NATO1997     Year of Change

A Ukrainian Perspective:  Implications for European Security Structures

Yuri M. Shcherbak

I would like to draw your attention to the issue of NATO enlargement. This issue has recently moved from the sphere of discussion and hypothetical statement to that of concrete political decision. In his speech in Detroit on October 22, 1996, President Clinton clearly formulated the goal of the United States: in 1999, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, and 10 years after the fall of the "Berlin wall," the first group of [former Warsaw Pact] countries will become full-fledged NATO members.

The NATO Ministerials of December 1996 supported this proposal and decided that at the Madrid Summit of the Alliance in July 1997 an invitation will be sent to one or several countries to join NATO, and respective negotiations will begin.

The issue of NATO enlargement has recently become the focus of attention of the Ukrainian leadership, which attaches the greatest importance to it. Ukrainian experts, in particular those from the National Security and Defense Council, indicate that most probably the countries of the first tranche to enter NATO will include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In this case Ukraine will have a common border with NATO stretching for 330 miles. If Slovakia and Romania are added to the process, the common border with NATO will have a length of 563 miles. Understandably, this will mean a sharp change in the geostrategic situation, not only of Ukraine, but of Europe at large.

In 1996 and the beginning of 1997, the question of NATO enlargement became the subject of numerous speeches by President Leonid Kuchma, National Security and Defense Council Secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hennadiy Udovenko; and other officials. During the talks in Washington last autumn, these issues were also the focus of intensive consideration for U.S. National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake; Secretary of State, Warren Christopher; Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott; Secretary of Defense, William Perry; and other U.S. administration representatives.

Ukraine’s stand on the issue of NATO enlargement is consistent, widely known, and very transparent:

1. Ukraine regards NATO as an alliance of democratic peace- loving countries, and one of the most effective structures for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Important for Ukraine is not only the defense organization of NATO, but also the political structures which foster the development of science and technology, information, and medical and humanitarian ties.

In the NATO-Ukraine Joint Press Statement of September 14, 1995, it was stated that:

The Ukrainian side highly appreciated the process of NATO’s continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of the Euro-Atlantic security. It was stressed that NATO played a vital role in the dialogue on political, military and security issues aimed at promoting a general climate of confidence in the Euro-Atlantic area. In promoting this climate, it was noted that special attention should be paid to strict respect for territorial integrity, existing borders, and rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Both sides shared the view that NATO enlargement should be directed at enhancing security of all countries in Europe without creating dividing lines and taking into account political and security development n the whole of Europe. Both sides also agreed that the further development of NATO-Ukraine relations will contribute to enhancing European security.

2. Ukraine does not oppose the expansion of NATO, because that is an objective process. We see the future of NATO as the gradual transformation of a predominantly defensive bloc into a Euro-Atlantic security structure for all European states. Ukraine does not consider NATO a potential enemy or threat to its interests. As the Ukrainian minister of defense declared, Ukraine will not move additional forces towards its western borders when NATO is enlarged eastward. The decision to enter military-political structures, including NATO, is the right of any nation, and no "third party" has a "veto" power over this decision.

3. To avoid new division lines in Europe, the principle of indivisibility of security should be observed. The primary national security interests of all interested nations, including non-bloc and neutral states, should thus be ensured. Ukraine is no exception. Its place in Europe, Ukraine’s non-bloc policy—directed at preventing the reappearance of bloc confrontation—demands that our interests be taken into consideration as fully as possible. NATO expansion should be a gradual, evolutionary, and transparent process; not a revolutionary action.

4. Ukraine was seriously concerned over the possibility of stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new member-states, and by territorial claims of certain candidates. Ukraine could not agree with even the theoretical possibility of the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of neighboring countries, when Ukraine had, as early as 1992, voluntarily withdrawn the tactical nuclear arms located on its own territory. Trying to avoid a return to the confrontations of the Cold War, President Kuchma proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, fully capitalizing on the withdrawal of such weapons from Ukraine, by shrinking the area where nuclear weapons are deployed. This is why we commend the declaration by the December 1996 NATO Ministerials that NATO has no plans, no intentions, and no reason to station nuclear weapons on the territory of future new member-states. Ukraine held intensive negotiations on the subject with NATO and its individual members, and is satisfied that Ukraine’s stand was fully taken into account by the Alliance.

5. Ukraine, the largest non-bloc country of Europe, will not necessarily retain its non-bloc status in the future. At the present, Ukraine does not want to join any military bloc (Tashkent or NATO). At the same time, as was stressed by Secretary Horbulin, of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, after his visit to Brussels last January, "Today we are not yet ready [to join NATO] but we do not exclude such a possibility." We can raise the issue of joining NATO at an appropriate time. However, Ukraine is not now ready to meet all the requirements put forward to candidates for NATO membership. If we have made significant progress with respect to such political requirements as the establishment of a democratic society, civil control of the military, good neighborly relations with adjacent countries, etc. We still have much to do to meet the approximately 1,800 technical requirements and criteria necessary for full-fledged membership in NATO.

