CONCLUSIONS

The cases treated in this work offer ample evidence to support the claim that each post-Cold War peace operation has been unique. Our authors have provided the distinct flavor of these experiences in abundant detail and have also drawn operation-specific conclusions. When these experiences are examined together in comparative perspective, however, it also becomes possible to identify recurring themes and commonalities. Such is the burden here: to identify durable lessons and general recommendations to pass on to military and civilian officials who will be responsible for planning and executing public security aspects of future multilateral peace operations. We have organized this discussion into three categories:

Authors’ note: In this regard, we particularly wish to acknowledge the wealth of insights developed by leading international specialists from Norway and Sweden included above. Although arrived at via their own distinct methodologies, we are encouraged that many of their conclusions overlap with or are identical to our own. A special thanks is also due to the panelists and rapporteurs who made the September 15-16, 1997 National Defense University conference on public security so insightful and productive. They are: Carl Alexandre, Dr. David Bayley, Nils Gunnar Billinger, Colonel James Burger, U.S. Army, Colonel Brian Bush, U.S. Army, Charles T. Call, Antonia Handler Chayes, Dr. Graham Day, Mark Ellis, Charles English, Dr. Ken Eyre, Colonel Karl Farris, U.S. Army (Ret.), Dr. Michele A. Flournoy, Colonel Larry Forster, U.S. Army, Major General Louis A. Geiger, Swiss Army (Ret.), Brigadier General

Lessons Learned

Public Security Reform Is Vital

One of the defining features of post-Cold War peace operations is domestic disorder. Because these are internal conflicts, a lasting resolution will require erstwhile antagonists to live together as part of a single political community with adequate assurances that political disputes will be resolved through peaceful rather than violent means.

Merely restoring order will not be sufficient. Unless attention is also given to establishing effective safeguards against abuse, there is the very real possibility that international assistance for public security could have the perverse effect of reinforcing rather than reforming the repressive capacity of the state. Justice must also be included as an objective, otherwise public security will not be sustainable. Reform does not require creating an ideal society or advanced democracy, but it does require functional mechanisms to deal with abuses of authority within the public security system. These mechanisms need to function well enough so that no significant segment of the political community feels compelled to resort to force once again to demolish an unjust system.

This process takes time, and it will almost assuredly take longer than the United States and other countries are prepared to leave their military forces deployed in significant numbers in some distant land. However, the military contingent can be progressively downsized as law and order are restored and civilian assistance programs come into effect. There are clear operational advantages for the military contingent if international law enforcement assistance is effectively carried out. It can reduce the threat to military peacekeepers, enhance popular support for the ongoing mission, improve respect for human rights, accelerate the reduction and withdrawal of military peacekeepers, and increase prospects for long-term stability.

W. C. Gregson, U.S. Marine Corps, Edmund Hull, Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Kelly, AM, Dr. Otwin Marenin, Major General William Nash, U.S. Army, Colonel David Patton, U.S. Army, Robert Perito, J. O’Neil G. Pouliot, Om Prakash Rathor, Dr. James Schear, Dr. William Stanley, Jan Stromsem, Molly Warlow, Robert Wasserman, and Richard Wilcox. Several of them were also very helpful to us in developing this chapter.

Public Security Reform is Holistic

The task of rebuilding or reforming the public security apparatus requires that the judicial process, associated legal code, and penal system be addressed during the earliest stages, along with reform of the police force. Compared to policing, judicial reform takes longer and is even more difficult because of its intimate connection with national sovereignty and the distribution of power in any regime. By waiting until the latter stages of a peace operation to come to grips with such shortcomings, the clout of the international community will likely have faded, and a window of opportunity will probably have been lost. This is self-defeating, because police reform is of little value when the judicial process is corrupt and abusive behavior is rampant within the penal system.

In Bosnia, Civil Affairs specialists assigned to IFOR/SFOR and the NGO community (e.g., the American Bar Association) have stressed the need to assist the IPTF and other organizations in reforming the judiciary. This was reflected in a study conducted by IFOR, “The Functioning of the Legal System in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1 October 1996,” similar to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs survey of Haiti’s judicial system. This sort of collaboration is extremely important and should be standard procedure in future operations, especially given the inevitable impact upon military activities and the fate of the overall mission.

Taking a holistic approach to the criminal justice system would entail conducting a detailed assessment of the local judiciary, legal codes, and penal systems, along with the police force; identifying the major deficiencies in each; and engaging in a dialogue with local authorities to determine how the resources of the international community can be applied to overcoming shortcomings. It also means getting an early start on these programs in order to build momentum. None of this will matter, however, unless local authorities manifest a willingness to cooperate and bilateral and multilateral assistance programs give judicial and penal reform adequate priority when resources are allocated.

Sustainable Public Security is Not Always Possible

Not all internal conflicts are ripe for the ministrations of a peace operation. Prior to mounting such a mission, it is absolutely crucial to perform a rigorous assessment of the prospects for a successful intervention. Apart from other pertinent considerations, reform of public security will require two developments: commitment of resources over time that are capable of overcoming deficiencies in the capacity of public security structures, and generating political consensus among the former disputants that these structures should function in a reasonably impartial manner. It is essential to address both if the efforts of the international community are to have lasting beneficial impact. The most daunting of these challenges invariably will be to overcome resistance from powerful political elites who calculate they will be disadvantaged by the outcome of the reform process. A proper job of institution building could undercut the political interests of certain powerful actors whose consent may be required for the peace mission to continue functioning or for its results to be sustained.

