NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCES WITH U.N. CIVILIAN POLICE OPERATIONS

Introduction

This paper is a Nordic perspective of the increasing role of international public security support. After briefly placing the subject in the wider context of peace operations, it outlines the experience of a small, but active U.N. Member State, Norway, and the way in which it is adapting to the changing demands in this specific field. From there it goes on to discuss some of the major questions in the public security debate in light of the Norwegian (and Nordic) experiences with this type of operation. It concludes with a few comments on how the UNCIVPOL system could be further strengthened in the years to come.¹

The public security project emphasizes the importance of looking into the “microsecurity” dimension of modern, complex peace operations. It is widely recognized today that in order to be able to assist a country torn by internal strife in its transition from war to peace, the emphasis cannot solely be with the military element, however important, nor exclusively with the various humanitarian and developmental efforts aiming at reconstruction and reconciliation. As has been pointed out elsewhere, a public security gap frequently arises between the two. Where one used to apply peacekeeping troops to monitor a negotiated border between two distinct statelike units, the challenge was to maintain the respect for that new international border, not to assist the internal law and order mechanisms of the two parties. Where a political settlement has to take place internally, however, such simple demarcation lines are seldom applicable, or at least not the main problem. In post-civil war communities, groups that were recently fighting are now expected to live together.

This has a series of new implications for an international peace operation. Over and over again, we have seen that when the artillery surrounding a city is silenced, the security challenge to the individual citizens is not removed but rather transformed. Crime, rampage, and demands for revenge flourish in such a climate. Frequently, demobilized fighters who come back to civilian life meet a harsh reality of rejection, unemployment, and loss of status compared to that which they enjoyed as combatants. In many areas of the world, these are among the first to become involved in criminal activity, together with political leaders who got their power through the conflict and are more than reluctant to give it away.

Simultaneously, such immediate post-civil war societies are often characterized by lack of an appropriate and benign native police force and judiciary. In some cases the functions of the former state system may have collapsed altogether; in other cases it might be intact but associated with the “old regime” and perceived as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

This type of climate is extremely hostile to long-term development initiatives. Without a basic feeling of security among civilians, few efforts will be channeled into reconstruction and fresh investment. It is hardly surprising that an individual—for instance, a refugee who has just returned from abroad—will think twice about investing scarce capital into something that is likely to be taken away the next day by armed bandits. At the end of the day, the many individual decisions that citizens make under “normal” conditions—such as building a house, investing in local industry, marrying, or raising children—are always taken with some kind of calculation about the future in mind. If one does not believe in a peaceful future where a minimum of security for life and property is ensured, people will not focus on these decisions. Thus, a vicious circle is introduced where peace does not come along because people do not believe it will come. In such situations, much of the capital locally available is saved for the eventuality of having to escape from a return to hostilities, and thus even existing capital is not circulated into the local economy. Nor are such climates particularly attractive to foreign capital investments. Much of the link between security and development lies here. The security- first approach often referred to in African contexts addresses precisely this problem. The path back to “normalcy” passes through the (re)establishment of public security in the form of police forces designed for public service, independent judiciaries, and penal systems.

The recognition of this particular dimension of complex peace operations has led to a “new wave” of international police efforts over the last 7 to 8 years. Since the UNTAG operation in Namibia in 1989-90, the United Nations has rapidly increased its emphasis on international police and judiciary support.² The current number of police personnel serving with the United Nations is approximately 3,000. In addition, lawyers and criminal investigation experts serve in field missions or assist national judiciaries.

At the United Nations, this has led to the establishment of a dedicated CIVPOL unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which, together with the UNDPKO Training Unit, is responsible for the selection and preparation of officers for deployment as U.N. civilian police. As will be argued later in the paper, a more dedicated approach to both selection and training has brought a clear improvement over the last few years, after some quite obvious mistakes had been made at earlier crossroads, particularly in the field of recruiting the right personnel.

Likewise, individual contributing countries are adapting and developing their own systems of selection and training of police officers for international service. This paper intends to look closer at Norway’s efforts in this respect. In doing that, we are not arguing that Norway represents a unique model. Rather, the paper should be seen as a specific case-study of a more general development. Much of what will be said about Norway’s model here will in broad terms also be valid for a series of other small and medium-sized Western countries, not the least the other members of the Nordic family.³

Norway’s Commitment to U.N. Peacekeeping

Norway is a long-standing contributor to international peacekeeping operations. It has contributed since the very beginning of U.N. peacekeeping. Over the almost 50 years that have passed, Norwegian troops or observers have participated in around half the U.N. peacekeeping operations. The total number of Norwegians who have served as military servicemen and women in U.N. uniform exceeds 55,000. As recruitment has taken place from all over the country, one will hardly find a village where no one has served with the United Nations. In other Nordic countries, figures are roughly the same, hence, peacekeeping has become a household word. In addition, there are large numbers of people who have participated over the years on related missions, such as humanitarian relief operations. On the civilian side, the Norwegian Refugee Council handles a system of rapid deployment of humanitarian relief personnel. Currently, some 300 to 400 people are “on call” on the Norwegian team list of experts; many are ready to go to a crisis situation on 72-hours notice.

In Norway, support of the United Nations is widespread and almost an apolitical topic. In fact, there is no political party in parliament that has suggested substantial cuts in either financial or personnel contributions to U.N. peacekeeping.

For the Norwegian Armed Forces, peacekeeping has increasingly come to be understood as an integral part of their raison d’etre. From initially viewing peacekeeping as an activity on the side of the “real” tasks of the military, the Armed Forces have adapted to the post-Cold War by increasing their efforts in training and other preparations for peace operations and through establishing an International Competence Center with specific responsibilities in this respect. Similar processes have taken place in other Nordic countries. The country that most enthusiastically has adapted, however, is Denmark, which is undergoing a major restructuring of its military forces in order to make international operations their prime rationale.

For decades, the Nordic countries have co-operated in the field of peacekeeping, particularly with respect to training activities. Through the Nordic Committee of U.N. (peacekeeping) Co-operation (NorSamFN), the training tasks have been divided in such a way that Finland has trained the military observers; Norway, the logistics officers; Denmark, the military police; and Sweden, the staff officers.

Over the last few years, this co-operation has increased. In the Balkans, there has been an integrated Nordic battalion in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) for 4 years. A similar arrangement existed during UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Since the introduction of IFOR/SFOR, there has been a Nordic-Polish brigade in the Multinational Division North in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At home, this has inspired the decision to establish the so-called Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangements for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). NORDCAPS is to become a modular system for the rapid establishment of joint Nordic units up to the size of a reinforced brigade, to be used for future U.N. or NATO peace operations.

All Nordic countries base their defense on a system of conscription. There are, therefore, no “professional” soldiers to send to international peace operations. Hence, soldiers typically are volunteers who have applied for international service, some during the last stage of their draft, but the vast majority several years after their initial service. Thus the Nordic units have a higher average age than many other counties. Within the Nordic community, it is believed that given the specific tasks to be conducted in peacekeeping operations, some “life experience” is a benefit when the soldiers are, for instance, to negotiate with the local population in tense situations.⁴

The fact that most men have served in the military, combined with the lack of a professional army, implies that there are few signs of a distinct military culture apart from the civilian population. In complex operations, the typical male, humanitarian aid worker has a personal experience with military service, because many military personnel are or have been actively involved in civil society organizations. Cooperation among them therefore is facilitated, an advantage not always prevalent elsewhere. Lately, the close relationship between the military and humanitarian sectors has even led to joint exercises: The military-NGO joint exercise Nordic Peace in May 1997 brought together a full ad hoc Nordic battalion with four major relief NGOs in an “ethnic conflict” scenario in Northern Norway. As far as we know, this was the world’s first military-civilian exercise of its kind. At Nordic Peace, police participants only observed the exercises, but in the next Nordic Peace exercise to be held in Finland in 1998, an active police component will be included.

Norwegian CIVPOL Contributions

When the peacekeeping focus shifted from interstate to intrastate conflict, and the question of a U.N. police force was brought up, Norway decided to contribute some 20 police officers to the UNTAG operation in Namibia. Since then, Norwegian police have participated in ONUSAL (El Salvador) with some 5 officers, the Balkans operations (UNPROFOR, UNCRO, U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, IPTF) with some 150 officers, UNTAC (Cambodia) with 31, ONUMOZ (Mozambique) with 11, and MINURSO (Western Sahara) with 5 officers. All in all, approximately 220 of Norway’s 8,000 police officers have served with UNCIVPOL in 11 different missions. In addition, others have been involved in planning, support and training for U.N. missions at home and in international organizations. Currently, Norwegian police officers serve with the UNDPKO as well as with the West European Union.

Below, we will first present the way Norway currently recruits and trains its U.N. police personnel. Thereafter, with a basis in Norwegian experiences and thinking in the field, we will discuss some of the general conceptual challenges the United Nations faces in this area, before we go on to discuss possible improvements in the CIVPOL system.