According to a recent opinion poll, 36 percent of Ukrainians support the idea of joining NATO (15 percent think it should be done as soon as possible; 21 percent, sometime later), and only 19 percent are against the move, while 45 percent remain undecided. It is worthwhile to bear in mind that in December 1994 only 9 percent supported Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

"The Conception of National Security of Ukraine," which was adopted by Ukraine’s Parliament on January 16, 1997, defines as one of the principle tasks of state policy on national security, "participation in universal and regional security systems which exist already or are being established." Ukraine, actively expanding its "enhanced relationship" with NATO within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program, and beyond, hopes to establish a special partner- ship with the Alliance, which should result in the conclusion of a relevant document. We think that the process of political and military collaboration between NATO and Ukraine should not be linked with the development of relations between NATO and Russia. These two parallel activities should be pursued separately and independently. We hope that in the spring we will reach an understanding with the Alliance on the substance of a NATO-Ukraine document on our special relationship.

The December 1996 NATO Ministerial meeting acknowledged that the maintenance of Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is crucial to stability and security in Europe. It was recognized that Ukraine’s development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is an important aspect of the emerging European security architecture. NATO foreign ministers greatly valued the active participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace.

I want to remind you that cooperation within the PFP framework envisages the attainment of the following goals:

1. Promoting openness in national defense planning and forming the defense budget.

2. Providing democratic control over armed forces.

3. Maintaining the option and readiness to participate in the operations conducted under the UN auspices and/or within Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) responsibility, within the limits allowed by the Constitution.

4. Developing cooperative defense relations with NATO with the aim of joint planning and military training and exercises meant to raise their capability to fulfill tasks connected with peacekeeping activities, search and rescue operations, operations to provide humanitarian aid, and other goals which can soon be agreed upon.

5. Forming, in the long run, such armed forces as can better interact with the armed forces of NATO states.

The final stage of our joining the PFP is the preparation and conclusion of the individual partnership program between Ukraine and NATO, which stipulates concrete measures and actions in which Ukraine will participate.

During 1996, Ukraine took part in over 150 activities within the framework of PFP, including 17 military exercises. In 1997, the Ukrainian Armed Forces plans to take part in over 200 activities under this program. In June 1996, for the first time on Ukrainian territory, the PFP Peace Shield-96 exercises took place, involving troops from Ukraine, the United States, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and other participants. In August 1996, a marine platoon from Ukraine took part in the Cooperative Osprey-96 exercises in the United States. This platoon finished first among 16 participating units. Secretary William Perry, and Atlantic Command Chief, General John J. Sheehan noted the excellent preparation of the Ukrainian platoon. In 1997, Ukraine plans to invite high-level chiefs of staff to Ukraine for the Cooperative Neighbor-97 exercises.

In general, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in cooperation with the armed forces of 31 countries, concluded 127 bilateral agreements for military and defense cooperation.

To provide for regional stability and security during the first stage of NATO enlargement, and to avoid new division lines and confrontations in Europe, we consider it necessary to:

1. Guarantee the openness of NATO in the future under the slogan "NATO’s doors should not be closed to anyone."

2. Complement the process of NATO enlargement by deepening its cooperation with other structures and with all interested states of the region; that is, the alliance should be transformed in the direction of a structure for collective security, as has recently been stated by Secretary of State Warren Christopher during his trip to Germany.

3. Proceeding from the principle of indivisibility of security, to take into account the interests and concerns of all countries of the region. During NATO’s enlargement, Ukraine’s security interests should be taken into account. For Ukraine in this context, the following provisions matter most:

a. Assurance that none of the member states lays any territorial claims against Ukraine.

b. Non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of new-member states.

c. Establishment of a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO by the conclusion of a special bilateral document.

If the second of the above-mentioned issues can already be considered solved, the other two, as I mentioned, still require further consultations.

On the first issue we have the reassuring statement by the NATO ministers of foreign affairs that, "the maintenance of Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe."

On the third point, Ukraine has already submitted to NATO members its vision of a possible special partnership with the Alliance, and has submitted a Ukrainian draft of a possible document on this subject. Respective consultations are being carried out now, and we hope that the document will be ready for signature by the NATO Summit in Madrid.

