MOZAMBIQUE:
The CIVPOL Operation
JAMES L. WOODS
Background
The Civil War
The following account addresses three early UNCIVPOL efforts, all taking place in southern Africa from 1989 on, focusing primarily on the operation in Mozambique, and including comparisons with the Angolan and Namibian missions. The three CIVPOL efforts described here were sizable, costly affairs and involved personnel from dozens of contributing countries. Their importance must be considered not only in terms of their contributions to the respective operations but also their learning and doctrinal value at this early point in the development of UNCIVPOL operations.
Beginning with independence in 1975, Mozambique struggled for nearly two decades under the weight of a primitive but deadly civil war. The Communist-backed FRELIMO party, which came to power after independence, was opposed by the RENAMO1 rebelsinitially formed and supported by Rhodesia and later given modest support by South Africa and apparently also by some western private groups. Their conflict left a bloody legacy of a million dead, three million internally displaced, and the infrastructure of the country destroyed. By 1989-90, the two sides had finally reached exhaustion and stalemate. Serious peace negotiations followed in 1991, supported by several African countries (including South Africa) plus the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, and the United Nations; in October 1992 a General Peace Agreement (GPA) ending the conflict was signed in Rome.
The two parties approached the peace process with very different views and expectations. The Government felt it should both govern and supervise the electoral process; it was not fully comfortable with the leading role of the United Nations and specifically objected to the concept of introducing a CIVPOL element. RENAMO, however, was looking to the United Nations to protect both the process and itself.
The United Nations was given responsibility for implementing or supervising the most difficult aspects of the peace, including demobilizing former combatants, reintegrating them into civil society, and organizing national elections. At the same time, but independent of any provisions of the Peace Agreement, the United Nations designed a civilian policing (CIVPOL) mission as a way to monitor the conduct of the indigenous police force during this delicate time in Mozambiques history. Although a robust CIVPOL mission was advocated from the beginning by RENAMO, the Government was equally adamant in its opposition. This disagreement led to an initial impasse, and then to a long delay in approving the inclusion of a CIVPOL element in the operation, as well as restrictions on its mandate. This was notwithstanding obvious major deficiencies in Mozambiques existing police structure and capabilities.
The Police
The need for improved civil policing in Mozambique was great.
The public security system had deteriorated by the early
nineties.2 Mozambiques cities, which had been renowned for their lack of crime even during the height of the civil war, were caught up in a crime wave against which the local police seemed almost powerless. Several factors had contributed to the increased crime rate:
¨ Economic liberalization had increased the amount of consumer goods in shops but did nothing to increase the publics purchasing power.
¨ Thousands of migrant workers had lost their jobs and returned home to Mozambique when East and West Germany reunited.
¨ Thousands of decommissioned soldiers and rebels had no jobs and no prospects.
¨ The remaining armed forces were increasingly desperate and undisciplined.
¨ Army and rebel guns began finding their way into criminal hands.
¨ Social constraints simply broke down after 15 years of civil war.
As a result of these various strains on the social and labor systems, violent crime in Mozambique soared, and public confidence in the police was virtually destroyed. Along with their inability to control crime, the police force was also considered highly corrupt by most Mozambicans.3 As crime increased, the police became almost irrelevant to the public, and citizens took the law into their own hands. Often, the consequences were very violent. Alternatively, when the police did act, it was sometimes with such excessive force that suspects were killed.4
Explaining the operational foundation for the CIVPOL mission, the Secretary-General cited the following difficulties facing Mozambique:
The population of approximately 16 million people had endured almost 16 years of a devastating civil war, which resulted in approximately 1 million deaths and 4.5 million refugees and displaced persons. The protracted hostilities in Mozambique have disrupted infrastructure to a great degree, contributed to the existence of armed banditry and created conditions for lawlessness in some parts of the countryside. Between May and September 1993 alone, the number of reported crimes in Mozambique included 167 homicides, 726 armed robberies and hundreds of cases of physical assault, rape, etc. . . . It is obvious that among their functions, United Nations police observers will need to encourage the Mozambican police to improve the protection of citizens and property. . . . A number of additional factors should also be taken into account. There is no efficient arms control system in place, and estimates put the total number of assorted types of weapons in non-official hands at approximately 1 million.5