Recruitment and Training

All Norwegian police officers receive 3 years of education and training at the National Police Academy. To enter the Academy, secondary school must be completed, and male candidates must have fulfilled their military service. In addition, a large number of police cadets have completed the military’s junior officer course. Among those who serve in CIVPOL, the number of police officers with junior officer training is relatively higher than among police officers in general. This ensures that policemen, like most other Norwegian males, have a basic understanding of the military system. Among women in the police, there is a clear overrepresentation of persons with military background as well, typically a 2-year noncommissioned officer course.⁵ The high number of police officers with a military background is seen as an asset in situations where international police have to work closely with military peacekeepers in the field.

International service is based on applications to join specific police missions. No police officer can be commanded to serve internationally.⁶ To be selected for U.N. police service, the candidate has to go through a selection process that is tailored to the requirements of the U.N. DPKO training unit. They must have at least 8 years of varied police experience after completing the Academy, good mental and physical health, good driving skills (including four-wheel drive practice), good language skills (English plus the mission language), basic computer knowledge, and the capacity to write good police reports. Furthermore, they must hold values and attitudes toward other cultures consistent with U.N. principles.

A selection team, consisting of one representative of the Ministry of Justice, one of the National Police Academy, and a police chief commissioner, then interviews the applicants. The interview takes not only professional skills into account but also poses questions concerning the family situation of the candidate in order to ensure that a mission abroad does not inflict too much strain on the candidate’s private life. As the selection process is relatively strict, a significant number of applicants fail and are not sent to international service.

Those who fulfil the requirements may apply for the basic U.N. course at the National Police Academy. The course adheres to the guidelines issued by the U.N. DPKO Training Unit. It lasts 2 weeks and includes theoretical as well as practical elements. At the end of the course, a field exercise is organized. The most recent course was conducted in English primarily to allow foreign participants to be included, but it also serves to familiarize participants with a foreign language milieu prior to deployment. (The most recent course included participants from Africa.)

The second round of training takes place just before deployment. The duration of the training is 1 week, and includes information about the mission mandate; the history, culture and geography of the mission area; and the conflict that triggered the mission. Upon their return, participants take part in a 3-day debriefing.

Training of Norwegian CIVPOL recruits is organized by the Ministry of Justice through the U.N. coordinator’s office. (Norway has a national police force but no national police chief; hence the national co-ordinating body is the Ministry.) The Norwegian training model differs from the Swedes, who channel their police through the country’s center for military peacekeeping training, the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT). The argument in favor of this model is that it promotes a higher level of co-operation between the two services. U.N. policemen are administered by the Armed Forces while undergoing training and U.N. service, and then transferred back to their police district after completing their service. A Government white paper has recently suggested, however, that the U.N. police resources in Sweden be transferred to the National Police Board and that courses be held at the National Police Academy.⁷ Currently, the Swedish and the Norwegian academies are looking into the possibility of closer co-operation on the basic course model.

Norwegian CIVPOL

Experiences and Perspectives

Generally, Norwegian experience has indicated that civilian police support is a valuable and constructive extension of international peacekeeping, given the character of contemporary conflicts. However, many lessons have been learned about which approaches work and which do not.

First and foremost, we have learned that there is a high degree of confusion about the CIVPOL concept among member states, the local population in the mission areas, military and civilian “mission colleagues,” and even among CIVPOL personnel themselves. Misunderstandings and lack of clarity about the mandate and the mission can at best be a hindrance to an effective peace implementation process and, at worse, prove disastrous for the mission and the people involved. There is a strong need to improve the understanding of what the role of civilian police is in the wider context of peacekeeping operations.

We increasingly experienced a problem related to the very name “civilian police.” Whereas the word originally was introduced to distinguish police officers from military police, it might be a flawed concept, as UNCIVPOL operations almost never have executive powers. It is only logical that if foreign people turn up in police uniforms and police vehicles and call themselves police, the local population will expect them to behave as if they were the police. Over and over again, frustrations have been generated when CIVPOL officers have confined themselves to taking notes rather than intervening in situations such as local police harassment of citizens. The local people can hardly be expected to differentiate between the roles of observing and executing police powers. Media are often confused by the concept as well. Repeatedly, international media, like CNN, have reported that “the U.N. police are not doing a proper job,” as they, too, seem to expect that UNCIVPOL are there to enforce “the law.” Norwegian and other CIVPOL personnel have repeatedly reported that being present and expected to intervene—but without a mandate to do so—has been the most frustrating part of their field work.

The main tasks of international police officers in peacekeeping operations are to monitor the local police (reporting on their activities to international institutions, co-locating with them, etc.) or to train and assist them. Perhaps the role they are to play should be reflected in the very title of their mission. If they are to be police observers or monitors, why not call the mission UNCIVPOL observers or UNCIVPOL monitors.⁸ Obviously, performing such roles requires police experience, but other skills may be requested as well (e.g., human rights competence). Here we see a parallel to the existing model of U.N. military observers. A U.N. military observer (UNMO) is often a high-ranking military officer, but he or she operates alone or in small teams, unarmed, and without any executive authority. In contrast to UNCIVPOL, the title UNMO seems better to reflect the actual work being conducted, which basically is reporting on military activity in the mission area. Again, to perform that job requires military knowledge (there is little use in sending someone to report on troop movements who cannot distinguish a tank from an APC), but it is not a military job per se.

Once CIVPOL observers or monitors themselves understand their role, with its implications and limitations, it is of paramount importance to inform other actors about that role and to establish a good working relationship with them. It is of particular importance to make the local population and local authorities aware of why there is a U.N. police mission in their area.

CIVPOL officers are often deployed in very small teams in masses of potentially hostile people and are usually far outnumbered by the local security forces. Only in exceptional cases can they rely on the international military presence to perform “point security” for their benefit. Their personal security, therefore, depends primarily on the co-operation of the local community and secondarily on general “area security” provided by international military forces. When international military forces take on a more proactive role against parts of the local population, the international police become potential “soft targets.” Local groups who want to protest an international military action would be prudent to avoid firing on an Abrams tank but would likely seek other ways to take revenge. In such situations, a well-established working relationship with local authorities, as well as maintenance of a clear distinction between the UNCIVPOL and the international military presence, might be the best source of security available.

UNCIVPOL officers are typically unarmed, and calls to provide them with weapons are not heard within the Norwegian peacekeeping community. Introducing arms—even only for self-defense—may incorrectly signal enforcement authority. In a typical immediate postwar situation, small arms are flourishing, particularly automatic rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The typical sidearm of the policeman has little to offer in combat against more heavily armed civilians with recent war experience. It is a common feeling among the Nordic countries that the police officers in peace operations are in fact better protected by not being armed. Heavy weapons, then, should be left for the military presence.

In Norway, the police are unarmed during normal operations, such as patrolling and carrying out arrests. Only in extreme situations is permission given to arm the officers, and each case is later reported and investigated by a special commission in order to keep the use of weapons as limited as possible. Hence, Norwegian policemen come to the mission area prepared mediate disputes. Again, this is perceived as a beneficial experience in UNCIVPOL work.

If the mandate gives international police a more proactive role, on the other hand, one might want to reconsider the armaments question. Theoretically, two paths then become available: Equipping the police with appropriate armaments (possibly of a paramilitary nature in hostile environments), or enhancing the police-military cooperation within the mission, as in the form of joint patrols.

Which path to choose obviously depends on the specific situation of each mission. The first one, arming the U.N. police, would require recruitment from countries with established paramilitary police forces, like the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Italian carabinieri, or the French gendarmerie. There would most likely not be any role for Nordic police forces in such paramilitary operations, because of a lack of experience with this kind of activity. As the potential opponents of such a police force would be well armed and trained, the force would need to be quite heavily armed and protected and might eventually become quite indistinguishable from a military peace enforcement mission.

The other path, integrating more closely with the international military presence while maintaining a clear distinction in the mission mandates, may in many situations be a better solution for the desire to introduce a more proactive public security role. Very interesting developments are currently taking place between NATO’s SFOR and the U.N. IPTF in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A system of joint patrolling has developed where the IPTF in fact is “borrowing” enforcement authority from SFOR. A typical joint patrol consists of an IPTF vehicle followed by three SFOR vehicles, of which at least one is an APC. It is still the IPTF officers who, for instance, inspect a local police station for illegal armaments or ask for the removal of a checkpoint, but it is SFOR who represents the enforcement capacity if needed. In many situations, the very presence of SFOR has been sufficient to make the IPTF’s possible opponents comply. This model has been developed without having to go beyond the two missions’ formal mandates. The IPTF still does not do enforcement, and SFOR already had provisions to “provide a secure environment for the civilian implementation process,” to disarm armed civilians, and to “provide freedom of movement in the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” What has developed is simply a more flexible manner of applying the mandates and of doing it in coordination. It is yet another example of the constructive “mission creep” that has taken place within IFOR/SFOR since the beginning of the Dayton peace process.⁹

Drawing on the SFOR-IPTF cooperative model, we would suggest that rather than arming the police, the enforcement role is better left to the one institution that can do that effectively in a potentially hostile environment, which is the military peacekeeping force. As military peace forces are rapidly learning—in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere—many of the tasks they may have to conduct in tense postwar environments resemble tasks that traditionally are associated with police forces. An example may be riot control, for which infantry troops are normally not trained. Possibly future peacekeeping training of military forces may include this kind of operation, and police experience may be drawn upon in the training for and conduct of such operations. For instance, the Norwegian infantry battalion in Multinational Division North in Bosnia has received advice and practical help from IPTF officers in the handling of civilian crowds.

