Richard G. Lugar

The Atlantic Alliance is preparing for the Madrid Summit at which some prospective applicants will be invited to commence assession talks. In addition to these enlargement preparations the Alliance, in general, and the United States, specifically, are trying to reassure Russia on the non-threatening nature of such steps. Programs such as Nunn-Lugar and strategic arms control may also contribute to a more secure Europe as NATO enlargement moves forward. However, obtaining Senate consent to ratification of enlargement will depend on a number of critical issues.

There are two basic propositions related to Senate consent:

• Congressional attitudes with respect to "NATO after the Summit" will depend substantially on what transpires before the Summit. Members will carefully monitor progress over the next four months on Alliance and Russian adaptation with regard to enlargement. If Congress perceives that too high a price was paid by the United States relative to the contributions of our allies and Russia, then support after Madrid—for the Alliance and the additional commitments and costs associated with expansion—will be threatened.

You will note that I made reference not only to Russia, but also to our European allies. Any sign that the allies are getting cold feet about proceeding with the enlargement timetable will have a major impact on congressional attitudes with respect to ratification and the costs associated with it.

• Russian attitudes and actions in any negotiations leading up to Madrid will have an enormous impact on congressional willingness to proceed with the effort to improve strategic bilateral relations with Russia. Put bluntly, the future of the Nunn-Lugar program could well be determined over the next four months in the negotiations between the Alliance and Russia attendant to NATO enlargement and in the halls of the Duma with respect to Russian ratification of START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

I approach the cluster of issues associated with NATO enlargement—that is, a NATO-Russia charter, NATO’s internal adaptation, the CFE modernization talks, etc.—not simply from a policy standpoint, but also from the perspective of the Senate role in the ratification of NATO enlargement and congressional attitudes to associated issues.

My point of departure on this issue is recognition that ratification of NATO enlargement in the United States Senate will require a broad bipartisan coalition.

First, the required coalition to secure ratification will be diverse. Enlargement supporters include both those who support NATO expansion as a means of injecting greater stability into Central Europe and those who view enlargement as a hedge against a resurgent, aggressive Russia. The Administration thus far has appealed primarily to the pro-stability elements in promoting its NATO enlargement policy, but it will require a broader coalition to secure ratification.

Second, the NATO-Russian piece of any European security package will be critical in determining whether Senators support enlargement. Some Senators will be concerned that NATO not go too far in making "concessions" to Moscow that could hollow out the Alliance. Other Senators will want to ensure that the Alliance has gone many extra miles to respond to Russian sensitivities. Balancing these two view points will be difficult.

Third, although it would be a mistake to strive for a NATO-Russia treaty that would require ratification by 16 different national parliaments, Senate consent will be required for an adapted CFE Treaty. The original CFE Treaty had a clear political and strategic purpose—to create a new military balance in Europe though asymmetrical force cuts. While I support CFE adaptation or modernization, we must ensure that CFE II does not become, and is not perceived as, merely a way to unilaterally constrain NATO in order to appease Moscow. Since CFE adaptation is such an integral part of the Administration strategy of dealing with Russia, it is very important that we build the kind of broad coalition of support that will be needed for its ratification.

Last, if we consider NATO enlargement exclusively in terms of the politics of ratification, there are three subject areas where the Administration must take a firm stand in the negotiations on any NATO-Russia charter or attendant U.S.-Russian "bargain":

• No caps or "pauses" should be accepted with respect to prospective entrants—that is, no new Yalta—and no Russian veto;

• No unilateral concessions should be made to the Russians. Rather we must pursue reciprocal constraints designed to prevent a new military competition that no one wants; and

• No direct linkages between NATO enlargement and START II or START III should be accepted.

The Administration has already laid out three areas for future NATO-Russia cooperation through which it seeks to reassure Russia about the implications of NATO enlargement: namely, a NATO-Russia charter; a new NATO-Russia consultative mechanism; and CFE adaptation and arms control. I would call these the three "yes’s" in the Administration’s negotiating strategy.

