HAITI:

Military-Police Partnership for

Public Security

Background

Capacity for Self-Governance

In December 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest and political populist, was elected President of Haiti, winning some two-thirds of a massive voter turnout. Aristide’s internationally monitored election came 4 years after the 1986 demise of the 29-year Duvalier family dictatorship and a subsequent series of military-dominated governments. Aristide’s election seemed to offer Haiti a chance to join other nations of the region in developing modern, democratic institutions and achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth in the Western Hemisphere’s poorest nation.

Eight months following Aristide’s February 7, 1991, inauguration— the first of a democratically elected president in Haiti’s turbulent history—the enormously popular President was overthrown by a violent military coup d’etat and forced to flee to the United States. The late September 1991 coup set in motion a chain of events that would eventually lead to a U.N.-sanctioned and U.S.-led military intervention in Haiti almost 3 years later.

Aristide’s free and fair election and his brief, pre-coup tenure ran against the grain of Haiti’s political tradition. For most of its history it had been ruled by autocrats. Since winning its freedom from the French in 1804, Haiti had 21 constitutions and 41 heads of state, 29 of whom were assassinated or overthrown. Haiti’s history of autocracy and political instability had begotten a society highly polarized on the basis of race, class, and geography, with a small group of French-

speaking, urban-based elites completely dominating the country’s social, economic and political institutions, reducing both the Creole-speaking urban poor and the demographically dominant Creole-speaking peasantry to positions of second-class citizenship.

Over time, Haiti’s increasingly impoverished masses eked out survival on smaller and smaller farm plots or as members of an expanding urban underclass. As the country’s population grew, and Haiti’s leaders failed to invest in its human resources or to provide new opportunities for sustained economic growth, tremendous pressure was placed on the country’s limited natural resources, leading to severe environmental degradation. With their resource base shrinking, Haiti’s poor became desperate for change, as evidenced by significant increases in internal and external migration commencing in the 1970s. As much as the 1986 demise of the Duvaliers provided hope for many, it posed a grave threat to those who benefitted from this repressive and corrupt system.

As Haiti entered the 1990s, shared political power and the rule of law had not emerged. Power remained in the hands of Haiti’s tiny elite, with the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) serving as the country’s enforcer and political arbiter, dominating the series of governments that succeeded Jean-Claude Duvalier. As such, institutions of the state continued to oppress the people rather than serve them, and the entire public security apparatus (police, courts, and prisons) functioned to control the population and preserve the status of the elites in exchange for the spoils of governance.

With the coup, Haiti reverted to its long tradition of authoritarian rule and political corruption, with no truly functioning judicial system and no tradition of public service or integrity on the part of those in government service at any level. Further, international intervention came only after the perennially weak economy had virtually disintegrated under the pressures of governmental corruption and an international economic embargo was imposed to dislodge the coup leaders.

Status of the Public Security Apparatus

Haiti’s police remained integrated within its Army even though the 1987 Constitution passed overwhelmingly by a popular referendum mandated their separation, with the police to be placed under civilian authority within the Ministry of Justice. Intimidation of the population by the uniformed military and allied paramilitary thugs who functioned with complete impunity was the norm, with no official or legal recourse available to average Haitians, who had no illusions that the state’s security apparatus would serve or protect them.

In this void, citizens had little choice but to acquiesce to fear and intimidation, or to take matters into their own hands. Particularly following the demise of the Duvaliers, the acquiescence of the past gave way to heightened confrontation between state authorities and citizens seeking change. As a result, incidents of “popular justice” increased, with groups of frustrated, angry, usually poor Haitians replicating the system that repressed them by reacting in a harsh and violent manner toward those believed or alleged to have abused power or committed other crimes. In the absence of a police or a judiciary that applied mandated legal practices, frenzied crowds sometimes beat, stoned or even necklaced with a burning tire suspected or confirmed criminals. Political scores were settled similarly, with impunity for all the norm.

The Situation Precipitating the Intervention

During President Aristide’s brief, precoup tenure, Haiti’s profile of violence and impunity was challenged by initiatives to apply constitutional law, separate the police from the Army, and reform the security apparatus. With the coup, however, those nascent reforms were immediately swept aside and old practices restored. As the reformers fled the country or went into hiding, more than 1,000 Aristide supporters, primarily in the slums of Port-au-Prince, were murdered by Haiti’s army.

The immediate response to the coup by the United States was to condemn it, demand the restoration of President Aristide to his legitimate office, and initiate diplomatic efforts—reinforced by economic sanctions—toward achieving that goal. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations kept apace with the U.S. response as a quick reversal of the coup seemed assured. Unevenly applied sanctions and ineffective diplomatic pressure, however, helped to prolong the crisis that had in the meantime become beset with another element, particularly troublesome for the United States: massive outmigration. As military rule tightened, tens of thousands of poor, frightened Haitians took to the seas on rickety boats to seek a safe haven, primarily in Florida. This element of the crisis quickly involved not only the U.S. Coast Guard but also U.S. Armed Forces based in Guantanamo, as they intercepted, housed, processed, and returned refugees.

By July 1993, unrelenting, albeit uneven, international pressure on the de facto Haitian Government led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, the commander of the Haitian Armed Forces, managed to bring the junta to Governor’s Island in New York to negotiate an end to the stalemate. The resultant Governor’s Island Accords established steps for the eventual return of President Aristide to Haiti by October 30, 1993, and the almost immediate removal of economic sanctions.

The accords called for the introduction of a small multinational peacekeeping force to assist in the transition to Aristide’s return. On October 8, 1993, however, when the USS Harlan County attempted to dock in Port-au-Prince to land those lightly armed peacekeepers, a small but rowdy, gun-carrying mob affiliated with the Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH)—a paramilitary organization that had coalesced from disparate elements in 1993 and was closely linked with the de facto government—occupied the dock to protest the landing. Recalling recent events in Somalia where U.S. military peacekeeping personnel were killed by an armed mob, the Clinton administration decided to turn the ship away rather than to face a confrontation for which the small force was not prepared.

The Harlan County incident was quickly followed by more FAd’H/FRAPH violence against Haitians and heightened intimidation of foreigners, particularly those attached to the joint U.N./OAS International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH), which deployed to Haiti in early 1993 primarily to monitor human rights violations. On October 13, international sanctions lifted in August were reimposed, effectively acknowledging the death of the Governor’s Island Accords. Two days later, the United Nations evacuated all personnel from Haiti, including MICIVIH. Correctly sensing that nothing short of armed force would convince the Haitian military to relinquish control of the government, a decision was then made by U.S. policy makers to begin planning for a possible military intervention to restore President Aristide to office.

By July 1994, as conditions in Haiti worsened, planning for a forced military entry into the country was relatively advanced, with parallel preparations for entry in either a permissive or semi-hostile environment were also underway. On July 31, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 940 calling for the application of “all necessary means” to dislodge the de facto government and restore the duly elected Aristide to office. The use of military force was thus legitimized. The resolution envisioned the Multinational Force (MNF), composed primarily of U.S. military forces, under U.S. command, that would unseat the de facto government, followed by a smaller peacekeeping force under U.N. command, after a safe and secure environment had been established by the MNF.