The environment we are talking about here is not one where classical distinctions between combatants and noncombatants are easily applied. Many of the alleged “civilian” crowds that stir up trouble, attack returning refugees, etc., are actually military and police personnel in plain clothes, whereas the “combatants” as such often live a “civilian” life between the battles. Whether a given situation involves armed persons is typically very difficult to determine at the outset. For instance, the status of armed children or armed gangs is not very clear if we try to apply international humanitarian law. The distinction between police and military tasks during a peace operation may have to be reconsidered.

The military, at least in more “robust” operations like the one currently underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina, have a completely different degree of escalation control than does a police force. It is often forgotten that in well-functioning societies, the police normally do not need to apply force physically, precisely because the threat is already credible. The perpetrator normally knows that somewhere behind the friendly unarmed Norwegian policeman is the overwhelming power of the state. This “invisible backup” is key to the credibility of his authority even if he does not bring it with him. The other key is that most citizens support the law most of the time and are even prepared to assist the community policeman when necessary. In contrast, in a undefined, partly chaotic, post-civil war situation, the uniform itself does not convey authority. Credibility must be demonstrated locally. One of the reasons NATO troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been drawn into any major combat situation to date, whereas UNPROFOR was repeatedly attacked and actually lost quite a number of lives, is that IFOR made its capacity to escalate credible. From day one, there have been heavy artillery and attack helicopters moving around in pure displays of force. The lesson learned is that if one wants to threaten with force, one had better be prepared to use it when challenged, or credibility will be lost. In the context of international police support, the lesson is that a police officer cannot simply be deployed, without backup, and receive the same respect or reaction as they do “at home.” At home, the police officer is the lowest but most visible element of the “authority chain.” Abroad, the officer might easily be quite alone on the job.

Law Enforcement Needs a Native Basis

New models of cooperation between international police and military peacekeeping forces may help make the native police comply with the peace accords, and in some situations, avoid local turbulence involving opposing groups of (alleged) civilians. However, as a general rule, law and order functions, including that of policing a local population, must be based on the mission country’s own institutions. The idea that international CIVPOL personnel should conduct local policing is futile, except in very exceptional cases.

Enforcement of law and order must be connected to a legitimate judiciary and penal system. There is little use in detaining perpetrators, for instance, if there is no court to take them to or no prison in which to put them. A legitimate and impartial police force needs a native backing, an impartial judiciary, and an impartial prison system. Making such institutions work is a very important element of a postconflict settlement. Hence the United Nations and others put special emphasis on assistance in training, restructuring, and developing such systems. It is hardly desirable to have two such systems operating at cross purposes in the same area, one being international, the other homegrown. We should stick therefore to the principle of monitoring and assisting local police authorities as much as possible and avoid using international cops to police a local population.

There may, however, be cases where law and order cannot be maintained by local authorities, either because they no longer exist, are completely illegitimate, or fractionated. Torn-apart or “failed states” may sometimes represent such a picture of total anarchy. In principle, the international community may decide to introduce certain minimal state functions in such situations, in the interest of the local population and of a long-term return to peace. That route, however, should then go via the establishment of a protectorate or occupation government. It is a dangerous misconception that one can enforce law and order in isolation from the other elements of the public security triad of police, judiciary, and penal system described above. An internationally mandated occupation government may combine these functions. There may be situations where the majority of the local population welcomes such an arrangements as the lesser evil, as it, for instance, keeps war from returning. Still, few people would want such a model to persist for a very long time. It easily becomes very costly to conduct, and public support might easily deteriorate. If economic growth, for instance, is delayed for some time, the population might blame the foreign government, and the cry to expel the foreign occupiers might become an easy rallying ground for native political leaders. The international community may shy away from situations requiring such involvement. The only viable approach, therefore, would be to form a transitional authority that from the very first day starts planning for a future withdrawal and re-establishment of a locally founded government.

As a general proposition, the international community may either assist a local government in its law and order functions or choose to take over the government, but intermediate solutions may prove futile. Involving oneself in actual policing, for instance, including the detention of perpetrators, but then leaving the detainee to the local authorities for punishment may turn out to be disastrous either for the individual in question, the prestige of the international police force, or both. If the international community involves itself in such acts, it must also take the moral responsibility for the future fate of the persons detained. In some settings, this means ensuring that the physical treatment of and legal process for a detainee are consistent with international human rights covenants and legitimate native laws. In other settings, the local detainee might actually have committed an offense but be protected by a corrupt or politically governed local court system and hence be freed instead of being put on trial. Both situations illustrate the problems of having a police force based on an international mandate and a judiciary and penal system based on local political realities.

The failure to understand that there is no “middle ground” here is reflected in a series of unrealistic and ill-informed suggestions about how to improve the CIVPOL system. The idea that the UNCIVPOL as they exist today should take a more proactive role in, for instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, has frequently been brought up in the discussions both in 1996 and 1997 about a post-IFOR/post-SFOR situation in that country. Both NATO’s Secretary-General Javier Solana and U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen have suggested an increased U.N. IPTF role as an answer to a reduced NATO role. It is crucial to recognize, however, that this is not simply a matter of swapping one for the other.

Arresting War Criminals

When it comes to arresting suspected war criminals sought by an international tribunal, the case is different. Here, we do not see the same principal objections against international bodies conducting search and arrest, as the legal framework where the court trial and possible punishment will take place itself is internationally mandated. However, this does not in itself give the UNCIVPOL executive powers. Again, the first choice would be to have the local authorities arrest the suspects—as they are obliged to do by international law and often by the peace agreement—or the job must be carried out by international bodies that have both enforcement authority and the actual means to conduct such an operation. This points once again toward a military peacekeeping force.

Norwegian conceptual thinking in the field of developing police support operations, therefore, indicates that a move toward more enforcement power for CIVPOL should be rejected, but that the role of monitoring and training should be enhanced. We see the U.N. mission to El Salvador as a good example of a model to develop further: By concentrating on developing the curriculum and assisting in the training of police recruits at the police academy, CIVPOL concentrates on improving local capabilities and bringing them more in line with international human rights regulations. It also involves a “train the trainers” approach, which is frequently sought by the Nordic governments in order to make the initiatives sustainable. Assistance in the restructuring of local police forces such as in Eastern Slavonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina are other examples of such models.

This emphasis puts high demands on the police officers who are to conduct the monitoring or training of the local police. It is important to remember that as a general rule, UNCIVPOL officers are professional police officers, not professional police monitors. Being a good police officer, for instance, does not imply that one is also a good educator. More specific tailoring of personnel for the mission seems warranted. If this means fewer people will be available, then quality should take priority over quantity.

Whichever model is chosen, respect for the local population and authorities as well as a high degree of cultural sensitivity is an inescapable dimension of any police support operation. A good understanding of the international human rights system is paramount. Functions like training and monitoring require that local officers trust the sincerity and professionalism of their international counterparts. There have been cases where the skills and experiences of international police officers have been clearly inferior to local officers. Too many stories have been reported about CIVPOL officers deployed in a mission area with no language skills, no driving experience, and no familiarity whatsoever with the concept of human rights. Such cases easily undermine the operation as a whole. The professional quality of the individual officer is particularly important in CIVPOL work because, in contrast to military peacekeepers, CIVPOL deploy in very small teams and operate very close to local police officers.¹⁰

DPKO has adapted to negative feedback and improved the selection system for international CIVPOL personnel. A system of Selection Assistance Teams and Training Assistance Teams that are sent to the contributing countries before the officers are selected and sent to the mission area has been introduced. Whereas in the first contingents many of the officers provided were clearly below the minimum standards required, the introduction of these measures has substantially improved the picture.

Suggestions for Future Improvements

Norwegian authorities are actively involved in attempts to improve the UNCIVPOL system.¹¹ The general impression is that the CIVPOL unit is well aware of the possible shortcomings in the system. Authorities in Norway feel that rather than changing the existing procedures and norms, the challenge is to support the work going on at DPKO and to encourage contributing countries to stick to the recommendations that already exist. The Selection Assistance Teams approach could even be considered for the selection of other types of peacekeeping personnel, for instance, UNMOs. Norway also supports the move toward more standard international training, either through the exchange of trainers between different countries’ training centers or through actually training future CIVPOL personnel in international settings.