These general lessons, viewed in the context of past performance and current capabilities of international law enforcement assistance, lead to a number of specific recommendations (set forth below). These recommendations are directed at the U.N. system, starting with DPKO but also including other U.N. offices and agencies; at member states of the United Nations who participate in its law enforcement assistance activities or who have bilateral assistance programs of their own; and at those NGOs engaged in various aspects of law enforcement assistance (e.g., the American Bar Association).¹

Recommendations

The Deployment Gap

There are two basic remedies for this gap. To narrow the gap, the capacity of the international community to mobilize CIVPOL personnel should be strengthened, both within contributing states and at the United Nations. Because this gap probably cannot be closed entirely in most cases, the military also needs to be prepared to discharge this function, on an interim basis, until the security environment has been sufficiently stabilized and the CIVPOL contingent has become operational. The recommendations developed below are intended to address these two requirements.

A Standby Force of Trained CIVPOL Personnel. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States) The standby force concept currently used to assemble military troop contributions for peace operations should be adapted for use in CIVPOL mobilization. The most significant difference would be that it would almost always be individuals, rather than entire units, who would be designated as potentially available. Member states would have to assume some responsibility for ensuring their volunteers had received the requisite advanced training, either in-country or in certain third countries specializing in international police training (e.g., Norway, Spain, Sweden, etc.). The CIVPOL office within the U.N. DPKO would require additional staffing to establish training standards and procedures, identify the spectrum of specialized skills likely to be required, establish a team to oversee this function, and maintain a data base of standby personnel and organizations (see CIVPOL Resources, below). Also required would be rapid access to the necessary equipment and supplies. The U.N. Interregional Crime Research Institute and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division should also seek to identify a cadre of judicial experts for standby status, enabling rapid deployment alongside police specialists. Countries such as Sweden and Norway have already taken the initiative to establish a reserve of dedicated civilian police personnel for use in future UNCIVPOL or other multilateral missions. This includes the development of specialized training programs for international policing. Canada and Australia also have established procedures for rapidly mobilizing personnel for CIVPOL missions and providing advanced training for them. The United States and others should follow their example.

CIVPOL in U.N. Assessment Teams and Deployable Headquarters. (Key Actor: United Nations) Experienced CIVPOL personnel should be incorporated into the proposed U.N. Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) and advance U.N. assessment teams. To support the RDMHQ, a cadre of prospective supervisory personnel with experience in international policing and in administering police and judicial organizations need to be identified and maintained in a reserve status by the U.N. Civilian Police office (perhaps as a special category of the CIVPOL standby force recommended above). The assessment team should include civilian law enforcement specialists who are prepared to address the scope of the CIVPOL mission, the viability of the current public security apparatus (police, judiciary/legal code, prisons), the extent of consent among local elites as well as popular acceptance of the peace mission, resources required, and how this activity can be sustained over the long haul. It would also be beneficial to include specialists in the legal tradition and culture of the nation-state involved so that mission-specific planning can be tailored to local circumstances. The assessment should strive to do more than describe the structures of public security and their present capabilities; it should also seek to understand the popular legitimacy of each, the prevailing “legal culture,” and the dynamics that determine their actual functioning (e.g., is the system characterized by impunity for a few or equal justice for all).

CIVPOL Training. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States contributing to CIVPOL) Over the past several years there has been significant progress in producing handbooks, field guides, manuals, etc., on international human rights and justice standards for CIVPOL, providing training in these areas, and screening/testing prospective personnel prior to deployment (see section by Broer and Emery). However, there is a need to continue to improve training, including for specialized as well as basic functions. This can be undertaken by individual member states, with CIVPOL supervision. Before deployment, CIVPOL personnel should be familiar with international standards that apply to the broad range of public security and human rights functions; the general differences among legal systems based on the Napoleonic Code, English Common Law, and the Sharia; and techniques for effective monitoring and mentoring. This would be in addition to pre-mission training dealing with the specific cultural traits, contemporary political realities, and security threats in the mission area. English language training should also be made liberally available.

In addition to basic CIVPOL training programs conducted by Member States, there is a need for multilateral training and exercises. This would emulate the considerable number of multilateral military peacekeeping exercises, such as those conducted by NATO and PFP forces and by U.S. and Latin American militaries. This would substantially improve collective civilian capabilities, as it has with military forces. In addition, military planners should give consideration to incorporating CIVPOL elements in their exercise scenarios.

Skills for the CIVPOL Contingent. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States) Until recently, the typical pattern of recruitment by the United Nations had been to solicit volunteers from Member States using a very basic set of criteria, such as a given number of years experience in policing, fluency in the mission language (normally English), and driving ability. Beginning with the second cadre of police monitors in Bosnia, however, the United Nations also asked contributing nations to provide volunteers who have the specific skills needed for that operation. This is a major advance, and recruitment of future CIVPOL contingents should continue to be done in this manner (i.e., on the basis of specific personnel needs). Among the areas of expertise that ought to be considered during recruitment of future CIVPOL contingents (depending on the nature of the mandate) should be the following: specialists in the legal code applicable in the host country, administration of justice, administration of police academies, penal system reform, internal affairs/inspector general, criminal investigations, organized crime, and field training. There should be a special emphasis upon recruiting personnel proficient in the language of the country where the mission is taking place.