The Judicial System
The judicial system was also in trouble in the early nineties. Despite constitutional provisions establishing strong, independent courts, Mozambiques judicial system was hampered by several factors:
¨ A de facto lack of judicial independence from the ruling FRELIMO party
¨ A lack of capable district and provisional judges
¨ A lack of lawyers in general6
¨ A severe lack of funding.7
The Prison System
The prisons also suffered from a lack of resources. Some were greatly overcrowded, sometimes holding four times the prisoners they were designed for. Prisoners were often fed only once each day.8 The majority of prisoners were being held on remand, and they complained that it could take up to a year to hear their cases. Despite these difficulties, some prisons fared betterthey were less crowded and therefore less resource-constrained than othersand prison officials systemwide were generally commended for doing the most with what they had.9
Police Relations with Local Power Structure
Relations between the police and other elements of the local power structure were very uneasy. The Minister of the Interior (who had responsibility for the police force) was detained in late 1991 as a suspected coup plotter. Cooperation between the military and police forces was the exception rather than the rule. One such exception was a joint police and military operation in September 1991 which led to the arrest of over 800 criminal suspects.10
Size and Structure of the Police Force
In January 1994, shortly after the initiation of the first phase of UNCIVPOL operations, the Secretary-General reported on the size and structure of Mozambiques police force:
The current strength of the Mozambican police (PRM) is 18,047, with the command structure of national headquarters in Maputo, 11 provincial headquarters and over 200 stations and posts in the districts. There is a quick reaction police force numbering several thousand as well as various private security companies and agencies.11
The Mandate
The U.N. Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) mandate specified the following tasks:
¨ Monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties as well as their demobilization, and the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons
¨ Monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces
¨ Provide security in the four transport corridors; monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.12
The parties agreed that legislative and presidential elections would be held simultaneously 1 year after the date of signature of the agreement. Elections could be delayed only if warranted by prevailing circumstances. The ONUMOZ Electoral Division was to monitor and verify all aspects of the electoral process, which would be organized by the National Elections Commission.
The agreement also set two objectives for international and humanitarian assistance: to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger, whether they had taken refuge in neighboring countries or in provincial and district centers within Mozambique.
Even though the Secretary-General was personally convinced of the desirability of a CIVPOL mission, initially he could not persuade the Government to accept one. The General Peace Agreement does discuss the indigenous police force in Protocol IV (Military Questions), Point V. This protocol addresses several points: guidelines for police conduct; selection; basic tasks; appointment of Commander and Deputy Commander; and establishment of a National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) to verify conduct. However, there is no mention either of international police or a role for the United Nations specifically.
The official request for U.N. involvement in Mozambique came on October 4, 1992 in a letter from President Chissano to the Secretary-General, in which he wrote:
Accordingly, I would like to request Your Excellency to take appropriate action in order to ensure the participation of the United Nations in monitoring and ensuring the implementation of the General Peace Agreement and in assisting the Government by providing technical assistance for the General Elections and in monitoring these elections.13
This broad initial request was directed at U.N. military and electoral assistance to implement the GPA. While civil policing was a part of the agreement, the section dealing with policing does not suggest a role for the United Nations. President Chissano requested the United Nations to chair the newly created Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) and its subcommissions, the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). Indeed, in the GPA paragraphs that create these commissions, a U.N. role is explicitly stated.
On the other hand, the text creating the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) in Protocol IV does not mention a role for the United Nations, nor did President Chissano request such a role when he asked for U.N. chairmanship of the other three Commissions. Likewise, in his report to the Security Council on the details of the General Peace Agreement, the Secretary-General outlined the U.N. role in Mozambique but only spoke of the CSC, CCF, and CORE. In essence, the Secretary-General wrote, the United Nations is asked to undertake certain specific functions in relation to the cease-fire, the elections, and humanitarian assistance.14 Again, there was no mention of a policing function.