With stricter application of selection principles, a possible consequence may be that fewer people will be eligible for CIVPOL missions. This should not lead to a weakening of the requirements but rather to an open recognition from the United Nations that priority should be given to quality rather than quantity. It may not be the case, however, that everyone involved in, for instance, the establishment of a new national police academy in a war-torn country needs to be a police officer: for instance, those who are to teach human rights could be selected from professional sectors other than the police community.

There is no universal key to how to make good CIVPOL officers. Training courses need further tailoring to meet the specific needs of each mission. However, basic “modules” may be developed according to tasks to be fulfilled. Initiatives are currently underway to increase Nordic co-operation in such training and to open Nordic courses to non-Nordic participants.

Improvements should also be made when it comes to presenting the CIVPOL role and limitations to the local population, local authorities, international military and civilian “colleagues” in the mission area, and the international community. This is increasingly becoming an integral part of international military missions, which by definition are larger and come much better prepared to conduct information campaigns (or, more precisely, psychological operations). It is important to ensure that these also take the information needs of the CIVPOL contingents into account or, as a minimum, seek to avoid contributing to misunderstandings of the role of the U.N. police. It is a fact of life that the CIVPOL often will be the junior partner to the military in complex peace support operations, so one might as well prepare for such situations right from the start.

The time it takes to recruit CIVPOL personnel and equipment and bring them to the theater is often all too long. From the time a mandate is given by the U.N. Security Council until actual deployment in the field may often extend to several months. In the meantime, the local situation might have deteriorated and the operation becomes both more difficult and costly. Norwegian authorities have, therefore, contemplated the idea of establishing a small, rapid deployment capacity within the CIVPOL sector.¹² This could consist of, at the least, a rapidly deployable headquarters (RDHQ) and some equipment, particularly four-wheel drive vehicles and radio transmitters.

When discussing an increase in CIVPOL activity, one frequently runs into the problem that few countries have many “spare” policemen to send without creating problems in their home institution. Whereas states living in peace keep military forces for the eventuality of other times, police forces are needed every day, and few countries seem to think that they have too many of them. Particularly scarce are those most sought after for U.N. missions (e.g., senior personnel like commissioners and instructors with special skills). Member states with a national police force might establish a reserve available for international service. This has recently been suggested in the Swedish debate, where the government white paper on reforming Sweden’s UNCIVPOL contribution includes a suggestion of allocating 150 extra positions in Sweden’s police force for CIVPOL contributions.¹³ Similar ideas are being discussed in Norway, but no official decision has been taken yet in either country.

The Swedish white paper also suggests that the CIVPOL label be changed to police monitors or police advisers to better relate to what the international police contingents are actually doing and to avoid misunderstandings and false impressions. It is most likely that a Swedish proposal in this direction at the United Nations would gain Norway’s official support.

It seems that international public security assistance has come to stay. More and more peace support operations take place after civil wars, and many typically take place where the previous regime used its police forces for public control rather than for public service. Whereas the classical, first generation peacekeeping operation was about re-establishing something resembling the status quo ante (i.e., the situation preceding the war), today’s operations involve managing change. At the same time, the international community is striving to avoid a return to hostilities and assisting in constructing a new political system that is both more democratic and able to stand on its own feet in the long run. A judiciary and prison system is an integral part of achieving a legitimate, sound, and effective police force. It deserves the attention of all those interested in enhancing the international community’s ability to achieve and maintain peace. Furthermore, there should be no doubt that such activity should be rooted in the U.N. Charter and co-ordinated by the United Nations. Precisely because international police assistance easily runs the risk of being associated with neo-imperialism or great power interference by its critics, it needs an internationally recognized mandate and provisions to ensure that it does not become a cover-up for less altruistic activity.¹⁴ This principle in no way excludes subcontracting but just ensures that the international community as a collective keeps some kind of track of the contents of such activity.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SWEDISH COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACTIVITIES

Background

On December 19, 1996, the Government of Sweden decided to appoint a special commission with the task of proposing guidelines for contributions by civilian police in international activities. As a basis, the commission was tasked to report, analyze, and evaluate the contributions made to date by Swedish civilian policemen in international actions. Further, they were asked to estimate the future international demand for Swedish participation with civilian police. Finally, the commission was expected to present a proposal for how the activity involving Swedish civilian police should be organized and administered.

On January 16, 1997, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hjelm-Wallén appointed the former Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defense, Nils Gunnar Billinger, as special investigator. The Deputy Assistant Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Helena Lindström; the Directors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malin Kärre, Elisabeth Borsiin Bonnier, Staffan Carlsson, and Johan Molander; and the Director at the Ministry of Defense, Nils Daag, were assigned as experts to the Commission. The Principal Administrative Officer at the County Administrative Board in Uppsala, Sune Lindh, was appointed secretary.

On May 27, 1997, the Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Herman af Trolle; the Associate Judge of Appeal, Tomas Zander; the Senior Administrative Officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Johanna Brismar Skoog, and Cecilia Ruthström-Ruin, the then-Senior Administrative Officer at the Ministry of Defense; Lars Schmidt; the Chief Superintendent at the National Police Board, Michael Jorsback; the Principal Administrative Officer at the Swedish Defence Command, Nils-Ivar Tetting; and the Program Officers at the Swedish International Development Authority, Margareta Eliasson and Henrik Hammargren, were also assigned as experts, effective as of February 1, 1997. On April 16, 1997, the Senior Clerical Officer at the Foreign Ministry, Margareta Pllg, was assigned to be the assistant of the Commission, effective March 24, 1997.

The Commission submitted its completed report, Police in the Service of Peace, in June 1997. The Government of Sweden has kindly given permission for a translation of the concluding chapter of the 12-part report to be included here. The conclusions contain a number of important insights, observations, and recommendations for national governments and the United Nations as to how international police assistance can be enhanced.

CONSIDERATIONS, ESTIMATES, AND PROPOSALS

The Need for Guidelines for Police Work

Peace-promoting efforts during recent years have to an increasing extent taken place in response to internal conflicts where the legal system has been weakened or has collapsed, thus the role and mandate of international police efforts have been subject to discussion and analysis. The task of this investigation is to propose guidelines for the role of the police in peace-promoting activities, to analyze the question of armament, and to consider the responsibility for different tasks concerning civil security and order, while national judicial authorities are being built up or reconstructed.

Several peace-promotion missions since the first Congo operation have included different forms of police activity, from advice to local police forces to active cooperation in maintaining law and order. Most of this work has been carried out by police who have been part of a civilian police unit (CIVPOL) in a peace-promotion mission established by the United Nations. Although police are included as an important element in peace-promotion efforts and although this activity has continued for several decades, guidelines for this type of activity have been deficient or lacking. Mandates give only a general direction, and documents which describe tasks and responsibilities vary in stature from resolutions adopted by the Security Council to local agreements. In Sweden, civilian police activities have been treated only in general terms by the government. Guidelines or doctrines are lacking for how police work shall be designed and how public security shall be maintained in a peace-promotion operation. The responsibility for specifying tasks and guidelines has been given to those who have had active responsibility in each mission. Nor, until most recently, has police work been subject to analysis and intensive international debate about peace-promoting efforts.

A further reason why it is necessary to clarify the concept of police work is that traditional “civilian police efforts” are often hindered by incorrect expectations. The primary aim of traditional civilian police efforts has been to monitor, guide, and educate the local police, not to create security for the local population through direct contributions to the maintenance of law and order, which is often expected.

Most of the conflicts motivating peace-promoting contributions today are domestic. Civil wars are certainly no new phenomenon, but the number of domestic conflicts has increased dramatically during recent years. Many of these new conflicts are to a great extent multidimensional. This means that, besides political and armed antagonism between the parties, they have radical social and sometimes also international ramifications, e.g., ethnic purging, other serious crimes against human rights, refugee flows, and actions by irregular military units. In many cases, the conflict has progressed so far that the social structure is close to collapse or has collapsed. The police system and other judicial authorities have ceased to function or have lost the confidence of the people. The consequences for the civil population are in most cases very serious.

Monitoring and ensuring the observance of human rights have become increasingly important tasks in peace-promoting efforts. The security of the civil population is a basic condition for rebuilding a society after a conflict. In all peace-promoting activities, work with such security questions, therefore, assumes a central place. Security can be achieved for the local population through intervention by international peace-promoting forces. These can also in certain cases take responsibility for maintaining law and order before national judicial authorities have been created or reconstructed and before confidence in these has been re-established. If a peace-promoting mission succeeds in the task of creating a stable and secure environment, the possibility of succeeding in other effective and long-term measures improves considerably.

