European Security and Defense Identity:  An American Perspective

Stanley R. Sloan

From time to time, I find it helpful to return to the roots of an issue. In this case, I thought it might be entertaining to ask why the word "identity" has emerged as the key word in the description of what we used to call "European defense cooperation." Going back to basics, I consulted my Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, and my Roget’s Thesaurus. From these and other sources, it became clear that "identity" is much more prominently associated with psychology than it is with political science.

Nevertheless, two definitions of "identity" appear particularly relevant to the case of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The first is that "identity" means the "essence" or "character" of something. The second is that "identity" suggests a sense of "sameness," or something shared in common; for example, an "identity of views," so often proclaimed in diplomatic parlance. My next thought, was that this thing called ESDI may not have an identity crisis, but perhaps could be diagnosed as experiencing a multiple personality disorder.

With regard to its essence or character, ESDI seems currently to have a split personality. It now plays a critical role in the trans-Atlantic security system, particularly following the June 1996 ministerial meeting in Berlin. At the same time, it is seen as an important part of the process of European unification, as agreed in the Treaty of Maastricht.

The link between these two roles has not been clearly established. In particular, European Union (EU) members have not yet been able to agree on how the Western European Union (WEU), where ESDI currently resides, should relate to the broader process of European unification.

The reality, as we all know, is that ESDI is a goal, not an accomplished fact. The concept has deep roots in the desire of many European nations to play a meaningful and distinctive role in security and defense.

In earlier discussions about ESDI, the United States looked suspiciously at the identity goal because it appeared to be headed toward something that was given its special character by the way it distinguished its participants from the United States, rather than by the way it linked them to the United States.

As far back as the early 1980s, when European Community members were beginning to develop some concerted positions, for example concerning Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issues, senior American diplomats cautioned that "European security cooperation is fine just as long as they don’t go over into a corner and gang up on us."

These concerns were prominent in the early 1990s, when the Bush administration raised the alarm about an ESDI that would be built outside, instead of within, the trans-Atlantic alliance.

This "yes, but" policy still influences U.S. approaches to ESDI. The United States does not want the political dynamics or operational practices of an ESDI to create splits in the trans-Atlantic alliance.

This concern is shared by most Europeans as well. But there is less agreement concerning how to give the process real content without creating conflicts with U.S. views.

The good news is that the NATO reform process (or "adaptation," as NATO officials prefer to call it) is generating a splendid compromise. The compromise, reached in principle in Berlin, does not remove all sources of potential trans-Atlantic friction; it certainly does not resolve intra-European issues concerning, for example, the relationship between the WEU and the European Union. It does, however, establish a structure and a process for the ESDI-NATO interaction that promotes greater transparency, provides for effective consultations, creates a framework for improved burdensharing, and will require more thorough responsibility sharing.

The structure is complex and multifaceted, but, boiled down to its essentials, it includes two critical innovations. The first key innovation, agreed to in principle at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, is the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

According to the original concept, as developed by American planners, including notably the late Nelson Drew, CJTF commands could be used by NATO to plan and construct appropriate force packages, or "lego-legions," of allied and non-allied forces to deal with non-Article 5 military contingencies. This reform responded directly to the interpretation of NATO’s mission found in the New Strategic Concept.

The New Strategic Concept proclaimed that "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature . . . . [and that] [a]rrangements exist within the Alliance for Consultations among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, Coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks."

But CJTF was hijacked by ESDI. At and after the Brussels Summit, U.S. and European officials, and therefore U.S. and European news stories, focused almost exclusively on how CJTF could be used by the Europeans acting without the United States. They did not make it clear that CJTF’s first rationale, and most likely utility, would be to facilitate trans-Atlantic operational responses to the emerging challenges addressed by the new strategic concept.

The strong focus on CJTF as a way for the European allies to take more responsibility in the Alliance led to a misunderstanding, particularly in Paris, but also in the U. S. Congress, concerning U.S. intentions toward the future of the Alliance. Some French observers thought the Brussels outcome meant that the United States was signaling a pullback from its leading role in the Euro-Atlantic security system. Some in Congress cheered the same interpretation.

This interpretation led some in Paris to believe that a far-reaching "Europeanization" of the alliance was underway. It led some in Washington to believe that security tasks could in the future be divided between Europe and the United States, rather than shared.

Now, the Alliance is in the midst of its second CJTF operation— Stabilization Force (SFOR) following the Implementation Force (IFOR). Both IFOR and SFOR are first class CJTF operations, even though we have not been able to call them that.

In both cases, the United States and the European allies have used the Alliance to share burdens and responsibilities. We have not yet seen a CJTF configured according to the ESDI enthusiasm in Brussels. But the first opportunity for a European-led CJTF may not be far away.

The second fundamental change in the NATO structure, agreed to just hours before ministers convened in Berlin, was the decision to allow the Deputy SACEUR to wear a second hat as the senior WEU commander. This Deputy SACEUR reform was intended to ensure that the ESDI was constructed within, not outside, the structure of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

In order to ensure such a construction, while giving the reform real content, the Alliance had to change. Some important people in Washington had to be convinced that this change was necessary, and that it could work.

