This story, which has made the rounds in Beijing, has become a focus of debate on the role of U.S. forces in Asia and their impact on Chinese security. What is interesting is that there is no consensus internally on the issue. Some Chinese commentators would be willing to pay at least 75 cents for the U.S. presence in Korea, for example. Others would pay up to $1 to keep open the sealanes in the South China Sea, citing China's increased reliance on Persian Gulf oil. Still others would pay 50 cents or less for the U.S. role in Japan because, they argue, the U.S. presence has done little to restrain the development of Japan's military capability and in fact has boosted it. The United States has encouraged Japan to be more assertive on the East Asian international political scene.

This story illustrates two important points-that the Chinese are very ambivalent about the U..S.BJapan alliance, and that there is no consensus in Beijing on the issue of U.S. alliances in Asia or on the U.S. forward presence in Asia.

Chinese ambivalence and lack of consensus on these issues do not represent a new phenomenon. Chinese posture toward U.S. alliances has historically been modified in reaction to changes in the security environment. In the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC staunchly opposed American alliances but later joined the United States and the Japanese in an informal anti-Soviet coalition. During the Cold War, the Chinese ceased publicly calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia and even urged the Japanese to increase defense spending; it also worried about a possible rift in the U.S.BJapan alliance that could weaken the anti-Soviet front. As recently as 1992, Chinese experts worried that WashingtonBTokyo economic frictions could spill over into the security realm and undermine the alliance and that this would, in turn, trigger a Japanese military buildup, which might include the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new security environment for China resulted in a re-evaluation by Beijing of U.S. alliances and force presence, and this re-evaluation is still under way. With the end of the Soviet threat and rising suspicions about Chinese intentions in the United States as well as in Japan and elsewhere, the PRC has come to suspect that U.S. alliances are increasingly oriented against China. Some Chinese observers see this new orientation in terms of counterbalancing China, others see it as an attempt to check China, and still others believe the United States is trying to contain China. Many Chinese seem convinced that the United States will do whatever it can to thwart China's emergence as a Great Power in the 21^st century.

What are some of the specific sources of Chinese apprehension about U.S. alliances and force presence today? First and foremost is Taiwan. The 1997 revision of the U.S.BJapan Defense Guidelines has raised the specter that the U.S.BJapan alliance covers Taiwan. Despite reassurances from both Japanese and American officials, the Chinese are convinced that the United States and Japan are being intentionally ambiguous and indeed have turned the tables on the United States, arguing that the United States is not being sufficiently "transparent" about its intentions.

In peacetime, the Chinese worry that the strengthening of the alliance in the new Defense Guidelines will give Taipei confidence to work to change the status quo and to seek international recognition for Taiwan's accomplishments as a democratic and even as a sovereign state. Even more worrisome for the PRC is the possibility that Taiwan will resist joining serious talks with the Mainland over ending the state of hostility across the Strait. In the event that the Chinese resort to force to unify Taiwan and the Mainland, the Chinese fear that the guidelines increase the likelihood that the United States and Japan will come to the aid of Taiwan. The Chinese learned from the U.S. response to China's missile firings in 1996 that they cannot rule out the possibility that the United States will intervene and prevent the Chinese from reclaiming what the Chinese see as rightfully theirs.

The second major concern for Beijing is Japan. The Chinese are obviously uneasy about Japan's political direction and its growing military power. They perceive that Japan is on course to revise the Peace Constitution and to assume the role of an equal partner with the United States in preserving regional stability in Asia. From China's perspective, any expansion in Japan's regional or global role runs counter to Chinese interests. The new Defense Guidelines are viewed as opening the door to such an expansion for Japan. A commonly stated fear in Beijing is that U.S. forces will withdraw from the region either because of Japanese pressure or because the American domestic political process will cease to support a U.S. force presence in Japan, leaving China to face a militarily powerful and nuclear-armed Japan.

The third concern is a broader one and not confined to Northeast Asia: prevailing regional security arrangements. China is increasingly dissatisfied with the existing regional security structure, which is founded on a system of U.S. alliances and military relationships with states in the region. In the post-Cold War era, these arrangements are no longer seen as unquestionably beneficial to Chinese interests. Regional reliance on the United States and its allies to maintain security serves U.S. interests, say the Chinese, but it does not necessarily suit the broader interests of the states in the region. It is suited to the perpetuation of the status quo, in which the United States is the dominant power. It is obviously not suited, from China's perspective, to the trend of multipolarity. Moreover, no role is accorded to China in the security architecture.

One might ask how China would define its ideal security environment. China might prefer a region or even a world in which it is the dominant power and where the United States plays a lesser role, sans alliances and forward military presence, and where Japan is docile and certainly nonnuclear. In a sense, it is pointless to even discuss this scenario because as both the United States and the Chinese know, it would be impossible to achieve this ideal security environment at any time in the foreseeable future.

It seems fairly clear that creating such a security environment is not an operational strategic objective for China. A PRC strategy that aimed to end U.S. alliances and to eject the United States from the region would be very risky for Beijing, and the Chinese know this. With the exception of North Korea, every other state in Asia supports the U.S. military presence; if the PRC's neighbors perceived Beijing as making a bid for regional hegemony, its neighbors would likely side with the United States. Such a turn of events would pose a major setback to Chinese efforts to build trust with the states on China's periphery. More importantly, it would lead to a confrontation with the United States which would certainly jeopardize China's broader economic modernization goals. Certainly, such a Chinese strategy would push the United States and Japan closer together and would provide a major impetus to the creation of the very military containment strategy China fears. That in turn would compel the Chinese to drastically re-order their domestic priorities, devoting greater resources to defense modernization, which would threaten the economic foundation of Communist Party power.