The Secretary-General himself requested a CIVPOL mission in his report to the Security Council on the establishment of ONUMOZ. In this report, he outlined the need for a policing element based on prior experience:
While the agreement [GPA] does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, experience elsewhere suggests that this could be desirable in order to inspire confidence that violations of civil liberties, human rights and political freedom will be avoided. Throughout the peace process, but particularly during the electoral campaign, the presence of a United Nations police component could be most useful, although agreement on this point was not reached in the Rome negotiations.15
He also outlined a proposed structure for such a CIVPOL effort:
If agreed by the two sides, such a component could be headed by an Inspector General, and consist of up to 128 police officers, deployed in the regions and provincial capitals. It would work in close cooperation with the National Police Affairs Commission and provide technical advice to this body as required. I believe that such a unit would be a valuable addition to ONUMOZ and I therefore intend to ask my interim Special Representative to reopen this matter with the parties and seek their concurrence.16
There was no suggestion that the United Nations should act as the chairman of COMPOL, though the United Nations served as Chair of the other Commissions. On October 15, the day the peace agreement came into effect, an advance team of 21 U.N. observers arrived to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops and assess the general situation. On November 4, 1992, the CSC held its first meeting and appointed the main subsidiary commissions: Cease-Fire (CCF), Reintegration (CORE), and the Joint Commission for Formation of the Mozambique Defense Force (CCEADM).
On December 16, 1992, the Security Council approved Security Council Resolution (SCR) 797, creating ONUMOZ along the lines suggested by the Secretary-General. The mission included a civilian police component of 128 people, contingent upon a request from the Mozambicans for CIVPOL. Such a request did finally come, nine months later and after much negotiation. After receiving that request, the Secretary-General, in his report on ONUMOZ, wrote:
The parties have agreed to request the United Nations to monitor all police activities in the country, public or private, to monitor the rights and liberties of citizens in Mozambique and to provide technical support to the Police Commission (COMPOL). The proposed United Nations police contingent would be responsible for verifying that all police activities in the country are consistent with the General Peace Agreement. The Government has agreed to provide a list of materiel in the possession of the police, as well as other information necessary to verify the activities of the police.17
However, he also noted in the same document that It appears that at least one of the parties has in mind a much larger police force than that envisaged in the initial operational plan for ONUMOZ.
ONUMOZ was fully deployed and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions by the beginning of May 1993. However, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration was still pending, as was the cantonment and demobilization of troops and the formation of the new army.
Concerned about the pace of implementation, the Secretary-General presented a revised timetable that took as its point of departure resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions beginning on June 3, 1993, concluding 16 months later with elections in October 1994. The phased concentration and demobilization of Government and RENAMO troops was expected to take 8 or 9 months.18
Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the CIVPOL mission in Mozambique evolved from a policy controversy into an operational reality, with the first CIVPOL personnel deploying on the ground in September 1993. A month later, in October, the parties reached agreement on the function of all Commissions, including COMPOL, allowing these to begin their work as well. After this agreement had been reached, the Security Council, in February 1994, authorized creation of an expanded police component of ONUMOZ,19 along the lines described by the Secretary-General in his report a month earlier.20
The Secretary-General outlined the CIVPOL mandate, listing seven separate points:
¨ To monitor all police activities in the country, including those of PRM [Mozambican police] and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions are fully consistent with the General Peace Agreement
¨ To monitor the respect of rights and civil liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country
¨ To provide technical support to the National Police Commission
¨ To verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies do not violate the General Peace Agreement
¨ To verify the strength and location of the government police forces, their materiel, as well as any other information which might be needed in support of the peace process
¨ To monitor and verify the process of the reorganization and retraining of the quick reaction police and their activities, as well as to verify their weapons and equipment
¨ To monitor, together with ONUMOZ components, the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that political rights of individuals, groups and political organizations are respected, in accordance with the General Peace Agreement and relevant electoral documents.21
Though this public security gap needed to be filled, the Secretary- General also wrote, in the context of the CIVPOL mission, that responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will clearly remain with the Government. All violations of the Criminal Code will be investigated by the Mozambican police, with the possibility of parallel investigations being conducted by CIVPOL, when the latter considers it appropriate.22
Size of the Component
Once the Mozambicans had agreed to a civilian policing mandate, the Secretary-General proposed that the strength of the expanded CIVPOL contingent be set at 1,144 police observers (inclusive of the initial 128). He broke down the contingent as follows:
¨ The Chief Police Observer, with the rank of Inspector General
¨ The Deputy Police Observer
¨ 29 police observers at the component headquarters in Maputo
¨ 30 police observers comprising a special task force to monitor and evaluate the quick reaction police and to be available for unforeseen exigencies
¨ 12 police observers in each of the three regional headquarters
¨ 327 police observers to be deployed at 11 provincial capitals, including those to be formed into stationary and mobile teams to service surrounding areas
¨ 720 police observers in other locations throughout the country.23
The Security Council approved 1,144 police observers but mandated that an appropriate number of military observers be drawn down in order to keep the overall cost of the ONUMOZ mission the same.24 Ultimately, 1,086 CIVPOL officers deployed in Mozambique, coming from 29 different countries.