The Administration also has drawn so-called "red lines"—that is, negotiating thresholds that it says it will not cross under any circumstances. The following are what I call the five "no’s":

• NO delay in NATO’s plans to enlarge in July;

• NO veto by Russia or anyone else over NATO decisionmaking;

• NO second-class-citizen membership in NATO;

• NO exclusion of any Partnership for Peace (PFP) partner from possible future NATO membership; and

• NO subordination of NATO to any other organization or decisionmaking body.

This represents a constructive approach by the Administration, but it sets some parameters to possible NATO-Russian cooperation. The hardest task for the Administration lies in defining in practical terms what kinds of understandings and steps we should and should not embrace within these parameters. In short, how do we square some of the "yes’s" with the "no’s."

By the same token, we must guard against contradictions or inconsistencies among the "yes’s." While the three "yes’s" may be thought of as reassurances to Russia in light of NATO enlargement, they also will be scrutinized and interpreted by other audiences—namely, the West European allies, prospective applicants for membership, and an American political audience. For example, the charter not only will offer a set of principles governing the possibilities for NATO-Russia relations, it will communicate the limits of such a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to critical American political circles.

Similarly, an adapted CFE must be designed to reassure the Russians, the Central Europeans, and the newly independent states as to the possibilities and limits of NATO’s forward presence following enlargement. A new NATO-Russia consultative mechanism may be viewed as much as a form of reassurance to current West European allies, who worry about institutionalizing and integrating Europe’s relationship with Russia, as a form of reassurance to Russia herself.

The gap between what the Administration is proposing and what Moscow is demanding is still quite wide. Tempting as it may be to try to close that gap before the Madrid meeting, it would be a mistake to reach closure with the Russians at any price, particularly one that doomed ratification of enlargement in the United States Senate.

As part of his opening gambit, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov has been open in saying what he wants from these negotiations: namely, an explicit or implicit veto over any NATO action in or out of area. He does not want NATO countries to be able to act in Bosnia, or go to the Persian Gulf, or go any where else for that matter, without Russian concurrence. He wants to limit NATO’s military capabilities to low-level peacekeeping tasks. He would like to see NATO transform itself from a military alliance into a political debating society on cooperative security. This is not the kind of NATO-Russian understanding that would garner broad bipartisan support in the United States Senate.

Let me give you some examples of the kinds of tough questions we must confront and answer before the Madrid Summit if we are to chart a sensible course for the Alliance after the summit.

First, how do we square a NATO-Russia "consultative mechanism" with the "no veto" pledge? How do we make a consultative mechanism substantive enough for Russia without compromising NATO decisionmaking?

Second, how do we insure that CFE modernization will be truly balanced, transparent, and reciprocal? Given Russia’s hope to use CFE II to limit NATO’s deployments in Central Europe, how do we guarantee that the CFE results do not violate our pledge of "no second-class members" or tie NATO’s hands?

Third, what should "no exclusion" mean in practice? Should we be prepared to continue the process of expansion until all PFP members, including Russia, qualify for NATO? If not, where and when do we draw the line? If we do mean "No exclusion", are we prepared for the inevitable changes in NATO that this policy would bring? What would be the main mission for a NATO that included Russia?

And this takes us back to the domestic political imperatives. What aspects of the NATO-Russia relationship are likely to be the most controversial with the American people and Capitol Hill? How can the package best be structured to maximize public understanding of it and support for it?

These questions should not minimize the importance of trying to work out new cooperative structures or mechanisms between NATO and Russia and between the United States and Russia. Rather, I am suggesting that we need to define our policy objectives toward Russia with greater precision before we seek to construct a charter, or a consultative mechanism, or a new CFE Treaty, in pursuit of those goals.