It is clear that some such change was necessary in order to create political space within which the ESDI could develop. The Deputy SACEUR will henceforth continue to wear his NATO hat routinely and his WEU command hat when necessary, while his national hat remains hung on the door for future reference. This, by the way, is far more fundamental and important to the future of ESDI than the question of who has command of AFSOUTH.

Whether or not this reformed arrangement will work is another question. When the Deputy SACEUR dual-hatting arrangement was first suggested in the summer of 1995, I thought it would work if the member states wanted it to work. That still is my judgment.

It certainly appears that Europe will have its chance to give ESDI some real operational content when the SFOR mandate runs out. Senator Carl Levin, one of the more thoughtful defense intellectuals in Congress, has said that ESDI is ". . . made for a follow-on force to SFOR." Surely, many other key members of Congress will agree with Senator Levin. Secretary of Defense Cohen apparently agrees with Senator Levin.

The issue here is two-fold. First, there is the burdensharing aspect that concerns Senator Levin and other members of the U.S. Congress. The burdensharing problem could be handled without using the ESDI/CJTF approach. SFOR/2 could simply be designed as a NATO force without U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia. During 1996, this model was discussed as a follow on to IFOR and was called IFOR-minus (meaning "minus" the United States on the ground). This would diminish the cost and prominence of the U.S. role there, and ease burdensharing concerns in the United States.

But this approach would not serve the goal of strengthening the ESDI. For the European role in the alliance to receive a real boost in SFOR/2, the CJTF and Deputy SACEUR reforms would have to be brought fully into play. In this scenario, SFOR/2 would become a WEU operation, led by the Deputy SACEUR wearing his WEU hat, supported by SACEUR with whatever from NATO’s integrated command structure is required to make the operation a success.

Granted, the French and British governments still say "We went into IFOR/SFOR together and we will go out together." But nobody believes Bosnia will be able to walk the walk toward peace and democracy unassisted by mid-1998.

The opportunity therefore presents itself for the European members of NATO to demonstrate that there is some character to their security and defense identity, and some unity in their approach. The only question now is whether they will seize this opportunity, and take responsibility for SFOR/2.

Looking beyond Bosnia, there is another important and controversial issue that will have to be addressed as ESDI develops: the nuclear aspect of a European security and defense identity. The issue has recently been put on the table by the French government.

Now, if we were going to be suspicious, we would say that this is just another French plot to undermine the Alliance. However, I would like to give President Chirac the benefit of the doubt, and assume that France wants to work constructively toward a happy marriage between the trans-Atlantic and European aspects of defense. It is apparent that no ESDI would be complete without taking into account questions of nuclear deterrence. It is equally apparent that no French return to military cooperation in NATO would be complete without including some new modus vivendi in nuclear weapons consultations.

It seems that when President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl met in Nuremberg on December 9, 1996, they had some very interesting discussions about ESDI. The leaders apparently agreed to give a "new impetus" to their security and defense cooperation "in both a European and Atlantic perspective." They reportedly agreed that France and Germany "are ready to open a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in the framework of European defense policy."

The question of a concerted European nuclear deterrent is, of course, an old one. Whenever it comes to the fore, the first issue raised is how a concerted European nuclear role can be developed without undermining the U.S. nuclear guarantee. This remains a critical question.

The day when there will be a concerted European deterrent may be years, even decades away. But, in the meanwhile, the main question is how any discussions of nuclear issues at the European level would be coordinated with trans-Atlantic consultations in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Because President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl agreed that the entirety of the ESDI must be compatible with the trans-Atlantic as well as the European aspects of the Alliance, it presumably means that some arrangement linking the WEU/ESDI and NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group would have to be created.

It is clear that France would like to be able to demonstrate in any arrangement that its nuclear weapons and strategy make a positive contribution to European security. However, any attempt to innovate in this very sensitive area of policy, will be controversial. Any approach that creates structural or political divisions among NATO allies would be counterproductive.

In particular, I doubt that we want to give the impression that nuclear deterrence is being organized on either side of a trans-Atlantic dividing line after working so hard to avoid such a distinction throughout the Cold War.

Where will all this lead? There still are those on both sides of the Atlantic who argue that if enlargement does not ruin the alliance, then France and the ESDI will. Of course, in France, the Socialist opposition argues that NATO or "Nato-izatiore" will be the ruin of France!

I tend to be more optimistic, for both France and the Alliance. The United States, France, and the other allies have a common interest in maintaining a relatively stable international system. They have a common interest in doing so while effectively sharing both burdens and responsibilities.

No one country, not even the United States, and certainly not France, can ensure its security acting alone. The goal of establishing an ESDI as part of the process of European unification is a legitimate political aspiration. But, as was acknowledged in Berlin, the aspiration will be self-defeating if Europe’s identity is defined against, rather than in alliance with, Europe’s trans-Atlantic partners.

From this perspective, a "yes, but" approach, with a growing emphasis on the "yes" for greater European responsibility, will most likely be the touchstone of future U.S. policy toward ESDI.