The Resource Costs and Security Burden of NATO Enlargement

If all goes according to plan, the Madrid Summit will mark the final phase of the process of NATO enlargement—the invitation to certain countries, accession negotiations, and ratification. The acceptance of new members is an event of far-reaching significance for NATO in its adaptation to the new strategic environment. Given the magnitude of this decision and the stakes involved, governments will be particularly eager to ensure parliamentary and public support. Until recently, enlargement has received widespread parliamentary endorsement as a worthy objective. Now, as the day of decision draws nearer and the commitment in principle is translated into practical detail, doubts and concerns have begun to surface over potential costs. Critics and skeptics have emerged and a public debate is underway. Governments will need to answer this criticism through open and informed public debate.

Parliaments and parliamentarians will play an important role in the efforts to ensure public backing. On the one hand, as representatives of their electorate, parliamentarians constitute an important barometer of public opinion and, on the other, they constitute a useful vehicle for influencing that opinion and generating public support.

However, the requirement in most countries that ratification involves parliamentary approval gives the parliamentary role a particular significance and will ensure parliamentary activity is given a degree of prominence in the coming months. While practices and procedures differ, all parliaments will wish to make their views heard and, in most countries, the ratification process could be lengthy: involving hearings, debates and finally votes. This parliamentary activity will be at the center of the final phase of this round of enlargement and will also provide its finale.

In view of the importance, therefore, of the parliamentary dimension, this paper will look at enlargement and its potential "costs" from the legislative perspective and examine those issues which appear to be of greatest concern to parliamentarians.

However, before doing this, a few qualifications are necessary.

First, in looking at parliamentary attitudes, this paper will draw on the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) and its various meetings, including the most recent meeting in February which focused on enlargement. As the parliamentary arm of NATO, the Assembly brings together more than 200 parliamentarians from the 16 member countries, representing a wide spectrum of political opinion. Delegations from 15 "partner" countries also participate actively in its work. The Assembly, therefore, constitutes an effective point of reference for assessing parliamentary attitudes. It is not, of course, the only one and others will have their own experiences. Nor is it assumed that parliamentary opinion is necessarily synonymous with public opinion—the latter being a particularly elusive animal to grapple with. However, the attitude expressed by Assembly members provide a good starting point for a discussion of parliamentary views on enlargement.

Second, as with most things to do with the Alliance, constitutional arrangements and parliamentary practices concerning ratification vary widely among the countries of the Alliance. At one end of the spectrum is the close scrutiny of the U.S. Senate and the requirement of a two-thirds vote, at the other, the almost non-existent formal role of the British parliament, where ratification remains the prerogative of the executive. Whatever their constitutional responsibilities, most Parliaments will ensure that enlargement is closely scrutinised and thoroughly debated. Many parliaments have already scheduled debates before the Madrid Summit in order to convey their views on the forthcoming decisions.

Third, while most parliaments to varying degrees hold their governments accountable in foreign and defence policy, there is a tendency for parliaments to regard these areas as the prerogative of the executive and to accept the government’s lead. This does not mean governments get a free ride on these issues, far from it, but it does mean that defeats on issues of real significance, particularly when they involve collective or Alliance action, are infrequent.

Having noted these qualifications, I would suggest that currently there is broad parliamentary support throughout the Alliance for the decision to invite in Madrid certain countries to commence accession negotiations. While until recently enlargement has not been the subject of media attention, the principle has consistently received parliamentary endorsement as NATO has moved, step- by-step, towards the decision to issue invitations. The NAA, for example, has passed resolutions for the last five years endorsing the principle of enlargement. More recently, in the United States, the passage of the 1996 NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act provided a clear indication of bipartisan and very substantial Congressional intent. It can be argued with some justification that these endorsements were due more to an instinctive reaction that enlargement was a good and honorable objective than to a careful examination of the costs as opposed to the benefits. However, it would not be true to say that the potential political costs have been ignored. Concerns have been raised over Russian reactions, the countries who might be excluded and over the effect on NATO’s functioning. However, while enlargement remained a distant goal, these concerns remained in the realm of theory and were easily answered by solutions such as a parallel cooperative relationship or an enhanced PFP. Now, these costs become more real and serious and attention is being paid to implications and consequences in political, military and budgetary terms.