The potential opposing force in Haiti consisted of an ill-equipped, ill-trained army/police of about 7,000 regulars and an unknown number of irregulars referred to in general as attaches and including paramilitary personnel affiliated with FRAPH. On September 19, 1994, following the last-minute success of a diplomatic mission led by former President Carter and deployed to Haiti by President Clinton to achieve a negotiated departure of General Cedras and other key de facto leaders, U.S. forces quickly shifted their mission from a forced entry to a permissive one. Immediately, the first contingent of an eventual 21,000 strong armed force moved into Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the use of all necessary means, including military force, to secure the departure of the de facto military regime from Haiti, restore the legitimate government to power, and create a secure and stable environment that would allow both Haiti’s democratic political processes to advance and its shattered economy to recover. It established the mandate for the predominantly U.S.-manned MNF to intervene. The resolution also called for a U.N. peacekeeping force (U.N. Mission in Haiti, UNMIH) to replace the MNF once a safe and secure environment had been established. UNMIH was to remain in the country until free and fair presidential elections and a peaceful transfer of power had occurred. In addition, it also provided for civilian International Police Monitors (IPM) to assist the MNF and, subsequently, for U.N. Civilian Police (CIVPOL) to replace the IPMs during the UNMIH phase.

The operational guidelines for the IPM and CIVPOL (similar to military ROE) were the vital ingredient in UNMIH’s ability to accomplish the mission successfully. CIVPOL’s guidelines were essentially the same as those established by the MNF for the IPMs and were also more robust and proactive than normal CIVPOL guidelines. Under the 1993 Governor’s Island Accords, the IPM and CIVPOL were authorized to carry weapons (a first for a U.N. police contingent), to enforce Haitian laws when no local security forces were present, to use the minimum force necessary under carefully prescribed conditions, and to intervene to prevent loss of life or disruption of a “safe and secure” environment. In addition, CIVPOL was charged with monitoring the performance of the Haitian public security forces and serving as mentors for the HNP.

The U.N. mandate authorizing the MNF was translated by the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) into three primary military objectives:

Regarding the public security function, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940 authorized assistance to the Government of Haiti (GOH) in the creation of a separate police force and in establishing an environment conducive to free and fair elections that would be monitored by the United Nations and the OAS. Although the Security Council resolution did not explicitly call for military personnel to provide direct assistance to the IPMs, CIVPOL, Haitian security forces, or judicial and penal systems, by its nature the mandate created unity of effort by ascribing the same mission to all entities participating in the operation. The United States and the United Nations were very cognizant of the need to integrate the three main aspects of the operation: military/security, diplomatic, and humanitarian relief/economic revitalization. In particular, this led to synchronization of actions by military and civilian police elements first of MNF, and then of UNMIH. In general, the U.S. military provided the overall organizational and support framework for the entire military-civilian operation. The initial military emphasis was on stopping violence and restoring stability by use of the MFN (10^th Mountain Division followed by 25^th Division) with emphasis on developing an indigenous capability to sustain stability in a democratic framework.

Public security was a requisite for success and a principal objective of both the MNF and UNMIH. To fill the public security void while a new Haitian National Police (HNP) force was trained and fielded, the U.S. interagency community, working in collaboration with the United Nations and other concerned nations, developed a comprehensive plan prior to the intervention of the MNF calling for an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF). The IPSF would consist primarily of former Haitian soldiers vetted by the United States and restored Haitian authorities, excluding from participation those with a record of extreme abuse or corruption. Those selected for inclusion in the IPSF would subsequently be subjected to reorientation training. Their performance was to be monitored by the IPMs, followed by CIVPOL. As mandated in Haiti’s Constitution, the new HNP would be an separate entity under civilian authority. However, less consideration was given to the need for rapid judicial reform or prison conditions.

IPM Resources

The decision was made in advance of the September 19 landing to create an IPM force to work with Haitians, in conjunction with the MNF. As 821 International Police Monitors from 20 separate countries were deployed to Haiti, a partnership developed among the military police, the IPMs, and the IPSF through extensive combined patrolling. The IPMs were commanded by Ray Kelly, former Commissioner of Police for New York City, who reported to and was supported by the MNF Commander. Kelly had a staff provided by the MNF that coordinated logistics, communications, and operations.

Once Kelly overcame the initial command disorganization, the three greatest limitations on the IPM were that of quality of personnel, experience, and language. As with any multinational group, some national delegations were stronger in police skills than others. During the first UNMIH phase, this constraint was addressed by mixing national CIVPOL contingents to assure a core group of mature, experienced French and Canadians in each contingent to provide leadership and policing skills. During the earlier MNF phase, however, national contingents of IPMs remained intact, to do either a good or bad job, based upon their respective skills.

Complicating the problem posed by differences in experience and methods of policing were delegations originating from countries with diverse systems of civil and common law. Further, delegations tended to have pre-conceived notions on how to police based on their national experience. In an attempt to provide consistent mentoring and monitoring of police activity, the U.S. Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP) provided each IPM with a full set of lesson plans that were to be used in training the IPSF so that they could directly reinforce the training, as it had been given. Later, ICITAP provided the CIVPOL contingent with full sets of HNP basic recruit lesson plans for the same reason. Giving police monitors standard lesson plans that were designed specifically to be consistent with Haitian law allowed the monitors to support the training effort in a consistent manner nationwide.

The third major problem, language, was evident from the very start of U.N. operations. Most IPM and CIVPOL contingents spoke English; few spoke French; several spoke neither English nor French; and Creole-speakers were a rare asset. The majority of both the IPMs and CIVPOL officers, therefore, could not communicate directly with the IPSF, at least not in French, let alone Creole. During the IPM period, national police contingents were deployed intact, despite their uneven capabilities and language limitations. During the CIVPOL period, experienced French and Canadian police were mixed with other contingents in order to deal with language problems and enhance capabilities generally.

This host of limitations linked to international police contingents was not just a sobering reality for the Haiti U.N. mission, but also underscored the fact that most contributing countries did not abide by the basic personnel requirements. As a result, the entire concept of working closely with the IPSF and of training HNP cadets in the field was seriously handicapped. Enormous pressures were exerted on the United Nations to supply more interpreters, but mostly in vain. The relatively few bilingual CIVPOL members were unavailable to conduct the concurrent, language-sensitive tasks that had to be carried out, namely, to be partnered 24-hours a day with CIVPOL members who did not meet French language requirements; to be involved with the recruiting efforts of ICITAP; to be involved in security planning for elections in their respective areas; and to instill the principles of community policing everywhere. Often these individuals found themselves required to provide translation while attending meetings between Government of Haiti officials and MNF commanders and, later, U.N. personnel. Out of an identified minimum requirement of 359 interpreters, the U.N. administration informed CIVPOL on the eve of the UNMIH’s April 1995 takeover that only 100 were available.