Continuing emphasis should be placed on obtaining credible performance evaluations on CIVPOL personnel during the conduct of each mission. The purpose would be both to identify incompetent personnel, so they can be removed, as well as the most qualified, so they can be groomed for supervisory positions in future missions.

CIVPOL Resources. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States) Present requirements for mobilizing, training, equipping, and sustaining CIVPOL field operations greatly outstrip current capabilities. The UNCIVPOL office is currently authorized one full-time position. Even though the office has been supplemented by five specialists seconded from member states at no cost to the United Nations, this is woefully insufficient given that there are some 3,000 CIVPOL personnel in the field under the nominal supervision of this office. Implementation of the recommendations made here, such as a CIVPOL standby force, would require additional staffing, computerization, and financial resources. Yet, there is strong pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement to end the practice of secondment, which would deprive the CIVPOL office of its five pro bono specialists. This would be highly counterproductive and tantamount to abandonment of concern for this function.

The United Nations and Member States need to assign a higher priority to supporting CIVPOL activities. The CIVPOL office has been commendably flexible in welcoming various forms of assistance for CIVPOL activities via bilateral government programs and NGOs. To a limited degree, CIVPOL personnel shortcomings might be ameliorated by greater integration with and support from other elements of DPKO (for equipment, logistics, etc.). However, DPKO also faces severe personnel and budgetary pressures. Thus, an increase in funding for CIVPOL is essential, but not likely until the United States clears up the bulk of its arrears to the United Nations and others increase their contributions.

A Generic Public Security Plan. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States contributing to CIVPOL) To ensure that vital lessons gleaned from previous peace operations are reliably acted upon in the future, a generic public security plan should be developed by U.N. DPKO. This should also be an integral component of the U.S. interagency political-military planning process. This plan would identify the functions to be performed by members of the international community (e.g., UNCIVPOL and bilateral governments); address all elements of the public security “triad”; specify the resources and personnel skills/ranks normally required for each function; list the likely sources for resources and personnel and their likely availability to sustain such missions; and provide general guidance regarding the relationships that should be developed with the local police force and other authorities, the military contingent, and other entities contributing to the mission. Each mission will confront anew various fundamental choices: whether CIVPOL should be armed and have “executive authority” to enforce local law; whether the military and CIVPOL should have common communications and logistics systems and engage in joint patrolling; and how the deployment, enforcement, and institutional gaps will be addressed, especially how civil disturbances and other types of unrest are to be handled.

Other functional issues to be considered would be how former combatants are to be demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated into civil society; the potential for vigilante activity by police if the judiciary does not function; whether the international community should provide funding for judicial and police salaries until the government can do so adequately; the sanctions and inducements available to encourage compliance with reform of the public security apparatus; possible placement of experienced international advisors within ministries involved in public security; how the safety of CIVPOL personnel will be preserved and, if necessary, how evacuation will be accomplished; and how to adapt to cultural conditions and public expectations in the mission area.

While a generic plan can serve as a rough-and-ready guide, it must be tailored to the circumstances of each contingency. The generic plan would, thus, be the starting point for mission-specific planning for each new operation. A plan covering policing, the judiciary, and prisons is essential before deployment for each mission, ideally integrated with the military plan but valuable by itself if this is not feasible. At a minimum, the relationship between the military and CIVPOL contingents must be addressed, with special attention given to maximizing common communications capabilities and logistics support. Coordination with other elements of the operation (e.g., humanitarian, human rights, economic reconstruction) should also be vigorously pursued. An actual operation plan will be much easier to prepare if there is a generic plan to use as a template. Even after this step has been taken, however, the plan must be reviewed and revised as the mission unfolds, conditions change, and more is learned from exposure to reality on the ground. Rigidity is to be avoided. In addition, there should be a dynamic mechanism for capturing lessons learned after each peace operation and revising the generic plan as warranted.

MPs and Civil Affairs Specialists. (Key Actors: Military and CIVPOL Planners at the United Nations and Member States) While steps can and should be taken to accelerate CIVPOL mobilization and overall capacity, there will continue to be a high probability that in most cases there will be a considerable lag between the deployment of the two contingents. Military peacekeepers will need to perform constabulary functions on an interim basis, therefore, during the earliest stages of most peace missions. Additionally, a high threat environment during the initial period of international intervention may militate against effective CIVPOL operations until the military contingent has been able to stabilize the situation (e.g., by beginning the process of cantonment for the former combatants). Consequently, military planners should ensure that adequate military police or gendarme units are incorporated in the initial deployment package. As Brigadier General David Foley pointed out in his speech to the September 1997 National Defense University conference, “Policing the New World Disorder,” U.S. Army Military Police are well qualified for this mission, as are constabulary forces from some other countries (see appendix B). Erwin Schmidl points out the frequent past use of constabulary forces for this purpose. As experience in Panama and Haiti demonstrates, when adequate advanced provisions have not been made to have MP units immediately available, the consequences for the peace mission can be decidedly negative.

Careful attention must be given to specification of the mission, tasks, and ROEs for these units. ROEs must be crafted with prudence and precision, indicating circumstances under which military forces are to act to preserve order. Issues to be addressed include responses to violence within the local population, responses to other criminal activity, authority to arrest and detain local citizens and their subsequent disposition, and the extent of training assistance that troops are permitted to provide indigenous police and judicial authorities. Other issues that must be covered are the relationship with local police forces, the process by which CIVPOL will ultimately assume its responsibilities from the military, and their subsequent relationship with each other.

In addition, civil affairs personnel with backgrounds in planning, logistics, and police operations should be assigned to work with the CIVPOL commissioner, as soon as one has been designated, to facilitate CIVPOL deployment and military support to it. Intelligence and public information/psychological operations assets as well as communications and logistics capabilities of the military contingent are vital for restoring the rule of law and should be closely coordinated from the outset with corresponding CIVPOL functions. With proper preparation this can be done within the context of existing policies and capabilities of the United Nations, the United States, and other governments. It is justifiable as a military activity, given the negative effect upon force protection, mission accomplishment, and prospects for withdrawal if there is a delay in restoring public security.

Constabulary Capability and Utilization. (Key Actors: United Nations and Member States) Some military establishments already possess very significant constabulary forces—that is, units capable of maintaining public order by performing both law enforcement and light infantry operations. Such units (e.g., the U.S. Military Police and Special Forces, French gendarmerie, Spanish Guardia Civil, Chilean carabineros, Argentine gendarmes, Italian carabinieri, Dutch Royal Mariechaussee, etc.) should be explicitly solicited from donor nations when there is a serious prospect that an impending peace operation will have to cope with significant public disorder. Constabulary forces are better suited for law enforcement functions and for interaction with CIVPOL than regular military forces. In circumstances where potential for violence is not high or has been greatly reduced, but there is a continuing need for law enforcement, constabulary forces could be considered as a substitute for regular combat forces in peace operations.

This remedy could overtax the finite number of member states currently possessing such a “constabulary” capability. Additional training, manpower, and other resources would undoubtedly be required if there were to be significant and recurring missions for such units. Thus, there are inherent limitations in this approach, unless Member States would be amenable to expanding their constabulary forces and/or assisting other countries to develop an enhanced capability in response to this need. Owing to sensitivities about the possible impact on civil-military relations, assistance to Member States in developing new “constabulary” forces would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

The Enforcement Gap

This gap is greatest when political consent with the peace agreement is deficient and the CIVPOL element is unarmed, as is normally the case. To address the existing void in local law enforcement, the most workable option is generally an interim police force assembled, after careful screening, from local government security forces.

When the enforcement gap involves a need to promote compliance with provisions of a peace agreement, the most promising approach is to bring all resources of the peace operation to bear in a coordinated fashion. In particular, this entails integrated and mutually reinforcing operations by the military and CIVPOL contingents. Absent such unity of effort, this gap in public security can become acute and threaten the success of the entire mission.

An Interim Police Force. (Key Actors: Special Representative of Secretary-General or Equivalent in Charge of the Peace Mission; CIVPOL; Military Contingent Commander; Local Officials) In most cases, the local police force will not be held in very high public esteem. Thus, in seeking to fill the law enforcement gap, the challenge will be to convert what may have been a predatory and illegitimate force into at least a visible facade of law enforcement (as in Haiti with the IPSF). This allows local law to be applied and minimizes confrontations between the peace force and the local population. This will entail vetting of notoriously corrupt or sadistic personnel, a retraining program to make those retained on duty aware of their new performance standards, adequate materiel support, supervision by CIVPOL monitors, and, perhaps, joint patrolling with military police, as well. A mechanism for funding salaries and operational expenses of this interim police force must be anticipated, because revenue collection is apt to have broken down along with other government functions. Even if this were not the case, there may be no utility in relying on a police force that has remained totally beholden to those responsible for causing the intervention in the first place. One of the inherent dangers that must be guarded against is the inclination for such interim policemen to exploit what they may view as their final opportunity in a police uniform to enrich themselves through extortion or outright banditry. Stifling this requires a competent, adequately staffed, and fully engaged CIVPOL force, often with military support. It also means holding out opportunities for individuals in the interim force to become members of a permanent force if their current behavior and past records meet proper standards. Throughout this process a public information campaign should keep the general public and specific elite audiences informed about the mission’s intentions and the new standard expected from the police.

The Demobilization Dilemma. (Key Actors: Special Representative of Secretary-General or Equivalent in Charge of the Peace Mission; CIVPOL; Commander of Military Contingent; Local Government Officials; Donor Nations Funding Retraining Programs; ICITAP and Equivalent Government Agencies) In a postconflict environment, the rates of violent crime, especially assault with automatic weapons, are apt to be soaring. Government security forces are typically demobilized or restricted to cantonments, creating a void in public order after years of harsh and repressive rule. As public alarm mounts, the retention of elite units and a leadership cadre who have had the benefit of extensive training and years of experience becomes very appealing. The dilemma arises because these same individuals and elite units are often guilty of grave human rights abuses and rampant corruption.

Past experience indicates it is generally preferable to disband elite units, vet the personnel, require them to be fully retrained if they wish to re-enter the force, and permit them back only individually to prevent them from coalescing as a group and usurping control over the fledgling police force. Similarly, there will be a great temptation to retain experienced police supervisors because the remainder of the police force will be comprised of rookies. Once again, extreme care must be exercised, because whoever is allowed to name these individuals to senior posts will be in a strong position to monopolize power over the long haul. Prospects for constructing a police force that is both proficient and endowed with an ethos of service to the public hinges on fundamentally altering the police culture. Retaining specialized units or cadres of previous supervisory personnel (especially midlevel supervisors) could constitute an insurmountable barrier to essential change.

Another dimension of the demobilization dilemma is the concern that former security personnel may be unable to find gainful employment and will therefore turn to criminal activity to support themselves. Given their training, discipline, and knowledge of the criminal underworld, this is a realistic possibility. Demobilization or retraining programs are an obvious answer, but as in Haiti, there may be considerable political resistance to providing special assistance to the same nefarious group that had formerly victimized their fellow citizens.

CIVPOL and Military Unity of Effort. (Key Actors: U.N. DPKO; Special Representative of Secretary-General or Equivalent in Charge of the Peace Mission; CIVPOL and Military Contingent Commanders; Member States Contributing Military or Police Personnel) The most effective way to deal with an enforcement gap is via mutually reinforcing operations between the international military and CIVPOL contingents. Haiti provides the model. There was a single individual in charge of the operation, to whom both the police and military contingents were subordinated. (For this to function well, key individuals involved must be capable of working together as a team.) At the operational level, police and military command posts were co-located, and both forces used the same communication network, information/intelligence structures, and logistics support system. At the tactical level, military policemen were temporarily assigned to duty in local police stations to accompany CIVPOL and local police on patrols.

The “Haiti model” enhances unity of effort in a variety of areas. First, information about potential threats, forthcoming operations, and other mutual concerns can be passed freely between the military and CIVPOL organizations by virtue of a common communications net, a shared command post, and intermingling of personnel in the field. Second, the presence of military forces serves as a deterrent against armed resistance to CIVPOL and their local counterparts, boosting their morale and effectiveness. Third, the use of common communication and logistics networks allows for economies of scale, interoperability, and other efficiencies. Finally, joint planning by the military and CIVPOL should make the response to contingencies much more timely and effective.

Maximizing unity of effort also requires recognition of the need for Civil Affairs personnel to work with CIVPOL, as well as for effective coordination of public information and intelligence capabilities. CIVPOL personnel can serve as a rich and timely source of raw intelligence data, as demonstrated by the ASF in Somalia and by the IPTF in Bosnia. Assuring a continuous and timely exchange of information should be a high priority. The efficacy of the military’s public information campaign in shaping local attitudes toward CIVPOL activities was clearly demonstrated in Haiti. Such capabilities are not found in normal UNCIVPOL deployments, therefore arrangements for military support in this area should be included in military planning. After the military peacekeeping mission has ended, a limited number of military police, Civil Affairs, intelligence, or public information personnel may be required to remain with CIVPOL temporarily to ensure a smooth transition and continuity of effort.

Sanctions and Inducements. (Key Actors: U.N. DPKO; Special Representative of Secretary-General or Equivalent in Charge of the Peace Mission; CIVPOL and Military Contingent Commanders; Member States Contributing Military or Police Personnel) Even the most unified and well-coordinated peace mission will not, by virtue of this factor alone, be able to overcome deficient political will on the part of one or more of the parties to comply with obligations of their peace agreement. Assuming the international coalition involved is reasonably unified regarding the desired outcome (or end state), it may be possible to encourage greater compliance through a coordinated package of international sanctions and inducements. One of the dilemmas for those concerned with reforming the instruments of public security is that suspending public security reform programs as a sanction for misconduct might be counterproductive. The lack of effective measures to sanction defiance by Bosnian Serb police and Interior Ministry officials was a chronic liability for IPTF Commissioners.²

The Institutional Gap

A blueprint for achieving sustainable security ought to be considered a centerpiece of any peace operation. First, the structural components of indigenous public security (police, judiciary/legal code, and prisons) must achieve at least a basic capacity to maintain law and order by capitalizing on the international assistance available to them. This process should begin as soon as possible during the peace operation.

The second and more challenging task is to imbue these structures of public security with an ethos of public service and impartiality, and to bolster societal mechanisms of accountability.³ Achieving law and order with justice under these circumstances is a long-term process requiring international and indigenous mechanisms for generating and sustaining the requisite political will. This process brings a host of additional players to the forefront. Among the more prominent are specialists in public administration, human rights, electoral processes, and journalism.

