James Steinberg

It’s a particularly good time to address how the United States is approaching the future of NATO, not only because of the quite extraordinary series of events that are coming up over the next several months but also because of where we are in the overall adaptation of Europe in the period since the end of the Cold War.

Depending on the dates used, the Cold War ended five to eight years ago, yet people continue talking about the post-Cold War era. It says something about where the Alliance is in its thinking if people can only define an era by saying what it is after. That’s largely due to the fact that for some time now we’ve recognized that the political, economic, and security environment in Europe has changed. But the institutions and the relationships have not fully kept pace with these dramatic changes, and so the Alliance has been in an era of transition—this period of post-Cold War but pre-what? What’s remarkable about this period is that we are beginning to answer that question of "pre-what?" as we move toward what we all believe and hope will be an era of European integration and cooperation. The decisions that will be made in Madrid, and in some of the associated developments in the coming months, really will begin to give us a clearer idea of just what that era and what that political and security environment is going to be like.

What’s particularly important is that the Alliance is moving beyond simply responding to events, many of which were unanticipated, and we are beginning to make the decisions that are actually going to shape our environment, to take more responsibility for creating the conditions that will ensure stability and prosperity in Europe. There are many difficult issues that need to be debated, and there are many serious problems facing the Alliance in Europe, whether it’s in Bosnia or even in the turmoil in Albania. Many of the great challenges of the past have been overcome, but there are still many serious problems to be addressed if we are to ensure that democracy stays rooted, that economic prosperity extends to those parts of Europe which did not enjoy the kind of prosperity that the West had for 40 years, and also that stability and tolerance—so lacking in the former Yugoslavia—comes more deeply and to more parts of Europe.

How we are approaching this remarkable series of events, beginning with the Helsinki summit, the United States/EU summit, the North-Atlantic Council meeting, the G7/G8 meeting in Denver, and finally the Madrid summit, is important. It is a time for healthy public debate concerning NATO’s future as well as the role of the United States in Europe’s future.

This process of adapting NATO to changing times is not a recent idea. The evolution of NATO in particular has been a very steady, gradual, and deliberate one beginning as early as 1990.

• The London Declaration

• The decision by NATO to move away from defining itself in terms of an adversary and toward a promoter of stability

• The decisions to restructure military forces and radically alter our strategy to deal with threats

• The new security strategic concept adopted at Rome, which began the very fruitful period of evolution in NATO’s thinking, not only about its roles and missions but about how it organizes its forces

• The decision to reach out to the East with the creation of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council

• And the further engagement of NATO with its former adversaries.

Yet, even with all those changes, NATO remains the cornerstone of the trans-Atlantic relationship. From its beginning, NATO was more than just a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It helped end age-old rivalries and integrate western Europe; it provided the security underpinnings for democratic recovery after World War II and for the prosperity that followed; and, of course, it was the instrument for U.S. engagement in Europe. Those general principles remain the cornerstone of our approach as we enter this new era.

This current period of construction really dates back to the NATO summit in January 1994, which set out an ambitious program with four basic elements:

• The adaptation of NATO’s internal structures

• The attempt to give a stronger and more coherent European identity to NATO

• An attempt to reach out to the East, to our former adversaries, not only in central and eastern Europe but to Russia as well through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program

• The decision to move forward on enlargement.

Since January 1994, the Alliance has moved on each of these fronts. In Berlin in 1996 NATO completed developing the concept of combined joint task forces giving the Alliance new flexibility to deal with new missions. It took major steps forward toward the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. And, in December 1996, in Brussels, the foreign ministers made the decision to meet in Madrid this July to begin the process of inviting new members to join NATO.

So 1997 will, in fact, be a watershed year with four key elements coming together. Though not all of them will be completed in 1997, this will be the year in which we will see progress on all fronts.

First, the Alliance will continue the work of its internal adaptation, both in terms of developing new missions and in terms of developing the ESDI. Second, NATO will make critical decisions on inviting several new members to join NATO. Third, NATO will define more concretely its relationship to the other countries in Europe—those who are not invited to join—both countries that continue to aspire to membership; but also with countries that, at least for now, seek to remain outside of NATO yet want to have a close relationship with NATO. And, NATO will address the importance of building a relationship with Russia.

It is important to remember that this process of constructing an era of European integration and cooperation involves more than NATO. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) plays a very important role, not only in terms of providing a forum where all members of the European community can come together, but also by establishing standards and principles that underpin democracy and human rights within this community. The process of adaptation and enlargement in the European Union (EU) as it seeks to strengthen its own internal cohesion while reaching out to new members are all important parts of this broader process of construction and need to be kept in mind and related to this work that we are undertaking in NATO.

NATO’s internal adaptation has two parts. The first is the effort to create greater flexibility, mobility, and versatility in NATO to deal with a variety of security challenges. The collective defense mission remains essential to NATO and is at its core. Yet, as we have seen in Bosnia, NATO isn’t capable of providing a variety of responses to deal with challenges in the broader Euro-Atlantic community that are very important toward maintaining stability in Europe. A number of steps have been taken over the years to adapt NATO to be more streamlined, smaller, and more flexible. This adaptation also reveals that our declared principle that NATO is not oriented against any specific adversary really does reflect the concept and the strategy of NATO.