As the Administration and the Alliance proceed with their negotiating efforts with the Russians, it is important to place NATO enlargement and the means to assuage Russian concerns over that process in the larger context of U.S.-Russian relations. NATO enlargement and a NATO-Russia charter are components of a broader American policy toward Russia. Whatever we decide to do in a charter or CFE II or with a new consultative mechanism, will have to fit into our larger policy approach to Moscow, which includes strategic arms control and assistance to Russia.

NATO enlargement need not be a zero-sum game. One can be both a strong supporter of NATO enlargement and of a new U.S.-Russian strategic partnership. We need to continue to invest in the security and stability of Russia and the newly independent states.

But the Russians must overcome their lingering stereotypes about us, and their own tendency to think in zero-sum terms. Our policy must devise relationships and incentives to help them move along this path, realizing that it will take time and consistent efforts on our part.

Although we should make every effort to address Russian concerns before we start to enlarge, we need to recognize that Moscow may not be willing to do us the favor of signing on to any kind of agreement that it sees as facilitating NATO enlargement plans. It is likely that Russian attitudes toward NATO enlargement will not start to change until after enlargement has commenced and they see that their worst fears are unjustified.

We often talk about the need to take "legitimate" Russian interests into account as we proceed with enlargement. But we never define what those legitimate interests are. I would distinguish between "real" and "imagined" Russian interests. We must be clear about which are which.

In my view, what we should not do is to compromise our principles on the enlargement process. Russians do not and should not have a veto over who gets in or over the pace of enlargement. By offering to deal with the Russians on such issues, we only prolong the fight over enlargement, invite them to think that they can control the process, and create insecurity in Eastern and Central Europe among those who will view this as a new Yalta.

Rather, we should find ways to demonstrate to Moscow that its professed fears about the military threat posed by an enlarged NATO are misplaced. Of course, we should discuss new consultative mechanisms that might draw Russia closer to NATO and other European security institutions.

But we should concentrate even harder on encouraging a broader relationship in which Russia sees its primary interest as one of cooperating with the West. If we succeed, Russia will not allow a disagreement over NATO enlargement to jeopardize this relationship.

An important part of such an effort to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia that transcends the NATO enlargement issues will involve START II, START III, and the Nunn-Lugar programs.

Many Russian officials are in favor of delaying or rejecting ratification of the START II treaty, which would limit strategic nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 each on the American and Russian sides. The Russians claim that the dismantlement of additional armaments beyond the START I limits is an up-front expense that they cannot manage, given their current financial problems. They also believe that building 500 to 700 new single-warhead missiles to replace the destabilizing MIRVed (multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles) land-based missiles that would be destroyed under START II will be another insurmountable cost. At minimum, they want five years delay in implementation of all treaty provisions while they sort out their financial predicament and argue for better terms.

If START II is not adopted or is delayed for five years, the United States will face an expense of approximately $4 to $5 billion just to maintain weapons we wish to destroy. The Russians will face a similar cost against a military budget that may be only 15 percent to 25 percent of ours and is currently only partially funded, given the tax collection crisis in Russia.

But for the moment, the Russians also want to argue about NATO expansion. Although this subject is not necessarily related to strategic nuclear missile reduction, they sense that the United States, after ratifying START II, is eager to get on with mutual downsizing of nuclear forces. Moscow hopes to delay or deter NATO expansion in part by linking it with START II.

The Russians need to be disabused of this notion! Even as we are negotiating with them on the implications of NATO enlargement, we need to press them hard on strategic arms reductions.

First, we should press hard for Russian ratification of START II without renegotiation or delay.

Second, we should expand our efforts to assist Russia in dismantling its nuclear weapons and offer to accelerate, not extend, the START II timetables by appropriating additional Nunn-Lugar funds. This will diminish the chances that leftover Soviet weapons and technologies of mass destruction will fall into the wrong hands.