New Concepts

Proposal

A unit with police in peace-promoting or similar activities should be called an International Police Force or where appropriate a U.N. Police Force. The individual police officer should be called a police observer or police adviser or should be given another title which corresponds to the task.

Considerations

The concept of “civilian police activities” is imprecise and should be replaced by the concept of International Police Activities. The force should be designated an International Police Force or where appropriate a U.N. Police Force. In the documents which regulate the activity in the conflict area, a distinction should be made between Police Observer and Police Adviser. These concepts should be used both in multilateral work and within the framework of bilateral work. The Commission notes that developments are already taking place in this direction, and Sweden should act for a continued separation of these concepts. A police presence in peace-promoting activities has during the 1990s become so common that it is no longer justifiable to use the word “civilian” to distinguish these police from military police. In everyday Swedish, the term “civilian police” is not used either.

The Character and Development of Conflicts

Considerations

In connection with the establishment of a peace-promoting mission, the categories currently given by the United Nations and other organs are used to describe the character and purpose of the action. Concepts such as peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building indicate roughly what type of contribution is required and what authority the force has. In the inquiries made to member countries about contributions to peace-promoting activities, military units and police contingents are spoken of in general terms. In certain U.N. operations, forces consisting of police were recruited and sent to the mission area without the decision having been preceded by sufficient analysis of the problems to be solved or tasks to be accomplished. To increase efficiency and the probability of success, better analysis is required both of the problems to be solved and of the contributions and authority required. A comprehensive and long-term view must be developed so that peace-promoting measures and aid measures can be linked together to increase efficiency and minimize the costs.

One part of this task is to analyze the character and development of a conflict. There is no unambiguous way of describing and analyzing a conflict process; all conflicts are unique. It is, however, possible to describe schematically the different levels or different phases of a conflict. Different phases and levels can overlap each other. A crisis development is not linear; setbacks can occur. Nor is a crisis always equally serious in all parts of the crisis area.

Common to the many conflicts subjected to peace-promoting measures is that they require an input of different components with different tasks. The actions thereby become multifunctional. The mission components can vary between different conflicts and over time within a conflict.

The Initial or Chaotic Phase

In a situation characterized by open fighting and fragmentation or dissolution of the national authority or police force, the first important task is to create basic stability and security. This is in general a task for military units. Different armed groups can be separated and disarmed only by units acting under military emergency powers.

Even after open fighting has ceased, military units can be required. The situation can, for example, be disturbed by serious riots and domestic armed groups. Because of the firepower these large or small groups often possess, this is a task for military units. If the legal system is weak, the forces which arrive first may also need to take responsibility for creating law and order.

The Completion or Normalization Phase

In order to be able to complete a peace-promoting effort, a reasonably functioning state governed by law with relevant authorities must have been recreated. In the task of creating a new police and judicial system, an international police force has an important task. Above all, it can supervise the national police and contribute to establishing principles for how a policeman shall act in a just society. The involvement can take place either as a multinational contribution or as a bilateral contribution. An international police force can also collaborate in the appointment of a new police corps and assist with education and equipment.

The Grey Zone

Between the task of creating security and the task of participating in rebuilding a judicial system there is a grey zone. It can either be described as a gap between different functions or as a gap across time between different contributions. In a situation where a national authority or legal apparatus has not yet begun to function and where individuals or groups use gross violence for political or criminal reasons, international peace-promoting actions are required to maintain security for the local population and for aid workers.

In such a grey zone, the international military units have the given task of monitoring domestic military units and arms depots, maintaining separation zones, etc. The international police force also has a given task in monitoring and participating in the reconstruction of an often weak national police force. The task of assisting in the maintenance of order and security for the population has a tendency in such situations to fall between the task of the military force and that of the police force.

Important Tasks in a Peace-Promoting Mission

In order to specify the type of contribution and the mandate which are required to reach a goal, there is reason to describe, from an analysis of the conflict concerned, the concrete tasks for an international force consisting of military units, police, judicial experts and other specialists. Examples of such tasks are:

Category A

Category B

Category C (the Grey Zone)

Category D

Category E

Tasks under Category A can be carried out by diplomats, military observers, or police observers. For such work, people are often recruited who have a long experience and good skills in mediation and negotiation.

Tasks under Category B can only be carried out by military units. For several of these tasks, a mandate is required which allows the use of violence other than in self-defense (i.e., a mandate which is based on Chapter VII in the U.N. Charter).

Tasks under Category D are carried out by police. To fulfill these tasks, they have no executive authority but act as monitors, observers, advisers and educators. Other civilian experts within the legal field are also required to rebuild a legal system.

Tasks under Category E are carried out by civilian experts, such as monitors of human rights and aid workers. In the Swedish case, recruiting has in certain cases intentionally taken place within the police system. The tasks under Category E are under certain conditions carried out together with an international police force which acts in the area.

Tasks under Category C, the “grey zone,” involve the creation of security and order for the population. The tasks can be carried out by military units, police and soldiers in cooperation or by gendarmes and soldiers in cooperation. Contributions of this kind can require a mandate with certain elements of authorization according to Chapter VII in the U.N. Charter. This argument is developed in a later section.

Legal Basis for Peace-Promoting Work

All exercise of power in a peace-promoting or similar mission must build on a legal foundation connected to international legal regulations [described in “The Legal Basis for International Intervention,” of the Commission’s report]. A characteristic feature of a civil war or crisis is that the legal system does not function. The civilian population has often lost confidence in the legal apparatus and in the legislation which exists. The police and military may even be accomplices in serious crimes in violation of both human rights and national legislation. In certain cases, the social structure may have collapsed totally and anarchy may prevail.

In situations where local legal apparatus do not exist or cannot fulfill its task, a peace-promoting force, regardless of whether it consists of military units or police, faces great difficulties. In these situations, it is often unclear whether the authorities indicated in the mandate and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) constitute sufficient legal support to intervene and protect the population. It is further often unclear according to which national law one shall act.

In more difficult cases, the international peace-promoting forces must act under emergency powers described in the mandate. When the legal apparatus has collapsed or has otherwise lost its legitimacy, the task can be limited to monitoring respect for human rights. It may even be necessary in certain cases to start from an agreed minimum level regarding law and rights. This can mean intervention against gross violations of human rights and humanity laws such as murder, kidnaping, rape, and gross property crimes. The degree of intervention that can be applied must in such cases rest completely on international law. If it is a question of a U.N. operation, or an operation mandated by the U.N. Security Council, it should be possible to derive this authority from chapter VI or VII in the U.N. Charter. This means that the command lines must be so clear that it is possible to derive the responsibility for measures taken in the field all the way up to the organ that has given the mission its mandate.

In the final phase of a conflict, or in less serious situations in a conflict, there is in general a national law from which to start. The aim of all peace-promoting activity must be that, when the mission is completed, there shall exist a national judicial system that functions and a national law to follow. Even during an ongoing mission, the main rule shall be to start from the national judicial system. The task for the international operation then becomes to monitor local legal authorities’ adherence to the established legal order. This is usually a task for police observers and police advisers. Another possibility is that the host country gives an international force the right to exercise authority. In such cases, the individual international police officers act within the legal system of the host country.

The Task of Creating Security and Order

Definitions and Problem Formulation

Considerations. In a previous section [of the Commission Report], it was established that in any decision regarding peace-promoting efforts, it is essential to define at an early stage, and before the mission begins, those tasks are to be addressed. Concurrently, attention should be given to the question of which instruments (components in a peace operation) can tackle the tasks involved. It is important that the organization issuing the mandate (the United Nations) understands that there can be urgent tasks for which none of the traditionally available components is especially trained or suitable. If a decision is made to establish a peace-promoting mission, all participants should be aware of these “grey zones.” The organization giving the mandate should make an effort to quickly find, or develop a component which can solve the tasks which arise within the “grey zones.” This report will discusses the choice of a component for tackling the task of creating order and security.

Basic Differences: Policeman/Gendarme/Soldier. In Sweden, as in other democracies, the division of responsibility between the police and military is clearly defined in law. The task of the military is to protect the country against external threats. The police are recruited, educated, and organized to maintain law and order within the country. The police have certain forcible means at their disposal. They can, with legal support, employ force which shall, however, always be in proportion to what the situation requires. The police are the only civilian organ that in peacetime can legitimately use violence in its exercise of power. Military personnel have in peacetime such authority only in cases indicated in the Ordinance (1982:756) concerning intervention of the Swedish Military Command organization in the event of a violation of Swedish territory during peace and neutrality (Instruction for the Armed Forces in Peace and Neutrality, the IKFN ordinance).