These concerns will be represented by critics and skeptics who are opposed to enlargement and who are beginning to make themselves heard. A close reading of the British and American press suggests the emergence in these two countries of a vociferous and articulate opposition including a considerable sprinkling of former officials and security specialists. The criticisms range from suggestions that enlargement will undermine democracy in Russia, create a new Cold War, divide Europe and cripple fledgling economies in the new democracies through enforcing unnecessary defence expenditure. The depth and influence of this opposition and its potential impact on the forthcoming ratification debates and discussions remains to be seen.

Much of the criticism, particularly that of the "Russia first" school, expresses genuine concern that the Alliance has its priorities wrong. However, much criticism appears to be motivated by other agendas. It is noticeable that some of the critics are people who never really accepted NATO or at least regard it as a Cold War organization whose day is over and do not want to see its role boosted by enlargement. In Europe, a variant of this exists among critics who believe that NATO’s success comes at the expense of the European Union and its efforts to extend into the security sphere.

One of the ironies to the situation is that the critics frequently express concern over the affect enlargement will have on Russia in addition to fears of excessive military costs. Yet, by exaggerating the military dimensions and the related costs, they encourage the very Russian reaction they profess they wish to avoid.

One of the more curious criticisms is that NATO is guilty of rushing into enlargement. The Financial Time’s description of enlargement was: "NATO’s leap in the dark" and "hurtling towards the biggest change in its security arrangements for half a century." Not only is the idea of the Alliance doing anything in a hurry a surprising notion, but also this belies the measured step-by-step approach of the last five years.

The ratification process will allow ample time for these criticisms to be aired, for them to be assessed in their proper context, and for the pros and cons to be thoroughly discussed.

Parliamentary concern, thus far, has been directed at four broad areas:

• The effect on relations with Russia;

• The need to reassure those countries not invited in the first round;

• The possible dilution of Alliance cohesion and ultimately its effectiveness; and

• The financial costs that will accrue to existing and new members alike.

This paper will comment briefly on each issue, concentrating, however, on budgetary implications because these and the military requirements from which they flow are those closest to parliamentary competence.

In NAA discussions, the possibility that enlargement could lead to a deterioration of relations with Russia has been the most widely-voiced concern. Almost all members are anxious to avoid a result in which enlargement makes Europe less rather than more secure. Clearly, current Russian attitudes present that risk. However, few would allow this concern to impede or delay the course of NATO enlargement. In balancing competing risks—the possibility of alienating Russia against the certainty of frustrating the legitimate expectations of the new democracies—the moral imperative wins. The general view is that enlargement must go ahead but that every effort has to be made to build a new relationship with Russia and in doing so, change the Russian perception of NATO as an exclusively military organization. Until recently, Russian leaders had resolutely resisted NATO’s efforts to intensify cooperation, with the single and highly-successful exception of the Russia Brigade in Bosnia, as a means to prepare the way for enlargement. The message was cooperation or enlargement, but not both.

This apparently paradoxical approach—acknowledgement of Russian concerns yet determination to go ahead with enlargement—is in many ways due to the relentless opposition of the Russian political establishment. Within the Assembly’s environment, this unyielding approach was demonstrated by Russian parliamentarians who denounced enlargement at every opportunity. This approach was eventually counterproductive. There was also frustration that Russian political figures with direct experience of the West would return home and reinforce the stereotype they clearly knew to be untrue. The result was a hardening of attitudes and many members concluded that there was no option but to move ahead on enlargement regardless of Russian reactions. The conclusion of a French member during the recent Assembly debate that NATO had one choice—to enlarge when Russia was weak or when she was strong—appeared to sum up the general approach.

Nevertheless, there is strong parliamentary support for the development of an enhanced relationship between NATO and Russia that would institutionalize cooperation and consultation and, in some areas, co-decision. The latter, of course, being the tricky issue of how far into Alliance business can Russia be allowed to intrude. In this area, parliamentary views tend to be fairly restrictive—the "line in the sand" would be drawn very firmly at anything to do with collective defence.

Recent signs that progress is being made in the talks between Russia and NATO—if correct—could ease legislative concerns. It could also produce legislative support for other measures to ease the impact of enlargement, for example, a minimalist approach to the military measures necessary for new members and a sympathetic approach in the CFE negotiations to Russian concerns over the current balance of forces. However, if these optimistic signs prove incorrect it is unlikely that continued Russian objections, whatever form they take, will affect support for the enlargement process.

