NATO1997     Year of Change

NATO Enlargement and the Role of Russia in Europe

Catherine McArdle Kelleher

The critical question, as NATO proceeds to enlargement at the Madrid Summit, is how enlargement and specifically the role of Russia and other states on the space of the former Soviet Union will find their place in the new European security framework.

It is, in fact, interesting and perhaps dramatic that the meeting will take place in Madrid, making decisions among the alliance members on the first candidates because, indeed, it is the revolution in Spain in the early 1980s that is the beginning of the process that we are seeing now. That revolution established a pattern whereby new democracies in Europe seal their status through membership in the complex regional political, economic, and security institutions that have been and continue to be so successful in guaranteeing peace and stability in the western European region for 40 years.

It is no surprise, nor is it really without a certain logic that Russia has strenuously opposed this enlargement. If one looks to the past for patterns, it is true that every time the alliance has enlarged, Russia has lodged an opposition, objections, and in some cases even raised real questions about the international legal basis on which this is being done. But this moment, a momentous one, is very different from those in the past.

First, NATO’s motivation, as the alliance understands it, is very different. We are not aiming at an external enemy. We are not adding very valuable geostrategic space to allow defense of our own territories. Rather, it is to extend to those democracies that are interested the possibility, the opportunity, and one must say both the benefits and the responsibilities of being involved in a cooperative security organization.

Second, NATO’s approach, not just to Russia but to all of the new democracies that have emerged since 1991, is based on this concept, that of cooperative security: the idea that we are all better off in the pattern of mutual cooperation—some closer cooperation, some less cooperation—than we would be in a situation in which we returned to a nationalization of national defense policy.

It is clear that the choice to enlarge is that of the alliance. It is not, nor should it be, the place of any power outside the alliance to determine who can and cannot join the alliance. What we are concerned about, and what we are currently negotiating, is what should be the relationship of this new expanded NATO to the remaining states in the European security space. Particularly, and most importantly, given Russia’s importance, its size, its status, its capabilities, is how can we manage a U.S.-Russian, and a NATO-Russian relationship, in a way that while Russia may never become a member of NATO—although the door will remain open—it does in fact remain in a positive, cooperative relationship with both the United States and Europe, to which it historically and geographically belongs.

Clearly, from the U.S. point of view, from the point of view of our allies, an engaged Europe is far better. It means that Russia adds its size, status, and weight to the management of European security as we understand it and promotes a level of stability and indeed predictability, and dare we say confidence and trust that we have found to be the essential ingredients of the European security system in the West. This means, however, that NATO cannot simply ignore Russian concerns about enlargement. Russia has been an important player in European security for 300 years, and it is likely to remain so. The alliance must do what it can in the process of enlargement to ensure that Russia’s legitimate concerns are satisfied and that it remains a force for stability and not for disruption. But NATO, and an expanding NATO, is a fact of life. The decision, as has been said many times, has been taken, and the alliance will enlarge. If Russia wants to have a constructive role in Europe, if it wants to have the cooperative partnership I have just outlined, it must in fact accept the inevitability of enlargement and work with—not against—the alliance in this process.

In past discussions that have become public concerning a robust and effective NATO-Russia relationship, the stated objections fall into five separate groups.

1. Enlargement presents an increased military challenge to Russia, particularly if it involves new deployments of nuclear and conventional forces and infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders.

2. Enlargement will further exclude Russia from European security decisionmaking, because enlargement will further NATO’s drive to become the dominant security organization.

3. Though difficult to understand, there is an argument that says that the umbrella afforded by the Article 5 guarantee to the allied partners of the indivisibility of alliance security will only encourage adventurism among new members and be a cause of anxiety for all those states who are outside of the security organization.

4. Enlargement will create a new and permanent dividing line in Europe, similar to that not at all lamented that was set down in 1948 and 1949.

5. An objection that perhaps strikes the greatest resonance in certain audiences is that enlargement will undermine democratic reform in Russia by strengthening the hands of anti-western elements in the Russian electorate.

The objection that seems to be most important is that enlargement will exclude Russia from European security decisions—a Russian fear of isolation in the post-Cold War security environment, from a nation that not only wants a voice in such decisions but indeed deserves them.

It is likely, however, that the problem that enlargement poses for Russia actually taps into far deeper concerns and that even if NATO were to fully address each of these specific arguments, as I hope indeed it will, Russia will still oppose enlargement. The fundamental problem seems to me one of political and, indeed, perhaps even political military approach. The decades of Cold War propaganda in which NATO was inevitably portrayed as a wolf about to gobble up unsuspecting victims has conditioned an image of NATO among Russian elites, as well Russian populations, to suspect that NATO is the same old organization. And these old habits die hard.