A judicial state is characterized, for example, by the exercise of power that takes place with the support of laws which are decided upon in a democratic manner. A national police force, therefore, acts in a politically controlled environment where questions about legal authority, power, and control are important elements. For the police to be able to act, they must have the confidence of the people. This can be attained only if there are generally accepted laws and other statutes which control the activity of both the citizens and the police. Further, it is generally required that individual officers have wide experience and good judgement and that they use their intuition in the executive role.

Swedish police who participate in peace-promoting activities have a good insight into and understanding of work within the law. They are accustomed to working singly or in small groups. On the other hand, they have little experience working in units such as platoons or companies or creating security and order in environments characterized by heavy violence.

Swedish police are normally equipped only with pistols. Use of weapons is strictly controlled, and police may use only the degree of violence proportional to the situation. This means that police can use their weapons in certain cases.

Swedish military units are trained and organized for fighting under military laws against a military opponent. Military personnel usually work in units, not singly. The units consist of platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades. Military personnel are not assumed to have any knowledge about sections of the law under which general order is maintained during peacetime, nor are they trained in such tasks. Swedish U.N.-units consist mainly of persons who have undergone basic military training later complemented with a shorter period of training for peace-promoting activities.

In several countries, a special form of police force, gendarmes, has been created to act outside both the police and military systems. Gendarme forces have evident military characteristics; for example, they are trained to act in units. They are intended to act domestically and are responsible for internal order in situations involving riots or heavy violence.

Grey Zone. Thus, there is no force that can “naturally” be given the task of creating security and order. Experience from several peace-promoting missions in the past decade shows that a grey zone often develops in a situation where none of the components in an international peace-promoting force is trained or otherwise prepared to create order and security. This obstructs and delays the effort to give the subjected country security and conditions for democratic development.

There are several reasons why none of the parties in a peace-promoting mission addresses or is inclined to deal with the urgent task of creating order and security. Often the task is not mentioned in the mandate or in any other tasking document. This can be attributed to a hesitance on the part of the police and troop contributing countries to undertake such a task. The legal basis for executive tasks is often unclear. The creation of order and security also assumes that there is a functioning judicial apparatus (i.e., a prosecutor system, courts, and prisons). A further reason can be an unwillingness in the host country to allow foreign personnel to carry out these tasks. Accordingly, no preparations are made to tackle such tasks by either international police forces or military units.

Among military personnel, both within and outside Sweden, there is great reluctance to assume responsibility for security and order in a civil environment. Military personnel lack education, training, and experience in such situations. There is a risk that military methods used in a civil environment may escalate the conflict to uncontrollable proportions. It further conflicts with democratic practice for military personnel to be responsible for civil security and order.

Gendarme forces have never been deployed in international peace-keeping missions. On the other hand, several countries have recruited gendarmes as participants in international police forces. Gendarme tasks and organizational structure differ country to country. This makes it doubtful that an international organization would be able to create an international gendarme force for peace-promoting activities at a reasonable cost.

According to many analysts, a basic condition for police observers and police advisers to monitor, educate, and advise local police successfully is that they are unarmed, live among the population, and are perceived to be impartial. If they were given more arms and had executive tasks in riots and disturbances, their ability to successfully perform ordinary tasks would probably decrease.

Order and Security in Peace-Promoting Work. Nevertheless, it is necessary that a force in certain peace-promoting missions is tasked with participation in the maintenance of order and security. Such efforts must be based on international law. A peace-promoting mission in a failed state ravaged by civil war or plagued by irregular units is placed in a situation where the division of responsibility between military and police, as in a Western state governed by law, is not always applicable.

The task of creating security and order in the initial phase of such a mission can be carried out only by military units. Later phases, when the open fighting has ceased and an internationally supervised peace process has begun, often see violence and lawlessness still occurring during the transition period. Groups that have a lot to lose from a peace can carry out more or less open fighting to regain lost territory. In these situations, national authorities able to oppose this violence are often lacking. Anxiety and fear of reprisals are common among the population.

In such a situation, the task of creating security and order can be at least partly carried out by military units or in collaboration with a deployed international police force or by an international gendarme force. On the other hand, the task cannot generally be given to an unarmed or a lightly armed international police force. The heavy armament that is often found in illegal “gangs” and the low threshold that exists for the use of violence make it difficult for an unarmed or lightly armed international police force to have any effect. Such a force runs the risk of being ignored or of provoking the use of violence, because armed civilians or groups command such heavy weapons that only a unit with military training and equipment can challenge the threats. Further, only the military can respond to riots and disturbances arising from these situations. Military units assigned such tasks as a rule have undertaken them without enthusiasm. Sometimes, the mission has not been accomplished, which has led to great suffering for the civilian population.

Increased Preparedness for Police Tasks in

Military Units

Proposal. Organizations issuing mandates need to indicate clearly what responsibility the mission components have for maintaining order and security for the population.

Military units involved in peace-promoting work should, to a greater extent, be prepared to cooperate, when required, in maintaining order and security for the local population. They should be trained for this task by instructors who are police officers and include posts which are manned by police officers

Further, it should be possible under certain circumstances to place military personnel in peace-promoting missions who are trained and prepared to maintain order and security in the mission area, under police command when this type of mission is required. The Government should assign to the Swedish Military Command and the National Police Board the task of studying more closely the conditions for giving military units such missions.

Considerations. The Commission concludes that police observers and police advisers should continue to perform the tasks entrusted to them so far (i.e., to monitor, educate, and give advice to the local police). It is not suitable to assign executive [law enforcement tasks] that might jeopardize these missions. Only in a few countries are police educated and trained to act in units, which is necessary to defeat an uprising or to take action against armed “gangs.” The number of police from each police-contributing country is usually small enough to allow training for these kinds of tasks in the home country before departure; exercises and training carried out in the conflict area risk taking too much attention away from the main task.

The investigation also establishes that internationally recruited gendarme forces could probably be manned only by countries that have national gendarmes. It would cause considerable problems to coordinate the armament, work methods, and leadership of such a force. If the force were assigned heavy weapons and vehicles, a condition to succeed with this type of task, it would mean that a force would be built largely parallel to the military component in peace-promoting mission. This would mean further costs for the United Nations and other organizations involved.

The Commission further considers that it is not acceptable that an internationally composed peace-promoting mission be delayed or even become impossible to carry out as a consequence of violence and terrorism from irregular units or other armed assailants. The “grey zone,” where none of the components included in the mission has or perceives itself to have a responsibility for maintaining order and security for the population, must be made as small as possible and preferably be eliminated completely. Because the Commission has already rejected the possibility of giving tasks of this character to international police departments or gendarmes, it remains to test the possibility of giving military units in peace-promoting activities increased preparedness to execute certain tasks that, in a national perspective, are policing duties.

Military units in peace-promoting missions already fulfill some of the requirements of a force tasked to maintain order and security for the local population: the ability to work in a unit, access to weapons and armored vehicles, secured barracks, and an internationally recognized staff and leadership organization comparable among troop-contributing countries. The military units often monitor regular military units and armistice lines and monitor or sometimes disarm one party in the conflict or guard weapon depots. The methods used to perform these tasks could often be applied to irregular units or armed “gangs.” It is therefore understandable that military units in peace-promoting missions have already been assigned tasks of this kind. The Commission judges that this also will take place in the future and that this is a suitable task for military units, provided that they are prepared for the task and the mandate permits this.

The Commission concludes that Sweden should train military units recruited to serve in peace-promoting activities so that they can participate in performing certain tasks in the area of maintaining order. It must be clear that this training is intended for use only in work abroad. The task shall be performed within the framework of what the United Nations or some other international organization has decided. Education of this type should not be done during basic military education.

It is natural for the Swedish Military Command to employ experts from the Swedish police to provide this education. Within the police system, there is a documented knowledge of how to handle so-called special occurrences such as violent demonstrations, riots, and sports violence. By adding such knowledge to military education, the possibility of using military units in peace-promoting missions to maintain security and order increases, if permitted by the mandate.

A military unit strives to have personnel in its organization who possess required expert knowledge for solving all imaginable tasks. A unit which can be assigned police tasks should, therefore, in its organization include posts intended for police officers. These should be able to participate both in the planning and performance of tasks of a police character. Examples of this can already be found in certain foreign battalions that act in peace-promoting missions. The police’s tactical experience and ability to mediate and create confidence among the civilian population should be exploited in military units with responsibility for civil security and order in their mandate. These police officers should be organizationally included in the military unit and consequently wear military uniforms.

Regarding the operational management of a police contribution to a military unit in connection with a riot, careful consideration should be given to whether the regular military commander should temporarily transfer operational control to a police officer. Several considerations should be weighed against each other, for example, the ability to make a professional estimate of the situation and the importance of continuity and consistency in the exercise of command. The Commission estimates that, in most cases, it would be appropriate for the regular commander to retain command, but that the police officials’ opinion should be given decisive importance when orders are given. The Commission does not, however, reject the possibility that, in certain situations, it may be more suitable to have command temporarily taken over by a police officer. The conditions for this should be stated in advance, and the police officer who in such a case shall assume command should, of course, have been given the opportunity to carry out training exercises with the unit during the training period in Sweden.