The successful deployment of the MNF and the avoidance of casualties resulted from flexible advanced military planning and skillful exercise of coercive diplomacy. Once the 11^th-hour diplomacy of the Carter Mission, which also included Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, secured assurances that Haiti’s de facto leaders would step aside, the MNF rapidly shifted from a forced-entry scenario to a plan predicated on more permissive circumstances. Rules of engagement (ROE), already prepared for this option, were quickly verified and disseminated.

The Deployment Gap

According to the Carter Agreement, security was to have been achieved through the joint cooperation of international forces and existing Haitian public security personnel. Initially, efforts were made by ACOM to work with Haiti’s existing public security forces, still under the command of General Cedras, and joint patrols were established. Although the MNF plan did not originally call for U.S. soldiers to take on a police role, it quickly became evident that existing Haitian security forces could not perform public security functions according to accepted international norms. Continued incidents of FAd’H/FRAPH violence toward Haitian citizens in the immediate aftermath of the intervention, matched by repeated citizen protests against the maintenance of authority by those who had so recently repressed them, made joint cooperation a particularly difficult mission to accomplish. In this setting, the International Police Monitors could not provide the presence needed to deter violence, particularly since they were slow to deploy and had an uncertain initial command and support structure. Creating a secure and stable environment thus required a degree of both oversight and presence by MNF military forces in addition to the presence of the IPMs.

Within 3 days following the arrival of its forces, the United States made a major change in policy, spurred in part by televised reports of unarmed Haitian citizens being beaten (and killed) by uniformed Haitian personnel while U.S. soldiers looked on because their ROE precluded involvement in such violence. Fearing that a repetition of such incidents would embolden the FAd’H and turn the populace against U.S. forces, a revised ROE interpretation was issued allowing U.S. forces broad police-style powers to detain and, if necessary shoot, people committing serious criminal acts (e.g., homicide, aggravated assault, rape, robbery). This specifically applied to Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Michel Francois, Haiti’s then-Chief of Police, was told in no uncertain terms that police violence was to stop. This ultimatum, combined with more aggressive U.S. patrolling, significantly reduced the level of violence against the local population.

While initial efforts were made to work with the existing police element, it was always understood that a new, professional police corps would have to be created in order to have legitimacy with the Haitian people. Two incidents hastened that process—a shoot-out in Haiti’s second largest city, Cap Haitien, between the FAd’H and U.S. Marines on September 24, 1994, that left 10 Haitians dead, and an armed attack several days later by FRAPH on peaceful, unarmed protest marchers in Port-au-Prince that left 5 dead. In rapid succession, the FAd’H virtually ceased to exist in northern areas within the vicinity of Cap Haitien, the FRAPH was declared illegal by the legitimate Haitian government, and the MNF closed FRAPH offices around the country. Concurrently, the MNF continued to disarm the FAd’H.

Following another violent incident involving Haitian Army personnel in December 1994, President Aristide moved in January 1995 to disband the FAd’H immediately. Most disappeared into the streets or their homes, without pay but with real grievances. By late May 1995, all that remained of the erstwhile repressive force was a 50-member marching band. After disbanding the FAd’H, Aristide gave grudging permission for the United States to conduct a demobilization program aimed at reintegrating ex-soldiers into Haitian society by providing them 4 months of training in such marketable skills as mechanics, carpentry, electrical repairs, plumbing, and computer operations. As the IPSF was displaced by the newly trained Haitian National Police (HNP) personnel commencing in March 1995, these former FAd’H also became eligible for the reintegration program (except for the small number of former FAd’H who were deemed eligible to enter HNP training or take positions with the Presidential and Palace Security Units). Of an estimated 6,250 demobilized soldiers, 5,482 (88 percent) registered for the retraining program.

While in training the former soldiers received a stipend, but upon graduation they were on their own to compete in Haiti’s largely informal job market. Although 4,867 former soldiers graduated from the program, only 304 found jobs through its job referral service. Unable to secure permanent jobs in the formal sector, most have joined the informal economy, competing for scarce jobs with others in Haiti’s vast manpower pool, thus undermining the effectiveness of the program and leaving some graduates disillusioned, still more angry, and prone to engage in disruptive activities.

Concurrent with the demise of the FAd’H, MNF authorities moved quickly to stand the Interim Public Security Force in order to fill the glaring deployment gap. U.S. and restored GOH officials collaborated in vetting the records of Haitian military personnel who were identified for possible incorporation into the force with the intention of eliminating known human rights abusers and criminals. Some 3,000 former FAd’H personnel were incorporated into the IPSF. ICITAP provided 6 days of orientation and training prior to redeployment. In addition to the former FAd’H, 950 overwhelmingly pro-Aristide Haitian refugees at Guantanamo who had been given 21 days training by ICITAP were incorporated into the IPSF. This cadre of former FAd’H and returned Guantanamo refugees provided public security until the new civilian HNP could be recruited and trained by ICITAP.

From the day the IPSF was created, it was planned that it would be phased out as the HNP gradually deployed between June 1995 and February 1996. However, IPSF members who passed the rigid acceptance standards for the HNP would be permitted to apply for entry into its training program. Few IPSF met that criteria. The United States had originally planned for a vetted, smaller army as well as a national police force, in good part to keep former soldiers off the streets and out of trouble. However, Aristide’s action made this impossible. He also resisted for several months the use of retrained FAd’H for the IPSF, wanting to replace them with Aristide loyalists whose names his lieutenants kept adding to IPSF rolls while the U.S. Embassy and the MNF kept striking them off.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) also trained 100 Haitians in Canada for inclusion into the IPSF. Manipulation of the selection of the Regina cadre by Aristide supporters, however, and the cadre’s subsequent, favorable treatment (e.g., salaries at least triple the standard Haitian police and better weapons than others in the IPSF) were viewed as an attempt to create a group of elite loyalists who could be used to assert control over the nascent HNP. Not all 100 of the Regina cadre chose to deploy to Haiti. Ultimately, President Rene Preval, who was elected in December 1996 to succeed Aristide, cashiered the most politicized individuals because of criminal misconduct and other problems, including the fact that many Regina recruits had actually become American or Canadian citizens.

The MNF Role in Public Security

With Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien considered “operational centers of gravity” for the MNF mission, urban security operations were especially important for establishing and sustaining the “secure and stable environment” necessary for eventual transition to UNMIH. By October 15, 1994, the 10^th Mountain Division had seven infantry battalions stationed around Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. The 16^th MP Brigade had two military police battalions in the urban areas. They were supplemented by a Caribbean Command battalion and 327 IPMs.

The MNF conducted scores of separate day-and-night mounted and presence patrols in Port-au-Prince and had a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) on standby at all times. The military police conducted an average of 160 joint patrols per day with the IPMs and the IPSF. Frequent and highly visible MNF mobile patrols provided a psychological deterrent against violent outbursts between Haitian civilians and elements of the de facto regime.

Concurrently, a small detachment of MPs with good communications capability was stationed at each police station. Together with IPMs, they provided initial training at the police stations on subjects such as patrolling, desk operations and use of force. The MP approach was “watch what I do.” Problems that the MPs had to overcome included the absence in police stations of an office for citizens to file complaints. In addition, most police officers were unfamiliar with the necessary forms to receive complaints.