Organizational Structure
As planning for the CIVPOL mission in Mozambique matured, the Secretary-General outlined its organizational structure:
¨ The headquarters component would be headed by the Chief Police Observer at the rank of Inspector General and would consist of his deputy and chiefs of staff for operations, liaison, investigations, logistics and personnel. A headquarters team would also liaise with and provide technical assistance to the Police Commission.
¨ A special task force would be stationed in Maputo for monitoring and verification of the quick reaction police force. This
group would also monitor security arrangements for the leadership of RENAMO. In addition, it would be on call to respond to any exigencies that might arise in other parts of the country.
¨ Three compact regional headquarters, whose tasks would primarily be coordination of activities spanning several provinces. Each of these headquarters would be headed by a regional chief police observer.
¨ Eleven provincial headquarters would each be headed by a provincial chief police observer and would include a deputy, an operations officer, an investigations officer, a logistics/personnel officer and several patrol and investigation teams, which would cover the provincial capital and as much of the surrounding area as possible.
¨ One hundred and eighty United Nations police stations and posts would be established throughout the country in remote and isolated locations, near Government police facilities.25
The CIVPOL operation was established as a separate component within ONUMOZ. Its commander, the Chief Police Officer, reported directly to the Secretary-Generals Special Representative in Mozambique. It worked closely with existing electoral, military, humanitarian and administrative components of ONUMOZ. After a period of difficulties, appropriate liaison arrangements were established with the national police at all levels, and CIVPOL itself had a presence at all strategic locations throughout the country. Despite some resistance, especially at the initial stages of the operation, it sought unrestricted access to the general public. It conducted all its own investigations and, when necessary, recommended corrective action.26
Training of CIVPOL Personnel
There was little initial training for CIVPOL officers beyond an induction program to explain the mission. Officially, qualifications for participation were command of English and the ability to drive U.N. vehicles.27 However, even these basic requirements were often not met: in mid-1994, the U.N. Police Commissioner in Maputo reported that 255 CIVPOL officers (about 36 percent of the total contingent at the time) could not drive or did not speak English, or both.
As the mission progressed, two special training programs were developed for officers already deployed. One training session dealt with human rights, the other with electoral observation. In each case, a small number of CIVPOL officers were trained to recognize violations; these trainees in turn trained other officers to do the same.28
Deployment, Activity, and Withdrawal of Personnel
Deployment of the CIVPOL observers was staggered, starting with the topmost layers of the hierarchy and proceeding progressively downwards as the elections approached. Specifically, the Secretary-General suggested:
The initial phase, during which the central headquarters and regional and provincial capitals teams would be fully established, should be completed by mid-March 1994. The second phase would coincide with the voter registration process from April to June 1994, during which up to 70 per cent of CIVPOLs posts and stations throughout the countryside would become operational. The remainder of the component would be deployed by no later than one month before the beginning of the electoral campaign, which is scheduled to begin on 1 September 1994.29
By April 18, 1994, 278 U.N. police observers had been deployed around the country and 10 CIVPOL outposts had been established. By the end of April, CIVPOL had investigated 36 cases of police misconduct, and had communicated these cases to COMPOL and the Mozambican Police Command for remedial action, where necessary.30
By July 4, 1994, 817 U.N. police observers had been deployed around the country and 29 CIVPOL outposts had been established. CIVPOL had received a total of 47 complaints of police misconduct, 35 of which had been investigated and resolved, while 12 were still under investigation. These cases fell into three categories: illegal detention of civilians; abuse of detainees civil rights; and criminal investigations involving possible political motives.31
By August 22, 1994, 905 police observers from 26 countries had been deployed and 44 field posts had been established. CIVPOL had received a total of 91 complaints, 78 of which had been resolved, with 13 still under investigation.32
Overall, a total of 1,086 U.N. police observers from 29 countries were deployed to 83 field posts, plus the national and provincial capitals. They investigated 511 complaints, 61 of which were related to human rights violations. CIVPOL also monitored the conduct of the election campaign and the polling.33