The requirement for this type of measure has been demonstrated in several ongoing and recently completed missions. It is therefore important that Sweden act in an international context so that more countries carry out similar arrangements. This increases prospects for creating more versatile peace-promoting missions by reducing a troublesome “grey zone.”

The Commission recommends that the Government ask the Swedish Military Command and the National Police Board to investigate carefully the circumstances when military units assume police tasks, as described above. In this context, the need for additional education for peace-promoting forces and the related costs should also be addressed.

The Responsibility of International Police Forces for Order and Security

Considerations. Although their main task is to monitor, educate, and guide the local police, police in peace-promoting activities can play a greater role than ever to create and maintain order and security for the population. Police included in an international force often have great experience with negotiation and mediation. Through their presence, they can also contribute to creating order. This can be facilitated through deliberate proactive behavior. This means that the police display great mobility within their field and utilize flexible methods to prevent improper action by local police.

In connection with the large refugee flows in parts of Africa during the 1990s, armed militia sometimes infiltrated refugee camps and caused further suffering for already severely tried people. The prospects for handling this and other refugee-related problems should, for example, be an aspect of doctrinal development.

Through good relations with the local population and authorities and through close collaboration with the political components of a mission, conditions for an early identification of local problems and their causes can be improved. Police observers can then be effectively used to mediate between the parties and thereby defuse an uneasy situation. For such tasks, experienced police officers should be recruited.

To reinforce the effect of proactive behavior by the police, military units can use a highly visible presence to support police work in certain situations. The importance of a police force for public security can thus be reinforced through close cooperation with military units. This can take place through joint planning and by having high flexibility and mobility in both the military and the police components of the mission. The responsibility for achieving this in the mission area lies with the senior commander and his staff. Methods should be developed to reinforce the capacity of the police to establish order and security.

Future Tasks and the Estimated Requirement for Police Participation

Estimate

The international requirement for police in peace-promoting activities during the coming decade will at least be of the same magnitude as during 1997. The need will probably increase. This means an increased need for Swedish police. In the future, major tasks for international police forces will be to monitor, educate, and support local police in a conflict area. Gradually, the demand for police officers in posts other than their traditional monitoring role will increase.

Considerations

The Tasks of the Police. An important aim of a peace-promoting mission is to reinforce successively the possibilities for national police to maintain order and security in a democratic manner and with respect for human rights. Long-term stability can only be achieved by national authorities which have the confidence of the population. After a civil war or in a situation where the judicial apparatus is weak or has collapsed, it is (as pointed out previously) essential that international support include comprehensive measures for reconstructing a national system of justice. In the initial phase of this process, the main tasks for an international police force are, as a rule, as follows:

Monitoring local police means to check that they respect both national legislation and human rights in their professional conduct. This entails verifying that police observe an impartial behavior, respect minorities, treat arrested and imprisoned persons according to valid international conventions, and document their actions according to recognized standards. (These can be found in Appendix 6 [of the Commission’s Report], “U.N. Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police.”) To determine whether local police respect national laws, the international police force must have a knowledge of these. Because this is often not the case, human rights often becomes the dominating element in monitoring.

Monitoring can take place through a presence at police stations, prisons, places of criminal investigation, on joint patrols, etc. The international police force may also be authorized to carry out its own investigations and patrols. Monitors must report what has been observed. This makes it possible for the representative of the Secretary-General, or in certain situations the Security Council, to take necessary measures.

In some missions, the task is to train and educate the local police. This can take place at special training or education centers or by on-the-job training of local police. In some cases, training can be performed abroad. International police officers can also assist in the recruitment of new police officers when the system of justice is to be rebuilt. This is a discreet but very important task. In many conflicts, the local police have participated in the fighting and may be guilty of serious violations of human rights. In order to create a new national police force which can win the confidence of the people, it is very important that individuals who are guilty of crimes not be permitted to serve.

In addition to recruiting police officers, the re-creation of a judicial system requires the recruitment of lawyers with a variety of specialties. International police officers can, therefore, cooperate with prosecutors, judges and prison personnel. In the initial phase, these persons may need to be internationally recruited. The more successful the international community is in re-establishing legal institutions and authorities in a country hit by a conflict, the greater will be the potential for reaching a long-term solution to the conflict.

International Needs. At present, approximately 3,000 “civilian police” are engaged in peace-promoting missions. About 100 of these are Swedes, 90 of whom are employed in the Foreign Force within the Swedish Military forces. It is probable that the United Nations and other international organizations will decide to establish missions in a large number of acute crises in the future. There are many unstable areas and countries where open conflicts may break out. Furthermore, reverberations from conflicts which have been the cause of peace-promoting missions during recent years will continue to be the subject of international interest and responsibility (e.g., in the Balkans and several African countries). These crises are or will often be of a multinational character which means that the international peace-promoting efforts will probably have a multifunctional character. International police work is expected to continue to be an essential and increasingly required component in this work. This is underlined by the fact that many “new” conflicts have a domestic character.

It is very difficult to estimate the magnitude of future requirements. It is also difficult to indicate exact geographical regions which will be subject to civilian police activities. Practically all conflict centers can become the object of a peace-promoting contribution. The Commission estimates that the demand will increase and that the need for countries, such as Sweden, to increase its contribution will continue.

Swedish Participation with Police Officers

Proposal

Sweden should be prepared to have about 125 police officers permanently on call for service in peace-promoting abroad. Sweden should be prepared to temporarily to raise the level to 150 police officers, for a maximum period of 12 months. Sweden should further strive to have at least 75 police officers deployed abroad engaged in this type of international activity.

Special attention should be given to the importance of employing female police officers to create security and confidence in a mission area.

Considerations

The international need for police officers for peace-promoting activities is estimated to increase, as has been shown in the previous section. The demand includes police both for the traditional tasks of monitoring and educating local police and for participating in development activities. The traditional tasks are described in the previous section. The demand for the latter type of activity usually arises in connection with the completion and normalization phase of a conflict. It can also involve participation in international war crime tribunals of the kind active today in the Hague and Arusha.

An important part of Swedish aid policy is to support the democratization process and the promotion of human rights. This involves reinforcing processes and developing institutions within the state and society in general which promote the development of peace, democracy, and respect for human rights. This may require long-term efforts to reinforce key institutions within the state and other parts of society. Especially important are activities that improve the openness, legitimacy, and responsibility of the local administration toward its constituents, so-called good governance. To stabilize the process of building a nation, a functioning police system is very important for the population’s trust in national authorities. Experiences from recent activities with Swedish police officers in aid projects are so good that continued involvement is warranted.

In education and training courses, it has been shown that Swedish female police officers have also filled an important function. In an international police force, female officers can play a special role in creating security and confidence for a civil population exposed to traumatic events. This is true especially in relation to women who have been exposed to violence or have witnessed acts of violence toward relatives and, as a result, have lost confidence in men.

Experience shows that monitoring of elections and implementation of a peace agreement by an independent international force is strategically important. The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) estimates that police often have a professional background that makes them suitable for this type of service. SIDA has, therefore, intentionally recruited police officers for such a purpose. This will probably continue to take place in the future.

Policing contributions that either ameliorate humanitarian crises or contribute to maintenance of law and order within the framework of rebuilding a state governed by law are recognized both in Sweden and internationally as an increasingly recognized function within aid services. This trend is expected to continue. Experience from such police assistance activity should be utilized for methodological development within the field of international aid.

Sweden should have a clear and realistic level of ambition regarding the total number of police officers who should serve abroad in national service in their capacity as police officers. Several factors limit the level of involvement: international demand for Swedish policemen, the total supply of policemen in Sweden, the willingness of Swedish police officers to serve abroad, the lead organization’s demands on the police officers who participate and the country’s financial situation. Sweden has about 17,000 police officers, of whom about 100 currently serve abroad. The largest number of Swedish policemen who have served abroad at the same time is about 150. This took place during a period in the early 1990s when the number of policemen in the country was greater than it is today. The Commission notes as follows:

The Commission considers that there should be budgetary and organizational preparedness to increase Swedish participation from the present level of 100 police officers to about 125. Thereafter, a gradual increase should take place in relation to demand. For a short period (at the most 12 months), it would be possible to increase the level to about 150 police officers. Sweden should make these parameters known in international contexts.

The United Nations will continue to play a dominating role both as the organization issuing the mandate and performing the activities. The demand for police contributions has also increased in relation to U.N. humanitarian activity (e.g., the handling of massive refugee flows). In the long run, regional organizations will also be given a larger role, particularly with regard to police contributions. The Western European Union has already acted in this role, and other international organizations may in the future also play an active role in a police context. Thus, Sweden, as a police-contributing country, must ensure that the organization performing these activities has the required competence and capacity to plan and execute a peace mission involving police officers. Sweden should strive to participate in the formulation of mandates and other basic regulations when an action is planned.