Third, we should outline a framework for a potential START III Treaty now, and we should offer to begin actual negotiations on such further reductions as soon as Russia ratifies START II. By striving toward a new ceiling of 2,000 to 2,300 total aggregate warheads on each side, it will not be necessary for Russia to build the full complement of single-warhead missiles allowed under START II. This will save them money and assist our security. If the Russians insist on delaying START II in an attempt to delay NATO enlargement, they will increase their financial crisis and make their own defense reforms more difficult. The Russian leadership needs to understand this.

Fourth, the United States should ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention within the next month, and we should urge the Russian government to do the same. Russian officials must come to grips with the need to systematically destroy their chemical weapons, and the fact that Nunn-Lugar funds are dedicated to accelerating that task.

Fifth, as we move forward with the important work of expanding NATO, we should intensify bilateral negotiations with Russia aimed at defining a role for Russia in European security that is commensurate with its status and interests. Our efforts in this area can prevent the potential friction of the NATO issue from entangling other priorities, such as cooperative threat reduction and START II.

But even as we pursue strategic arms reductions with Russia, here at home we need to get on with exploring how decisions about relations with Europe and about the future shape of NATO will affect U.S. defense programs and budgets. The Senate will not only want to answer the question of whether enlargement is or is not a good idea. It also will want to make sure that the Clinton Administration has a sound strategy for implementing it, that the allies support it, and that we have an agreed-upon strategy for how to carry it out and how to share the burdens. As a U.S. Senator, I will want to know in advance what role and burden will fall on the shoulders of the U.S. taxpayer as well as the U.S. military. We must have answers to these questions before we enlarge, not afterwards.

I am skeptical of the argument that we can enlarge NATO now for political reasons, and change course later if events in the East start to go sour. Such an approach is likely to be very contentious and, in my view, unacceptable in the United States and in the Senate. The reason is simple. Americans are concerned that Europeans will not deliver under those circumstances and that the United States will be stuck with what is a de facto unilateral security guarantee under the guise of NATO. This is not a "good deal" for the United States. The problem here is Europe’s willingness to build and commit the forces necessary to carry out the obligations to which they have committed themselves.

The President has now acknowledged that NATO enlargement will not be a free lunch but will entail substantial costs and changes in what NATO does. I agree with him. But the Administration has yet to speak clearly on this issue. Ideally, the President should have started by defining an appropriate defense posture and Alliance burden-sharing agreement. Then and only then should the Administration have engaged in discussions with the Russians on these issues.

We do not require a detailed blueprint from the Administration, but we do need an overview of the strategy the United States wants NATO to pursue, the defense preparedness measures that will have to be undertaken, and who in the Alliance we can count on for carrying them out.

In response to reporting requirements levied in the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act, the Administration has finally come forward with its judgments on the costs related to NATO enlargement. The Defense Department has estimated both the direct enlargement costs (e.g., for interoperability between the forces of current and new members and for extending NATO’s integrated command, communications and air defense surveillance systems) and the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing and new members that will also contribute to carrying out NATO’s missions in an enlarged alliance. The direct enlargement costs are estimated to average $700 to $900 million annually, for a total of $9 to $12 billion between 1997 and 2009, the date by which new NATO members are anticipated to have reached a "mature capability."

According to the Defense Department, the U.S. share of these costs, chiefly for our component of the NATO budgets for direct enlargement costs, would largely be incurred in the 10 years following formal accession in 1999. It would average $150 to $200 million annually during that period. The costs for new members associated with restructuring their forces are estimated to be $800 million to $1 billion annually, while those for improvements of our NATO allies’ regional reinforcement capabilities are estimated at $600 to $800 million annually—respectively $10 to $13 billion and $8 to $10 billion over 1997-2009. The United States would share in these costs only to the extent that the United States, with Congressional approval, may choose to continue or expand the current modest assistance being provided to the military modernization of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

In short, NATO expansion will cost money and resources. But the costs, as estimated by the Defense Department, do not pose as large an obstacle as many critics of enlargement have assumed. And let us not forget that there are costs in not enlarging.