The question of reassuring those countries not included in the first round of enlargement has also been a major concern for some time. This will become more of an issue once the names of the first group are known. However, Nordic parliamentarians are already reinforcing the concerns of their governments over the likely exclusion of the Baltic states. Likewise, increasing attention is being paid to Ukraine and the need for a relationship with NATO that reflects its unique status and position. Parliaments will look for the Alliance to provide concrete assurances that NATO’s door will remain open after the first round and that active involvement and cooperation, including active involvement in Alliance structures, will be intensified through an enhanced PFP. Here, the real challenge will be to develop closer cooperation for those outside while maintaining a distinction between members and partners.

The impact of enlargement on Alliance effectiveness has always struck a chord among parliamentarians. From the earliest days of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there has been some nervousness over what these closer relations would do to NATO’s core identity. Concern was often voiced that in developing closer relations, NATO risked diluting the very cohesion and solidarity on which its success had been based. These concerns were rarely voiced too loudly because members also realized the political impossibility of keeping NATO as a closed shop and that to attempt to do so would condemn the Alliance to growing irrelevance. The imminent prospect of enlargement has resurrected and reinforced these fears because it adds the additional dimension of more members to an already laborious decisionmaking process and the possibility that new members will arrive with their own agendas. NATO officials point out that the arrival of greater numbers will also coincide with the need for faster decisionmaking if NATO is to contribute effectively to crisis management.

No one knows what the Alliance will be like with 17, 18 or 19 members. What is known is that Alliance machinery is well tried and tested and the Alliance has considerable experience in accommodating national preoccupations and reconciling different perspectives. It is difficult to believe that the new members can introduce problems so much more difficult than those the Alliance has coped with in the past. Moreover, new members will bring fresh perspectives and will doubtless learn the art of "give and take" in the search for consensus. In any case, it was never likely that concerns about effectiveness would prove a serious impediment to enlargement.

The budgetary impact of enlargement is of particular interest to parliamentarians as defense expenditures are normally subject to parliamentary scrutiny and oversight and, therefore, directly relevant to parliamentary competence. Moreover, the military obligations that drive these costs are of direct relevance.

However, this dimension of the enlargement debate is not well understood in the public domain and currently there is considerable confusion. Various semi-official studies have emerged with very different ranges of estimates, the higher figures always being quoted by the critics of enlargement. Yet there is little understanding of what these estimates mean or where they come from.

The U.S. Congressional Budget Office and Rand studies are the two most frequently quoted. A study by the Polish Euro-Atlantic Institute has added a new and helpful corrective and most recently the U.S. Department of Defence has issued a report to Congress which provides a relatively modest assessment of costs, along with a clear description of the methodology used in arriving at these costs.

It is important that in the forthcoming parliamentary debates, the relationship between costs, military requirements and assumptions is clearly understood. The crucial element is to emphasize that all studies and assessments depend on assumptions. Everything depends on what you assume should be done and what as a result you ask new members and existing allies to do.

In the case of NATO enlargement, the military requirements will depend on two questions: how, in today’s environment, will the commitment to collective defense contained in Article 5 be applied to new members? How will new members themselves be expected to contribute to collective defense and to NATO’s new roles? The answers to these questions will depend on a number of assumptions concerning: assessments of the nature and degree of risk; the degree of assurance required; the time frame; the adequacy of existing capabilities; and the political and economic acceptability of the resulting requirements. These are all assumptions which depend on professional judgement and, therefore, are variable.

The Department of Defence study helpfully divides the resulting costs into two categories: those they term direct enlargement costs that are related to improvements to common facilities, most of which will come under NATO’s common funding and are collectively shared; and those enhancements that existing and new members must undertake to modernize and upgrade their existing capabilities. The latter improvements as the study points out are needed whether or not enlargement takes place and are already underway.

For obvious reasons, this is not the place to pass judgment on the accuracy or otherwise of these or other studies. First, without access to the detailed costings, this is impossible. Second, it is not clear how many potential new members are the subject of assessment. Finally, the military requirements and related costs will be determined during accession negotiations and will be the result of collective Alliance agreement, not a single national assessment.

The principal objective is to clarify how the eventual estimates are arrived at and to identify the major consideration that influence the assumptions. There are a range of considerations that should be borne in mind in looking at the military implications and related costs of enlargement.

They include:

• The fact that the planning environment is entirely different from that of the Cold War and that, therefore, the military requirements can be of an entirely different scale and character. During the Cold War, a high degree of confidence and assurance of collective defence commitments was necessary. NATO gave substance to Article 5 through declarations, force structure, capabilities and deployments, and of course, a strategy of nuclear deterrence. The current environment does not require such a high degree of assurances and planning requirements can be more relaxed. As with NATO’s own strategy, the yardstick is "uncertainty."

• The absence of an immediate threat means that enhancements can be modest and measured, the emphasis placed on existing forces and "the ability to get there," which means improving reinforcement capabilities and the ability to operate together. Improvements can be targeted on specific areas where the return in cooperation and interoperability is greatest, such as language and communications. In terms of interoperability, the Alliance should not ask more of new members than it has achieved itself.

• In the current environment, it would make sense for the new members to focus initially on forces capable of operating with those of NATO in operations such as Bosnia, where valuable experience has already been learned.

• Because of the absence of an immediate threat, the costs of these adjustments and of more sustained modernization can be phased in over time. The U.S. Department of Defence study suggests 13 years.

• In determining the level and types of military enhancements that new members must undertake, it should be remembered that these should be consistent with NATO’s political message that enlargement is not directed against anyone.

• The costs for the new members should be within their economic means. To ask for expenditure that would negatively affect their economies would be counterproductive.

• In assessing new members’ contributions, it is important to remember that NATO does not impose demands. NATO’s collective defence planning system offers guidelines and force goals based on collectively-agreed concepts and principles. However, these goals are frequently tailored to national circumstances. NATO has always operated with what countries could afford rather than what they should provide.

• In this respect, it is important to remember that members have always contributed to the Alliance in different ways. Moreover, these contributions have been frequently tailored to domestic pressures and strategic sensitivities. Membership in the Alliance has never been measured in military capabilities alone.

Finally, it is appropriate to remember that one of NATO’s principal purposes has always been to sustain political and economic stability.

Taking all of these considerations into account, it is difficult to see why the question of military obligations and related costs should be a problem. There is absolutely no reason for the inflated estimates of some studies. Nor will joining NATO force new members to depart dramatically from existing plans and divert scarce resources into defense. Everything will be a question of negotiations with an eye firmly on what is possible politically and domestically.

In looking at the negotiations between NATO and a new member that will determine the conditions under which the new member will enter the Alliance, there are several potential stumbling blocks. The first is the inherent tension between the military requirement for contingency planning in the new member countries and the political requirement to minimize the impact of enlargement on Russian perceptions. Russian statements to date have indicated an extreme sensitivity to any military preparation or arrangements. This could become a contentious issue as it also involves the rights of new members.

The second is an inter-Alliance issue. The Department of Defense study points out that to a substantial degree the costs of improving the capabilities of new and existing members to ensure collective defence would be incurred with or without enlargement. In other words, the Alliance needs a reinforcement capability whether or not new members join. However, as the DOD study also points out, the United States already has the necessary capabilities and no further expenditure is necessary. The non-U.S. allies, however, are in the process of producing these improvements. The implication is, of course, that the Europeans need to come up with the expenditures to fund these promised improvements. This has the probability of becoming a new burden-sharing issue.

The issue of civil-military relations should be mentioned, not because it represents a cost as such, but because it is an issue in which parliaments have taken an interest; and progress, or lack of it, could be the subject of debate in the ratification process. The problem facing the CEE countries in establishing effective civil-military relations, including democratic civilian control of the armed forces, are well known. Considerable progress has been made—appropriate structures and procedures have been put in place and are beginning to function—but shortcomings remain. The largest obstacle lies in the prevailing attitudes of some, towards military to civilian oversight and the lack of expertise of the civilians to impose this oversight. The two shortcomings are mutually reinforcing. The development of civilian expertise and changing military attitudes will take time. The current weaknesses and shortcomings should not be an obstacle to membership.

The final details of the terms under which certain selected countries will join NATO remain to be negotiated. Despite concerns over the potential "costs" which could accompany enlargement, it is difficult to see any issue that will change the current parliamentary support for the admission of new members.

Placed in their proper context, the concerns discussed in this paper can all be adequately answered. The simple fact is that most legislators see the benefits of enlargement as outweighing the potential disadvantages. Behind this is also the assumption that the costs of non-enlargement would be greater than those required if enlargement does not take place. Europe will be more secure with enlargement than without. Even among those members who still entertain reservations, most believe that the Alliance has travelled too far to turn back. There is always the possibility of a glitch in one or other of the parliaments; that one parliament could hold ratification hostage to the redress of grievances in other areas, but this is not likely. The consequences of such an action would be so enormous that collective responsibility is likely to prevail.

Barring any unforeseen calamity the Alliance is on track to accept new members in 1999; the ratification process and the accompanying parliamentary activity will confirm NATO’s measured and pragmatic progress towards this historic decision.