In this process U.S. troop strength has dropped from 320,000 to about 100,000 in Europe. Overall, NATO allies have cut more than half a million troops. NATO’s nuclear weapons have been reduced by 90 percent. NATO has proven it can meet both Article 4 and Article 5 contingencies through more mobile and flexible forces, making the Cold War force posture is no longer necessary. Nowhere is this effort clearer than in Bosnia where NATO—drawing on core elements of this new, more flexible structure—undertook a very complex mission with its newly developed capabilities.

The second element of internal adaptation is the effort to enhance the ESDI within NATO. Over the years, through the adaptation of the concept of the combined joint task forces and some of the work that has been done leading up to and since Berlin in 1996, there is now an acceptance of the notion that NATO should make forces and capabilities available to the WEU for WEU-led operations. The Alliance is beginning to both streamline and adapt the command structure to allow its commands to function in the European mode. The debate over Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) is a reflection of the fact that this is a process that is still in transition. As Europe develops its own capabilities, it will be able to take on more responsibilities. And, as the United States approaches AFSOUTH question, we will try to maintain the maximum amount of flexibility to carry through on the idea of strength in the ESDI without losing the essential military coherence that makes NATO so effective.

In NATO’s enlargement deliberations there has been very steady progression from the January 1994 summit decision to move forward on enlargement, beginning with a 1995 study on enlargement that outlined a road map for enlargement criteria, rules, and understandings that would safeguard the alliance’s approach.

The process of individualized dialogues with NATO allowed countries that were interested in exploring membership to understand better both the requirements and the responsibilities that come with NATO membership.

Finally, in December 1996 the foreign ministers decided to set a summit for July 1997 in which several new members were to be invited to begin accession talks with the goal of full accession by 1999.

Enlargement is not new to the alliance. Previous enlargements brought in Greece and Turkey, Germany, and Spain. But this is a new environment, and so our process of enlargement needs to be sensitive to the very specific requirements of this new Europe. The rationale, at least for the United States government’s approach and its support for the enlargement, is outlined in the President’s report on NATO enlargement recently submitted to the Congress. There are a number of compelling reasons why this is important, not only for the security of the new members who will be joining NATO but for the old members and for the rest of Europe as well.

Among those reasons are the need to prevent a security vacuum—a kind of no-man’s land, where the requirements of security remain undefined—from emerging in central and eastern Europe. There is a need to maintain coherence among all allies in dealing with security challenges so that individual countries are not left alone to deal with new problems as they arise. Enlargement gives NATO new and willing allies to help carry out our missions, not only for Article 5 but also in the mission of stability such as in Bosnia. It will help consolidate and stabilize the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, help marginalize nationalists, and strengthen the pro-western orientations of these countries.

One of the most obvious benefits of enlargement is the impact it has already had upon aspirant states in terms of dealing with their own problems and the problems in their region. The recent agreements between Hungary and Romania, for example, and Poland and Lithuania show that the prospect of enlargement is already having a very positive impact on helping to stabilize this region.

Perhaps the final reason for supporting enlargement is that it will help erase the artificial dividing line that emerged with the beginning of the Cold War. Enlargement will be true to Article X—that NATO is open to all the democracies of Europe. It has been one of the great strengths of NATO that that underlying principle has been one that has guided the Alliance through a very difficult period.

Enlargement carries costs and commitments, but these costs and commitments are far outweighed by the benefits. The President’s report makes it clear that these are not unrealistic costs in terms of the overall burden on existing and new members.

This adaptation of NATO for enlargement will be sustainable by new members because the concept which NATO itself has been developing for collective defense under Article 5 depends more and more on the concept of reinforcement capability, not permanent stationing, and interoperability of forces. Additionally, new members will need to modernize and restructure their forces whether or not NATO enlargement proceeds. As was the case with new members in the past, new members will be integrated into the Alliance gradually, although from day one there is an understanding that members will be expected to take on their responsibilities for collective defense.

Indeed, the case for NATO’s enlargement is the case for NATO itself, the need and the benefits of collective defense rooted in the commitments of each democracy to defend their values and to defend each other’s security. Enlargement is not directed at any other country, but it is part of this broader process of integration.

One of the reasons why the President issued the NATO enlargement report, is that as we move forward with enlargement informed and vigorous debate is important. This is true not only because we will have to look to our legislatures and parliaments to deal with the issue of ratification once new members have completed their accession talks, but also because the commitments embodied in Article 5 are serious and solemn commitments and need to have the support and understanding of our publics if they are to be maintained.

The third element of our overall strategy has to do with NATO’s relationship to countries which may not be invited to join NATO in the first "wave," as it is so commonly called. This is a challenge not only for countries which are actively seeking membership but also for those countries which are not now seeking membership but are concerned that their interest, their security, their stability not be compromised by this process of enlargement.

Perhaps the first and most important element of this strategy is our commitment that the door to NATO membership remain open after this first wave begins and that no prearrangements be made to either specify who is in or who is out or to artificially limit who may join the alliance.