In the end, how much NATO enlargement costs will depend greatly on how the Alliance decides to defend itself and to reassure new members. Because there is no immediate threat to the Alliance or to likely new members, the Alliance can afford to adopt a lighter defense posture backed up by the ability to reinforce in the region during a crisis.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the Alliance even without expanding, will spend a considerable amount of money for defense during the next 10 to 15 years. The costs of enlargement are unlikely to amount to more than 1 percent to 2 percent of planned defense spending. Enlargement is affordable if handled properly, done in a step-by-step fashion, and if the costs are spread fairly among both old and new members.

The Senate will want to know in advance the costs and commitments and who will bear them. But it also will seek to understand the burden-sharing arrangements before it assumes new commitments. Burden-sharing will be equally as salient a political issue as costs in a Senate ratification debate. The Senate will not move forward to ratification of enlargement until it knows the costs, the burden-sharing arrangements, and the consequences for both the U.S. armed forces and the American taxpayer.

With all of the pitfalls I have enumerated along the NATO enlargement path, can the debate be won and ratification of enlargement be obtained? I believe it will, if we follow what I call the "Six Commandments" on NATO enlargement.

1) Show leadership. Above all, we must have presidential leadership. This will be a national debate and the President must lead. He also must work closely with the leadership of the U.S. Senate. The sooner he starts this process, the better. Leadership must not only come from the United States. It must come from Europe, too, and Germany in particular. And such leadership must be visible both within NATO and beyond.

2) Have a clear moral and political vision and rationale. Enlargement must be seen as the right thing to do. While NATO bureaucrats and diplomats may be consumed by the details of tactics and compromise communique language, occupying the moral and political high ground will be crucial in the public debate. We will ask the opponents of enlargement to lay out their alternative vision—and we will see whose vision is more convincing!

3) Start with the strongest candidates and keep the door open. The enlargement of NATO will start with the strongest candidates for membership. But this does not mean that the Alliance is drawing new lines or forgetting about those who, for whatever reasons, cannot be included in the first tranche. Those who are first have an obligation to insure that stability is extended beyond their borders as well.

4) Know the costs and commitments—and who will bear them—in advance. We need to understand the burden-sharing arrangements before we assume the new commitments. The U.S. Senate will not ratify enlargement until it knows the costs and consequences.

5) Have a strategy for dealing with the "have nots." The initial selection of members may be small. When another round of enlargement will take place may be uncertain. Thus, we need to have a clear strategy to underscore that enlargement will not produce a "new Yalta." In some cases, the United States has a special relationship with countries that, seem unlikely to be included in the first tranche.

6) Realize the U.S. need for partners beyond Europe. While many Europeans do not want to acknowledge it, the reality is that there is a linkage between burden-sharing arrangements within Europe and outside of it. As a U.S. Senator, I can more effectively argue the case for NATO’s "double enlargement" to the American people than argue for NATO’s eastward enlargement alone. Americans understand that we have vital interests in Europe. They are willing to do their share to insure that the new Europe that is emerging remains stable. They understand a strategy that posits that we and the Europeans are in this together and that we will work together to defend shared interests—both in Europe and beyond.

What they will not understand is an arrangement in which the United States is asked to extend new security guarantees and expand budgetary commitments, to secure stability to Europe’s eastern half—while carrying, more or less on its own, the responsibility for defending common Western interests outside of Europe.

There are many other factors that could yet shape the U.S. politics of NATO enlargement. For example, if democratic reforms in the candidate states were to stall, the entire enlargement plan might be put on hold. Overall, however, while ratification of new NATO members may face many obstacles and pitfalls, proponents will likely succeed if their efforts are vigorous and well-coordinated and if the President demonstrates leadership.

The Senate, having encouraged the Administration—through legislation—to proceed with the inclusion of new members in the Alliance, must now strive to construct a bipartisan consensus and public support for NATO enlargement.