BOSNIA

AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

Background

After the death in 1980 of Yugoslavia’s erstwhile ruler, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the disintegration of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s, forces that had held Yugoslavia’s fractious peoples together were no longer present. When Serbian leaders sought to unify their nation into a greater Serbia, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia began moving toward independence. After several failed attempts at peaceful transition, Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared independence in June 1991. In response, the Yugoslav Army (JNA) moved to secure Slovenia’s external borders. In fewer than 3 weeks, Slovenia succeeded in surrounding JNA armored columns, capturing a sizable number of tanks and troops. By early July, the European Community (EC) had mediated a truce and a 3-month moratorium on further steps toward independence. Slovenia’s subsequent declaration of independence met no significant resistance, but the Croatian announcement triggered an immediate attack by Serb-dominated JNA troops. The battle for Serb-populated areas in Croatia took place between July and December 1991, with the Serbs gaining control over 27 percent of Croatian territory.

Authors’ note: We wish to acknowledge the careful scrutiny and incisive suggestions we received on earlier versions of this chapter from former International Police Task Force (IPTF) Deputy Commissioner Robert Wasserman, UNPROFOR CIVPOL Commissioner Michael F. O’Reilly, Major Donald Zoufal, U.S. Army Reserve, Colonel Larry Forester, U.S. Army, Jim Hooper, Lynn Thomas, Joe Drach, and Glenn MacPhail. In addition, as primary researcher for this chapter, Mike Dollenger was indefatigable, lending much greater precision and substance.

Active involvement by the United Nations began in September 1991, when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713 calling for an embargo on deliveries of arms and military hardware to Yugoslavia. At the request of the Yugoslav Government, the Secretary-General subsequently began preparing to deploy a peacekeeping force to areas of Croatia with sizable Serb populations. The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in Croatia for an initial period of 12 months by Security Council Resolution 743 (February 21, 1992). In what proved to be a crucial deficiency, the Serb leadership never gave its complete approval to the operation or to the countries that would comprise the force.

In March 1992, UNPROFOR infantry units began deployment to three U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs): Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina (see map). Their mandate: to monitor withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia and to oversee demilitarization and administration of the UNPAs. UNPROFOR was authorized to control access to the UNPAs. It also had 900 unarmed CIVPOL personnel to monitor local police compliance with human rights standards and to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. By mid-June, UNPROFOR was almost fully operational.

Although JNA and Croatian National Guard units generally withdrew as agreed, irregular forces were absorbed into local territorial defense militias or community police forces. In many cases, local Serb paramilitary units acquired heavy weapons from the JNA as they withdrew. Fighting among irregulars continued until the Croatian Army seized the Krajina and Western Slavonia in the summer of 1995. During its 3?-year history, UNPROFOR’s CIVPOL contingent was essentially powerless against these well-armed local military and paramilitary organizations.¹

Even though the situation in Croatia stabilized after the UNPROFOR deployment, the contagion of ethnic distrust and polarization had already spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. When President Alija Izetbegovic declared Bosnia’s independence on February 29, 1992, conflict erupted among Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups.² Violence quickly spread, creating a desperate humanitarian situation. At the end of May, U.N. Security Council Resolution 757 demanded unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations in Bosnia. UNPROFOR established a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and assumed operational control of the airport. The conflict continued to escalate, however, despite incessant mediation by the United Nations and the European Community. UNPROFOR was thus forced to conduct its operations in and around the airport in a militarily active and hostile environment.

During the summer, some relief supplies were distributed, but the requirement vastly outstripped supply. That fall, Bosnian Serbs resorted to a deliberate policy of rape, torture, and mass murder to purge ethnic minorities from territory they sought to control. By late 1993, the Bosnian Serb Army, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, had 75 percent of Bosnia under its sway. Owing to a considerable Serb advantage in tanks and artillery, Bosniac and Croat forces were very much on the defensive.³

In June 1993, the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) turned its sights on the Bosniacs, compelling them to defend a second front, primarily in areas bordering Croatia. By March 1994, the United States and key European nations had brokered a cease-fire and formation of a Federation between Bosniacs and Croats. This new alliance laid the foundation for expansion of UNPROFOR into Sectors Southwest and Northeast (see map). After this expansion, the United Nations also enlarged its CIVPOL activities in Bosnia, by opening a detachment in Tuzla, adding to its existing activities in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Mostar. The CIVPOL presence in Bosnia began in Sarajevo in June 1992, with 40 personnel assigned to the airport to monitor the flow of relief supplies to preclude the abuse of this process to smuggle weapons into the enclave. After Srebrenica was declared a “safe area,” 16 CIVPOL personnel were sent there in April 1993 in an attempt to restrict abusive behavior by local police and to regulate the influx of refugees and relief supplies. Shortly thereafter, a similar contingent was introduced into Mostar for the purpose of limiting police misconduct.⁴

Ultimately, UNPROFOR proved incapable of preventing continued ethnic purges, mostly directed at Moslems.⁵ An attempt to bring pressure on Bosnian Serbs using air strikes in May 1995 resulted in the further discrediting of the mission when Serb forces retaliated by taking hundreds of UNPROFOR troops hostage for several weeks. World opinion was horrified when Serb forces under General Mladic overran U.N.-protected enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995, slaughtering thousands of defenseless Moslem males. The Croatian Army, bolstered through a clandestine arms program, launched an offensive in August aimed at evicting 150,000 Serb inhabitants of the Krajina. Coupled with retaliatory NATO air strikes in late August and September, this shattered the myth of Serb invincibility and dramatically altered the balance of power. Bosnian Croat and Bosniac forces took advantage of this to drive the Serbs from 20 percent of the territory they had occupied in central and western Bosnia, eventually threatening to overrun Banja Luka, the largest Bosnian Serb population center. This reversal in conditions on the ground created an opportunity to negotiate a settlement to the ethnic conflict. The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) were signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, and deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) commenced under theauthority of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1035 (December 21, 1995).

Capacity for Self-Governance

The absence of a formula for governance acceptable to each of Bosnia’s ethnic constituencies is the fundamental source of dysfunction. Until this primordial issue is resolved, no amount of international largesse, infrastructure repair, or specialized training will suffice to put Bosnia back together again. Thus the central issue is the lack of consensus about whether Bosnia should be a unitary state or partitioned, not lack of governing capacity.

If a workable political formula ultimately emerges, there are numerous secondary factors relevant to governing capacity that will likely play a crucial role in shaping Bosnia’s ultimate destiny (e.g., economic resources; reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, and former combatants into productive society; and the link between governing elites and organized crime).

The Economy

Bosnia’s economic challenges would have been daunting even without the convulsions of civil war. The shock of exposing the centrally planned economy to the discipline of global competition would have been harsh enough, given Bosnia’s relatively primitive level of development, even by East European standards. By 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the Bosnian economy was in deplorable condition. Inflation exceeded 1,000 percent, and per capita foreign debt for all Yugoslavia was the highest in Europe.⁶ Compounding the task of economic adjustment, roughly half the 1990 federal budget for Yugoslavia was consumed by the military.⁷ Lacking the means to continue propping up noncompetitive state-run enterprises, the Government slashed subsidies. Unemployment skyrocketed. The economic devastation subsequently wrought by the war reduced the economy largely to smuggling and distribution of humanitarian supplies. Industrial activity in Bosnian-Moslem areas fell to an estimated 5 percent of prewar levels.⁸

The infrastructure was also a shambles, with Bosniac areas suffering the greatest devastation. By autumn 1995, 75 percent of Bosnia’s oil refining capacity had been destroyed, electrical generation was down 80 percent, and coal production was less than 10 percent of prewar output. Almost one-fifth of all houses had been destroyed and another two-thirds damaged, 50 percent of schools had been gutted, 30 percent of roads and bridges had been damaged or destroyed, and more than $1 billion of damage had been inflicted on railroads.⁹

By mid-1997, 18 months after the Dayton Accords had come into effect, economic activity within the Federation was growing at a 50 percent annual rate, and unemployment had fallen to 50 percent. The bulk of this, however, was being driven by foreign reconstruction assistance.¹⁰ Since only a trickle of external aid had gone to the Serb Republic (RS), its economy had not yet begun the postwar recovery process.

Social Disruption

A further consequence of the war, waged largely against civilian targets, was massive emigration.¹¹ A million Bosnians, 20 to 25 percent of the prewar population, fled the country. These refugees came disproportionately from the ranks of professionals and skilled laborers, causing a “brain drain” but also creating a potential source of remittances useful for recovery after the conclusion of the conflict.¹² In addition, more than a million inhabitants remained displaced by the conflict inside Bosnia.

Organized Crime

The exigencies of the war drove political leaders from all three warring factions to rely on the criminal underworld to perform various essential functions. Owing to the international arms embargo and their need to fashion a military establishment from the ground up, the Bosniacs desperately needed to smuggle military contraband across international boundaries. Criminal organizations based in Sarajevo helped to meet this requirement. Revenue to fund the war effort was particularly vital for the Serbs, which was in part satisfied through smuggling and black marketeering in consumer goods and primary products. This continues to be essential for de facto Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, and his ability to maintain a grip on power.

Another common phenomenon was reliance upon local thugs and armed gangs to prosecute the war effort at the local level, including perpetration of some of the most brutal instances of “ethnic cleansing.”¹³ Among the more notorious were the Serb “Arkan” around Brcko, and Croats “Tuta” and “Stela” in Mostar. Certain of these individuals have been indicted as war criminals; however, in their local ethnic communities they are regarded as war heroes. Owing to their intimate links with local elites, this criminal element will be an especially severe challenge for those seeking to establish the rule of law in Bosnia.

Throughout most of its recent history, including the Tito regime, the public security apparatus—the judiciary, police force, and penal system—served as a fundamental instrument of state control. Yugoslavia’s disintegration into ethnically defined entities during the first half of the 1990s had the further effect of converting many local police organizations into agents of intimidation and brutality against those of different ethnic origins.

The Courts and Judiciary

The basic features of the legal system have remained relatively constant in spite of political upheavals in the region.¹⁴ Prior to the war, the judiciary in Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of some 970 judges and 250 prosecutors distributed among a Supreme Court, 7 Higher (or appellate) Courts, and 61 Basic Courts at the municipal level. Each court is presided over by a president and a panel of trial judges that varies in size according to the level of the court. Cases are assigned initially to an investigating judge who is responsible for conducting an inquiry to determine if sufficient evidence exists to warrant a trial. Unlike the “adversarial” process in the United States, which seeks to establish truth via competing arguments of prosecuting and defense attorneys, the Bosnian system is inquisitorial. The trial judge, therefore, conducts an examination of the facts in the courtroom.¹⁵

The Constitution contained in Annex 4 of the DPA establishes two political entities, the Federation and the Serb Republic, and endows each with separate responsibilities for administering a system of justice. In practice, however, there were three discrete systems operating at the end of the Bosnia conflict, one for each ethnic group.¹⁶ All three shared the same basic structure, and they functioned similarly in that the courts were highly politicized.¹⁷ In similar fashion, the role of the prosecuting attorney has been exploited by those in power. Other factors having a negative impact on the judicial system are a shortage of trained personnel, meager salaries, lack of basic resources (e.g., transportation, computers, reference books, and a centralized database), and a legal code that was designed to maximize state power at the expense of individual liberty.

The Police

During the Communist era, the police force was a basic instrument of state control in Yugoslavia’s autocratic, single-party regime. Their formal functions were state security, major criminal investigation, traffic regulation, executive protection, intelligence, and border/customs services. In addition to municipal police forces, a key element of state security was the Ministry of Interior Special Police (commonly referred to as MUPs). During times of war or martial law, these paramilitary units were assigned to support territorial defense and maintain control of the interior of the country. MUPs were armed with rocket-launched grenades, large caliber weapons (including mortars and antitank guns), light armor (including armored personnel carriers, or APCs), and, in some cases, tanks and anti-aircraft guns. During the 1992-95 war, MUPs in all three ethnic communities were used heavily, performing a range of paramilitary functions.

The typical mode of police interaction with the population was the traffic checkpoint attended by some four or five armed policemen. Citizens were required to produce mandatory documents, and the function served was population control. Police harassment was common, and during the Bosnian conflict checkpoints were exploited to restrict freedom of movement and intimidate ethnic minorities. Police forces lacked patrol cars and radios, so the checkpoint was a tactic well tailored to their meager means and overall mission of state control.

Most officers began police training in high school and subsequently followed a professional career path. Owing to the character of the Bosnian conflict, all ethnic communities sought to preserve internal security by expanding their police cadres. This was accomplished through an influx of personnel with little or no police training. An IFOR study conducted in 1996 indicated that over 80 percent of Federation policemen had fewer than 6 years’ experience, and in many cases their background was of a paramilitary nature.¹⁸ The ranks were swollen with individuals having predominantly military preparation, and the flow of personnel between police and military units became quite fluid (the standard uniform for the police was the fatigue uniform of their military counterparts, and their basic weapon was the AK-47).

Prior to the war, municipal police forces in the larger urban areas, Sarajevo in particular, were reasonably multiethnic; however, the outbreak of conflict quickly produced three ethnically segregated forces. In December 1995, a U.N. advance mission determined that 44,750 police officers were on active duty in Bosnia: 29,750 in Moslem-controlled areas, 3,000 in Croat areas, and 12,000 in the RS.¹⁹ Police strength, in proportion to the civilian population, was several times higher than the European standard (1:330), owing to the wartime expansion.²⁰ After deployment of IFOR and the IPTF, the Federation agreed to reduce their forces to 11,500. The Serb Republic, in contrast, persistently refused to participate in such a normalization process. Until February 1997, when the first canton was restructured in the Federation, Bosnia continued to have three completely discrete and autonomous police forces.

Police of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The regular police are headquartered in Sarajevo and are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Prior to 1997, the police force was geographically divided into seven districts (Sarajevo, Zenica, Doboj, Bihac, Tuzla, Mostar, and Gorazde). At present, the organization is being realigned on a cantonal basis under the Federation restructuring program.²¹ Functionally, the force is organized into motorized patrols, traffic patrols, criminal investigation units, and state security services, including presidential protection. The traffic and motorized patrol police are more akin to “street cops” and were meant to control the local population and rural areas.

Prior to the restructuring program, the MUPs also constituted a major element of the Ministry of Interior. They were equipped with automatic weapons and light armor and thus were similar to a constabulary force. Although they fell under the day-to-day administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, when required for national defense they came under the command of the Ministry of Defense. In some cases, these police conducted patrols and engaged in actual combat along the confrontation line during the Bosnian conflict, but they were intended chiefly for rear area security. The main Bosniac element of the MUPs, the Black Swans, have been disarmed and demobilized.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government also has Border and Customs units, but they are largely vestigial, because the government lacks control over most of its international border. The Croats still control border crossings in the south and west, Serbs control the north and east, and the Bosnian Army’s Fifth Corps provides border security in the Bihac area. In reality, these police have collected customs and fees on commodities in transit through the interior of the country. Border and Customs belongs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documentation (BAID) is the main Bosniac intelligence organization. Known for ruthless intimidation and political assassination during the conflict, the BAID served as an arm of the Bosnian Presidency and is populated by hard-line members of the governing Party for Democratic Action (SDA). The BAID’s influence in Bosniac politics has been greatly reduced since implementation of the Dayton Accords, and the agency has been restructured as a result of the Split Agreement of August 1997.

Police of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna

Patterned after the police of Croatia, the primary functions of the police of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (CRHB) have been state security, criminal investigation, traffic regulation, special operations and intelligence, and border and customs services. Although the CRHB was in theory disbanded on January 10, 1996 under terms of the Dayton Agreement, there was no immediate mechanism to provide a substitute police force. The subsequent Petersburg and Federation Forum (Sarajevo) Agreements called for integration of Croat and Moslem police forces, which began to take place, canton by canton, during the latter half of 1997. Since Bosnian Croat police control border crossings along the primary trade routes between Bosnia and Croatia, they provide a major source of revenue via collection of customs fees. Prior to Federation restructuring, CRHB police had been deployed in eight districts: Mostar, Livno, Travnik-Vitez, Derventa, Zepce, Kiseljak, Jajce, and Orasje.

During the Dayton-mandated transfer of territories from the RS to the Federation, MUPs from Croatia deployed into areas south of Mostar to assist their Bosnian Croat counterparts. IFOR successfully expelled the Croatian MUPs. Throughout most of the Federation, therefore, the Special Police have come under IPTF monitoring and have been incorporated into the police restructuring program.

Police of the Serb Republic

The RS police were exploited during the war as an instrument of population control and genocide, and they continue to be used as the principal defense against infiltration or incursions by other ethnic groups. Their training and functions were similar to the other police forces, but greater emphasis has recently been placed on state security, special operations, and border control. Thus, even at the municipal level, police also perform intelligence and paramilitary activities and were active during the conflict in “ethnic cleansing” operations. Among the functions performed by Special Police throughout the RS in the aftermath of the conflict has been to provide bodyguards for indicted war criminals.

Revenue to meet the payroll of municipal police and the Interior Ministry has been generated from monopolistic control exercised by Radovan Karadzic over imports and distribution of consumer products throughout the Serb Republic. Karadzic has exploited his control over the police to repress both ethnic minorities and his political opponents. Although officially subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, command of local police can easily be handed over to the RS Army General Staff in a crisis. When required, the RS military also assumes command of key border units and Special Forces police. Headquartered in Pale, major RS police stations are located in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Brcko, Bijeljina, Foca, Trebine, and Han Pijesak.

The Penal System

Bosnia has eleven prisons, five of which are Bosniac (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zenica, and East Mostar) three Serb (Bijelina, Banja Luka, Doboj), and three Croat (Travnik, Busovaca, Mostar/Rodac).²²

The Cultural Context

The historic relationship between state and society in the Balkans placed very little emphasis on abstractions like individual rights or responsiveness to citizen demands. Power has traditionally been concentrated in the hands of a monarch, a marshal, or similar monolithic authority figure. Law and order have historically been imposed on subjugated masses in the interest of the state. The police role has been to maintain control on behalf of whoever wields power. (Currently, the reins of power in each ethnic community are dominated by a faction of the former Communist Party.) Thus, the notion of policing as a public service is alien both to the police and the populace.

Routine procedures in such basic functions as traffic control and criminal investigation illustrate the traditional role of the police and the expectations that have been shaped in the public mind. The most likely form of interaction with the average citizen during the communist era was the police roadblock or checkpoint. This would afford police an opportunity to review documents, collect customs fees, inspect for weapons or other contraband, and intimidate members of other ethnic groups. The purpose was regulation and control of individual conduct, as opposed to protection of the public against criminal activity.

When crimes were committed, evidence gathering was largely confined to rounding up witnesses and suspects for questioning under police custody. Interrogation was both a verbal and physical process, sometimes even for the hapless witness. Little or no emphasis was placed on using forensic techniques to gather physical evidence to establish guilt or innocence.²³ Given that these police practices have persisted over generations, they have become deeply ingrained in the political culture and conform to expectations of the average citizen.

The Mandate

The purpose of the intervention resulting from the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) differed fundamentally from UNPROFOR, which was largely humanitarian and directed at facilitating delivery of relief supplies and shielding Moslem enclaves in territory surrounded by Serb forces. In discharging their numerous mandates, UNPROFOR commanders had to consult political authorities in both NATO and the United Nations before force could be used. U.N. authorities were very reluctant to authorize forceful measures. Consequently, this unwieldy, “dual key” command and control arrangement rendered UNPROFOR powerless to respond to tactical developments. The Contact Group countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia), especially the United States, insisted that IFOR would not operate under the same emasculating constraints. To discharge its responsibilities under Annex 1A of the DPA (ensuring separation of forces, their confinement to cantons, and downsizing), IFOR would be endowed with a single chain of command (NATO), executive powers, robust rules of engagement, and overwhelming force.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1035 (December 21, 1995) articulates the mandate for both IFOR and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). As with IFOR, however, the real basis for the IPTF originates in the DPA. Annex 11 of the DPA explicitly states that responsibility for maintaining a “safe and secure environment for all persons” rests with the signatories themselves.²⁴ However, to assist in discharging their public security obligations, the Parties requested that the IPTF be created and that it perform the following functions:

The IPTF was not armed and was not empowered to enforce local laws. Because its purpose was to help already established law enforcement agencies maintain public order and assist them in adopting methods of policing consistent with international standards, the IPTF could function effectively only with the consent of the Parties. In the absence of such collaboration, the IPTF possessed neither the mandate nor the resources to preserve public order independently. The dilemmas this would generate for IPTF officials do not appear to have been anticipated or well understood by drafters of this annex. The IPTF’s first Deputy Commissioner, Robert Wasserman, offers the following insights into this situation:

In circumstances where implementation of Dayton ran counter to interests of one of the Parties (e.g., the transfer of Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo to the Federation or the resettlement of Moslems to strategic locations in the Zone of Separation), local police either withdrew or became active protagonists. In such instances, IFOR was compelled to become involved. While IFOR could provide “area security” or reinforced patrolling to deter lawlessness, its forces were not trained or equipped for riot control or law enforcement tasks. Nor was it considered prudent to engage in activity that smacked of policing. Thus, when the police force of one of the Parties refused to cooperate with the IPTF—because doing so would have damaged their vital interests—an “enforcement gap” arose. There were no effective sanctions available to the IPTF to punish noncompliance, and this gap was never bridged during the life of the IFOR mission.

Peace Mission Organization

By establishing IFOR under NATO auspices, the “dual key” problem suffered by UNPROFOR was resolved for purposes of implementing the military provisions of Dayton, but the consequence was to fragment implementation of civilian aspects. The two international actors concerned with maintaining a safe and secure environment, IFOR and the IPTF, were divided from each other organizationally, with the IPTF falling under the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Yet another actor, the High Representative (HR), was delegated a coordinating role by the DPA, but without authority over any other entity. The IPTF Commissioner was simply directed to consult with the High Representative. Responsibility for organizing the pivotal national elections, moreover, was assigned to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which itself regularly spoke with contradictory voices.²⁶ In addition, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, numerous other international organizations and several hundred NGOs had vital, independent contributions to make to various aspects of the peace building process.

During the first crucial months, the HR made no effort to promote coordination among the various civilian entities (such as convening regular meetings of the “principals” or heads of the other key international organizations operating in Bosnia). Only after the mission was well under way was the HR ultimately prodded into conducting weekly “Principals Meetings” to bring a measure of coherence to the peace operation.²⁷ Obtaining strategic unity of effort out of this fragmented structure, therefore, could only be achieved by dint of considerable exertion and continuous attention to cooperative action. At the operational level, the national and municipal elections compelled the IFOR/SFOR, the OSCE, IPTF, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to establish a Joint Elections Operations Center for more timely exchange of information and coordination of responses.

Size and Composition of CIVPOL

In the wake of Security Council Resolution 1026 (November 30, 1995), a U.N. assessment team was dispatched to Bosnia in early December by the Secretary-General to establish the requirements for the forthcoming CIVPOL mission. The determination of the number of required IPTF personnel was based simply on a mathematical calculation (one monitor for 30 local police). Since the assessment team determined the total strength to be 44,750, the IPTF was authorized 1,721 monitors.²⁸ Their organization scheme was simply to replicate the deployment of the various police forces in Bosnia. Because there were 109 police stations, IPTF monitors were originally to be disbursed among 109 stations of their own. No consideration was given to the implications of the other tasks assigned to the IPTF in Annex 11, such as advising, training, and restructuring local law enforcement agencies. In part, this was driven by external constraints, specifically concerns that the United Nations could neither recruit nor finance a larger force.

On December 24, 1995, the U.N. Secretary-General issued a verbal invitation to U.N. Member States to contribute to the newly established monitoring mission. Over 40 countries responded, and the first contingent of monitors began to deploy a month later. These were added to the residual UNPROFOR CIVPOL contingent that retained some 200 monitors. Rather than following the original deployment scheme, which would have required an inordinate number of intermediate management layers, the IPTF Commissioner reduced the number of stations from 109 to 54, which resulted in a corresponding reduction of district offices to 14. Initially, there were three regional headquarters (Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo), with the IPTF headquarters also situated in Sarajevo.

In keeping with previous U.N. practice, the requirements to serve on the first IPTF mission were fluency in English, the ability to drive, and 8 years of experience in policing (as policing was defined in the contributing country). No consideration was given to recruiting personnel with skills essential for tasks other than monitoring (e.g., field training officers, police academy administrators, specialists in management or police reform). During the initial stages of deployment, however, it was not uncommon for IPTF members to fall short of even these basic standards. Of the three requirements, the most vital was competence in English. Without the ability to communicate, personnel were unable to make any contribution to the mission. In addition, the long-range objective was to reorient Bosnia’s various police agencies to operate in accordance with international standards. Police monitors from autocratic regimes that themselves fail to conform to these standards could scarcely be expected to imbue such ideals in their Bosnian counterparts.

It quickly became apparent that screening potential CIVPOL volunteers for English fluency and driving skills in the donor country prior to deployment would be much more cost-effective. The IPTF was able to convince the United Nations to begin doing this with a few donor nations as early as March 1996. Prior to recruiting the second rotation for duty as of December 1996 (a normal tour in Bosnia being 1 year), the United Nations began routinely sending Selection Assistance Teams to screen volunteers in various source countries before deployment. To evaluate the English competence of incoming personnel, the IPTF Training Unit developed an English aptitude test (speaking, reading, and writing). To avoid compromise of the exam, the IPTF insisted that a member of their training staff accompany the teams administering the qualifying exams. This significantly enhanced the quality of incoming IPTF personnel. The quality of the force was also greatly enhanced during recruitment of the second rotation by specifying to donors the spectrum of skills required to staff the organization. Once the United Nations established specific guidance regarding the type of expertise and level of experience required, most contributing countries responded positively, producing personnel with the desired capabilities.

Prior to deployment in the field, newly assigned police monitors underwent a 1-week screening and orientation course at the IPTF training facility outside Zagreb, Croatia. In addition to being tested on their English language and driving ability, incoming personnel received specific information pertaining to the mission in Bosnia. Once again, the IPTF began with a generic U.N. formula and transformed it into a program well tailored to mission requirements. This also entailed inviting the U.N. Centre for Human Rights to offer human rights training retroactively to 900 previously deployed IPTF monitors and to help incorporate this subject into the curriculum at the Zagreb training facility. Among the other topics covered were the mandate, IPTF reporting forms, computer literacy, attributes of the mission area, mine awareness, and an orientation to IFOR/SFOR. After the second rotation, the training unit began conducting in-service training to provide additional skills that posttraining surveys had indicated were lacking. When more training time was available, as occurred with the contingent destined for Brcko in early 1997, the IPTF experimented with instruction in Serbo-Croatian. Many monitors did achieve some fluency in the local language on their own initiative during the mission.

When UNPROFOR transferred the Bosnia operation to IFOR, all participating forces came under NATO operational control. UNPROFOR also transferred the existing U.N. logistical and communication infrastructure to the NATO-led operation. This made it possible for IFOR to begin operations immediately and to reach its full complement of over 60,000 troops expeditiously. No consideration was given to the needs of the IPTF, however, even though it was to be a U.N.-supported activity just like UNPROFOR had been.

After IFOR absorbed mission-essential U.N. assets in theater, the IPTF had to build its entire operation from the ground up. Consequently, the deployment gap typically associated with CIVPOL missions was greatly compounded. The Security Council Resolution authorizing creation of the IPTF (as well as the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina to manage it) was approved in late December 1995. Organizers then had to confront the Herculean task of procuring essential resources via the U.N.’s plodding logistic support system. Recruiting more than 1,700 qualified police monitors from around the world was also a protracted process.²⁹ Even the United States was delayed in fielding its contingent,³⁰ and as of the first week of March 1996, the IPTF had only 392 monitors in-country.³¹ The result was considerable delay in bringing the IPTF up to operational status, and a serious gap in readiness when the Sarajevo suburbs were transferred to Moslem authority in February-March 1996 (see chart).

The operational capability of the IPTF was seriously hampered during the IFOR phase of the peace operation owing to deficiencies in logistical support. While improvements were made with the passage of time, shortcomings in transportation, communications, and interpreters continued to plague the mission well into the SFOR phase.³² As of the end of July 1996, for example, deficiencies in communications equipment had become chronic, with shortfalls of 25 percent in handheld radios, 29 percent for vehicle radios, and 65 percent for satellite links.³³ Transportation was another major limitation. The IPTF had received 516 vehicles as of July 30, yet only 454 were operational. This constituted a 21 percent shortfall from the 574 required to carry out mandated responsibilities.³⁴ UNMIBH made no provision to replace total losses in spite of regular attrition, a problem that was accentuated by the recurring failure of donor countries to ensure all their monitors could drive.³⁵ Even simple items such as snow tires and chains began to loom large in late September 1996 after the UNMIBH Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) refused repeated IPTF requisition requests. This was in spite of the fact that 75 percent of IPTF vehicles had bald tires, and November is one of the snowier months in Bosnia.³⁶ This had serious operational implications, because municipal elections were slated at the time for November 22, and this electoral process was expected to be contentious, involving efforts by tens of thousands of prospective voters to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).

Two fundamental constraints compounded the IPTF’s logistical woes, one procedural and one administrative. As a standard procedure, the United Nations based its resource allocations for essential items like vehicles and communications gear on standards developed during previous missions involving use of CIVPOL as monitors only. In the U.N. mission assessment, no consideration was given to the added requirements associated with training, advising, or restructuring law enforcement agencies in Bosnia. Thus, the United Nations authorized a single vehicle for every three IPTF personnel, for example, when the needs of the mission dictated a ratio of at least one for every two policemen.³⁷

Most of these logistical deficiencies were exacerbated by UNMIBH’s first Chief Administrative Officer. This individual ensured that top priority for vehicles, computers, communications equipment and other perquisites was given to UNMIBH headquarters personnel in Sarajevo. Their needs were fully satisfied before many IPTF personnel in the field even began to be supported.³⁸ Summarizing the situation as of mid-1996, a senior IPTF logistician asserted, “During formal and informal discussions with IPTF Monitors, from the IPTF Stations, Districts, and Regions, almost without exception all have indicated that UNMIBH logistical support has been unresponsive, or totally inadequate.”³⁹ This changed dramatically at the end of the IPTF’s first year when the CAO was replaced. After a more mission-oriented CAO took charge, many of the more troubling logistical difficulties were eventually alleviated.⁴⁰ This second constraint illustrates the crucial importance of placing the right people in key posts.

It was perhaps inevitable that the IPTF would turn to IFOR to ameliorate shortcomings in mission support. As the operation was being established, the IPTF sought assistance with medical care, fuel, maps, security for its vehicle maintenance facility, and access for its personnel to military stores. With the exception of maps (readily available) and post exchanges (which were not), the support the IPTF sought was decentralized and available only by negotiating directly with one or more of IFOR’s 34 contributing countries.⁴¹ This scattershot approach proved to be particularly inappropriate for purposes of medical care.⁴²

The U.N. medical staff had assumed that IPTF personnel would be able to rely on IFOR’s medical support system. IFOR did agree to provide emergency medical evacuation. For other medical support, the United Nations was directed to approach each national contingent possessing medical units to make arrangements. Even though nations such as Norway allowed IPTF personnel to use their medical services on an informal, space available basis, this still left many gaps. As late as mid-1996, UNMIBH had not made any formal arrangements for medical support, other than emergency evacuation.⁴³

In mid-1996, IFOR agreed to formalize a “Logistics Support Package” involving co-location of communications antennas and diesel fuel storage sites, and, in emergencies, to provide fuel, medical care, water, rations, and shower facilities.⁴⁴ This alleviated the more extreme implications of IPTF logistical shortcomings. Thus, as the IPTF entered its second year, logistic support had improved considerably, as arrangements with IFOR were put in place, as UNMIBH itself became more responsive, and as logistics pipelines began operating predictably with the simple passage of time. Nevertheless, its operational capacity continued to be impeded in particular by inadequate transportation owing to an aging vehicle fleet that required excessive maintenance and was not adequate for the IPTF’s multiple tasks in the first place.

The Mission

Phases of the Operation

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) establish the authority for both the IPTF (Annex 11) and IFOR (Annex 1A). The only reference to duration pertains to IFOR, stating that the Parties “welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in the implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement as described herein.”⁴⁵ Although Annex 1A had been fulfilled well ahead of schedule, crucial civilian aspects of the DPA (e.g., refugee returns, municipal elections, status of Brcko, war criminals) remained outstanding. Accordingly, a subsequent military force, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), was authorized by NATO and the United Nations. SFOR’s expected duration was 18 months, until June 1998. The IPTF mandate was also extended, but only for a year, until December 1997, with subsequent extensions likely as long as a NATO force is present.

Owing to the crucial role performed by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in forging the Dayton agreement, the State Department was the lead agency for orchestrating the U.S. role in implementation. As a result, a political-military plan was not developed to guide the U.S. contribution to this effort at its inception. In essence, Dayton itself was the formula for implementation, even though it made the former warring factions responsible for implementing civilian aspects of the accord.

During the IFOR phase of the operation, the IPTF focused on monitoring local police authorities for compliance with internationally accepted standards in their daily operations and treatment of minorities. They also assisted with the September 1996 national elections. During the SFOR phase the focus shifted to vetting, training, and restructuring local police forces so their future conduct would conform to norms of democratic policing (see “Guiding Philosophy of the IPTF Mission”).

The Deployment Gap

The first real test for the IPTF came when neighborhoods surrounding Sarajevo were transferred from the Bosnian Serbs to the Federation in early 1996. The Dayton agreement directed that control of certain high ground and buffer zones around Sarajevo, areas fiercely contested during the war, be transferred to the Federation so the city would not be as vulnerable to Serb artillery fire in the future. Over 100,000 ethnic Serbs populated these suburbs. Many were not permanent residents but had themselves been displaced by the fighting from other locations in Sarajevo. The transfer of these seven municipalities (i.e., Vogosca, Centar, Novi Grad, Ilijas, Hadzici, Ilidza, and Grbavica) was scheduled to take place, simultaneously, on February 4, 1996, 45 days after implementation of the DPA had begun.

As the date approached, the IPTF was not yet functional. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner would not arrive until mid-February, fewer than 400 monitors were on hand, and very few field stations had yet been opened. Other crucial deficiencies were described by two IFOR public safety specialists assigned to assist the IPTF during this early period:

In addition to the unpreparedness of the IPTF, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) had not done any detailed planning for the transition. Consequently, on February 4 the High Representative and the IFOR commander announced that the transfer would be delayed. The concept would also be changed to a phased process occurring over a 6-week period ending in mid-March. This adjustment provided an opportunity for the IPTF to become partially operational and for IFOR to render crucial assistance with planning, logistics, and communications. Bosnian Serb authorities took advantage of the delay, however, to prepare a sweeping evacuation of the suburbs and to pressure Serb residents to leave.⁴⁷ Residents thoroughly ransacked fixed property so that incoming Federation citizens would inherit little more than a wasteland.

In mid-February, as the OHR, IPTF, and IFOR began to conduct the first transfer, Serb authorities implemented their own plan to relocate ethnic Serbs into the Serb Republic. They employed local Serb police and marshaled Bosnian Serb Army vehicles and logistics infrastructure to facilitate movement of inhabitants and their belongings. From late January through mid-March, some 100,000 Serbs fled Sarajevo for RS territory. At least some of the dwellings being evacuated belonged to their Serb occupants, and therefore, the claim could be made that the electrical wiring, plumbing fixtures, and window frames being carted off were rightfully theirs. In the absence of an authoritative mechanism to establish legitimate ownership, the international community was powerless to prevent homes and apartments from being gutted. In addition, various buildings and industrial facilities were either set ablaze or booby-trapped. This turmoil created an impression of lawlessness, especially when these images were captured, and to a certain extent magnified, by international news coverage.

The transfer of Sarajevo suburbs was a “defining moment” for the entire peace mission. Although the limited assets available to the IPTF were skillfully employed, the organization would clearly have been much better equipped to handle the exigencies of this crucial event if it had been more nearly operational. Indeed, experience made a significant difference. Even though planners had specifically reserved the more troublesome locations until the end, each successive transfer was handled more smoothly than the previous ones, and the relationship with IFOR became more supportive. In general, the IPTF was more successful at managing the behavior of local uniformed police forces than they were at controlling the conduct of vandals and provocateurs from both sides of the ethnic divide.

An evaluation of whether the peace mission met this defining moment successfully depends on the yardstick used. If measured against the number of persons killed (one) in this volatile operation, then the transfer could be considered a remarkable accomplishment. Much more was at stake, however, as this event set the tone for the entire operation. If Dayton was to work, Serbs and Moslems had to have confidence that they could live together in relative safety. The message derived from this experience was that even under the cognizance and apparent protection of international military and police forces, it was not safe for Serbs to remain in Moslem neighborhoods. The international community could not dissuade the Serbs from fleeing en masse. Nor could they prevent significant destruction of property and intimidation aimed at compelling others to flee when they otherwise might have remained. This event also revealed a serious enforcement gap that would persist throughout the operation. IFOR would not engage in law enforcement, and because the disruptions did not constitute an imminent threat to life, IFOR did not initially consider the circumstances to warrant a military response. The IPTF, on the other hand, had neither the authority nor the firepower to act forcefully.

As each suburb was transferred, Federation authorities took political and administrative control, an accomplishment for the Dayton Accords. IFOR had just established its presence in Bosnia, however, and all parties were anxious to gauge what this would signify. While the outcome could clearly have been much worse, it was not quite reassuring either, and IFOR would not have another “window of opportunity” to create a stronger impression on the Bosnian Serb leadership.

IPTF Relations with Entity Police Forces

Annex 11 of the DPA describes functions that the IPTF is to perform, which essentially amount to monitoring, restructuring, and mentoring the law enforcement apparatus in Bosnia.⁴⁸ Although the parties theoretically requested such assistance, the Serb Republic did not participate in negotiating the Dayton Accords and did not freely consent to such intrusions. Thus, from the very start, the relationship between the IPTF and police forces of the RS was far less constructive than it was with the Federation.

During the earliest days of the mission, IPTF monitors found police in all three ethnic communities engaged in the traditional practice of erecting checkpoints to maintain internal control. This was in direct contravention to Dayton (Freedom of Movement). Federation police forces were the first to accept the need to change their mode of operation and restructure their police forces in conformance with principles of “democratic policing” (the Bosniacs doing so more convincingly than the Bosnian Croats). RS police remained unwilling to submit to the IPTF restructuring formula until late 1997, but the differences were narrowed to two items over time. First, the RS rejected the IPTF limit of 6,000 policemen, insisting on a force equal in strength to the Federation (11,500). The second contentious issue was the requirement to provide the names of all RS policemen so they could be vetted against the International Criminal Tribunal’s list of indicted war criminals.

When not subject to IPTF monitoring, RS police loyal to Radovan Karadzic continued to engage in conduct contrary to the DPA. Thus, the relationship with the RS was not one of collaboration, and at times it became confrontational (e.g., especially after the internal rupture between RS President Biljana Plavsic, with whom the international community sided, and Karadzic erupted in June 1997). In contrast, within most of the Federation, IPTF monitors were normally able to establish a professional working relationship, and this served as a catalyst for combining Bosniac and Bosnian Croat police forces into integrated entities at the municipal, cantonal, and Federation level.

In performing its monitoring function, the IPTF suffered from an enforcement gap that hindered the entire peace operation. Abuse of ethnic minorities by policemen continued to take place in all three ethnic communities.⁴⁹ Certain municipal police chiefs, moreover, were notoriously corrupt and enmeshed in networks of illicit activity along with their political mentors. Under certain circumstances, the IPTF could call upon IFOR/SFOR to back them up to compel compliance with the DPA. This was a suitable mechanism for dealing with unfolding or existing activities, such as roadblocks, weapons caches, or illegal detention of ethnic minorities. After the fact, however, the IPTF was reduced merely to conducting investigations and imploring appropriate authorities to act in accordance with their own laws.⁵⁰ As the authors of a 1996 study of Bosnian jurisprudence concluded, these entreaties tended to have only superficial effect:

It remains to be seen whether efforts to restructure and reform the police (see below) will have a profound and lasting impact on police accountability to the general public and, in particular, on their treatment of minorities.⁵²

Another serious constraint was lack of credibility for those monitors who were not proficient as policemen. Local Bosnian police cadres tended to regard themselves as superior to such IPTF personnel. Lack of funding also severely limited police restructuring. Only about 30 percent of the $100 million required for the 2-year program had been pledged by late 1997, almost all of which had come from the United States.

Vetting and Restructuring of Indigenous Police Forces

The agreement on restructuring Federation police forces (also known as the Petersberg Declaration) was signed on April 25, 1996, in Bonn-Petersberg.⁵³ This agreement obligated the Federation to reduce its police establishments to 11,500. Even though this left a ratio of policemen to inhabitants that is nearly double the European standard, it nevertheless reduced their forces by almost two-thirds.⁵⁴ This was agreeable because government expenses would be reduced, it would bring the parties a step closer to conformity with the European model of community policing, and it would thereby afford their public security forces access to international assistance. The Petersberg Declaration also mandated a new uniform for all Federation police officers; anyone found in the old uniforms would be subject to arrest.⁵⁵

The IPTF was a central player in cajoling the Federation and the RS to restructure their forces.⁵⁶ In April 1996, the IPTF Deputy Commissioner proposed the creation of a Commission on Restructuring for each entity for the purpose of exchanging information about the restructuring process and gaining cooperation from the relevant authorities. Although the RS stonewalled, the Commission dealing with Federation restructuring was able to make gradual progress. The membership included the Federation Minister of Interior (a Bosniac), the Deputy Minister of Interior (a Bosnian Croat), and senior IPTF and IFOR officials. The Commission agreed that all personnel allowed to remain in the Federation’s police forces should meet the following requirements:

The IPTF crafted a 40-question, multiple-choice exam designed to test comprehension of the new Bosnian Constitution, the new Police Code of Conduct, and the role of policing in a democratic society. In addition, each aspirant had to take a written psychological test. The latter was conducted by an IFOR psychologist seconded to the IPTF for this purpose. The multiple-choice exam was printed by IFOR (to avoid compromising the exam) and administered by IPTF members, with assistance from members of the Ministry of Interior.

Screening was conducted by canton, with the first exams administered in August 1996. Federation authorities sent only those applicants for testing whom they felt were qualified, thus accomplishing the first phase of “downsizing” themselves internally.⁵⁷ Out of the first batch of 1,350 taking the exam, only 29 failed the multiple-choice portion, and only one was ultimately found to be mentally imbalanced. All those vying for a position in the Federation were also screened against the files of the International Criminal Tribunal. After the exams were administered in the first several cantons, the entire process was suspended because the multiple-choice test had been compromised, and those affected were required to take a second test.

In late 1996 the IPTF recognized that the focus of its mission needed to evolve, with more emphasis given to training and the restructuring process and less to monitoring. Accordingly, they created a second Deputy Commissioner’s position with specific responsibility for restructuring. In recruiting the second contingent of monitors, moreover, the IPTF sought personnel with skills relevant to the task of restructuring.

To train police officials at all levels in the Federation in the principles of democratic policing and human rights, the IPTF collaborated with bilateral programs from the United States (ICITAP), Germany, and Austria. This entailed leadership training seminars in these countries to familiarize Federation police officials with law enforcement principles such as community policing and to expose them to investigative and enforcement techniques for dealing with transnational challenges such as drug-trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling. In addition, the United States and other interested countries collaborated with the United Nations to provide basic police equipment.

The certification process for all Bosniac personnel in the Sarajevo Canton was completed in February 1997. Eight of the 10 cantons comprising the Federation, along with the 1,000-member police force of the Federation itself, had completed the certification process by December 1977. Initially only Bosniac personnel were certified because there were no Bosnian-Croat volunteers. As of August 1997, however, this barrier had been overcome in three cantons (Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Mostar), and joint Moslem-Croat police forces were formed in almost all the municipalities of these cantons. A U.S. Embassy assessment noted as of August 5 that, “Since the integration of police in Sarajevo and Gorazde Cantons and in Mostar, we note that there have been few problems among the police themselves, and joint patrols are becoming the norm.”⁵⁸ Another positive step was taken in December 1997 with the inauguration of an IPTF-administered police academy with 110 cadets from all three ethnic populations. All 11,500 Federation policemen were slated to complete the 4 weeks of induction training by August 1998.⁵⁹ Assuming this process continues to progress as planned, the IPTF anticipates there could be a viable, integrated Federation police force before the year 2000.⁶⁰

Until September 1997 the RS had received training that served only the broader purposes of the peace mission, such as election security and VIP protection. Other programs were confined to the Federation until Biljana Plavsic agreed to permit restructuring to begin among those RS police units that were loyal to her (about a quarter of the force).

Demobilization

In spite of concerns that policemen thrown out of a job by the restructuring process would become a source of social disruption, this does not appear to have occurred in the Federation. If, in fact, the vetting process worked as intended, those who lost employment were not career policemen in the first place, but rather the minimally skilled recruits added to police ranks during the war. This outcome is probably in line, therefore, with what most of those involved expected to happen. To the extent these vetted individuals had a previous skill or trade, they presumably have attempted to return to that; this would undoubtedly include those who had been involved in criminal acitivity as well.

Judicial and Penal Reform

At least until late 1997, the Communist-era Code of Criminal Procedure and Bosnian Penal Code remained in force, and they were still being applied by many of the same judicial authorities as before the war.⁶¹ Transforming these ingredients into a system of jurisprudence that functions in rough conformance with internationally accepted standards, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is one of the basic requirements if sustainable security is to be attained in Bosnia.

IFOR’s 1996 evaluation of the judiciary indicated that “approximately 50 percent of judges from Republika Srpska and Bosnian Croat courts were not aware of the European Convention on Human Rights and the fact that the fundamental freedoms set out in it were to be incorporated into the legal system.”⁶² In part, therefore, this transformation will require a process of education for the legal profession. The more intractable problem, however, will be to remove judicial authorities from the ambit of political elites who exploit them to perpetuate their monopoly on power.

The first step taken by the international community to address these challenges was to study the issue. This took place during the first phase of the intervention, while the IPTF was concentrating on monitoring the various police forces of Bosnia.⁶³ As the IPTF turned its attention to the task of police restructuring in 1997, a broad spectrum of projects has also sprung forth in the judicial realm, many based on European legal traditions and expertise.⁶⁴ In January 1997, the Minister of Justice for the Federation launched a full-scale reform of the Criminal Procedure and Penal Codes with the assistance of UNMIBH, the OHR, and the American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI). By mid-1997, a draft had been presented to the Council of Europe, and that body had also become directly involved in the reform effort. When the process is complete, the proposed amendments will be introduced into the Federation Parliament for legislative action.

Judicial reform was addressed by a range of initiatives, but these efforts were severely constrained by lack of funding. An Association of Judges was formed within the Federation in late 1996, and in mid-1997 this body collaborated with ABA/CEELI and the Federation Ministry of Justice to conduct a conference on the issue of nurturing an independent judiciary. This produced a continuing campaign for judicial autonomy and for a judicial training institute to educate judges in the new criminal code, constitution, and international conventions that have either come into force recently or are expected to in the future. One product of this effort was a formal robing ceremony for Federation Justices, the intent of which was to burnish the image of judges and lend prestige to their office. Indicative of the distance still to be traveled, though, the Constitutional Court for Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the last institutions of the Dayton Accords to be established. While it formally came into existence in April 1997, it had heard no cases as of late 1997. A Constitutional Court had also been created for the Federation. It had just begun to accept cases dealing with some of the most sensitive interethnic issues, such as cantonal privatization laws and symbols used for cantonal flags, as of December 1997. Trial activity within other courts throughout the Federation and the RS is continually monitored by the Office of the High Representative.

Initiatives specifically directed at lawyers and prosecutors include an education program regarding the ECHR and other measures to democratize the legal process run by the International Human Rights Law Group. On their own initiative, prosecuting lawyers have established the Federation Prosecutors Association.

To guide reform of the corrections system, the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division of the U.N. Development Program has developed a procedural manual. Finally, educational programs addressing democratic rights and responsibilities serving both legal professionals and the general public have been provided by the OSCE Rule of Law program.

While each of these discrete international programs is beneficial, as yet there is no formal mechanism to coordinate or integrate them into a coherent reform program. To fill in this void, ABA/CEELI began convening ad hoc monthly meetings open to interested parties as a means of sharing information and informally coordinating efforts. Although the Office of the High Representative would appear to be the logical body to perform this function, during the first 2 years after the DPA was signed, it had neglected to do so.

Support for Elections

To monitor the September 14, 1996, national elections effectively while preserving the capacity to respond to potential disturbances, the IPTF developed a plan allowing for a more flexible deployment posture. Only 600 of its roughly 1,700 personnel were left to man static positions (i.e., at IPTF headquarters, Regional and District headquarters, and IPTF stations). The remainder were formed into 400 two-man Mobile Patrol Teams (providing coverage of 19 voter routes and 4,000 polling places), with a reserve comprised of a dozen strategically located “Hot-Spot” teams, each having 25 personnel.⁶⁵ The IPTF collaborated with IFOR to identify the most likely trouble spots and then established coordinated patrolling patterns for these areas. A number of OSCE officials were also incorporated into IPTF patrols on election day.

The IPTF gave particular attention to Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) crossing points along voter routes. Their function was to monitor local police as they searched vehicles and occupants for weapons and contraband. During the election, only wanted criminals could be detained by local police forces. After the search was completed at the crossing points, drivers received a certificate, signed by both the local police and IPTF, exempting them from further searches that day. Prior to the elections, IFOR assigned military communications specialists to IPTF headquarters, and on election day, senior IPTF officials were incorporated into the IFOR command post. The intent was to ensure rapid communications with IFOR should IPTF patrols encounter a hostile situation requiring a response.⁶⁶

In contrast to the controversy swirling around other aspects of the elections (e.g., intimidation of opposition candidates during the campaign, restrictions on their access to the media, and manipulation of the voter registry for municipal elections by the RS), the actual conduct of elections on September 14 was remarkably free of incidents. Several factors contributed to the absence of serious disruptions, but the sine qua non was the cooperation of governing elites in all three entities. Postponement of the municipal elections removed contention from the process, because the national-level elections then became contests over who would govern within each of the ethnically defined entities. In all three cases, nationalist leaders, exploiting the advantage of incumbency to the fullest, expected to be victorious. Thus, elections would confer a mantle of legitimacy on them that was useful for their aims. This prospect motivated Interior Ministers from each of the entities to work with the IPTF in developing a security plan for the election and instructing local police to implement it.

The IPTF Commissioner sought to ensure compliance in the field by personally visiting each anticipated trouble spot and obtaining the commitment of the local police chief to cooperate with the election security plan. As one experienced observer noted: “The IEBL crossing plan developed by the Interior Ministers is an excellent example of strategic instructions issued to local police for the accomplishment of a sensitive mission and the local police executing the instructions in a calm and competent manner.”⁶⁷ Without this, the efforts of the international community would merely have served to limit damage caused by inevitable confrontations and protests.

While the collaboration of local authorities was pivotal, prospects for tranquility on election day were certainly enhanced by the extensive planning and coordination undertaken by the IPTF and its counterparts, especially IFOR and the OSCE. The IPTF’s advanced preparations were assessed by a veteran U.S. military peacekeeper, as follows:

It was also vitally important that members of the international community with electoral responsibilities (OSCE, IFOR, and IPTF) had made extensive efforts to coordinate their actions. IFOR, in particular, provided crucial support in the form of Civil Affairs planning specialists for the OSCE and the IPTF, as well as logistic support for distribution and postelection collection of ballots.

When the oft-postponed municipal elections were subsequently held in mid-September 1997, the IPTF again played a crucial role in ensuring the support of ministry-level and local police authorities. The same basic approach was taken to maintaining order on election day as had been used a year earlier, with a similarly peaceful outcome. Shortly after these elections, however, the IPTF suffered a tragic loss in a helicopter accident that claimed the lives of Deputy Commissioner David “Kris” Kriskovich and four other senior IPTF officials.

Coordination and Cooperation

Guiding Philosophy of the IPTF Mission

Perhaps the most enduring contribution this mission has made to the conduct of future CIVPOL operations has been the articulation and operational enactment of the concept of “democratic policing.” A step beyond the “community policing” approach adopted in Haiti, this model explicitly links reform of the police with transformation of the political context. The essence of this innovative approach to policing is captured in the IPTF “Commissioner’s Guidance Notes for the Implementation of Democratic Policing Standards:”

The “democratic transition of the Federation” thus became more than a byproduct of IPTF activities.⁷⁰ In the words of Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, “It is a mandate.”⁷¹ To execute this mandate, the Commissioner directed that action be taken in three essential areas:

While the detailed articulation of this concept in a 40-page document was a major advance, devising an effective scheme for implementation is an even more vital, and challenging, matter. That remains a work in progress as of our publication date, but clear progress has been made within the Federation. Very little substantive interaction with RS police had been possible until September 1997 due to the recalcitrance of the Pale leadership. As a result of a power struggle between RS President Biljana Plavsic and de facto Bosnian Serb power broker, Radovan Karadzic, police forces loyal to Plavsic agreed to participate in the restructuring program in September 1997.