The elections were held on October 27-29, with roughly 2,300 international electoral observers present, 910 from the United Nations. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that they had been conducted peacefully, were well organized, and were without any major irregularities or credible charges of fraud or intimidation. The ONUMOZ mandate was extended by the U.N. Security Council from November 15 until December 15, with residual activities to be completed by January 31, 1995. The UNSC called upon all concerned to respect the election results. The new Parliament was installed, President Chissano took office on December 8, and the ONUMOZ mandate official ended on December 9. By November 17, 1994, 32 police observers had been withdrawn from Mozambique; 566 were gone by December 18, 1994, and the remainder left by December 31, 1994 (except for a group of about 20, to remain in Mozambique until mid-January, 1995).34
The Mission
The CIVPOL mission got off to a slow start. In his February 1993 letter to the Foreign Minister of Italy on the status of ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General reported that the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) had not yet been established. The delay resulted from RENAMOs refusal to name representatives to the commission because of claims that the Government had integrated military officers into elements of the police force. As a result of the delay, allegations of human rights abuses by the police were not being investigated, a primary function of the commission. Agreement on the various commissions was not reached until October 1993, 1 year after the signing of the General Peace Agreement, after which time COMPOL could begin work (it was February 1994 by the time COMPOL was fully staffed and actually began functioning). The public was generally pleased to see the CIVPOL officers arrive, though they were perceived first as guarantors of human rights and then as providers of public security.35
However, in a further complication, the United Nations announced in November 1993 that it was running out of money for the CIVPOL effort in Mozambique. Because of the growing number of U.N. commitments around the world, the Secretary-General notified the parties in Mozambique that the United Nations could not fund any expansion of CIVPOL beyond the 128 officers initially authorized, that COMPOL would need to use local units wherever possible, and that the mission would be limited geographically. The Government and RENAMO were also asked to establish local subdivisions of the National Police Affairs Commission in order to shoulder some of the civilian policing burden. Eventually, though, the CIVPOL mission was able to field 1,086 police observers (out of 1,144 eventually authorized) without increasing overall ONUMOZ costs, primarily by shifting resources from cease-fire observation which was proceeding at a much lower cost than initially expected.
Election Monitoring
Another goal of the CIVPOL mission was to instill confidence among the public in the appropriate conduct of the elections. This goal entailed direct observation of the process, together with U.N. electoral observers, as described by the Secretary-General:
With the concurrence of the Mozambican parties, United Nations police observers would assist the electoral observers of ONUMOZ in monitoring the registration process and the electoral campaign. In this context, they would also monitor security at the polling stations, including the security arrangements for the storage, counting and transporting of ballot papers and other election materials.36
From the beginning, CIVPOL observers were assigned to assist ONUMOZ election observers during each phase of the electionvoter registration, political campaigning, and voting. CIVPOL was also responsible for assisting with security at polling sites, including during counting and transporting of ballot papers. Some CIVPOL teams apparently also provided logistics support (mainly transportation), facilitating both registration and the conduct of the elections.
Human Rights Monitoring
Another prominent goal was to teach the Mozambican police force to conform to international standards of conduct, to respect human rights, and to act professionally in protecting citizens and their property. Regarding such a mentoring role, the Secretary-General wrote:
It may be necessary to familiarize local police with the international concepts of rights, civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, as well as the codes of conduct the political parties might agree to observe during the electoral process.37
The U.N. Centre for Human Rights provided human rights training for CIVPOL monitors. Amnesty International was also very involved in monitoring human rights during the ONUMOZ operation and provided reports and checklists to help guide the CIVPOL efforts. The Centre trained 30 CIVPOL officers to identify human rights abuses. These trainees were then sent out both to monitor human rights and to train other CIVPOL officers, government officials, and NGO workers to do the same.38
The Centre was not asked to provide training until 4 months after the first CIVPOL officers arrived in Mozambique, and the subsequent training program had to be adapted to minimize the effect of the delay. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights later expressed his desire to see such training incorporated into CIVPOL missions from the beginning.39
CIVPOL officers had no authority to act on human rights violations. Instead, they reported violations to COMPOL, which in turn reported them to the Ministry of Interior, which was then responsible for taking action to redress the violation. This system was, however, problematic. There was a lack of COMPOL offices at the provincial level to which CIVPOL could file reports, and even when reports did make it through this system, CIVPOL would not be informed of the action taken.