Arming the Police Force

Proposal

Police officers who act as police observers or police advisers in international peace-promoting missions shall as a rule be unarmed. In exceptional cases, these policemen could be armed for self-defense.

Considerations

International Police Observers. The task of police observers is not usually of an executive character. They shall monitor a national police corps, report, mediate and promote stability by showing their presence in sensitive regions, so-called proactive behavior. The ability to perform these tasks is not improved if policemen are armed. International police officers need the confidence of both the local police and the civil population to be able to complete their mission. The experiences of both military observers and police observers suggest that they can complete their task best if they are unarmed. If the police are armed, they may be expected to perform executive tasks which the mandate in general does not permit.

In many missions, the arms possessed by different groups and criminal elements are of such a caliber that arming police observers with sidearms would have no deterrent effect. Light arms usually provide no protection in situations characterized by heavy violence. On the contrary, arms can have a provocative effect and undermine the security for the policemen. The notion of equipping police with heavier weapons than sidearms has been rejected in a previous section. The main rule therefore should be that police observers are unarmed.

Sweden should not, however, categorically reject participation in police actions where police observers are armed. In the WEU-led action in Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the U.N. mission in Haiti, police observers were armed with firearms. This was because a majority of the police-contributing countries considered arms necessary to give sufficient protection in these difficult situations. Another alternative should be noted in this context. The police observers can be given access to firearms which are stored under lock until the situation is judged to be such that the policemen should be armed.

International Police Advisers. In the case of police advisers, it is even clearer that they fulfill their task best if they are unarmed. Police advisers can act either as teachers in police education or as mentors when local police carry out their tasks. Regardless of whether a police adviser acts together with police observers or in a later phase of the conflict when the reconstruction of a society is in progress, arming of police serves no purpose.

More Efficient Police Work

Within the United Nations

Proposal

Considerations

General. The Swedish attitude has traditionally been that a well-functioning multilateral system is an important guarantee for the creation of international peace and security, especially for small and medium-sized countries. International police activities have proven to be very useful as instruments of conflict resolution in situations where military troops or military observers have not constituted an active tool. Since 1989, the United Nations has initiated several international police missions. Other organizations have also shown an interest in organizing police work. In the foreseeable future, however, the United Nations will be the most important international actor in the field. As shown in chapter 9 of the Commission’s report addressing Swedish experiences with previous and continuing missions, there have been many deficiencies in these missions, largely because of U.N. inability to act rapidly and flexibly to solve practical problems and to meet unexpected situations. A further reason for difficulties has been the inability to learn from mistakes. There is, therefore, good reason for Sweden to act to develop, reinforce and improve U.N. potential for using police officers in peace-promoting activities.

Special difficulties have been observed when new missions are established. Proposals and considerations in this regard are provided in the next section.

Mandates and Other Documents That Define the Tasks of the Police. Mandates, which are approved by the U.N. Security Council, are political compromises which are often of a general nature, often intentionally so, to cover situations which are still difficult to predict. They are not always specified in the text of the resolution but are often indicated in a report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council. This report is then referred to in the resolution. From experience, mandates are primarily designed for the military component of a peace-promoting mission. This means that they provide only vague guidance to the U.N. Police Commissioner who must execute police tasks in the field. To facilitate both the initial and continuing mission activity, there should be a separate mandate for the international police force. This applies even in those cases where it is not possible, for reasons of time, to formulate a detailed mandate.

“Police advisers” are not included in U.N. delegations of Member States in the same way as there is often a military adviser. There is reason to believe therefore that police officers are not consulted in the preparation of mandates for a police component. With the aim of avoiding unclear tasks which can be misinterpreted, policemen with experience leading international police forces should be consulted when mandates are formulated. This can, for example, take place if member states, especially members of the Security Council, make room for a police adviser in the national U.N. delegations.

Increased Police Competence in the United Nations. It is common that the concrete tasks for a police force evolve continuously during the mission. This involves standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement, or operational directives. Regardless of in which document(s) the concrete tasks are specified, qualified police officers must be given the opportunity to participate in the process. This increases the potential that the police force will be used in the best possible way.

A special example of the formulation of tasks for police work is provided in the Dayton Agreement, Annex 11, regarding the International Police Task Force. This text has been declared by several reviewers to be the best example of a task description for a police force. The agreement was prepared under unusual circumstances and over a longer period than is normally available when the U.N. Security Council formulates a mandate.

The Commission encountered difficulties in its attempts to survey the concrete tasks of U.N. police forces. The tasks are dispersed among several documents which have in some cases been difficult to trace.

In relation to the number of military officials within DPKO, the Civilian Police Unit within DPKO is small. In the very important Mission Planning Cell in DPKO, there is only one policeman. The development of U.N. Headquarters does not correspond to the rapid increase in U.N. missions with police elements and the high expectations placed on the police in these missions. Police questions should be afforded greater attention in the planning work within DPKO. Police advisers and administrators should be integrated within more units of DPKO. The Civilian Police Unit should be given a greater role in planning new missions. The unit should also be given increased resources for developing methods and doctrines within this field of expertise.

Greater Competence for the Police in Peace-Promoting Service. It is well documented from various missions that many police officers in international service are not sufficiently experienced and qualified for the tasks they are expected to perform. For example, they lack knowledge of basic human rights and this makes it impossible for them to judge whether the local police follow current conventions. Knowledge of internationally applicable rules regarding the rights of an arrested or imprisoned person is necessary to be able to act as a police observer. Differing tasks in home countries also mean that the requirements of police academies will vary. In countries with a federal form of government there is not always a national police corps with standardized training. The United States, for example, lacks such a national police corps.

Another problem is the lack of knowledge of the national language. The effectiveness of police action is considerably increased if international police officers have a command of the language. This is especially important if they are to have law enforcement authority.

In general, the United Nations strives for broad geographical representation among police-contributing countries. This is an expression of U.N. striving for neutrality and impartiality. It also promotes global community and constitutes a condition for the organization to maintain the broad support required to be able to act. This striving for geographical representation and an equal opportunity for all members to participate has meant that police forces are often composed of police from many countries.

The general level of competence of policemen in peace-promoting service should be increased. An objective should be that the members of the international police force should have at least the same average general education level as the police who are to be supervised. An important additional step is to provide specialized training relating to local conditions in the mission area. In the section on Training and Recruiting, proposals are given for how the such activities in Sweden can be improved. Here a few proposals are provided for increasing general competence during an ongoing mission. (Special difficulties related to new missions are treated separately.)

The United Nations has observed the problems that arise as a consequence of the low competence of international police and certain measures have been adopted to ensure a certain minimum level. This level is in some respects too low to be accepted over the long term. Further measures should be taken. Education for an international mission should in principle be carried out before arrival at the conflict area. This should include a general knowledge of the U.N. system, human rights, and a basic knowledge of the technical equipment included in the mission. Opportunity should be provided for practical training in handling different possible scenarios in the field and in report writing. Further, there should be sufficient training in the mission language and in vehicle driving.

Special attention should also be given to a knowledge of the national laws in the area. The United Nations should collect and distribute to police-contributing countries information about the most important of these laws (e.g., which civil rights apply in addition to the universal human rights). International police officers should also be informed about the cultural, ethnic, and religious traditions of the other police-contributing countries and about the tasks of the police system in each country. Such knowledge facilitates preparations for service.

Sweden and other police-contributing countries should contribute as much as possible to improving the education of their police for international service. This would make U.N. missions much more effective. Screening systems of various kinds should be undertaken before departure from the home country. The United Nations should maintain and enhance the system introduced in 1997 with the Selection Assistance Teams.

The United Nations should continue to perfect its mission-specific police training programs. This should include current information about the situation in the mission area and about the operational routines. Another important aim is to give police from different countries the opportunity to establish contacts with each other prior to deployment.

Screening and predeployment training programs should be maintained for the duration of the mission.

Information to the Population about U.N. Tasks. When a force is established, the United Nations should seek the assurance of the parties to the conflict that it will be permitted to disseminate information to the population about U.N. roles and tasks. Because a recognized and general definition of the concept of “monitor” is lacking, interpretation of the concept becomes dependent on the specific conditions of each individual mission. If a mandate is far reaching and intended to be attained step by step, unless this is clearly expressed the local population may misinterpret U.N. conduct as being overly passive. There are examples where police in a U.N. force have witnessed a criminal act such as assault and have not intervened because the mandate only allows monitoring and reporting. This type of passivity impacts U.N. credibility if it is not clearly explained and justified to the population.

Higher Level of Preparedness for

International Police Work

Proposal

Concerning Measures Within the United Nations. The Commission proposes that Sweden should act so that the United Nations: