That the relationship is unlikely to meet Russia's hopes and expectations can be illustrated by addressing three issues: the Russian motivation for joining China in this new relationship, the issues that bring the two nations together, and a brief discussion of the factors that will ultimately limit the scope of the relationship, as the world is unlikely to face a Sino-Russian strategic alliance in the future.

Russian interest in the relationship does not grow out of Russian opposition to NATO or anti-Western feelings. Its origins lie elsewhere, in the historically tense and militarily precarious relations between the PRC and the USSR and in Russia's weak position in Asia. Both these factors compel Russia into a relationship with China, especially as Japan has only recently re-emerged as a potential alternative partner.

The legacy of Sino-Soviet problems, the disputed border, and the high cost of maintaining 50 divisions on that border propelled Russia to seek to normalize relations. Although the normalization process really gained momentum during the Gorbachev era and ultimately came to fruition under Yeltsin, the process is rooted farther back.

Russian weakness in Asia is unprecedented in this century, and in recent years, the Russian position in Asia has eroded still further. As a result, a central goal of Russian foreign policy for the coming decade is to find partners in the region who can help Russia recover its strength. Whether China can be such a partner is an open question. Both China's geographical proximity and the legacy of tension in Sino-Russian relations recommend China as a candidate for a relationship that extends beyond simple normalization. To date, however, even though the relationship has been called a "strategic partnership aimed at the 21^st century," there are few people in either Moscow or Beijing who can define that phrase.

While Moscow seems to maintain a "grand" vision of the relationship in which China and Russia will be partners in building a multipolar world and in responding to NATO expansion, the Chinese view is much more pragmatic. Beijing is focused on making concrete progress on resolving in its favor a particular set of problems such as border tensions and military sales. Moscow, on the other hand, does not have a similar set of pragmatic benefits that it has obtained from the Chinese- even the economic agreements and political promises signed in April of 1996 remain largely unfulfilled.

Issues that bind Russia and China flow not so much from a vision of what their relationship could be in the future but rather from a set of agenda items that was already discernible in the late Soviet period. Although the agreements signed recently do not shape the military environment (which was shaped to a large extent by the total collapse of Russian military power), the progress in arms reduction and demilitarization along the border capped a series of processes ongoing since the Soviet era.

There is a limit to these binding issues, however. The full demilitarization of the border called for in the 1997 demilitarization agreement will founder on Russian military weakness: most of Russia's military infrastructure-air bases, air defense sites, military bases-are within the original 100- kilometer zone slated to be demilitarized, and there is simply no

funding available in the Russian military to move these facilities from that zone.

Border demarcation as an issue also has its roots in the late Soviet period. Although some work remains to be done on the Central Asian borders, there has been a great deal of progress. While important, agreements on demilitarization and border demarcation do not represent a forward-looking strategy. Instead of representing the basis for a long-term, comprehensive, and close relationship, these agreements reflect the pragmatic resolution of outstanding problems.

Turning to economic and trade issues, little progress has been made on reaching the $20-billion target set by Russian and Chinese leaders. In fact, cross-border trade in consumer goods in the Russian far east has declined while sales of military goods have increased. There seems to be little hope of the two sides reaching their target trade figure, and as a result, trade is more likely to reflect a Chinese "wish list" of military products. It is improbable that trade ties will cement a long-term Sino-Russian relationship.

In Moscow, the litmus test of the long-run viability of this relationship is whether the economic agreements signed in April 1996 yield any concrete results. Tangible results on nuclear energy, on the Three Gorges Dam project, and in areas other than arms sales will give the economic elite in Moscow a stake in the Sino-Russian relationship. Currently, the economic elite cares more about developments in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan. Indeed, this group, led by Chubayis and Nemstov, is responsible for the recent Russo-Japanese initiatives. The fact that the April 1996 agreements have not yielded much in the way of signed contracts has had a corrosive effect on the attitude of the economic elite toward relations with China.

One area that warrants attention but that will be difficult to implement is a perceived shared view on many global issues. There is little evidence, however, that this "community of views" will generate sustained bilateral cooperation on any specific issues.

Arms sales also bind the two sides. It is unclear whether the Russians are simply not thinking about what they are selling or whether regional and local initiatives have simply overwhelmed a confused Moscow. The evidence is that both the center and the various defense sectors have realized that there is no alternative to selling as much as possible to any buyer. The Russians seem to have concluded any strategic debate on the issue by arguing that there is little danger in this course of action and, in any case, they have a 15-year lead on the Chinese. This ideology of sales has been built into Russian military reform-Russian planners will not buy any "big ticket" items until 2005, and R&D will be sustained until then by small state subsidies but mostly by sales abroad. Thus, arms sales is a tie that binds Russian and Chinese interests, but it could ultimately become a two-edged sword, endangering Russian interests.

