Expansion Ignores the Real Issues of European Security

by Sergei Karganov

Not every state sees NATO enlargement as a positive step toward peace and security for the whole of Europe. As a member of the Russian foreign policy establishment I offer these few harsh words as a partner and as a friend.

The decision to expand was, of course, one of the worst mistakes NATO could have possibly made. We have managed to dismantle the Cold War legacy relatively easily, in a very cooperative way, and relatively efficiently. And all of a sudden we are facing something like a farcical, false, and lightweight but nevertheless a repetition of it. I will not amuse you with 37 reasons why Russia is not interested in NATO expansion. However, one reason is that Russia is interested in keeping its Eastern and Central European neighbors and friends happy. There are a few other ways, however, of keeping them happy other than through NATO expansion; for instance, European Union membership. The argument that NATO expansion is needed to promote stability in the area is not acceptable. This is the most stable area in the world outside of Western Europe and North America. If you wanted to promote stability and to expand the zone of it, go to Russia, or Yugoslavia. The real problem now being created is not exactly that Russian democracy will die—or else Russia would be fearful of NATO expansion in military terms. There are some in Russia who are fearful. It is probable that the Russian population and Russian policy elite could be convinced that NATO expansion is not a big problem. However, there are a couple of real problems behind the NATO expansion. A major problem will be the creation of a real gray zone. And the real gray zone will be the Baltic States and partially Ukraine. I have no doubts that these countries will never become members of NATO because they have a security problem and a political problem, and the security and political problem they have isn’t Russia.

The Baltic states will be and are banging on the door because they know that they are in a very unpleasant geopolitical position. They have chosen to play an anti-Russian card, probably wrongly so—but that’s what they did, and they feel isolated, they feel themselves if not threatened then insecure. They are banging on the door and NATO’s expansion is at least creating a permanent political crisis after and if the first wave of expansion happens. If, however, somebody would ever think of trying to expand [into the Baltics], then we would have a first-class military-political crisis in Europe. Imagine after doing all that we have done to dismantle the Cold War, we would have a real problem.

If that happens, it would be a tragedy for the Baltic states and for European security as a whole. Instead of building a robust Euro-Atlantic system, we will introduce into it a permanently disturbing matter. Also the second problem, is that the expansion process is at least creating a defeated country. The Soviet Union and Russia dissembled willingly—and despite that fact we paid a dear price. We got out of the system of confrontation and we strengthened the foundation of democracy. Russia hoped to become a real partner with the West, with the countries which we considered to be those on which we could model, in the long term, our development. We paid dearly, but we thought it would be worth it in the end.

Now we see that our interests are blatantly neglected. We are not respected as a partner, and the hope of becoming a partner is waning among many segments of society.

Many of the Russian arguments against NATO enlargement are indeed idiosyncratic and psychopathic. But these arguments have been reigning or directing European policies over centuries. Most of the arguments that politicians, czars, and kings made over hundreds and thousands of years were psychopathic or idiosyncratic. They were real, they started wars, they started suffering, they inflicted many ills on the populations of Europe.

So, expansion is creating a "defeated country," or could create a defeated country—and we know what a defeated major power in Europe usually is. We are creating a country which is a visionist one. As a Russian, a European, and as a Euro-Russian I would not choose such a future for Russia.

The system that is being created on the ruins of what we had during the Cold War is fragile. Of course, you could prolong the life of NATO with a facelift or you could do something to other institutions. But we basically have entered a period of dismantling the old system which was created in 1948, 1953. That is a process for a generation, and inherently it will be a process of greater instability within the international system until we create a new one. The new system will have to be as robust as the previous one but [if established now] would cost [less] and would be a bit more constructive than the previous system both for the countries and the peoples affected.

I believed strongly that Russia would have a partnership with the West. If you look to the Far East Russia has, of course, the friendliest relations with China since the early 1950s—but we all know that China could become a problem for herself, and maybe for others, as we did during the process of transition. During the transition, which will last at least 20 to 30 years, many of our neighbors of the former Soviet Union will be inherently unstable. Of course, the stability of Russia—which has the best chances to live through and to become a robust economy and society—is also still not 100 percent, to say the least.

Worse, the debates over NATO expansion have distracted us from much more important issues, which should have been on our agenda. I have, as many friends here know, spent or rather wasted 15 years of my life on NATO, arms control, military strategy, etc. I am now spending more time on economics policy etc., and I know that these things matter more. Instead, I know that expansion is pushing us toward a relatively false issue. Of course there is a need to make Eastern and Central Europeans comfortable. Of course there is a need to keep NATO as long as possible. And Russia at this juncture is interested in NATO’s survival more than at any single point in its history. NATO’s not a threat and we know that. Even those who are saying that it is a threat know deep at heart that it is not. NATO is weaker than it used to be, and we have good relations with the United States and we are interested more than at any single point in our history in keeping the United States involved. I would not go into detail because I see German officers sitting here. Germany is, of course, the second most friendly country to Russia after China.

The problem with NATO expansion is that it not only distracts us from starting to build a new robust political-economic system for the 21st century, and a strategic system for the 21st century, but the debate is actually strangling cooperation between Russia and NATO. Partnership for Peace (PFP) was a good device. But it didn’t have a chance because people saw it as a possibility to postpone NATO expansion. When PFP didn’t stop NATO expansion it killed all political will in Russia to cooperate with PFP. We signed the agreement, but never implemented it in full.

The real issues which we are witnessing are geostrategic and that is our friendly integration of China and other major new powers. These issues are economic: possible stagnation in western Europe, and the necessity to create new markets for Europe and for Eastern and Central Europe and for Russia. These issues include telecommunications, ecology, terrorism, etc. We are not creating a robust system to deal with these issues of the 21st century. Instead, we are trying to adjust the institutions of the past.

