Currently, there is little consensus in the United States as to what shape that impact will take. The range of viewpoints goes from those who fear that growing Chinese military power could wreck the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region to those who believe that China can contribute to the international order. Still others worry that Chinese economic expansion will disrupt the international system, while some feel it will benefit the world economy as China is integrated into the international economic system.

These views aside, it is clear that the United States is experiencing a difficult period of what can be called "enemy deprivation," following the collapse of the USSR. The situation is only exacerbated by the numerous competing special interests that have a stake in U.S.BChina relations.

In any case, in trying to forecast the impact of China's rise, reasoning by analogy is perhaps the least helpful method: China's re-emergence on the international scene will cause unique problems. China is not Germany, Japan, the USSR, or even the United States. China does not seek lebensraum; is not pursuing its manifest destiny; does not want to incorporate additional non-Han peoples into its territory; has no ideology to export; and is certainly not a colonizer and does not station any troops overseas. China has very limited objectives, but these still affect American interests and those of our allies.

In particular, the future holds the likelihood of a conflict of ideologies and conflict between China's desire for supremacy and its opposition to challenges to that desire. American interests will be sorely tested by China's rise. Some of the challenges to U.S. interests include the capability of the United States to regulate military technology transfer; the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could threaten the United States or its allies; and the possibility that China may try to forcibly unify Taiwan with the Mainland. Other difficult tasks for the United States include ensuring U.S. ability to intervene in Asia without fear of retaliation against the American Mainland and preserving U.S. military and political dominance in Asia. China will challenge other U.S. interests in maintaining Japan as a Western auxiliary in the Western Pacific and preventing the domination of the Eurasian landmass by a single Great Power. Finally, China may also threaten the U.S. position as the sole global power.

Whether the United States and China clash over these and other areas is likely to be determined by how and where China directs its economic resources. So far, the trends are not alarming; they reflect both the resources available to China and Chinese intentions. In the security realm, challenges will not be decided by technology levels or even relative economic and military power: at the outbreak of World War II, Japan attacked the United States despite the fact that its GDP was equivalent to only one-tenth of that of the United States. Overwhelming U.S. technological superiority and power did not bring unequivocal victory in the Korean War. What will determine challenges in the security sphere will be the "balance of fervor." The perception that vital interests or national survival are involved will lead to a willingness to sacrifice whatever is necessary. In short, will still counts.

China's regional objectives are congruent with U.S. goals for the Asia-Pacific region-avoiding conflict and building and maintaining amicable relations with the nations of Southeast Asia. Chinese military objectives are equally modest. China seeks to preserve its territorial integrity.

The potential for conflict with the United States and its allies in the region arises from China's determination to undo the territorial "dismemberment" it endured earlier in the century. This desire is at the core of Chinese nationalism; to achieve it, China will use force if it is deemed necessary. Beijing is convinced that Taiwan is on a course toward independence and this has given new impetus to Chinese military modernization. China is working to build the capacity not only to take Taiwan by force but also to sink American aircraft carrier battle groups. Eventually, China will reach both goals.

As Chinese power grows, the United States faces some stark choices. The United States can either prepare for war with China over Taiwan or it can promote political accommodation. If the United States can restore prospects for a modus vivendi, China's neighbors will still have to deal with the shift in the regional balance of power. The South China Sea will continue to pose policy challenges to the United States and especially to the member states of ASEAN. China has argued for a deferment of the discussion on the South China Sea in hope that ASEAN would recognize this as evidence of Chinese reasonableness. In fact, however, Southeast Asian nations regard the Chinese position as an attempt to wait until the regional balance of power has shifted more in China's favor before resolving any disagreements. As long as the South China Sea remains at issue, China's hope for peace and stability in the region will remain just that. In addition, as long as the South China Sea debate is unresolved, the very anti-China coalition Beijing so fears will be a real possibility.

The consequences of China's economic rise may pose a more difficult and even dangerous challenge to U.S. interests than the security considerations of Chinese growth. To minimize the potential for harmful interaction, the United States should consider a new approach, a move away from single-issue agendas. Instead, in the economic sphere the United States should strike a deal with China on the World Trade Organization and end the sanction/countersanction cycle.

In the security realm, the United States should become more involved in the China-Taiwan relationship, maneuvering both sides toward a refashioned modus vivendi. China and the United States should cooperate more on the Korean peninsula as well as in South Asia. The United States should also stimulate ASEAN and China to discuss more fully the South China Sea disputes. In order to bind China to current and future international norms, the United States needs to bring China into the Missile Technology Control Regime and other international regimes.

Finally, the United States should help China remove the blockages to modernization and to building a decent society and assist China in solving the problems caused by its rapid economic growth.