Let me also draw your attention to the official visit of NATO’s Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Solana, to Kiev April 15-16, 1996. During this visit, the main topics included: 1) further enhancement of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, and elaboration of certain mechanisms for the implementation of the enhanced Ukraine-NATO relationship beyond the Partnership for Peace program and NACC activities; 2) regional security in Central and Eastern European countries and on the terrain of the former USSR, with consideration of possible NATO enlargement; and, 3) prospects for the establishment of the NATO Information Center an Kiev.

Ukraine stressed that it is interested in further developing active cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance, both within the framework of NACC activities and the PFP program, and in a wider format. Furthermore, Ukraine expressed its readiness to conclude a separate politically and legally binding agreement on special partnership relations between Ukraine and NATO. It was also stated that for the time being Ukraine’s accession to NATO is not on the agenda, though the non-aligned status of Ukraine should not be an obstacle to the comprehensive strengthening of Ukraine-NATO relations.

Ukraine neither opposes the idea of NATO enlargement on principle, nor considers it a threat to national security. At the same time, Ukraine believes that, while implementing this idea, our security interests must absolutely be taken into consideration. The whole process of NATO enlargement should be gradual, evolutionary, and transparent.

The Secretary-General was informed about the activities taking place in Ukraine for establishing an Interagency Working Group on the coordination of Ukraine’s participation in the PFP. Members of the NATO delegation met with the leadership of the Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, which has been suggested as a site for the NATO Information Center in Kiev.

The Secretary-General underscored the exceptional importance of further strengthening of the Ukraine-NATO relationship as a key factor to promoting stability and security in Europe. According to Mr. Solana, all Allies share the conviction that consolidation of an independent, stable and economically stable Ukraine is a crucial factor for strengthening European security.

The Secretary-General expressed his gratitude to the Government of Ukraine for its active participation in the NATO-led IFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in the UN operation in Eastern Slavonia.

He underlined the interests of NATO in comprehensive broadening cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in civil emergency planning, scientific, technological, and military fields.

Mr. Solana also expressed his understanding of Ukraine’s position on NATO enlargement and its concerns regarding the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new-member states, as well as respective reorientation of its military infrastructure. He declared that the issue of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new-member states "is not on the agenda."

Both parties agreed that Ukraine-NATO political dialogue, including within the "16+1" format, is to become permanent and regular.

Ukraine also considers the latest meeting of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee led by Zbigniew Brzezinski and First Deputy Minister of Ukraine Anton Buteiko with the participation of several prominent politicians from both sides as very important. Held in Kiev on October 10-11, 1996 the committee recommended urging:

1. NATO leaders to invite Ukraine to participate in the forth- coming NATO summit on Alliance enlargement.

2. the Ukrainian government and parliament to formulate a clear policy position concerning Kiev’s policy toward NATO in the short, mid, and long terms. Ukraine’s position and role as a "non-aligned" or "neutral" state should be clarified. In determining its future course, Ukraine should possess full freedom of choice.

3. the Ukrainian government to develop closer relations with individual NATO members (including possible security agreements), and not only with NATO as an institution. For example, the ministerial-level bilateral working groups between the United States and Ukraine can be expanded to deal with security-related issues such as energy, the environment, and Ukrainian ties with Western and Central Europe.

4. the U.S. government to facilitate early realization of the North Atlantic Council’s ministerial decision to establish a NATO information office in Kiev to better inform military personnel and ordinary civilians about the mission and operations of the Atlantic Alliance.

5. closer cooperation between Ukraine and the Western European Union (WEU) through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and participation in a range of WEU programs. The WEU must promptly provide Ukraine with associate partner status.

6. and, encouraging and helping Ukraine to enhance its cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program and beyond (16+1), in various spheres (military, political, environmental, nuclear non-proliferation, etc.). A bilateral document laying down the principles for this special form of cooperation should be formulated.

While expanding our partnership with NATO we also understand that it is still necessary to do much to consolidate Ukrainian society, reorienting its priorities with the aim of strengthening ties with trans-European structures, first transforming our economy and integrating it into the world market system

An important element of Ukraine’s strategy toward NATO is our interest in the development of equal and mutually advantageous ties with our largest neighbor, Russia, and in the development of a constructive cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The above mentioned facts and reflections testify to the following:

• Within the last year the position of Ukraine has further developed in favor of strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

• Ukraine will continue to secure its national interests by strongly opposing NATO membership for countries which have territorial claims against Ukraine.

• Ukraine highly appreciates actions made by NATO to take into account our position regarding non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new-member states. We consider this move to be eloquent evidence of enhanced cooperation between Ukraine and the Alliance,

• Ukraine is looking forward to concluding an agreement on special relations with NATO (for which Ukraine has already submitted a draft), which would envisage closer collaboration with the Alliance in political, defense, economic, and military-technical spheres, in the areas of science, technology, and the environment, in dealing with emergency situations, the information sphere, and other areas.