In the long-run, energy may be another such tie. Pipelines have figured centrally in RussianB-hinese dialogue, but thus far the necessary infrastructure is not in place. Moreover, it seems that Japanese or American technology and capital would be necessary to realize the full potential of any of these projects.

Of the issues that will limit the Sino-Russian rapprochement, the change in power distribution figures most prominently. From the Russian perspective, Russian power will continue in a flat trajectory or will increase only slightly while Chinese power is projected to grow substantially. This suggests that Russia will be forced to be the junior partner in the relationship, a role Russia will be reluctant to accept and that will ultimately cause considerable friction. The two nations will have great difficulty in agreeing on specific responsibilities for any partnership.

The Russian far east is another potential source of friction with China. This is Russia's weakest face, dominated by a "border guard" mentality uninterested in the influx of Chinese capital or people. In addition, the debilitating struggle between the region and the center over the control of resources continues and does not create a hospitable environment for foreign involvement of any sort. Chinese migration to the area is substantial, and although it is unwise to extrapolate future totals from current trends, there is a profound sense of unease among ethnic Russians in the area.

Central Asia is another tie that binds Russian and China but could ultimately unravel. The current bilateral agreement on the area recognizes that ethnic separatism and instability are dangerous and that there is a de facto military division of labor between the two countries. The Chinese will tend to their side of the border and the Russians will look after the former Soviet Union. What is problematic about this deal, however, is that the Russians already have numerous commitments in that part of the world they are unable to meet. It also remains unclear whether the fledgling Central Asian regimes themselves are stable yet. As in the Russian far east, relations are not likely to break down as a result of hostile intent on either side, but instead, because of the underlying balance of forces-economic, political and military-the Chinese could view the Russians as having failed to uphold their end of the agreements. Any real problem in Kazakhstan or Kirghizstan that the Russians were unable to solve would be solved by the Chinese.

The implications are not for a hostile Sino-Russian relationship or for a united anti-U.S. front but for a relationship that is extremely hard to manage. The two partners will be so absorbed in coping with the vagaries of their relationship that they will have little time to turn their attention outward, to NATO and elsewhere.

In conclusion, the revitalized Sino-Russian relationship should give the United States little cause for worry. Russia is likely to remain a truncated power in Asia for some time, and there is a growing realization in Russia that it needs Asian partners other than China. The Sino-Russian arms relationship will remain an important factor, however, and their ties will likely be important in the future in South Asia and the Middle East.

Thomas Robinson: Sino-Russian relations do not occupy a central position in American policy with regard to China, especially as compared with issues such as Taiwan, military matters, trade, and human rights. Indeed, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, America seems to have forgotten Russia, and Sino-Russian relations are of comparatively little interest both to policy makers and the attentive public in the United States.

This is unfortunate, because Sino-Russian relations are important for three reasons:

• This relationship is a text book case of the basis for and the operation of Chinese foreign policy.

• The implications of good Sino-Russian relations for Chinese foreign policy in Asia are important as they are for Chinese foreign policy toward America and for the longer term structure of global international relations.

• The current situation is unique in recent history. It is the first time in 150 years that Russia has been weak and China strong.

This discussion will place Sino-Russian relations in the context of the determinants of Chinese foreign policy in general and as they relate to Chinese national interests in particular. It will also address Chinese post-Cold War purposes, goals, and policies with regard to Russia and offer a brief overview of the relationship since 1989, with an emphasis on high-level visits and agreements. Finally, it will examine China's position in Asia, China's relations with and policies toward the United States, and future alternative structures of the Asian and international systems.

The major aims of Chinese foreign policy include making the world safe for Chinese economic development, to secure China from military threats, to ensure the respect and admiration by other nations (restoring China's glory), and to recover China's lost territories. China's foreign policy flows directly from these four factors. Economic development is the primary policy goal, and to safeguard that development, China must ensure that it is at peace, particularly with the capitalist world. This is key to maintaining the flow into China of the resources vital to Chinese growth.

In security terms, China's basic policy is to avoid war, especially in the three well-known Asian hot-spots (the South China Sea, the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan), to settle disputes with its neighbors, to modernize its military, and to use others (read the United States) to meet potential security threats.

In the political sense, Chinese policy is to enhance or restore relations with its neighbors, to emphasize the Third World, to hold off or minimize American influence, and to isolate Taiwan and prevent its independence.