I’ve made many friends—some of them are here—fighting over the International Nuclear Forces (INF) issue. A couple of months ago I was absolutely ashamed and flabbergasted over the fact that I forgot the number. I was shocked after spending four years fighting INF—I forgot the number. And that’s what we are doing now.

Of course, NATO could continue with the friendly information campaign, of trying to persuade Russian elites that expansion does not represent a threat. It is a waste of public money. Only two political clowns dared to speak for NATO expansion. Three years ago there would have been more, and some of them would be serious. Not a single liberal in Russia dares to speak for expansion. There will be no acquiescence.

The task of Russia is to limit, to the extent possible, the after effects of the possible decision to expand, and that should be the strategy of a friend helping partners to correct a blunder, limiting the effects of that mistake. So what could be the elements of our strategy? No signature of any charter, unless it is legally binding, unless it will have certain elements making it as expensive for all partners politically as possible so that the first or the second wave of expansion will not be considered at all. We should not overreact. Russia should look and put forward elements of the new system, which should be put on the agenda rather than only fighting over NATO expansion. What could be the new elements of the system? First, EU membership. Second, with the possible inclusion in the G8 of a couple of countries like China, and sooner or later a country like Poland as a representative of the Eastern and Central European nations—they have a right to be heard at this informal directorate. There should be common geostrategic strategies directed toward the outside world such as a common energy strategy instead of fighting with each other over small things like Caspian oil. We could increase the flow of oil and make money very easily—a Caspian deal would be part of it—simply by integrating Russia fully rather than just extracting her resources. We all know that the biggest source of oil is in Russian homes, which are not energy efficient—or Eastern and Central Europe or Ukraine. That is not help. That is a very sound business project.

Russia, NATO, and the Eastern and Central European states need a common economic strategy; a common anti-terrorist strategy; and, a common anti-mafia strategy. Because we have opened our society we are suffering from your mafia not less than you are from ours. If we really want to limit the transnational flow of narcotics, of dirty money, etc., we could and should devise a common strategy. Of course there should be a very strong security element in that system.

I do not share the views of my compatriots who believe that Russia should be a part of a collective system at all costs. What is a part of the collective system in Europe? There is no problem of security. I understand that in this crowd that is a very unpleasant statement. But the problem of security as we’ve had it during the previous several decades has been solved by the demise of communism, by the Soviet machine falling apart. We have tiny problems for which we do not need collective security. Of course, if you wish to defend Russia against a possible Chinese challenge, you are welcome. But I’m not sure you will do that. And also I believe that we’d be much better off to continue like we are, and that is to have friendly, deeply friendly relations and strategic cooperation with China rather than having a collective security system with Europe which will not defend any threat because there is no threat this collective security system would defend us against.

So, there should be a very robust system of defense and military cooperation in Europe, probably for peacekeeping, though I wonder where should we keep peace if we finish the business in Bosnia. Maybe I’m too optimistic, but I don’t see any hot bed of tension other than that. A brigade would be nice as a symbol of cooperation. But I’m not sure whether it’s useful or a proper use of taxpayer’s money. NATO is finished if it does not transform itself drastically from a defense alliance. And there is nobody to defend it against.

European security cannot revolve around the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because this is a child and it could not be the core of the European defense and security system whatever you do.

We have to create a new system. West European Union, NATO, maybe something else. We need to change our mentality, and to create a long-term plan for a political, economic, and security system for the 21st century.

I’m against the possibility of a Russian-NATO charter for all kinds of practical reasons. I believe that a first wave of NATO expansion will make it easier for the second wave. I am not even sure whether a legally binding treaty would be a solution, even if you put all the elements Russia wants into it.

But I’m not sure whether a treaty will be approved by the Russian parliament. Neither may the U.S. parliament approve NATO expansion. So we probably could have a treaty which is not ratified and which will actually not help but rather block for the possibilities of cooperation.

If we do not have a charter or treaty, we will have to live without it. But we could think about ways to compensate for it. After all, after Madrid the first wave of expansion will not be finished until April 1999. Russia and NATO could think about real economic, political cooperation, and Russia could, in principle, even go along with NATO expansion if it is not stoppable, though I hope we shall stop it. Still we might accept an expanded NATO as an intermediate system which will give us a few years of breathing space before Russia, NATO and the Eastern and Central European states start to build something constructive. So if, Russia and NATO sign a treaty, it should have what would be mildest for the treaty. First, such a treaty should have an obligatory character to be ratified by the parliaments of 17 countries, perhaps included as a package with the ratification of treaties for enlargement. Second start a real and deep strategic cooperation between Russia and NATO, including peacekeeping and peace enforcing. Third, more importantly, there should be an instrument where Russia would have a right to block the use of NATO force out of the North-Atlantic Treaty area in areas which have a direct impact on Russian security interests. Fourth, even more importantly, in perhaps a separate treaty with one of the countries of the North-Atlantic assembly, there should be a guarantee of non-expansion for at least 5 to 10 years—hopefully, in the meantime we would be able to create something like a new system of cooperation, which would make new expansion either redundant or less painful.

So, it should have, of course, an obligation for blocking NATO deployment of troops and weapons to new member states. It should envisage a freeze or decrease of troop levels in every group of countries, including Russia. It should envisage non-expansion of military infrastructure, especially construction of air fields and other infrastructure which could be used for defensive operations.

But, again, these are relatively minor issues. The big issue is whether we are able after this detour to start to build a new political, geostrategic and economic system for the 21st century.