Often civilians decided it was faster to go directly to the Ministry of Interior themselves, rather than reporting human rights violations to CIVPOL. Nonetheless, the very presence of CIVPOL officers in the country was thought to have the effect of mitigating some police excesses, and their presence at political rallies was credited with keeping the police from behaving in a partisan manner.40
CIVPOL authorities did report several serious violations of human rights by the PRM, ranging from deaths of individuals while in PRM custody or while being apprehended, to attempted assassination. In these more serious cases, after referring the matter to the Mozambican Government, CIVPOL authorities also sent reports directly to the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights.41
In general, CIVPOL was most effective at policing human rights at posts far from headquarters, where local policemen were less aware of CIVPOLs lack of authority for redress and were fearful of having their misdeeds reported to their superiors. CIVPOL was also more effective in situations where its officers had developed good personal relationships with the local police force.42
Weapons Verification and Disarmament
The ONUMOZ mission overall was very involved in demobilizing combatants and collecting weapons. Under the terms of the specific CIVPOL mandate, the Government was required to report all police weapons, but there was disagreement about the extent to which CIVPOL was allowed to verify weapons depots. Often, CIVPOL officers were denied access to police sites.43
CIVPOL officers were also available to help disarm private security forces and the public, an important role given the estimated one million weapons in non-official hands. The Secretary-General had written of the CIVPOL disarmament function:
Special attention would be given to the systematic verification of weapons and equipment in the possession of the national police and of private agencies and to monitoring the activities of the quick reaction police force, whose facilities would also be visited on a regular basis; ONUMOZ would also examine the latters role and structure. Given the scope of arms proliferation among the general population, teams of United Nations police observers would be available to collect any weapons and ammunition that may be surrendered by individuals or irregular forces throughout the country.44
In the end, however, ONUMOZ CIVPOL elements made only very limited progress in meeting any of these goals, given the difficulty of the tasks, lack of cooperation, and a general shortage of means and time.
The General Peace Agreement called for the Government and rebel armed forces to be combined to create a new army, but, RENAMO having no police, there was no need for a similar provision for the Mozambican police force. Rather, the existing police force, the 18,000-man PRM, was to extend its operations to include RENAMO areas. The role of CIVPOL in this extension was critical, because RENAMO authorities did not trust the PRM and would not let them into rebel-held territory without a CIVPOL chaperone.45
Over time, it became increasingly clear to CIVPOL officers that government military troops and equipment were being transferred to the police, especially to the Presidential Guard. These transfers were especially worrisome to RENAMO, who filed complaints about the weapons. The Government contended that because the Presidential Guard was neither a military nor a police unit, it was outside the scope of ONUMOZ and CIVPOL mandates. Consequently, CIVPOL was denied the authority to verify weapons claims.46
CIVPOL officers were sometimes denied access to sites where military personnel and equipment were suspected of being converted to police use. In one case, a visiting Security Council delegation was inadvertently shown an undeclared police training camp where police recruits were being trained in machine-gun use. Later, CIVPOL officers were denied access to the camp when they asked to verify the report.47
In order to accomplish this variety of tasks, the Secretary-General detailed the following guidance:
CIVPOLs functions would be carried out by stationing United Nations teams in the vicinity of the Mozambican police stations, posts and by extensive patrolling. In order to monitor certain activities, police observers would be deployed at various national police headquarters. At the same time, ONUMOZ would have unrestricted access to the general public and would be able to gather information as well as to receive complaints from individuals and organizations. CIVPOL would conduct its own investigations, on the basis of such complaints, as well as independently, into politically motivated offenses and, when necessary, recommend corrective action. Information about such investigations would be provided promptly to the National Police Affairs Commission and the national authorities.48
Coordination and Cooperation
Local Police
The relationship between CIVPOL officers and the Mozambique police was complex. It incorporated elements of monitoring, mentoring, joint patrolling, passive observation, and some training. Though the Mozambican police had full authority to investigate crimes, CIVPOL could, at its discretion, conduct its own investigations alongside the indigenous force.
There were problems of coordination and cooperation with the local police force, especially where access to information and visits to police stations and prisons were concerned. These difficulties, especially acute at the provincial level, were attributed to a lack of information provided to local police commanders concerning the tasks of CIVPOL. As a result, a seminar was held in February 1994 at which CIVPOL, the Police Affairs Commission, and the National Police worked out a modus operandi that improved the situation. There were also cases of government police refusing to accompany CIVPOL officers into RENAMO territory, and other instances when RENAMO officials denied access to government police, all of which hindered CIVPOLs ability to exercise its mandate.49 On the other hand, CIVPOL teams in some cases were the first to open up territory in the countryside, loosely controlled by RENAMO, where government police and civil authorities dared not go.