China's post-Cold War policies toward Russia follow from these general aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Seven policies stand out as most important:

• Ensure that Russia does not pose a military threat to China. This goal has been achieved by settling the border question and through arms control agreements and various confidence-building measures (CBMs).

• As part of a policy of maintaining friendly relations with its neighbors in Asia, participate in a series of high-level "friendship" visits to and from Moscow.

• Acquire economic dividends such as resources, markets, and capital from Russia through a bilateral trade relationship.

• Obtain Russian military assistance.

• Secure the north, central, and south-central Eurasian hinterland in order to concentrate Chinese attention and resources on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond.

• Prevent Russian cooperation or entente with China's potential enemies-the United States and Japan-and use Russia as a makeweight against those countries.

• Secure Russian assent to other Chinese foreign policy goals like Taiwan and Tibet.

China's has had both successes and failures in these policies. The border is a settled matter, the military supply relationship has been a success, and China and Russia maintain close, personal working ties between decisionmakers in the two countries. Indeed, since 1986, the evolution of Sino-Russian relations has gone through three phases: From détente, 1986-89, to rapprochement, 1989-91, and finally to the construction of entente, 1992B97. Chinese successes are reflected in the large number of agreements, communiqués, and high-level visits in recent years, all of which have been substantive. Another reflection of Chinese foreign policy success is that China can face outward toward Asia and the rest of the world and is not compelled to face inward, toward Siberia. This gives China a degree of confidence in its foreign policy that it might not otherwise have. China has also managed to obtain Russian support for certain Chinese policies. China does not need to be concerned with Russian attitudes toward Taiwan or other areas of Chinese interest. Finally, China has succeeded in constricting America's freedom of maneuver in certain regards. A good example is the U.N. Security Council, where the Russians and the Chinese cooperate daily, often in opposition to the United States

The pitfalls and failures of Chinese policies toward Russia include the trade issue. Since 1978, Sino-Russian trade has decreased, relative to Chinese trade with other nations. China focuses its foreign trade relations on the Western industrial powers and the rest of Asia, not on Russia. The discussions on Sino-Russian oil pipeline deals may signal a significant upturn in bilateral trade, but even that change will be modest-its goal is only $20 billion per year over 5 years. The Sino-Russian entente also unduly upsets and drives away the United States, despite Chinese and Russian proclamations that their relationship is not directed at the United States. If U.S.-China relations continue to suffer, China may be forced into the unpleasant situation of choosing between the United States and Russia.

If Russia democratizes and recovers its economic strength and independence, Russia may chart a course away from China. China could then be left alone in Asia. Another danger to Chinese foreign policy is accelerated Russian collapse and increased resistance to the Chinese presence in the Russian far east. If China grows too fast and grows too powerful for Russian tastes, Russia may become alarmed and may shrink from overly close ties with Beijing. In this scenario, Russia might move to improve its relations with the West and Japan, at China's expense.

The future will be dictated by a welter of domestic and foreign factors and will be a function of the order in which events occur and how problems are resolved-that is, will the Korean question be resolved peacefully or will it be resolved militarily? Despite the importance of other issues, domestic factors will predominate in China. China still has a limited understanding of the fast pace and scope of global change and interactions today. China has a long way to go.

In the short term, the Russian factor will be embedded in Chinese foreign policy, but Sino-Russian relations are not overly important. In the medium term, the importance of the Sino-Russian relationship assumes greater significance. The medium term will be a period of maximum fluidity in Asia as a new international system takes shape in Asia. Russia will be the swing state in determining whether that system will be a concert of powers, a "condominium of powers," or truly multipolar in shape. Russia is therefore important to both China and the United States. In the long run, the situation is likely to be radically different from the present, when domestic changes in Russian and China have given rise to a new Asian and global configuration of power.

Although the implications of Sino-Russian ties for the United States are currently little more than a nuisance, this will change in the future. The Russian-Chinese connection will be critical in determining the future shape of the global system; therefore, the United States needs to establish a better policy on this issue. Russia's place in American foreign policy priorities needs to elevated, and the United States must create a closer, more cooperative working relationship with Russia.

In Central Eurasia, or the "five 'Stans," China faces some unique difficulties. First, the Chinese have even less experience in this region than they do in dealing with the United States, Russia, and Japan. Second, the region is still highly fluid and the issue of Islamic fundamentalism impinges directly on China in Xinjiang province. Third, oil and other issues of economic development in the region are of increasing importance to China. Finally, the Russian "near-abroad" policy may lead to friction as the Russians suspiciously eye growing Chinese involvement in the area. Indeed, this is the single area-not trade, arms, or border issues-where China and Russia may return to a zero-sum game type of relationship.