In a way, NATO has been the eternal enemy for Russian military leaders and, to a lesser extent, Russian political elite. It is very difficult to undo this image or to accept the fact which can be explained and demonstrated that NATO since 1991 is a very different organization, taking on not only new missions and new responsibilities but fundamentally adapting both its structures and its strategies to the new conditions of security in Europe.

Moreover, and perhaps the most difficult to say with Russian colleagues present, is, in fact, that NATO is dealing with a country that has gone through a series of very important, difficult events since 1991, some of which constitute negative blows to the power and prestige of a very proud nation. There was a real sense in which NATO enlargement, at least from this optic, appears to be the last in this steam of events. It has, in fact, been played upon not always by the most responsible of the critics in Moscow, but have exaggerated the threat, the military threat, posed by NATO enlargement and Russia’s ability to stop it.

NATO has not yet been as successful as it must be in communicating its new profile and its new missions to Russia. It is incumbent on us to ensure that these old habits and old images no longer reign or that information contradicting them is not widely available to those who wish to have it. NATO must also articulate in a way perhaps that has not yet been done clearly enough of what NATO is good for; how it fits in to the European security framework; why, indeed, enlargement constitutes a contribution to stabilization, not just of Russia’s western border but indeed as a method and a way of doing business that promotes peace and the rapid resolution of conflict before, in fact, it reaches a military stage.

The alliance has to elaborate how NATO fits within the web of European security organizations that also exist, primarily those in which Russia has professed particular interest like the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). New members must be urged to convincingly make the case for NATO enlargement, to articulate their own reasons for joining, and, indeed, the way in which they see themselves fitting into this broader security framework.

Regretfully, domestic politics in Russia have also played an enormous role in this debate so far. Strong opposition to NATO enlargement is not just an official position but indeed the mainstream position. Russian politicians see this as an important issue with which to gain domestic political support. And the idea of conciliation and of compromise is not one that is often heard in these discussions.

Is it possible, given this background, to address Russia’s concerns about NATO enlargement? Is it possible that Russia can be convinced that there is not only a worthy role, but a role that they should wish to play within this broadened European and expanded NATO? I, for one, believe there is.

Certainly, one strategy sure to be adopted by both sides is to fence off the enlargement debate from what is indeed a relatively cooperative set of NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian’s relationships that have been established since 1991. Trouble, disputes, disagreements, or even dissatisfaction over enlargement need not infect relations generally. We have many interests in common. And, indeed, Russia has played and will continue to play the role of one of the great powers in world politics, and the only major military force with which cooperation is necessary to ensure global stability. This is particularly true in questions of arms control in which agreements such as Start II, or even a potential Start III, should not be held hostage to the NATO debate and the particular outcome. There are far more important interests at stake for both sides than to allow further delay in the implementation of agreements that serve the interests of both sides.

Secondly, as the Bosnian experience shows, we can accomplish a great deal cooperatively as a positive force for stable outcomes and for outcomes which enhance the peace and security of the world generally. This is not a gift which Russia gives to us or a gift that we give to the Russians. This is merely the responsibility and indeed the right that must be exercised under any number of agreements and are in both our interests.

Moreover, there are practical ways, certainly in the U.S.-Russia channel, and increasingly possible within the NATO-Russia channel, in which concrete cooperation can be deepened and expanded. NATO has proposed to Russia—with some interest being shown—to establish military liaison missions in Brussels, in Mons, in Norfolk, and in Moscow. Russia needs to see NATO up close, to work with NATO, to replace the myth of a Cold War NATO with the reality of precise and practical cooperation, and so does NATO needs those things with respect to working with Russia.

We must, as I said before, articulate the reasons why a more inclusive NATO is in Russia’s interests as we enter the 21st century. OSCE is simply not enough. It is indeed a good organization with many functions, particularly those of pre-conflict, and it has done good and valuable work in terms of long duration missions and indeed in setting forth codes of conduct and other principles and guidelines along which international behavior is to be structured. But it is simply not a decisionmaking body. And it is not a body which has the capability, as was proven over and over again with respect to Bosnia to organize and deploy effective capability to either bring about crisis management or indeed peace enforcement.

Europe needs such an organization, one that can organize and deploy effective military force. Only NATO can do that.

NATO has been, as a way of doing business, an effective way of redirecting national rivalries toward common objectives and to, in fact, obviate the need for countries to take individual and often destabilizing steps to guarantee their own security. The renationalization of national defense is, in fact, perhaps the greatest threat at the moment to security and stability, particularly as emerging democracies face critical choices about how to structure their military forces, what missions to adopt, and how to form their own national strategies.

Greece and Turkey—and the often cold peace between them—may not be enormously compelling evidence that these rivalries and this nationalization of defense can, in fact, lead to continuous conflict. But it is evident how different the relations between those two countries would have been had they not been within the alliance, subject to both formal and informal norms requiring cooperation in resolving their rivalries.