As the mission progressed, there was concern about the fact that most cases investigated by CIVPOL and referred to COMPOL were not being acted on. In August 1994, the Secretary-General reported:
It is a matter of concern that the National Commission for Police Affairs has not yet ruled on the cases referred to it by CIVPOL. Obviously, the deterrent effect of CIVPOL observation would be diluted if no corrective or preventive action follows CIVPOL investigations.50
Given the short duration of the full CIVPOL mission, its focus mainly on the electoral process, and its rapid withdrawal after elections, this issue was never successfully resolved and can be considered a major shortfall in CIVPOL accomplishments.
Other U.N. Components
In the first addendum to his January 1994 report on ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General suggested that CIVPOL share resources, infrastructure, and administration with the military and other civilian components of this mission but that some local employees be hired to work for CIVPOL specifically as needed:
To the extent possible, United Nations civilian police observers would be colocated with the military and other civilian elements of ONUMOZ and would rely on the existing military and administrative infrastructure of the Mission, including transport and communications facilities. However, given the fact that these elements would be widely spread throughout the country, CIVPOL would require additional support in terms of administrative personnel, such as interpreters and translators, as well as adequate transportation and other equipment, accommodation facilities, etc. It is estimated that a total of 4 international staff and 35 locally recruited personnel would be required.51
In practice, the CIVPOL operation was conducted as a separate function of ONUMOZ, independent of the military peacekeeping mission.52 The option of fully integrating into the military command structure seems never to have been seriously considered; however, the failure to achieve such integration seems not to have substantially affected the performance of either CIVPOL or the military component. The lack of training for CIVPOL officers was a much bigger problem.
Evaluation
Successes
Most commentators believe CIVPOL had a limited but positive impact in curbing abusive police behavior, especially in the more remote areas. More importantly, the elections were generally peaceful, without reports of serious violations by the local police. The CIVPOL mission can be judged as successful in contributing, psychologically as well as substantively, to this positive outcome.
Shortcomings
Allegations of human rights abuse by the police continued after the CIVPOL mission concluded. By mid-1996, there were also allegations that the police had been taken over by organized crime.53 It appears that CIVPOL had only a minor impact on curbing abusive tendencies of the Mozambique police. Even this impact rapidly waned after completion of the CIVPOL operation.
The most serious technical criticism of CIVPOL concerns a perceived lack of proper training for CIVPOL personnel. Many of the police who participated in the mission were not properly prepared to meet the enormous challenges they would face in Mozambique. This failure included differences in experience and a lack of such basics as being able to communicate with the local police or even to drive a vehicle. Though attempts were ultimately made to deal with the worst of these shortcomings, the experience has led some to question whether policemen are the most appropriate CIVPOL monitors in the first place. Trained human rights monitors (integrated into the existing U.N. military peacekeeping hierarchy) might be more effective.54
Conclusions
Despite its shortcomings, the CIVPOL operation in Mozambique can be termed a qualified success. It contributed substantially to creating a stable environment in which elections could be peacefully conducted. CIVPOL reporting is also considered to have contributed substantially to the curbing of police abuses, including abuses of human rights, especially in the countryside, even though most CIVPOL complaints were not formally acted on by the Government.
As one of the early UNCIVPOL operations, the Mozambique experience also made it very clear that there would have to be higher standards in personnel selection, to include serious attention to such basics as language and driver qualification. The experimentation with human rights training for CIVPOL monitors also proved positive and would exert influence for similar but expanded training in future operations.
Nevertheless, the operation would have had a more substantial and long-lasting impact had it been started much earlier. Owing to this deployment gap, the peace process was already in an advanced and critical stage. CIVPOLs role was largely constrained to opening up territory and providing a neutral presence during electoral registration and conduct. This was an important political contribution, but it prevented CIVPOL from having much impact on civil rights abuses by Mozambique police units.
Further, had there been the political will at the United Nations to investigate more actively and act on at least the more egregious reports of abuse filed by CIVPOL, this might have led to earlier and more sustainable corrections by the Government. Shortcomings in this area seem to have preoccupied the U.S. Embassy in particular. In retrospect, those sharp criticisms seem to miss the mark by failing to give weight to the broader CIVPOL contribution of political and psychological reinforcement to the peace process, and especially to the critical phase of the run-up and conduct of the elections.
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