The MNF and UNMIH also employed Psychological Operations teams. To assuage U.N. sensitivities, the name was changed to Military Information Support Teams (MIST). Deployed throughout Haiti and challenged to work in the relatively obscure language of Haitian Creole, they were crucial in shaping a favorable public reaction to the MNF, as well as in contributing to the pacification of unruly protesters. Because television is limited to the capital city and radio coverage is uneven, wild rumors are often a prime source of information. Initially, MIST was the only vehicle available to the GOH to communicate and provide accurate information to the country’s widely dispersed population. MIST also helped the police development effort by providing materials for recruitment and testing process.

In rural areas, where approximately two-thirds of Haiti’s 7 million people reside, there were Special Forces (SF) teams stationed in 27 separate locations, with patrols to 866 towns and villages. While disaffected and criminal elements were cowed by their presence, the general populace was converted into enthusiastic supporters through the SF teams’ presence and their creative use of community development projects (often in conjunction with the AID Office of Transition Initiatives). In an environment of weak, nascent local government capabilities, SF teams fulfilled a variety of essential tasks, not only facilitating order but performing such varied tasks as public health and socialization into democracy. Included on the SF teams were civil affairs and psychological operations personnel.

By virtue of their joint activities with the IPSF, MNF personnel were operating within the context of Haitian law. When necessary, MNF commanders used the mandate of UNSCR 940 to arrest and detain Haitians unilaterally, but this was minimized especially because the judicial and prison systems were in such bad shape. By putting MPs in police stations and on patrol with the IPSF, the situation in the cities was stabilized. In the countryside, Special Forces and the IPSF conducted similar combined patrolling. This demonstrated to ordinary citizens both that the legitimate Haitian Government was beginning to function again and that earlier abuses and lawlessness would not be tolerated. The morale, discipline, and leadership of the IPSF increased markedly, both on patrol and in the station houses, because of the standards set by the IPMs and U.S. forces. Also contributing to effective policing were the communications and logistics support supplied by the MNF. Detracting from morale and discipline, however, was concern that most IPSF members would soon be laid off, with virtually no hope of joining the HNP.

Arms reduction and arms control also contributed to the pacification process. Although the MNF did not disarm all Haitians through door-to-door searches for weapons, it acted immediately to seize heavy weapons from the Haitian Armed Forces, to confiscate weapons caches as they were discovered, and to keep all weapons (even machetes) off the streets. The MNF quickly seized large weapon stocks at major Haitian military bases. A weapons buy-back program, initiated in late September 1994, garnered 13,432 weapons by May 1995, including mortars, antitank weapons, artillery pieces, and machine guns. Together, the number of weapons purchased and confiscated by the MNF exceeded 30,000. The main effect of the arms reduction and control program was to break the power of FAd’H and its allies and discourage any thoughts of organized resistance. The program also helped both to convince the general populace that they had little to fear and to create a climate more propitious for establishing civil order.

In addition to arms control, the IPM/IPSF, with MNF backup, conducted operations to protect power plants and other vital civil installations. They also played a very important role in ensuring both a limited but regular supply of electricity in Port-au-Prince—a commodity equated by Haitians with improved security. By means of assigning civil affairs personnel to key ministries, the MNF aided the restoration of normal government functioning, replacing the de facto government’s patterns of abuse and corruption. This effort was designed to begin to return the country to a sense of “normalcy” and correctly justified as being a plus for force protection.

Institution Building and the Haitian National Police

Prior to the 1994 intervention, ICITAP prepared a Haiti Police Development Program based upon a 5-year commitment with two overlapping phases to help the GOH address its most pressing law enforcement needs. The first phase called for rapid action. It involved separating police functions from those of the FAd’H, defining the role of police in the context of Haitian society and local needs, and instituting a basic training program that provided vetted members of the FAd’H with immediate policing skills so that they could perform as interim police for the maintenance of law and order. Simultaneously, armed International Police Monitors would be trained and deployed, with ICITAP assistance, as a method of deterring violence during the transition period. The police monitors would also serve as an informal training resource for basic policing functions until HNP personnel could be trained and deployed.

The second phase of ICITAP’s mission would focus on institution building. This stage, central to the development of a professional civilian police force, included training and assisting in developing police administrative and managerial capabilities and specialized skills, such as investigative policing and forensics.

During the pre-Harlan County period, ICITAP coordinated planned activities with CIVPOL Commander LeMay. Given the rupture of the Governor’s Island Accords, the CIVPOL/ICITAP collaboration produced nothing. However, renewed collaboration got into full swing during the summer of 1994, when RCMP Chief Superintendent Pouliot was named UNMIH CIVPOL Commander. Joint planning efforts were developed between ICITAP and RCMP and between ICITAP and CIVPOL. The RCMP assigned three officers to ICITAP Washington Headquarters to assist in the development of the basic recruit curriculum and lesson plans. In addition, an outline of the field training officer manual was developed, based on U.S. and Canadian models, for use by police monitors following the deployment of the HNP after basic recruit training.

After the MNF landed, ICITAP refurbished the FAd’H’s former heavy weapon battalion complex at Port-au-Prince into a police academy. It had initial help from MNF logisticians, and engineers (for design and minor construction). The three RCMP members detailed to Washington were among the core of instructors involved in the ICITAP HNP training effort. At one point there were 20 RCMP and 3 French trainers assigned to the basic recruit training effort at the Police Academy in Port-au-Prince. The number of U.S. trainers grew to over 100, most of whom were active duty state and local police from throughout the country.

A major role of CIVPOL during the period of deployment of the new HNP personnel would include acting as field training officers (FTOs) for the fledgling police force. This task would include joint patrols, mentoring, and using standardized reporting forms to evaluate performance and effectiveness of training. Because UNCIVPOL was part of the U.N. advance team in Haiti, planning and coordination with Commissioner Pouliot continued during the entire MNF period. Because of a delay in full deployment of CIVPOL, ICITAP had to deploy some FTOs for Class 1 of the HNP from its instructor cadre. Once CIVPOL was in place, however, it began to fully implement the FTO program using the FTO manual that was jointly drafted by ICITAP and the RCMP.

The new Police Academy was staffed by ICITAP with experienced U.S. Government and civilian contract trainers plus Royal Canadian Mounted Police and French police personnel. It opened its doors January 30, 1995, with an initial class of 375. Cadets were given basic instruction over a 4-month period in a wide variety of skills, including making arrests, handling firearms and protecting civil rights. The salaries of the Haitian National Police were high by local standards, as was the level of education. Almost all recruits were in their late teens or early twenties and were carefully vetted for previous human rights abuses. CIVPOL, in consultation with ICITAP, developed a Field Training Guide for HNP and CIVPOL Trainers. The guide provided specific tasks to be accomplished by the cadet in the field to test in a real life situation how he/she put in practice what was learned at the Academy. The guide included an evaluation by the trainers for each of the field training stages. A further monthly performance evaluation system was designed for the 3,050 IPSF personnel. This would form the basis for future consideration for their integration into the HNP.