There must be specific mechanisms, as are now under discussion, in which to demonstrate that a strong NATO is neither a threat nor an attempt to isolate Russia from its proper role on the continent. I think the NATO-Russian charter which is now under discussion provides at least a formal framework in which these relationships can go forward. Negotiations, as you know, have begun in earnest between Secretary-General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov. More-over, there are a number of bilateral discussions occurring between alliance countries and Russia.

We seem at least to be making some progress. And there is in this area much progress to be made. However, we are not asking for Russian’s assent or acquiescence. No matter how well managed the process, Russia will not see enlargement as a good thing. Yeltzin and Premacoff have both made this quite clear in recent statements. But the content and the form of the charter can, in fact, reflect what should be the basic relationship between NATO and Russia, one in which there is not only the impetus for consultation on issues of mutual concern but indeed the opportunity for the taking of joint action to include issuing joint declarations in those areas in which there is a common interest and a will to cooperate.

Both sides must realize, however, that is merely a mechanism. This is recognized as the special relationship for strategic partnership that NATO has, in fact, defined as the relationship it is seeking with Russia. It is the baseline. It is the vessel into which can be poured the cooperative efforts and the cooperative spirit to which I have alluded.

When we look broadly at the charter and the way that it will operate, the way in which practical and effective cooperation continue, we will indeed have reached a set of measurements, a set of goals for the NATO-Russian relationship, in which, even if it comes to an agreement to disagree, there is much that remains in common and much that must be preserved in terms of major interests in all areas.

The role of the other players in this dialogue—those seeking NATO membership, and those adopting hostile or confrontational attitudes toward NATO—also deserves attention. The critical case of Ukraine, Russia’s neighbor and historic subject, is in fact probably the issue in which there is not only the most interest but perhaps the place in which, again, creative solutions and a commitment to a cooperative approach are the most important elements of present policy.

Ukraine has a unique position among the newly independent states. It has strong historic and economic ties with Russia and a large proportion of its population uses Russian not only as its first language, but perhaps as an ethnic identity. It occupies a critical geostrategic position between Russia and eastern Europe. It is also by far the most populated of the NIS other than Russia. For many of the states that developed on the space of the former Soviet Union, as well as for central and eastern European neighbors it is the touchstone. Its independence and its territorial integrity are indicators of how far we have come from the cold world of the 1980s.

Ukraine has on a number of instances made clear its interest both in developing a closer relationship with NATO and in maintaining and improving its relations with Russia. It is not seeking NATO membership but is an active member in the Partnership for Peace and perhaps is the most active of the newly independent states in NATO exercises and NATO seminars. It has presented an interesting and stimulating proposal for its own charter with NATO to develop and flush out a special relationship that it foresees and wishes to have with NATO.

The North Atlantic Council in several recent meetings has expressed the alliance’s wish to develop a distinctive relationship with the Ukraine, and negotiations are now underway on a charter text.

Ukraine’s wish, however, is clearly to have close relations with both Russia and NATO and, at least from the perspective of the United States and NATO, this does not seem to be either a problem or a contradiction.

These ties to NATO are seen, as Ambassador Shcherbak said in a recent speech, to be close links that cement Ukraine’s status as a full-fledged member of the European family of democratic nations. Ukraine, itself, has not objected to enlargement. It has raised questions about the deployment of nuclear weapons which now seem to be satisfied. It has indeed resisted calls by others to call for a common front of confrontation to enlargement. There is a full understanding, at least as expressed by the leadership in Kiev, of the wish of other central and east European states to aspire to membership in the alliance. Our hope is not only that Ukraine maintains this wish to balance its relationships, but that as the NATO-Russia and the NATO-Ukraine relationships are developed in their separate charter, and as Russian and Ukrainian relationships normalize and become those of two ordinary countries, Ukraine will in fact emerge as an important node of both regional stability and as a model for the kind of cooperation which NATO seeks with all states that either do not aspire to membership or who choose to ensure cooperation through the Partnership for Peace.

The United States and NATO are interested in the democratic and economic development of all European and Eurasian partners that have come into that relationship since 1991. The best way that we have found to encourage democratic consolidation is to encourage cooperation, to draw in the states that have emerged since 1991 through the Partnership for Peace, through NATO intensive dialogues, and through bilateral relations. Engagement and cooperation are the keys to stability in Europe. And transparency and gradual steps toward confidence building and trust are the tools that we have found that will accomplish this.

Russia is and will be a major player in European security as it has been for the last 300 years. If engagement is the key to stability—our wish, our hope, our goal, is to keep Russia engaged. Russia should want this. From the U.S. perspective, Europe certainly wants this. The United States is committed to it. The devil, as in all of these things, is in the details. We have the wit and the wisdom to solve these questions, to arrive at—if not full and final resolutions—at least interim solutions that allow cooperation to go forward.