Relationship Between the Military and CIVPOL

International responsibility for security matters is divided in the Dayton Peace Accords between the IPTF and IFOR. Annex 11 confers the tasks of monitoring, inspecting, training, and assisting Bosnia’s law enforcement and judicial systems to the IPTF. Military aspects of DPA are treated separately in Annex 1A (e.g., separation of the Former Warring Factions, establishment of the Zone of Separation, and cantonment of heavy weapons). Within the confines of their respective mandates, both IFOR/SFOR and the IPTF performed well. When called upon to support implementation of “civilian” aspects of Dayton, however, acute difficulties periodically arose. Some of the key provisions of Dayton (e.g., freedom of movement, refugee return, apprehension of war criminals, municipal governance, and the status of Brcko) regularly revealed an “enforcement gap” that remained largely unresolved well into the second year of the peace mission.⁷³

Freedom of Movement. One of the more egregious examples of interference with freedom of movement occurred in Mostar in February 1997. The Bosnian Croat Deputy Police Chief from West Mostar and numerous other Croatian police officers were observed by IPTF monitors firing point blank into a group of Moslems seeking to visit a Moslem cemetery located in the Croat sector. One Moslem was killed and 21 were wounded. Contributing to this outcome was an apparent failure to inform SFOR of the impending event and the subsequent lack of military backup for the IPTF. In spite of an IPTF investigation and indisputable evidence of police misconduct (including photos), the international community was unable to ensure more than token accountability for these actions. Only after intense international pressure had been applied was the Deputy Police Chief removed from his position.⁷⁴

On a more routine basis, freedom of movement was regularly impeded because policing had traditionally been equated with the use of traffic checkpoints/roadblocks. Unless authorized by the IPTF, this practice was forbidden but difficult to control owing to the ease of establishing impromptu checkpoints. Unarmed IPTF monitors, moreover, were not always sufficiently compelling to persuade local police to cease such activity. The IPTF was thus dependent on IFOR/SFOR to provide the muscle to compel compliance. It was not until the early stages of the SFOR mission that a checkpoint policy was established that routinized military support to the IPTF. The policy required local police to request authorization to set up checkpoints, and when necessary, unauthorized checkpoints were dismantled with SFOR assistance.

Refugee Return. A severe test of IFOR and the IPTF regarding this issue arose during the fall of 1996. Targeted for resettlement by Moslem authorities were communities located in the Zone of Separation (ZOS); however, these areas also tended to be strategic high ground overlooking vulnerable RS choke points. Consequently, each incursion by a large group of Moslems into the ZOS provoked a hostile response from the RS, typically involving MUPs. Since the IPTF had no capacity to control such encounters, IFOR/SFOR were repeatedly thrust into the midst of ugly confrontations between Moslems and Serbs. The most serious of these clashes, at Mahala in August 1996, was aggravated because the RS reacted to an influx of Moslems by sending armed MUPs to the scene in flagrant violation of the Dayton Accords. After IFOR detained and disarmed the offending policemen, RS authorities nearby in Zvornik responded by surrounding the local IPTF station with a surly crowd of demonstrators and effectively holding IPTF personnel hostage for 6 hours until the situation could be defused.

Control of RS Special Police. The challenge of asserting international control over MUPs in the RS reflects many of the difficulties associated with implementation of Dayton. Throughout the first 18 months of the peace process, RS Special Police obstructed implementation by hindering freedom of movement for non-Serbs, preventing return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the RS, and provoking the international community, including IFOR and the IPTF, with threatening incidents. RS Internal Affairs Minister Dragan Kijac stonewalled on police restructuring, asserting that even the number of police employed in the RS was a state secret. The unarmed IPTF was powerless to deal with MUP strong-arm tactics and obstructionism.

The Special Police, however, were included under provisions of Article 1-A of the Dayton Accords, along with regular military forces, as follows:

When IFOR oversaw the process of confining heavy weapons to cantonment areas, it did so for all units possessing such items (whether Special Police or regular military). This did not address the status of MUP personnel, however. Within the Federation, the IPTF restructuring program eliminated the MUPs, but the RS was another matter.

For some 18 months, MUPs in the RS flouted Dayton by carrying long-barreled rifles, grenades, and other weapons and acting as a local enforcement arm of the RS government and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) under the control of Radovan Karadzic. They organized much of the continuing “ethnic cleansing” in the RS that occurred after Dayton implementation began in December 1995. They also played a key role in coercing the exodus of Serbs residing in Sarajevo during the transfer of Serb-occupied suburbs to the Federation in early 1996.

After Biljana Plavsic was elected RS President in the September 1996 national elections, the stage was set for an internal RS power struggle. Eventually, Plavsic began to focus on the police, and on Kijac in particular, as a source of smuggling, black marketeering, and graft. She also accused Karadzic of misappropriating millions of dollars in tax revenues from state coffers. In June 1997, Plavsic suspended Kijac, sparking a confrontation with Karadzic. This provided the international community an opportunity to act against the MUPs. In July and August, SFOR formally asserted control over these personnel as provided in Annex 1-A. SFOR began regularly inspecting their stations (e.g., Banja Luka and Doboj), confiscating illegal weapons and equipment, and cashiering unacceptable personnel. Movements of MUP personnel were subject to careful SFOR scrutiny. This significantly curtailed their capacity in the RS to engage in paramilitary activities inimical to Dayton.⁷⁶

War Criminals, Brcko, and Municipal Governance. Each of these issues has defied full implementation as envisaged by the Dayton Accords, placing extraordinary demands on IFOR and the IPTF. To date, only three operations have been conducted to apprehend war criminals militarily (Prijedor, Vitez, and Eastern Slavonia); however, the quest for a solution has included consideration of mobilizing an international gendarmerie for this purpose. Similarly, the status of Brcko remains unresolved. Instead of deciding the status of that strategic city, international arbitration placed it under OHR administration in March 1997 for at least a year. To support this administration, the authorized strength of the IPTF was increased to 2,027, and an IPTF superstation with over 250 monitors was established in Brcko. In August 1997, after RS police became enmeshed in the Plavsic-Karadzic power struggle, SFOR troops were portrayed by RS media as attempting to take control of the Brcko station on behalf of Plavsic. This provoked an uprising among the Bosnian Serb populace, compelling the evacuation of IPTF personnel and leaving SFOR troops face to face with a hostile mob. Two soldiers sustained injuries, and SFOR ultimately resorted to use of tear gas to control the situation.

The Dayton-mandated election of municipal councils may also result in future enforcement dilemmas. In a handful of cases (e.g., Srebrenica and Brcko), a nonresident ethnic population voted their candidates into office, but their capacity to govern a community openly hostile to their presence remains to be seen.⁷⁷ The attempt to implement this aspect of the DPA will also test the resources and ingenuity of SFOR and the IPTF.

The issues cited above illustrate several aspects of the “enforcement gap” in Bosnia. First, these gaps in enforcement pertained to implementation of Dayton, not enforcement of local law. Police forces in each of Bosnia’s ethnic communities were capable of maintaining order and applying local law, even though their procedures did not necessarily conform to principles of due process and equal protection. Second, the police were one of the major instruments used by obstructionists in the RS to thwart implementation of the Dayton Accords. In part this was by default, because military activity was highly circumscribed by the DPA and the presence of IFOR/SFOR. Third, IFOR initially sought to remain aloof from law enforcement functions, both out of a desire to avoid a mission for which their units were neither trained nor equipped and in keeping with the division of responsibility in the peace treaty. The dependence of the IPTF on military back-up and the absence of other sources of international leverage, however, meant that the military contingent inevitably had to respond to serious breaches of Dayton. Whereas the initial IFOR posture was to deny that they were the “911” for IPTF emergencies, after several months the inevitability of this role was explicitly acknowledged. It was not until the SFOR phase of the mission, however, that this support became routinized.⁷⁸ Finally, when the parties were at least willing to acquiesce to implementation of certain provisions of Dayton (e.g., the elections of September 1996 and 1997), the IPTF and IFOR/SFOR were able to collaborate effectively to maintain order.

Military assistance, principally in the form of Civil Affairs police specialists, was also invaluable in establishing an operational capability for the IPTF and reducing the initial “deployment gap.” Their role was especially crucial in planning for the pivotal transfer to Moslem control of Sarajevo suburbs. To help the IPTF begin functioning as expeditiously as possible, IFOR detailed a half dozen Civil Affairs officers with backgrounds in planning, operations, training, and logistics. Among their contributions were the following:

Once the IPTF had become fully operational, Civil Affairs personnel provided liaison between the two organizations, ensuring that operationally relevant information was exchanged daily. IFOR also provided certain forms of logistic assistance (see Logistic Support, above). Another IFOR responsibility was to be prepared to evacuate IPTF personnel, if necessary. Civil Affairs personnel were responsible for coordinating these procedures between the two organizations. In addition to their daily function of exchanging operational information, they also provided the interface between IFOR and the IPTF in preparing for and supporting national and municipal elections and monitoring and dealing with the organized crime threat.

Relationship with U.N. Headquarters

In addition to the U.N.’s inherent bureaucratic lethargy, the IPTF faced an uphill battle for resources because of its unfortunate parentage. This CIVPOL mission was a creature of the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accord, which arose after many in the United States had heaped condemnation on the United Nations for the demise of UNPROFOR. Yet, when it came to finding a sponsor for the IPTF after the Dayton Accords had been drawn up, the United Nations was the only viable alternative. It took time for the IPTF to recover from the animus that had developed between the United States and the United Nations. Nor was the United Nations blessed with surplus funds to commit to this unanticipated contingency, a condition the United States certainly had a hand in creating.

Conclusions

Success of the Mission

The publication of this book occurs while the peace operation in Bosnia is far from completed, therefore any observations regarding the success of this mission must be regarded as preliminary. If we measure progress against the goal of sustainable security, however, there is clearly a considerable distance yet to travel. Implementation of Annex 1A by IFOR and the IPTF police restructuring and training programs will not provide sufficient prophylaxis against a resumption of conflict in Bosnia. To tout these commendable achievements too vocally at this stage would risk declaring the operation a success even though the patient (i.e., a multi-ethnic Bosnia) would almost assuredly perish if taken off life-support any time soon. The peace that prevailed under IFOR and SFOR was deceptive because it was a product of external intervention.