To establish an operational 5,000-member police force in time to replace the United Nations when its mandate expired in February 1996, ICITAP increased the training capacity to 3,000 by establishing an auxiliary training center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The final class of new police cadets graduated in February 1996, putting the total HNP complement at 5,243 officers.

Public Security Transition

To initiate on-the-ground planning for the transition from the MNF to UNMIH and from the IPSF/IPM to HNP/CIVPOL, an UNMIH Advance Team including military and civilian planners and 13 civilian police officers arrived in Haiti on October 4, 1994. By December 19, the team had increased to 40, with members deployed to Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, Les Cayes, Jacmel, and Jeremie. The Advance Team studied conditions around the country, with a view toward establishing initial community policing principles with the population and organizing community consultative groups (CCG).

The Advance Team had to determine the requirements for the operation such as vehicles, equipment and fuel. At the same time, CIVPOL contributed significantly toward the establishment of minimum standards for the selection of HNP applicants. They also supplied personnel to assist the MNF and ICITAP in selection of HNP applicants and administration of entry exams and fitness tests. As CIVPOL personnel undertook these duties, they developed operational concepts to execute the mission’s mandate: to train and monitor the IPSF and later the HNP; and to assist both in the maintenance of a safe and stable environment and in the conduct of free and fair elections.

On April 1, 1995, following the visit to Haiti of President Clinton, a seamless transition from the MNF to UNMIH was completed. U.N. Secretary-General Special Representative (SRSG) Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and his core headquarters personnel, both civilian and military, had been on the ground since October 1994, working with the MNF and undergoing advanced training. By the time of the transition, 95 percent of the military forces for UNMIH were already in place, either as part of the MNF, or as new personnel to replace departing MNF units. With the U.S. 25^th Division replacing the 10^th Division, Major General Joseph Kinzer became the UNMIH Force Commander with a total force of 6,000 troops, 2,500 of which were U.S. personnel. Brigadier General Tom Hill of the 25^th Infantry remained as Commander of the U.S. contingent. U.S. Special Forces were still deployed in the countryside, reinforced by several UNMIH national contingents. Two hundred U.S. MPs remained in Port-au-Prince, reinforced by a 120-man MP company from India. A Guatemalan MP company was deployed in Cap Haitien. All MPs were under the command of the U.S. 504^th MP Battalion.

A crucial factor contributing to the smooth transition and UNMIH’s successful mission accomplishment was exceptional cooperation among the key players particularly Ambassador Brahimi and Major General Kinzer. They and other senior officials regularly conferred together and with GOH authorities. Brahimi held twice-weekly meetings with his component heads to ensure synchronization of effort by the multidisciplinary U.N. team. The ROE for UNMIH, operating under a Chapter VI mandate from the UNSC, were robust enough to enable UNMIH to take appropriate actions to protect themselves and carry out the mandate. Though all MNF vehicles were eventually painted white to signify the change from the MNF to UNMIH, U.S. forces remained under U.S. Command and maintained their own uniforms and a high profile presence. These last factors contributed to Haitian perception that reality had not changed as a result of the transition. Indeed, UNMIH continued active patrolling in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien.

As part of UNMIH, the United Nations deployed 870 Civilian Police monitors under the command of RCMP Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot, who, on the mission’s organizational chart, was coequal with Kinzer. Both men reported directly to the SRSG. CIVPOL headquarters, its operations center, and its logistics support units were co-located with UNMIH military forces. This, along with a shared communications system, complemented deployment of forces, joint patrolling and integrated planning, to maximize collaboration between the two. This collaboration created the conditions that actually reduced the requirements for military presence.

The fact that both CIVPOL and the IPM were armed and had rapid military backup meant that they were more confident and less threatened in potentially dangerous environments where small-scale theft and violence were common. They were not subjected to having vehicles stolen or to being abused as had been the case with CIVPOL in Cambodia and elsewhere. They were also able to carry out arrests as well as encourage a more pro-active effort by the HNP than would have been the case had CIVPOL not had a more robust mandate and permission to carry arms.

Until the HNP was fully staffed with trained personnel and at least nominally capable of operating without direct military support, UNMIH MPs remained in Port-au-Prince police stations providing liaison and technical assistance. Initial CIVPOL reservations about the continued presence of MPs were overcome because their communications capability meant that UNMIH was able to monitor the evolving security situation accurately and respond more effectively when called upon by CIVPOL or the HNP.

UNMIH military patrols continued throughout the country as a deterrent against criminal activities or political violence. The main responsibility for security in the countryside remained with SF units, whose activity continued as before, although aided by UNMIH military units who were deployed to more rural locations than had been the case with MNF. The QRF, based in Port-au-Prince, remained ready to respond to any incident which posed a threat.

As the Haitian National Police gradually assumed responsibility for public security, the role of international military personnel diminished accordingly. U.N. Civilian Police monitors provided on-the-job training and mentoring for the HNP. Additionally, patrolling U.N. military forces monitored the conduct of the HNP, providing feedback to CIVPOL as necessary.

The Haitian National Police

Following his inauguration to succeed Jean-Bertrand Aristide as elected President of Haiti in February 1996, Rene Preval nominated Pierre Denize as Director General of the HNP. Noted for his record of honesty and dynamic action in the drug rehabilitation field, Denize’s nomination was quickly approved by the Haitian Parliament. Subsequently, recruitment began to fill supervisory positions, and ICITAP received authority to fund training programs for supervisors and to provide funds for communications and transportation. Only 35 of 257 HNP supervisors were in place when Preval took office, because of the limited pool of talent from which to draw and Aristide’s reluctance with a few notable exceptions to rely upon former members of the FAd’H.

In spite of progress made under Denize, the HNP continued to manifest shortcomings that flow from inexperience, insufficient training, and inadequate supervision. This included occasional episodes of excessive use of force, cases of poor discipline, and even abuse of human rights. Even though the Director General of the HNP moved responsibly to address these inherent problems, this did not completely quell Haitian and international concern. A July 1996 report issued by the U.N./OAS International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH), for example, stressed the role of the Inspector General (IG), set up to monitor police infractions but not fully functional when Denize took over.

Although a USIA-sponsored poll in November 1996 indicated three-quarters of the population had a good opinion of the HNP, international scrutiny and concern over HNP shortcomings continued to mount. In late 1996, the Clinton administration and Congress agreed to suspend $5 million in U.S.-funding for specialized training by ICITAP and for communications and transportation support. This was precipitated by the aforementioned shortcomings and also the assignment of a number of former FAd’H personnel to the HNP and the Palace and Presidential Security Units. By January 1997, as the Office of the IG became more robust and other actions were taken to assuage congressional concerns, half the withheld funding was released. Subsequently, the remainder was made available to ICITAP for its programs as former FAd’H members were removed and the IG continued to demonstrate improvement. By May 1997, more than 100 members of the HNP accused of abusing their positions had been dismissed at the behest of the IG, a fact unprecedented in the history of Haitian policing.