Strive for Multilateral Cohesion. (Key Actors: U.N. DPKO; the SRSG; the CIVPOL Contingent; the Military Contingent; Member States; Relevant International Organizations and NGOs) The UNCIVPOL office has been commendably flexible in blending available bilateral assistance together with the efforts of CIVPOL operations in the field. This has ranged from ICITAP taking responsibility for creating and operating police and judicial academies and training programs in Haiti, Bosnia and elsewhere, to France and Canada providing personnel for police and judicial activities in parallel with CIVPOL, to Norway and Spain providing training for prospective CIVPOL personnel from other countries. This is constructive and should be continued, especially given CIVPOL’s resource limitations. However, it must be more systematic, and more member states should be encouraged to become active if there is to be a positive, long-term impact on the overall law enforcement capability of states being assisted.⁴

Multilateral unity of effort requires a process of coordination embracing not merely Member States but key international organizations and NGOs involved in a peace operation, as well. There needs to be greater integration or coordination by DPKO with the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, the U.N. Development Program and other elements of the U.N. system, because public safety assistance goes well beyond policing and is a long-term developmental as well as a peacekeeping function. A suitable method for achieving this would be to establish a clearinghouse within the United Nations for premission coordination. While this process could never be mandatory or binding, it should at least identify the international actors expected to be involved, what their anticipated contributions to public security will be, and how they all will interact/coordinate with each other (e.g., CIVPOL contingents have been called upon to assist with human rights monitoring, disarmament programs, demobilization of ex-combatants, electoral supervision, etc.).⁵ The purpose would be to facilitate the sharing of intentions and coordination of plans among the various actors associated with a pending or ongoing peace mission (public security would not be the only aspect of peace operations to benefit from such a mechanism). A centralized database, perhaps building upon the computerized system used for refugee repatriation and reintegration in Bosnia by SFOR, UNHCR, and the Office of the High Representative could be developed as the centerpiece of this effort.

Once the mission has begun, the CIVPOL Commissioner and the senior international civilian and military representatives should take the initiative to establish a suitable mechanism for communication and coordination with other actors providing assistance in the realm of public security, including NGOs, international organizations, and Member States conducting bilateral assistance programs. The commissioner should also work closely with the military commander and under the unifying direction of the senior civilian authority (e.g., U.N. SRSG, the High Representative) to coordinate with other actors in the areas of human rights, elections, refugee resettlement, and related issues. The value added via coordination can be significant, both in planning and execution.

Follow-on Assistance for Public Security. (Key Actors: AID, ICITAP, and other Bilateral Assistance Programs; Human Rights Organizations; American Bar Association; Other Relevant NGOs) Redressing severe deficiencies in the public security system effectively requires a prolonged commitment by the international community. Reformation of the police force alone is normally at least a 5-year proposition; the judiciary requires even more time, because of the extensive educational requirements and experience required for most judicial posts. Public attitudes and expectations toward the legal system must also be altered, and support for the rule of law must be engendered within civil society (e.g., human rights organizations and free press). These reforms should begin as soon as possible during the peacekeeping phase and continue as a foundation for peace building. Once this has begun to happen and the peace process has become irreversible, there is no further need for the presence of a military intervention force.

One of the areas requiring particular development is follow-on assistance after the departure of military forces. Resources and programs need to be marshaled to sustain and consolidate advances made during the military phase of the peace operation. In the United States, AID, and ICITAP are crucial for this purpose, yet their funding is far from robust. Other bilateral public security assistance programs and NGOs can make a crucial contribution to development of institutions in civil society that will provide accountability for the police, judiciary, and prisons.

Standards for Public Security and Criminal Justice. (Key Actors: U.N. DPKO; UNHCR; U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division; Member States) International standards for policing have been prepared by the U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division. However, they are general in nature. The IPTF in Bosnia developed Commissioner’s Guidance, which specifies the actual conduct expected of policemen in the Federation and the Serb Republic.⁶ UNCPCJD also developed the “Guideline for the Conduct of Public Justice in Cambodia” (even though circumstances militated against practical application). Building on these initiatives, the United Nations should endeavor to refine international standards for policing, judicial affairs, and penal systems. As the Bosnia Commissioner’s Guidance has done, emphasis should be on providing specific, observable, and objective measures that can be used by monitors to evaluate the conduct of personnel involved in public security functions. Prior to deployment, CIVPOL monitors should receive training on these standards and a field monitoring and training guide should be developed reflecting them. Country-specific Commissioner’s Guidance manuals should also be developed with input from the UNCPCJD on judicial and penal matters and legal codes, and from the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights and the Center for Human Rights on human rights matters. For example, the Center produced a field guide for Bosnia (“Human Rights and Law Enforcement: International Standards for Monitoring, Training and Advice”); it is also working on universal guidance materials.

Public Security and Criminal Justice Responsibilities. (Key Actors: U.N. Security Council; U.N. DPKO; Member States; the Military Contingent) If warranted, authority for CIVPOL and other elements of the peace mission to reform the police, judiciary/legal code, and penal system, in conformance with internationally accepted standards, should be explicitly articulated in the mandate. The mandate should include provision for an international tribunal or other means of dealing with the issues of war crimes, if this is necessary. It should also address whether the military or CIVPOL contingents will have law enforcement powers and whether CIVPOL should be armed. Only under rather unusual circumstances would it be warranted to arm the CIVPOL contingent and assign it law enforcement responsibilities. The Haitian case was just such a partial exception. Even in this case, however, an interim local force (the IPSF) retained primary responsibility for law enforcement and arresting suspects, albeit under international scrutiny. Under normal circumstances, law enforcement activity by CIVPOL would run the risk of seriously antagonizing at least one of the former disputants and potentially the indigenous population, as well. This could easily entangle CIVPOL as a protagonist in local disputes, raising the risk of unacceptable casualties or hostage taking. To avoid such an outcome, the time-honored practice has been to adopt a strictly neutral and unarmed posture. Most of the countries that have a long tradition of contributing to CIVPOL operations prefer this approach, although the Swedish study included in this volume recognizes there may be exceptions.⁷

The more detailed the mandate and peace agreement are about required reforms, the more leverage CIVPOL has to press effectively for compliance. If possible, international standards for public security conduct should also be incorporated into any peace agreement that serves as a basis for the peace operation. A law enforcement plan should subsequently be developed under the guidance of the UNCIVPOL office.⁸ Authority to resolve conflicts between local law and international standards should be allocated in the mandate to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or equivalent. If warranted, the mandate should also include authority to certify the fitness of local police and to cashier those deemed by the CIVPOL commissioner to be responsible for gross human rights abuses or serious corruption, and to establish an indigenous police oversight body to ensure accountability to the public after CIVPOL departs. Provision should be made in both the mandate and the law enforcement plan for civilian assistance to continue after the military phase has concluded.

The early phase of an intervention is likely to be fraught with uncertainty about the willingness of the disputants to cooperate with the intervention force; however, this is also the moment of greatest opportunity to set in motion the dynamics necessary to complete the mission successfully. Those in charge of each peace operation should seek to capitalize on local war weariness, the state of flux, and the positive shock effect of international intervention to obtain necessary concessions and acceptance of a robust interpretation of the mandate. The emphasis ought to be on securing broad freedom of action for the peace force, but great care should be taken in actually exercising this authority until commanders gain a clearer understanding of local political realities. This phase of the intervention should not be squandered, because military presence in significant numbers and the initial positive impact on public opinion are of limited duration. The longer an external military force remains deployed on the ground, the more it is apt to be perceived as an occupation army.

Civil Society. (Key Actors: UNDP; U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights; U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division; CIVPOL; Member States, Relevant NGOs) In the long run, the objective of sustainable security will be assured only when impunity is no longer the norm and justice is perceived to be available to all, even if not on a totally equal footing. Achieving this aim entails mobilization and development of civil society. This is the only way that institutions of public security will reliably be held accountable for their conduct. Specific functions that are conducive to this outcome are a free press, open elections, availability of pro bono defense counsel for the indigent and minorities, domestic human rights monitoring organizations with effective international sponsorship, an ombudsman or similar mechanism to promote transparency of public security institutions, and public access to police via hot line (a 911 equivalent). The exact form that these take must be carefully crafted so as to be compatible with local culture and tradition.

This process involves arousing a sense of efficacy in the average citizen and a conviction that public security ought to be a public good and not a private privilege. The political culture must be altered, therefore, so repressive behavior by the police is not reinforced, which is probably what the populace expects. Public education is a crucial component of the process of altering expectations. In this regard, the public information resources of the military intervention force, as well as civilian agencies, ought to be put to maximum use. There should be planning for coordinated actions by both military and civilian elements of the peace mission to strengthen civil society as well as to promote good communication with local authorities. It will also be vitally important to nurture public support when sanctions are required to promote needed reform of the police, penal system, or judiciary. At the end of the day, civil society is the constituency that stands to gain if order with justice becomes the norm.

Separation of Power Between the Executive and Judiciary. (Key Actors: Local Government; SRSG; Human Rights Organizations) Injustice, impunity, and exploitation of the police and legal system to repress political opponents are often major contributing factors to the governmental meltdown that causes an international intervention. If the judicial process has been co-opted by the executive branch, its primary function invariably becomes perpetuation in power of the current governing elite. To alter this fundamentally, so justice ultimately prevails and the cycle of repression and governmental decay does not repeat itself, the power of the executive over the judiciary should be checked by other forces, such as the legislative branch and civil society. This would likely include limiting or balancing executive prerogatives in such areas as judicial appointments, budgetary allocations, and physical security.

U.S. Support for Public Security Assistance

Organizational

At present, responsibility for developing and implementing U.S. bilateral programs is divided between ICITAP (see Call’s paper in this volume) and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). AID, Department of Defense, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organizations (IO) and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have lesser roles. IO has the primary responsibility for working with UNCIVPOL, with important roles for ICITAP and State INL. All the primary agencies (ICITAP, IO, and INL) are short of personnel in relation to the magnitude of the bilateral programs involved and the need to coordinate them closely with UNCIVPOL, other bilateral programs, and NGOs. ICITAP is the only official agency with an exclusive focus on providing assistance to public security organizations outside the United States. However, other agencies also provide assistance to various law enforcement agencies (e.g., the DEA, FBI, CIA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and Secret Service). In spite of its pivotal role, ICITAP is only a temporary organization within the Department of Justice, without permanently funded staff or programs. Another organizational weakness is that none of the federal-level organizations has much experience, authority, or capacity to assist judicial or penal reform. The alternative of using AID-funded contractors for judicial assistance in Haiti has proven unsatisfactory.

The United States should follow the Swedish example by creating a single, permanent, properly staffed office to coordinate international policing functions currently fragmented among State (INL, IO, AID, etc.), Justice (ICITAP, FBI, DEA, etc.), and other agencies. This would greatly facilitate coordination with local or state police forces and with the United Nations, other governments, and NGOs. The scope of responsibility should include penal and judicial as well as police assistance. This office could be subordinate to the Department of State, but the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department would both need to be actively involved.

Funding

In the past 5 years, concern over and funding for U.S. law enforcement activities abroad have greatly increased, in recognition of the growing threat of international organized crime, narcotics, and terrorism. This has not been reflected in funding to enhance law enforcement capabilities of other countries. In order to better protect the United States and its interests from criminal activity abroad, this needs to be corrected.

Recruitment

At present, recruitment of U.S. personnel for UNCIVPOL missions or “coalitions of the willing” is essentially ad hoc and badly needs improvement. At the September 1997 NDU Conference, Chicago Police Superintendent Matt Rodriguez made specific suggestions for improving ICITAP/INL cooperation with major city police forces (appendix A). It would be a vast improvement if a formal arrangement were established to allow police chiefs to identify their best candidates for CIVPOL duties. Such an arrangement should be put into effect as soon as possible. Additional measures to regularize recruitment of qualified local and state police personnel should also be developed. Similar action needs to be taken to recruit qualified personnel with backgrounds in penal and judicial reform, working with organizations such as the Bureau of Prisons, state prison systems, and the American Bar Association. An additional, parallel measure could be the establishment of a database within DOD that indicates U.S. Reserve and National Guard personnel with civilian police experience or with military experience as MPs or Special Forces. This database would be a step toward establishing a national CIVPOL standby roster. The next step would be to incorporate volunteers from state and local police forces into this database.

Looking Beyond Peace Operations

This book has dealt primarily with international assistance to public security in the context of peacekeeping operations, although it has also emphasized the need for across-the-board support to the entire public security spectrum after the military peacekeeping mission has ended. The ramifications of the “new world disorder” extend beyond the realm of peace operations, however, and compel us to think more expansively about how the international community can confront these challenges more effectively. Moving outside the peacekeeping context, the United Nations and interested Member States need to look more closely at providing public security assistance to troubled states preemptively to reduce the risk of major crises that might trigger such costly operations. In several of our case studies, it is evident that with more capable (and just) law enforcement institutions, states could well have avoided the crises that precipitated international intervention. It is also evident that unless such institutions are developed and sustained, the situation that caused the intervention could easily return.

The United Nations and interested Member States should also explore prospective measures to assist states with weak police forces and judicial systems that are collapsing under the weight of transnational criminal activities, including narcotics, organized crime, and terrorism. Without expanding here upon the nature and scope of this threat, it is clear that bilateral assistance programs have clear limitations owing to concerns about national sovereignty. If the process of developing universally accepted public security standards gathers momentum, and the capacity of multilateral organizations to render effective assistance develops as a function of repeated experiences acquired during peace operations, there may be an expanding role for the international community in dealing with the transnational crime phenomenon as well. Thus, the question emerges:

Finally, there is also a pressing need for greater protection of personnel and assets in international humanitarian missions, given the sharp increase over the past 5 years of violence directed against organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Children’s Fund, and numerous NGOs, as well as violence against refugees and displaced persons. In many instances, there is a reluctance (e.g., for political reasons or expense) to call for full-scale military peacekeeping forces in such situations (e.g., eastern Zaire, 1994-96). There could be an opportunity to use constabulary forces in some of these situations instead of military forces, given their greater political acceptability, particularly if they are deployed before a situation becomes too violent and the floodgates have been opened to the flow of weapons and paramilitary groups. On the other hand, in some instances where civilians have undertaken protective roles, the results have not been as positive as expected (e.g., U.N. civilian guards for northern Iraq; UNHCR guards for eastern Zaire), and some say that this is not a feasible alternative to regular combat forces. Nevertheless, the question needs to be asked:

Summary

Even if all the recommendations cited above were to be heeded and all lessons faithfully applied, the outcome of any peace operation will remain hostage to the political will of the parties enmeshed in the internal dispute. No peace force can compel reconciliation if the power brokers involved are unalterably opposed to this, nor can the best efforts of the international community ensure that local law enforcement institutions will use this opportunity for reform to begin functioning according to “international standards” (which are still under development). Careful attention must also be given to the sanctions and inducements available to achieve compliance. Prudence is required when pressing for reforms, because of the potentially confounding influence of local culture, unfamiliar legal traditions, and internal political dynamics. Pressing too hard in the wrong areas may produce a backlash that places the mission in jeopardy and retards the reform process. Even in more promising circumstances, expectations must be realistic, because the clout of the international community is normally insufficient to induce all changes that might be desired in the subject nation’s public security apparatus.

Perhaps the most daunting constraint for the United States is the impatient character of the American people, especially when they do not understand why tax dollars and especially lives are being spent in some obscure corner of the globe. On the other hand, policy makers are apt to be bombarded by vocal and well-organized human rights and special interest groups pressing for an aggressive policy to rectify past wrongs immediately and to remake an uncivil culture promptly into an incubator of democracy. If peace operations are going to result in sustainable security over the long haul, the American people must come to a much clearer understanding of what we are about, what interests are at stake, and what our expectations realistically ought to be. It is hoped that this work can contribute modestly to that important task.