The second element is to strengthen the elements of cooperation among all the countries of Europe with NATO, not only through enhancing the PFP program but by trying to give a collective dimension to the partnership through the creation of an Atlantic Partnership Council.

NATO is also particularly mindful of the need to address the concerns and issues associated with Ukraine, which plays a very important strategic role in the region. The Alliance is working on its own concept of some kind of understanding or agreement or document reflecting the relationship that NATO seeks to develop with Ukraine.

There remains a requirement to maintain stability in the Baltic region, and there are a number of proposals both in terms of NATO’s relationship with the Baltics but also other regional organizations which can help maintain stability in that very important area.

Finally, in the United States perhaps the issue that is attracting the most immediate attention is how to develop a relationship with Russia. One of the determinants of the future security and stability of Europe depends on the evolution of Russia. Russia’s emergence as a democratic force in Europe as a cooperative partner with the countries in the region is one of the most promising, most stabilizing, most beneficial developments that has emerged from the end of the Cold War. It is critically important to maintain the pace and the commitment to reform and democracy. The United States has had a deep engagement with Russia, not only through specific assistance programs but also in terms of a political engagement to support reform and reformers there. It is critically important as we move forward with these other elements of NATO’s adaptation in enlargement that we are also cognizant about the implications of that process for Russia and its impact on positive developments within Russia internally. That’s why, even as we proceed with enlargement, NATO is paying particular attention to trying to build a partnership with Russia.

As we look at the issues being discussed between NATO and Russia and between the United States and Russia as part of a broader dialogue, there are two principal concerns that have been raised that need to be addressed as part of building this partnership with Russia.

The first concerns Russia’s role in the European security community—how Russia fits in, in effect, to the decisionmaking processes and the overall structures that we’re building today. The second important question that is being addressed is the question of how the enlargement and adaptation of NATO affects the military stability of the region and its military implications for Russia itself.

With respect to Russia’s role, there are a number of ways in which Russia plays an important role both regionally and globally as a member of the UN Security Council. As a member of the UNSC, Russia obviously has an integral place to play. But I think we’ve all come to the conclusion that it is also important to have a more structured way for Russia to relate to NATO and to NATO’s own activities. For this reason, NATO is elaborating on the concept of a mechanism, what has been called a joint council, for NATO and Russia to work together to try to find the maximum opportunity for cooperation on areas of common concern.

Our concept for the joint council would allow for joint decisionmaking by NATO and Russia but without vetoes. It would promote joint action where possible without requiring it. It would focus on reciprocal responsibilities and transparency of decisions. Meeting in regular session, dealing with both political and military issues, it would not only be a forum to resolve differences but also, over time, to build confidence and to increase the opportunities for common action. No place is this more clear than the kind of learning experience that we have had in Bosnia where both on a political and a military plane we have learned how it is possible to work together to achieve a common objective in that region.

On the military side, in terms of addressing the elements of military stability, there are two key features that should be noted. First is the concern expressed by many Russians about the implications of NATO’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear responsibilities for the adapted and enlarged alliance. The three No’s reflect the fact that NATO itself sees as the process of its own adaptation and the new security environment that it faces that there is no need for and no current plans or intentions to station nuclear weapons in the states of new alliance members. This is not a commitment which is done because of some kind of request by Russia but rather because it reflects NATO’s appraisal of what contributes to stability in the region. But it is a way, also, in fact, of addressing a concern that has been expressed not only by Russians but our friends in Ukraine and elsewhere. The second element is the process of adapting the CFE Treaty, which in many ways is the most effective way of addressing the problem of military stability and balance in Europe in a way that can address the concerns of all the community of nations—NATO members, future members, and nonmembers alike.

NATO has now developed a far-reaching CFE proposal, which was presented on February 20, 1997 which tries to assure that these changes do not prejudice the security of any European country. This new CFE structure will be based on national and territorial limits rather than the outdated bloc-to-bloc arrangements under the current CFE. Although it is designed in part to address some of the concerns expressed by the Russians, it also is designed more broadly to ensure that the treaty reflects the changes that have taken place in Europe since 1990. This new proposal will prevent destabilizing concentrations of forces in central Europe without undermining NATO’s ability to defend itself, and it will not create second-class NATO membership. It will encourage reduction to the CFE ceilings and to this end the allies committed in their ground equipment ceilings that they will be significantly less under an adapted CFE treaty.

Engagement with Russia is not limited to these two elements—that is, developing the consulting mechanism in dealing with the military dispositions in central and eastern Europe. There are a number of important bilateral issues that the United States and Russia are discussing that will also contribute to the overall stability of the region, particularly in the areas of strategic arms control as we move forward to seek ratification by the Duma of Start II. The United States is prepared to also move forward with talks about what the elements of the Start III treaty would look like. And we’d also continue our discussions to try to complete work on ABM TMD demarcation.

Perhaps equally important, although less headline grabbing, is the work of trying to deepen Russia’s economic engagement with the region and with the international community. As Russia moves forward with its own internal reforms, particularly in crucial areas like reform of public finances, it may be possible for the United States and others to increase their support for investment in Russia and thus provide the economic underpinnings for reform.