There can be no confidence that peace will be self-sustaining because the core issue in dispute—integration vs. partition—has not been resolved. Without consensus among the parties on the question of Bosnia’s identity, many matters integral to the DPA, such as refugee returns, municipal governance, the status of Brcko, or the disposition of war criminals, will continue to be regarded as matters of national survival. The outcome of each will heavily influence Bosnia’s ultimate destiny. The various police forces will be crucial players in the process that determines the outcome of each of these critical disputes. The most basic deficiency is not one of police capabilities, but rather, how those capabilities are employed. As long as xenophobic political leaders command the allegiance of police forces, the public security apparatus will continue to be exploitable as an instrument of repression and nationalistic policies.

Respect for Human Rights

This issue is at the core of the quandary in Bosnia. Ethnic populations were the targets of violence during the war, more so than opposing armies. The outcome was “ethnic cleansing,” and the carnage stopped just short of its ultimate objective. For Bosnia’s three nations to live peaceably together in a single state, respect for minority rights must become integral to its political and judicial processes. Abuse of minorities continues to be a chronic concern,⁷⁹ however, and no ethnic group had a totally unblemished record in this regard. A study conducted in 1996 provided the following assessment:

The Police

Until recently, intimidation (or worse) by police against members of other ethnic groups was likely to be equated with the promotion of public safety by the majority in their communities. The ethos of police officers from all three groups, at least until 1996, had been devoid of precepts such as equality before the law and respect for the rights of minorities.⁸¹ Initial indications from three cantons that had been restructured in the Federation by late August 1997 were positive, but the RS was still lagging far behind. If restructuring is to have an enduring effect, policemen at the municipal level would have to be held accountable for their conduct, and leadership at the Ministry of Interior and senior political levels would have to refrain from trampling on minority rights in premeditated actions ordered from above. It would not be sufficient, therefore, to convert the police into a public-service-oriented agency for the majority population alone. It is even more crucial, and demanding, to gain acceptance for concepts such as due process and human rights for all, without regard for ethnic origin.

The Courts, Legal Code, and Prison System

The IPTF’s path-breaking democratic policing initiative will need to be replicated in judicial and penal realms, because these are also chronically prone to abuse.⁸² One aspect of the system that appears to merit particular scrutiny is pretrial detention. This is a major concern given the preference of police for interrogating suspects, as opposed to the tedium of gathering physical evidence. There are numerous areas where safeguards are weak, disregarded, or lacking. These include manipulation and abuse of the supposed 3-day limit on police detention, the regular failure to notify detainees of their rights, and the lack of prohibitions against use of illegally obtained evidence.⁸³ These serious flaws in Bosnian jurisprudence were not resolved by the DPA, as the Legal Advisor for the HQ ACE Rapid Reaction Corps concluded:

Even the most well-conceived judicial reform plan can be confident only of resolving deficiencies in skills, knowledge, and materiel. Absent the political will to permit the intended democratic transformation to take place, the result will merely be a legalistic mirage. As long as the courts continue to respond to political direction from above, the judiciary can be expected to serve more as a barrier to police reform than as a watchdog over police conduct. To date, an autonomous judiciary and independent prosecutor’s office have not yet evolved, and detention of uncharged individuals persists within the penal system.⁸⁵ Important measures have been taken within the Federation to oxygenate a democratic rule of law. This process has scarcely begun in the RS, and ultimately the outcome will be determined by the amount of political will that emerges for a viable Federation and a multiethnic Bosnia.

The Federation and the RS, vestiges of a Communist-era police state now bereft of an ideology to lend them a whiff of legitimacy, are political regimes in transition. Municipal police chiefs and Ministers of Interior have operated as agents of public control for the leadership of their respective ruling parties. The only outcome compatible with a multiethnic state would be a democracy that preserves minority rights while practicing majority rule. Human rights monitoring organizations, such as the Commission on Human Rights created by Annex 6 of the DPA (including the Ombudsman and Human Rights chamber) need to be nurtured so they can perform a watchdog function over formal institutions of government. Sustaining them will require long-term international engagement, especially by entities with ECHR-based legal traditions. Bosnian human rights organizations, in turn, must develop robust linkages with counterparts internationally. All this will require an arduous process of institutional development coupled with a campaign to educate the citizenry so they understand their rights and obligations in a democracy. This represents the peace-building phase of a peace operation, and it will take many years to complete. It is not yet certain, however, that Bosnia is solidly headed down this path.

Lessons Learned

Even though an overall evaluation of the success of this mission would be premature, the IPTF has accumulated nearly 2 years of experience with the process of mobilizing and operating a CIVPOL mission. Drawing upon this experience, it is possible to highlight some innovations that ought to be continued, and it is also possible to identify persistent deficiencies that ought to be remedied.

Mandate

The foundation for any peace operation is the mandate. In this case, Annex 11 of the DPA serves this purpose, establishing the IPTF’s functions and authority. The factor that determines whether the mandate can be executed successfully is the extent to which the parties actually consent to ends that CIVPOL seeks to serve. At the core of the “enforcement gap” was the fiction that all the parties consented to full implementation of the DPA. Compounding this, Annex 11 clearly makes the parties themselves primarily responsible for maintaining law and order.⁸⁶ When they failed to do this, the typical response from the international community was to restate this responsibility emphatically and insist that the parties meet their obligations. The issue, however, was not a lack of clarity about the meaning of the DPA. There were no effective sanctions to close the gaps in either law enforcement or compliance with the DPA, other than compellance by IFOR/SFOR, and this also had its constraints.

Clearly, the international community needs to develop instruments that can give it greater leverage in such circumstances. Economic conditionality risks being overburdened, and it is not always a precise instrument. To deal with police misconduct, the clout of the IPTF to carry out its mandate has been strengthened by giving it authority over which personnel would be retained in public security forces in Bosnia. Anyone decertified for police duty would be subject to removal if they seek to continue functioning in a police capacity, with the IPTF backed by the military contingent, as required. The military contingent might be better positioned to support such IPTF enforcement action if constabulary or gendarme units were to be incorporated into the force mix for this purpose. To make this effective, the IPTF should bolster its capacity to conduct investigations, including those for corruption and organized crime. Additionally, the international community should consider whether it ought to become the paymaster for municipal, cantonal, and national-level police forces until public security in Bosnia is self-sustaining.

Premission Assessments

In December 1995, the U.N. assessment team focused essentially on numerical factors such as the total number of personnel and police stations in the forces of each ethnic community. This was inadequate for several reasons. First, it was sufficient only to determine the number of monitors required, neglecting the other missions assigned to the IPTF by Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords (e.g., training, advising, and restructuring Bosnian police forces). Second, it failed to take into account the extent to which the IPTF would confront “enforcement gaps” as it attempted to carry out its mandate owing to the evident lack of political commitment from Bosnian Serbs and Croats to Dayton. Thus, without advanced planning or coordination with IFOR for such contingencies and lacking resources to respond, treaty enforcement became a major deficiency. The credibility of the IPTF suffered considerably, especially with IFOR. Future assessments, therefore, should take into account the manning and resources needed to perform all CIVPOL missions, as well as the extent to which limited political consent among the disputants might constrain the CIVPOL mission.

Recruitment of CIVPOL Monitors

The Bosnia experience highlights four deficiencies in the CIVPOL recruitment process:

Premission Training

Several IPTF training innovations are worthy of replication. First, all monitors were given human-rights training. This is vital if monitors are to understand clearly the fundamental standards they are expected to enforce and actually do so in a consistent manner. Second, a program of in-service training was initiated during the second rotation to address shortcomings that the training unit had identified by surveying IPTF personnel and supervisors. Given that CIVPOL contingents will always contain an eclectic mix of skills and abilities, one way to enhance and standardize their capabilities is through in-service training. Presumably this might help to return CIVPOL personnel to their local police forces with enhanced capabilities, serving everyone’s purposes.

Logistics Support

The “deployment gap” in the Bosnian case was exacerbated by the failure to consider the future needs of the IPTF when U.N. assets were transferred to IFOR. While the acquisition of UNPROFOR’s communications systems, vehicles, and equipment by IFOR clearly accelerated its timelines, this also retarded IPTF ability to field an operational contingent. Because it was not incorporated into the military logistics system, the IPTF was left to build its own operation from the ground up even thought its predecessor, UNPROFOR, had been the dominant international organization in Bosnia before Dayton. Because it was under UNMIBH auspices—as opposed to being part of an integrated mission with combined military and CIVPOL components—logistical limitations became a chronic operational concern. The inevitable delays and shortfalls only aggravated the “enforcement gap” with IFOR, which ultimately had no other choice but to provide essential assets, such as communications capabilities, so the two organizations could work together. Even though the situation has gradually improved, the IPTF continues to be hampered logistically, especially by a shortfall in reliable transportation.⁸⁹ As the peace operation evolves, the military presence will presumably diminish, and the significance of the IPTF will correspondingly increase. Thus, the “enforcement gap” between the two organizations cou