower than IFOR would have liked. The main issues were the slow growth of the BiH PTT infrastructure and the continued unwillingness of the FWF PTTs to provide cross-inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) connectivity.

The CIS challenge for the future will be to shift major in-theater communications links from the tactical military systems to civilian leased bearers and establish a viable integrated digital services network based on commercial products and services—the objective of the IPN. The ability to achieve such a capability depends on the speed with which reconstruction of the internal national telecommunications infrastructure can take place, the political will of the Croatian and BiH PTTs and national leadership to make it happen and the organizations funding reconstruction to set the pace.

Knowledge gained in Bosnia can be applied to similar future NATO operations and especially to the realization of Nato CJTF and NCCAP concepts. The following comments are some of the initial findings from the ongoing National Defense University study (tasked by ASD(C3I)) of Bosnia command arrangements and supporting C3I:

• In future operations that depend on the success of both civil and military tasks, NATO will want to ensure that it’s civil counterparts will also receive the authority necessary to fulfill their responsibilities.

• Operations in which the civil implementation of the overall objectives plays a key role, civil affairs assets have an important, timely role to play.

• Public information is a critical element of mission accomplishment for peace operations and was an effective force multiplier for the IFOR operation.

• The current technology insertion process is incomplete and imperfect and requires a more coherent and disciplined process to ensure that military value is achieved with the introduction of advanced technology in an operational environment.

• In spite of obstacles, NATO successfully implemented an ad hoc military-civil C3I network that worked.

• The "information age" has arrived for NATO but largely stops at the Division level. The "Information Revolution" needs to be extended to lower levels of the command structure in order to more effectively support the troops on the ground who are actually executing the mission.

• Complex command arrangements and "Kluge of Systems" for the C3I laydowns are a reality for these types of operations and need to be factored into the planning, implementation and operation of similar future operations.

• Limited theater infrastructure is likely to be the case for future operations and needs to be included in the planning process.

• NATO needs an ability to more effectively deploy forward communications and information systems in support of peace operations. The realization of the NCCAP and CJTF concepts is a way to achieve this capability.

• Integrate "what you get not necessarily what you need" is a way of life for such operations and needs to be factored into the planning for and training of those who will participate in similar future operations.

• A dynamic planning environment is a reality for such operations and needs to be made a part of the training for future operations.

• Interoperability continues to be a challenge. Even though progress is being made, there is still a long way to go to achieve seamless operations for the communications and information systems. Innovative exercises and adherence to standardization are means to the end.

• Security disconnects and releasibility issues exist as a result of the ad hoc integration of disparate systems and more extensive sharing of information and collaboration becomes the norm for doing business as was the case for this operation. These are important considerations that need to be addressed as NATO moves into the "information age."

• Nato peacetime procurement process is too complex and slow to meet the demands of peace enforcement operations. Consideration needs to be given to appropriate modifications that will accommodate the requirements of the operational commander and at the same time satisfy the required procurement oversight needs as well.

• Increased reliance on commercial products and services is a reality and needs to be more effectively incorporated into the CIS architectures, planning, procurement, contracting and training for peace operations.

• Dust contamination of hardware, commercial power failures, and software viruses caused problems for IFOR operations and need to be factored into the planning for future operations. While most of the viruses have been relatively benign, their ubiquitous presence underscores the vulnerability of the information systems to systematic hostile attack. NATO needs to carefully examine the Defensive Information Warfare needs of future information systems to be deployed in support of peace operations and incorporate the necessary defensive capabilities to reduce their vulnerabilities to potential hostile actions.

• Exercises and training are important. The nature of the deployment required personnel to be more flexible and multi-disciplinary. Use of advanced technology and commercial products and services required more extensive "on-the-job" training and the need to set up a special school at Nato Latina training facility to provide the requisite skills for this operation.

• Exercises such as Interop 95 demonstrated the value of setting up the expected configurations in advance of deployment and sorting out the integration and interoperability problems. The exercises also served to train and do some team building for those personnel who would deploy.

• NATO needs a proper organization for planning, implementing and managing the communications and information networks supporting out of area peace operations. Realization of the CJTF concept and accommodation of appropriate aspects of the IFOR CJCCC concept employed to support Operation Joint Endeavor are steps towards Nato ability to more effectively respond and manage it’s deployed CIS resources for future operations.

Agility and accommodation are truly the keys to success in these types of operation. It is noted with considerable satisfaction that Operation Joint Endeavor has been successful in no small measure because of the ingenuity and dedication of the men and women who were there and those who supported them. This is not to say there have not been problems. There have been, but many of these have been fixed or ameliorated.

For future operations to have the greatest chance of success, NATO and its coalition partners must learn to avoid problems that can be avoided and to better accommodate those that cannot be avoided.