Concerns over the ponderous, if not glacial pace of NATO deliberations, committee activities, and military exercises during the Cold War are well known. In the 1990s, however, NATO has decisively and energetically moved toward new missions and broader international dialogue and engagement. For the fourth time since its founding, it has the potential to enlarge its membership.

NATO’s most significant achievements since the formation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 are not restricted to maintaining the military readiness that countered and outlasted the threats represented by the Warsaw Pact. Rather its achievements should be considered in the broader context of maintaining European and to no small extent, world peace and security.

The commitment of NATO member states to democracy, free market economics, and the peaceful resolution of disagreements among its members has led to European security and stability—truly NATO’s most crowning achievement. Historically, Central Europe has been the fuse of European conflict. Two world wars were ignited there; a third might have been, but for NATO. Today, Central and Eastern European nations are members of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and you find their military caps on the same coat racks at NATO headquarters as those of the 16 alliance states.

The NATO alliance has provided the framework upon which Western European and North American members have successfully woven peace, security, prosperity and stability—uniting the European states in a way never before thought possible, a way which may lead—in the near term—to a potentially unifying single European currency. In many ways NATO has created the necessary conditions from which the European Union, the Western European Union, the European Security Defense Identity, and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe could all continue to evolve. Is it any wonder then, as the Cold War ended and former communist states became fledgling democracies, that Central and Eastern European (CEE) states should seek that same peace, security, prosperity and stability enjoyed by NATO members? Neither is it surprising that NATO should seek to extend these qualities to qualified CEE applicants.

In March 1997 a symposium entitled "NATO: After the Madrid Summit," sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, was held at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. It challenged its participants to think beyond the issues of that month, well beyond the NATO heads of government summit in Madrid in July 1997. This volume is a collection of papers presented at that symposium in anticipation of the events that would unfold with the Madrid Summit.

The papers present ideas that are disparate in approach, both international and nationalistic, some political, some apolitical. They focus upon the issues of not only today’s NATO, but also tomorrow’s. The dialogue among the representatives of the 16 NATO nations and the 27 members of the Partnership for Peace will continue not only throughout this decade, but long into the next.

Perceptions of NATO and its future depend very much upon one’s national economies, military strength, and the political power of our legislative bodies. Critical to all of these are our own considerations as citizens, taxpayers, and providers of the manpower resources for our nations.

The political, ideological, civil-military, and economic changes in CEE states and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since 1989, the Gulf War, and the conflict in the Balkans have been seen by many as the forerunners of NATO’s evolving missions, doctrine, structures, and enlargement.

From the initial draft of the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991 (see appendix A) to the communique of the July 1997 NATO summit (see appendix A), the issue of whither NATO has been discussed on both sides of the Atlantic. The results of the dramatic changes in European and NATO history since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 will continue to be felt, not only by the baby boomers and their parents, but by succeeding generations as well.

Several authors recognized that an issue as important as enlargement is evolving as rapidly as enlargement itself. The changes that have occurred within Europe since 1989—as well as shrinking defense budgets—are shifting the roles of the United States and the European members of NATO. David Gompert believes two issues are fundamental to these changing roles. First, NATO’s strategic purpose is changing from a focus on the defense and security of Western Europe to defending shared vital interests—even when those interests exist outside the geographical extent of the region. Second, how should NATO redistribute its command responsibilities now that neither U.S. dominance nor European dependence on U.S. strength can be justified?

Redistributing command responsibilities became a contentious issue as France sought to place a European as the commander of AFSOUTH. The United States insisted on retaining command because AFSOUTH’s largest force is the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Ronald Tiersky views the issue not as an isolated grab for control by the French but as part of the larger issue of the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI). NATO’s European members want a more equitable distribution of command responsibilities, and the United States needs its European partners to shoulder a more equitable proportion of the defense of common interests—in and out of the region.

Stanley Sloan examines the beginnings of this ESDI, the initial alarm with which the United States greeted it, its context within NATO, and its possible benefits to the Alliance and the United States.