Parallel to these developments, other key institutional enhancements were made. In mid-1996, ICITAP organized four examinations in collaboration with the United Nations that yielded 54 commissaire (supervisory) recruits from the FAd’H, Haiti’s university milieu, and HNP commissaires already in place. These candidates received a 3-week orientation to the HNP and its management systems, as well as basic leadership skills. In 1997, a fifth round of recruitment assembled 23 additional commissaires who were promoted from HNP inspector ranks after completion of a 5-week training program. In addition, the Government of Canada, in coordination with other members of the international community, started a bilateral enforcement assistance program in August 1996 to develop midlevel supervisors.

ICITAP also conducted specialized training on a continuing basis for classes of 200 to 300 officers at the Haitian National Police Training Center (HNPTC) in instructor development, criminal investigation, narcotics enforcement, crowd control, SWAT, coast guard operations, dignitary protection, border patrol, and airport security. In addition, ICITAP began to provide in-service training in firearms, use of force limits, judgment, and respect for human rights.

To help the HNP define its own institutional needs, ICITAP worked with the Ministry of Justice’s Secretary of State for Public Security, the HNP Director General, the Chief Inspector General, and their respective staffs. Fashioned out of this collaboration was an HNP Development Plan to the year 2000. The plan constituted perhaps the most significant tangible innovation in Haiti’s law enforcement development process. The GOH and the international community have relied on the plan as the blueprint for all collective efforts. A Support Group for HNP Development Plan Implementation was created to consolidate efforts and accelerate HNP organization and development. The group meets regularly to verify compliance with stated objectives as well as to articulate needed resources for implementation and to identify potential donors.

The Judiciary and Prisons

To have lasting impact, improvements in law enforcement need to be accompanied by similar developments in the courts and prisons. This was particularly the case in Haiti, where the judicial system had been corrupt, largely dysfunctional, and devoid of legitimacy. Rebuilding the judicial system has proven a formidable task, with progress lagging far behind the police. As performance and efficiency of the police have improved, matching improvements in the judicial system, from the courts and prosecutors to the prisons, became even more urgent. Further complicating the situation is the fact that Haitian law mandates officials of the judicial system, not the police, to conduct criminal investigations.

Following international intervention, the judicial system could not adequately process individuals arrested by the IPSF and the HNP. Prisons were constantly overcrowded, and riots were numerous. To rectify this, the international community began to provide resources to start training the judges. Nevertheless, the dysfunctional state of the judicial system became a major source of frustration for HNP efforts to stop criminal activity as arrests were not met with adequate handling of suspects and other required judicial actions.

Almost 3 years after the intervention, Haiti’s judicial system remained virtually unchanged, unable to respond effectively either to the population’s desire for legal reform and uniform application of the law or to the HNP’s reformed role in law enforcement. CIVPOL officers reported HNP comments that they would rather get into a gunfight and kill a “bad guy” than turn him over to the judicial system because that was tantamount to release. Failure of judicial reform undermines police reform, therefore, and breeds attitudes that could lead to replication of traditional abuses carried out by Haitians.

International actors were aware of this imperative. In pre-intervention planning by the United States, the Agency for International Development (AID) was given responsibility for training and reform of the Haitian judicial system, paralleling the ICITAP role with the police. AID prepared a project proposal and eventually awarded a contract to an international firm. Congressionally mandated AID procedures, however, were so cumbersome that it took over 6 months before activity actually began. Recognizing the dangers this delay posed, the U.S. military took interim action to jump start judicial reform.

In February 1995, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command under Major General Donald Campbell, instituted a Judicial Mentors Program in February 1995. Campbell and his team provided copies of Haitian laws to judges and undertook an inventory of all courts and prisons, cataloguing the qualifications and capabilities of magistrates as well as needed commodities. In May 1995, the AID Administration of Justice Project (AOJ) was expanded to a 4-year, $18 million effort involving the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies as well as the AID contractor. The program began with the renovation of the former Military Academy in Port-au-Prince as the site for the National Magistrates School.

The DOJ, the Haitian Ministry of Justice, and the Haitian State University’s law school faculty developed a judicial training curriculum for a series of 2-week training courses for justices of the peace, prosecutors, investigating judges, and trial judges. From July 3, 1995, through October 11, 1996, an emergency training program was conducted for 439 incumbent judicial personnel by the DOJ and the Haitian National Center for State Courts. The Magistrates’ School became a resource center to provide technical assistance for judicial officers, and an Office of Judicial Supervision was established within the Ministry of Justice to monitor the performance of judges and prosecutors throughout the country.

Further reforms were enacted when the DOJ assigned two attorneys to work with the AOJ program with a particular focus on Haitian prosecutor’s offices (or “parquets”) that handle cases usually referred by local justices of the peace or by magistrates. These DOJ attorneys worked to improve investigative capability, judicial competence and case management in six of Haiti’s fourteen parquets. In October 1996, at the request of the National Security Council, the DOJ developed a more robust effort to be executed and managed by its Office of Professional Development and Training (OPDAT) in a manner similar to the ICITAP effort with the HNP.

When AID funding ($1.9 million) for the 6-month program was approved, OPDAT instituted a Phase I project to expand the model parquet program to Port-au-Prince, and to add seven new attorneys (five Haitians, two Americans) to support the effort nationwide. The Haitian attorneys were assigned as full-time mentors in the parquets while the U.S. attorneys advised the Port-au-Prince parquet and worked on judicial curriculum development and training at the École de la Magistrature, and on legislative reform, including judicial standards. To coordinate the programs for the police and prosecutors/investigating magistrates, DOJ programs are managed from Washington, and the field managers for the police and AOJ projects are co-located in Port-au-Prince.

Achievements through January 1997 include the completion of an inventory of all pending cases in the seven jurisdictions, the validation of prison registers and matching case files, and selection of a sample of cases from each parquet for detailed analysis to determine remedial case management procedures. They also include completed seminars for prosecutors and magistrates on managing complex investigations, joint investigative training with HNP Judicial Police investigators, and draft legislation to establish judicial selection and retention criteria. Delays in the elections of the territorial assemblies that are mandated to nominate local judicial officials and the resultant absence of fresh faces in local judicial offices are among the key factors that have slowed the pace of judicial reform.

In January 1997, the DOJ presented AID with a Phase II proposal to expand the model parquet program to all remaining jurisdictions, to conduct full judicial training for all new personnel whose appointments are anticipated following territorial elections, and to provide in-service training for all current judicial personnel who are retained. As an interim step, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Military Assistance Teams (MATs) assisted in expanding the standardized case tracking system to all remaining parquets.

Despite this progress in training and reorganization, the judicial system in many ways has continued to operate as in the past, still a prisoner of ignorance, corruption, intimidation, and impunity. It has failed to perform up to the expectations of the public and this has had especially negative consequences with regard to the HNP. With the HNP Office of the Inspector General now functioning more robustly, the Director General has approved the jailing or dismissal of over 100 HNP members for a variety of offenses. Unfortunately, jailed HNP officers have not been prosecuted, and the HNP can take no action stronger than dismissal. The failure of the judicial system to proceed with prosecution of HNP personnel gives the impression that Haiti’s new police can also act with impunity.

Another problem confronting judicial reform efforts is the rise of crime and corresponding vigilante acts by citizens who have no faith that the system will deliver justice. Particularly in urban milieux, armed car jackings, robbery, and burglary, perpetrated by individuals and gangs with weaponry that can match or exceed that of the police, have become commonplace. Shootouts with criminals have resulted in the deaths of at least 20 members of the force. Sensing a return of insecurity, citizen groups have begun to take matters into their own hands. In several extreme cases, vigilante groups have attempted to remove suspects from HNP custody forcibly, and suspected criminals have been killed when the HNP was loath to fire upon frenzied crowds to rescue alleged criminals. Until the public gains confidence in a reformed and functioning justice system, problems such as these will persist.

The National Penitentiary, the Cap Haitien prison, and other prisons throughout the country were in a state of almost complete disrepair when the de facto regime was dismantled and were incapable of meeting even minimal international health or human rights norms. Early in the MNF mission, these conditions gained international attention through the case of Captain Lawrence Rockwood, a U.S. military officer who disobeyed orders and attempted to visit the National Penitentiary late at night to conduct an investigation of conditions there. All jails and prisons in urban areas had already been inspected by MPs within 1 week of the landing. Reports on the horrible conditions were filed, but the air and sea lift then underway did not include resources for the penal systems. Although Rockwood was later court-martialed, the United States and the United Nations responded to the heavy publicity by taking emergency measures, including hands-on involvement to provide basic repairs to the National Penitentiary and other prisons. In February 1995, prison riots and Haitian inability to cope with them caused the MFN to assume control of prisons, begin training guards, etc. U.S. Army engineers and Special Forces were used for urgently needed repairs. A special prison was established for women and juveniles in Port-au-Prince to separate them from adult male prisoners, and weekly coordinating meetings on prison conditions were established by MFN, AID, MICIVIH, and interested nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

CIVPOL created a partnership with a Haitian NGO, the Bureau of Nutrition and Development, to supply food for the prisoners in Haiti’s 28 jails scattered nationwide. Outside Port-au-Prince, food was delivered by CIVPOL. Although not part of its mandate, CIVPOL took charge of administering 27 of the 28 jails.

Haiti’s penal system, though improved over conditions in 1994, continues to pose obstacles to public security reform programs. More than 75 percent of inmates are in pretrial detention. The average time served by these detainees is 1 year. Most have never seen a magistrate in spite of requirements to do so within 48 hours of detention. This intolerable reality underscores the slow progress of judicial reform and its detrimental impact throughout Haitian society.

Effective action to establish judicial recruitment, retention and training standards (as recommended in the OPDAT legislative proposal) and establishment of an appropriate pay scale for judicial personnel, would improve the system. The United States, Canada, France, and other members of the European Union continue to participate actively in judicial assistance programs. The election of regional bodies mandated to name new judicial officials, coupled with vetting of existing judicial personnel and selection of qualified personnel to fill judicial vacancies and with internationally sponsored judicial training, could result in significant improvements over time.

Public Security and Elections

Between President Aristide’s return to office on October 15, 1994, and the end of his term in February 1996, the Haitian electoral calendar called for the election of 399 municipal council members and 1,692 other local officials, 18 members of Haiti’s 24-member Senate, all 83 members of the Chamber of Deputies and, finally, Aristide’s successor. In all, Haiti conducted five nationwide elections (including runoffs) in a 6-month period. The successful completion of this electoral cycle was central to U.S. “exit strategy.” Despite numerous concerns that the campaigning or balloting would be marred by violence, the electoral process unfolded without serious incidents thanks to the orderly environment established by UNMIH and its planning and logistical support role, along with that played by a multitude of governments and electoral observers, including MICIVIH.

In the midst of this hectic electoral calendar, other tasks confronted UNMIH, CIVPOL, and the nascent HNP. In the summer of 1995 Haiti was to host the annual General Assembly meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS). CIVPOL developed and implemented a security plan for the meeting, which would bring numerous heads of state, other diplomats and dignitaries to Haiti. CIVPOL coordinated the security components of the HNP, UNMIH, and other personnel seconded to CIVPOL for the occasion. Around the same period, CIVPOL also provided firearm training to Presidential and Palace Security Guards that had been organized by the MNF and conducted a security needs analysis and security screening for the Truth Commission that had been established by the GOH to look into human rights abuses perpetrated under the de facto regime.

It was the task of organizing elections, however, that posed the greatest logistical, political, organizational, and security challenges. A variety of governments and international organizations collaborated to confront them. UNMIH military forces, including U.S. MPs and Special Forces, were crucial to this process, providing logistical and security planning assistance to distribute and collect ballots and assisting in maintaining security during the voting process. The United Nations provided technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), funded largely by the United States. The Government of Canada contributed several million dollars worth of ballot boxes and equipment. Most international electoral observers came under the sponsorship of the MICIVIH. A variety of NGOs funded by AID assisted with ballot procedures, training poll workers, public education, voter mobilization, and electoral observation. UNMIH, CIVPOL, IPSF, and HNP all played a role in providing a secure and stable environment.

The first round of elections, though free and fair, was flawed by major operational deficiencies on the part of the CEP. By the time of the December 17, 1995, presidential election, however, these irregularities had been almost totally resolved, owing to extensive international technical assistance and plenty of practice. As a result, the consensus view of the 400 international observers was that the December 1995 Presidential election was free and fair. Equally important, it was unblemished by the bloodshed and intimidation that had traditionally accompanied elections in Haiti.

Following the 1995 Presidential Elections and the impending end of the UNMIH mandate, CIVPOL began a transition from an operational to a training mode, and proceeded to downsize from 900 to 300 members. Remaining CIVPOL personnel were all French-speaking officers dedicated to training the HNP in the field. While previously developed Principles of Community Policing were being taught by CIVPOL officers, consultations with local community consultative groups became more exclusively the domain of the HNP.

UNMIH to UNSMIH: Extensions and Transition

With the impending end of the U.N. mission set for March 1996, including departure of all U.S. military personnel, the fledgling HNP was far from ready to assume sole responsibility for Haiti’s public security. HNP personnel simply did not have the on-the-job experience needed to develop a leadership capability. Additionally, the force did not have the necessary cadre of trained supervisors; nor had it fully trained and deployed such specialized units as riot control, SWAT, or counterdrug operations.

Given this situation, the Haitian Government, supported in the United Nations by the “Friends of Haiti,” requested a 6-month extension for UNMIH. The UNSC approved only a 4-month extension, however, until August 1, 1996, for a force of 1,200 military personnel and 300 Canadian, French, and West African CIVPOL (160 French and 100 Canadians) in what was officially labeled the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH). The Canadian Government agreed to provide, at its own expense, an additional 700 troops, while the United States extended its presence in UNMIH until April 1996, when the Canadians would be in place and thus able to take command. At the start of UNSMIH, France assumed command of CIVPOL and introduced a different approach based upon French national police and gendarmerie traditions, with less presence and training in the police stations and less participation in joint patrols.

The transition to UNSMIH and the resulting change in leadership of CIVPOL resulted in changes in both CIVPOL philosophy and capabilities. The French command took a different view toward mentoring, viewing its role as advisors at the executive level and limiting its work with basic recruits to stationhouse lectures and readings from manuals. French gendarmerie were specialists in tactical control, not general “beat cops,” in contrast to the French Police Nationale assigned to the UNMIH I planning cell who had been very useful in earlier development of concepts for basic police mission and deployment.

Many RCMP officers, particularly those in outlying districts, continued to perform familiar mentoring activities. This mentoring/leadership role was later re-enforced with the arrival of U.S. CIVPOL. Despite these individual initiatives, the official FTO program ceased to exist with the transition to UNSMIH. The impact of this change, coupled with a lack of HNP experience and supervisory personnel, would contribute to later cases of police misconduct and poor decision making during critical incidents. Moreover, it was not until January 1997, with 122 of the 150 police commissaires selected, trained and deployed, that the elements for leadership at the district level were in place.

A significant problem that emerged during the period following the international intervention—that of the multiplicity of “official” (as opposed to private) Haitian security forces—remained into 1997. Most prominent among these have been the Palace and Presidential Security Units (PSUs). Although formally placed under the HNP by executive order, these units continued to operate autonomously. It was not until ICITAP made it a condition for continued training in October 1996 that the responsibilities of the PSUs and their relationship to the HNP were defined by General Directive. And even then, HNP control over the units was nominal and de jure, with real control resting in the hands of former elements of the FAd’H and of Aristide-era appointments. Not until the PSUs were purged, with U.S. assistance, following the October directive was the Preval-Denize chain of command clearly established. Another discrete group consists of 950 former Guantanamo refugees who had been recruited for the IPSF. Primarily pro-Aristide, they now work in such posts as ministerial guards and have not been through HNP basic recruit training. They cannot receive full HNP status without being subjected to vigorous human rights vetting, testing and intensive training. In general, the Preval Government has continued to struggle in defining its relationship with the HNP vis-a-vis recruitment of new personnel and reporting relationships.

As the August 1996 UNSMIH-extended mandate drew down, increasing socioeconomic strains, an unresponsive economy, unresolved political problems, and the need for more time to provide the HNP on-the-job training, to weed out undisciplined members, and to put trained supervisors in place meant that an international presence would still be required. Indeed, conventional wisdom among those working to improve Haiti’s public security institutions suggested that police mentors would be essential for several more years. Accordingly, in late June 1996 the U.N. Security Council again extended the UNSMIH mission, this time to November 30, 1996.

For its third extension, UNSMIH consisted of 600 troops and 300 CIVPOL monitors. An additional 700 troops participated in the mission, funded directly by member states (the United States and Canada). The two main military contingents came from Pakistan and Canada, with a Canadian general in command of all forces except those from the United States The United States maintained a highly visible Support Group, with rotating units from the United States, consisting of up to 500 personnel at any one time. Oriented as a training mission, the rotational units of the support group carry out engineering/public works and public health projects, and provide additional presence. Nevertheless, perceptions of a less robust international CIVPOL and military presence during UNSMIH raised the potential for both criminal and political violence.

By the end of the third extension of the UNSMIH mandate, the politico-socioeconomic environment was still not conducive to shifting complete responsibility for public security to the HNP. The failure of the economy—shattered by the corruption and mismanagement of the Cedras era plus tough international economic sanctions—to respond to the population’s high expectations and desperate needs translated to a growing level of discontent accompanied by continued high unemployment and a resultant susceptibility to cynicism and violence. Powerful criminal groups, some allegedly linked to contraband and drug trafficking, vied with “unofficial” political groups for control in the streets. Ordinary citizens lamented the return of insecurity for the first time since the intervention.

In Parliament, divisions emerged between hard-core supporters of former President Aristide and those favoring Preval’s policies of economic modernization. As a result, economic reform legislation became delayed or blocked, holding back release of much needed financing from international financial institutions. The political struggle weakened the Preval government, prolonged Haiti’s economic stagnation, led to increasing agitation by the unemployed (including former FAd’H) and created disillusionment with the idea of democracy. These factors all contributed to continued popular unrest and a growth in criminal activity.

Accordingly, as November 30, 1996, drew near, the Government of Haiti, joined again by the U.N. “Friends of Haiti,” requested an 8- to 12-month extension of UNSMIH, including CIVPOL. The primary purpose was to provide the HNP more time to function under U.N. tutelage. Granted an 8-month extension until July 31, 1997, this iteration of UNSMIH included 45 Haitian-American CIVPOL members drawn from major metropolitan police force’s throughout the United States. Working in the FTO mold, they blended cultural and professional skills to help members of the HNP refine their abilities as street cops.

More recent political developments highlighted continuing uncertainty. In March 1997, Prime Minister Rosny Smarth was called before the Chamber of Deputies to answer questions on the issue of privatization, to which he and the President were committed but which Aristide opposes. This was followed by a vote of approval led by his party, the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL). (There is also a pro-Aristide party, Lafanmi Lavalas, created in early 1997.) The Government, however, failed to build on this victory.

Although elections in April for one-third of the Senate, two seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and thousands of members of local assemblies were held without incident, less than 10 percent of the electorate voted. Afterward, the Electoral Observer Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS-EOM) cited irregularities and “attempts to manipulate the results” in some jurisdictions (a reference to pro-Aristide elements). This caused some of the parties to withdraw from the process just prior to the second round. Attempts by the international community to resolve the situation have thus far failed. The second round was postponed, and some in Haiti began to blame the international community for the country’s continuing difficulties. Some popular organizations that strongly support Aristide publicly opposed what they term a “foreign occupation,” even calling for an armed struggle to “liberate” the country.

In June, Prime Minister Smarth resigned saying he had been hamstrung by tensions within the ruling coalition and lamenting certain developments surrounding recent elections. Smarth noted continued criticism by “some sectors” which had not accepted the Parliament’s decision and wanted to force the Government to “resign under pressure of the street” (another reference to pro-Aristide elements). By December, no prime minister had been named, the deadlock on privatization still blocked economic recovery, and the socioeconomic-criminal situation was worse.

Parallel to these developments, growing concern has emerged among U.N., U.S., and GOH officials regarding new and more sophisticated forms of organized crime. Smuggling has burgeoned, particularly of drugs and vehicles. If the fledgling HNP becomes more effective in combating this traffic, violent confrontations with criminal organizations could increase.

As July 31, 1997, drew near and Haiti’s political and economic conditions had not improved, UNSMIH’s mandate was extended for a final time to November 30, 1997 and was renamed the U.N. Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH). The HNP is assessed as having made real progress, it remains at a modest level of development. On the other hand, law enforcement is still very badly handicapped by the embryonic level of development of the judicial system. The UNTMIH mandate was not renewed after November 30, 1997, but ICITAP and 150 CIVPOLs will continue their programs with the support of 150 armed Argentine gendarmes to protect U.N. personnel. The separate bilateral U.S. military support unit will remain. ¹(See chart for a representation of the public security timeline in Haiti.)

Seven broad lessons are suggested:

Chart

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