Turning to the Western European Union, Graham Messervy-Whiting describes this organization as a potentially strengthening bridge between the Alliance and the European Union.

The primary issue at the Madrid Summit was not whether or not to enlarge, but rather which states would be invited to open accession talks with NATO. James Steinberg reviews the U.S. approach to the Madrid Summit, the issues of enlargement, and the importance of the United States and NATO building relationships with Russia and the other non-NATO European states.

Resource costs and the security burdens of enlargement will be of particular concern to the member parliaments as they consider ratification of enlargement. Simon Lunn discusses these concerns and concludes that the member states are likely to ratify enlargement.

Senator Richard Lugar recognized that an important aspect of NATO enlargement lies in the requirement for the U.S. Congress and NATO member parliaments to ratify the enlargement. He explains issues of significant interest to the U.S. Senate consent. He also reviews the importance of maintaining U.S.-Russia relations while guarding against constraints or vetoes on NATO’s decisionmaking by non-NATO states.

Catherine Kelleher argues that neither the United States nor other NATO members want Russia isolated or recast as a rival on a par with the former Soviet Union. The keys to stability in Europe are engagement and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states, including Russia and Ukraine. The effort to improve Europe’s stability must include Russia in a constructive role. While NATO does not need Moscow’s assent to enlarge, engagement is necessary to ensure Russian cooperation and consultation on issues of mutual concern to the peace and security of the continent.

The view from Russia, as described by Sergei Karganov, naturally differs from the Alliance perspective. He explains Russia’s arguments against enlargement. Yet, the views from Yuri Shcherbak, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, and from Andrzej Karkozka, the Secretary of State of Poland’s Ministry of Defense, provide a perspective shared by many in former Soviet republics. Ambassador Shcherbak expresses Ukraine’s interest in maintaining good relations with both NATO and Russia, avoiding the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, insuring that all European states have a continuing opportunity to seek NATO membership, while also insuring that each sovereign state has the right to enter whatever military-political structures it may desire without any "third-power" having a right to veto such relationships. Secretary Karkozka recognized the benefits of NATO’s enlargement process, including the growth of democracy and free-market economies within those states that are seeking NATO membership. He noted that the enlargement process had led to increased stability in the region as long-standing disagreements between several European states were resolved in the prospect of honoring the principles of peace idealized by the NATO alliance.

As the Madrid Summit neared it became apparent that accession talks would be offered to only a few of the CEE states actively seeking NATO membership. Constantin Ionescu describes Romania’s ardent desire to be among the invited states. He also explains a concern that states that are excluded from the first round of enlargement will be left in a security vacuum. Such security vacuums, he argues, will slow the move to free market economies because a greater share of the GDP will be needed to ensure defense requirements—accession, with its military expenses, would be less expensive.

Jeffrey Simon makes a case for not leaving "failed suitors" with a sense of exclusion and leaving the door open for future expansion as suitors meet the necessary democratic and free market requirements.

NATO’s deployment to the Balkans was its first operational non-exercise deployment, its first out-of-area deployment, and its first use of the Combined Jointed Task Force (CJTF)—which had been just a concept when deployment was first considered. Charles Barry reviews the effect that Bosnian operations have had on NATO’s command and force structure. The Bosnian operations have been highly successful and have actually been the proving ground for the CJTF concept presenting valuable lessons in civil-military affairs, logistics, and communications.

The difficulties and complexity of communications in the Balkans are the particular focus of Larry Wentz. He reviews C3I, civil-military coordination, public information, and technology issues.

While the Madrid Summit and NATO enlargement are celebrations of the stability that the Alliance brings to Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, all may not be well, according to David Hale. He writes that NATO’s health and European stability cannot be taken for granted. Hale notes that socio-economic weaknesses exist, that such weaknesses existed prior to and helped precipitate World War II, and that the security of Europe could be undermined by such weaknesses in the not so distant future.