If China is too weak to successfully pursue a strategy aimed at dismantling U.S. alliances, and if it is too risky to do so, what is China "up to?" The Chinese are in search of a means to obtain the more modest and more attainable goal of counterbalancing U.S. alliances while not undermining China's efforts to improve relations with both the United States and Japan. In the past year, the Chinese have focused on putting the issue of the future regional security architecture on the regional agenda. China's new security concept for the region terms alliances "relics of the Cold War" that are inappropriate to the Asia-Pacific region; it promotes equal security for all states, claiming that U.S. alliances benefit the security of some states at the expense of others; and it calls for greater multilateral security cooperation, although the definition of this concept remains unclear.

The Chinese are seeking to persuade regional states that an expanded U.S.BJapan alliance that broadens Japan's security role holds dangers for regional stability and that multilateral approaches can play an increasing role in maintaining stability, gradually usurping the U.S. alliance system. It should be emphasized that the latter is a long-term objective. Beijing is promoting its cause through bilateral discussions with scholars and officials in the region, through media propaganda, and most recently through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and other multilateral security fora.

There are some measures China could take but not at this juncture. Although Beijing is calling on the ASEAN member states to be concerned about Japan's future, the Chinese are not pressing them to oppose the alliance and the forward U.S. presence. They are also not pressuring ASEAN states to deny the U.S. access to military facilities in the region. Despite having had the opportunity to limit U.S. ship visits to Hong Kong, Beijing is not doing so. Finally, China is not seeking to hamper U.S. transit through the region. If the Chinese did aim at ejecting the United States from the region in the near term, they would be taking these measures and more. That they are not is indicative of their intentions.

Discussions with people in the foreign ministry, the PLA, and institute actors who have been involved in crafting this new security concept provide some insight into Chinese thinking and policy toward regional security. China's new posture toward U.S. alliances is both reactive and proactive. It is primarily reactive, especially in regard to changes in the environment that are perceived as detrimental to Chinese security interests. Most important in this regard is the conviction that Japan and United States are expanding the coverage of the alliance from defense of Japan to undefined areas surrounding Japan, including the Taiwan Strait.

China's new posture is proactive in the sense that after the end of the Cold War and with the prospect of growing Chinese regional and global clout, Chinese experts have, for the first time, the luxury of considering alternatives for future regional security architectures. Their analyses of trends and the balance of forces, both regionally and globally, have lead to the conclusion that constraining the influence of the United States and reducing the role of U.S. alliances while promoting greater multilateral security cooperation is possible as well as desirable.

At present, China's goal is no more concrete than that. Beijing is seeking to alter the balance between bilateral alliances and multilateral security, weakening the former and promoting the latter. There has been no judgment that an end to the U.S.BJapan alliance and a withdrawal of U.S. forces are feasible at present or would be beneficial to Chinese security interests today.

Most Chinese expect that bilateralism and multilateralism will coexist for decades to come. It is no doubt a long-term hope of some experts that ultimately U.S. alliances will be dissolved and U.S. forces will return to American shores. There are, however, other visions of future regional security architecture in China. Some see a U.S.-Japan-China condominium, while others foresee a NATO-like structure with a major role for the United States. There is no single concept extant in China of an ideal regional security concept that is achievable in the near term. The security architecture of the 21^st century is just beginning to be discussed and is unlikely to be resolved in the near term unless forced by outside events.

China's current posture toward U.S. alliances and forward force presence can perhaps be best summed up by a comment from a PLA officer: U.S. forces have been in the region for over 50 years; it is a fact of life and will take a long time to change.

Another point worth noting is that enthusiastic support for multilateralism in the security sphere comes from a very small group of internationalists who see China's security as bound up with that of other states. Most of the elite, including the most senior leadership, tend to favor bilateral arrangements and to resist multilateral cooperation, especially in military and security matters. There are still latent worries that any multilateral security forum could be used to pressure China to compromise on its claims in the South China Sea or to renounce the use of force on Taiwan. Nevertheless, strengthening ARF and advancing a regionwide security mechanism has struck a favorable chord with many in China, at all levels.

Beijing's policy toward U.S. alliances, forward force presence, and multilateral security cooperation will be influenced by other factors in the future. Briefly, developments in Sino-American relations will be critical in determining China's future posture toward U.S. alliances, trends in cross-Strait relations and Taiwan domestic politics, and developments in Japanese domestic politics and foreign and defense policy.

At present, there is little cause for concern about China's new security concept; there simply is no sympathetic audience in Asia for policies directed at weakening U.S. alliances. In pressing their new security concept, the Chinese are becoming participants in regional security discussions and are being forced to play by the rules. China is being held more accountable for its actions than it otherwise would be if it remained estranged from cooperative international relations in the region. The United States needs to think carefully about how to integrate China more fully into regional security arrangements. If China is going to take on a long-term share in responsibility for maintaining regional peace and stability, it must have a greater stake.

Some policy recommendations:

• The United States should encourage the ASEAN states to openly state their support for U.S. alliances, opposing China's claim that U.S. alliances are a Cold War relic.

• It must be explained to the highest levels of the Chinese leadership that the growing perception in the United States that China opposes U.S. alliances and force presence (whether it actually does or not) could be extremely damaging to Chinese interests. Support for the "China threat theory" and for a containment strategy will increase if Beijing does not act to remedy this perception.

• The United States should play a more active role in shaping the ARF agenda on CBMs, on transparency, and on preventative diplomacy and conflict resolution to promote more cooperative and restrained PRC behavior. Finally, the United States should continue to press for U.S.-China-Japan security discussions at the current Track 2 levels while also urging the Chinese to move them to Track 1 fora.

Ronald Montaperto: Let's discuss China's goals and objectives for Korea and China's goals and objectives for Japan.

Three major issues exist regarding Korea: China's objectives for the "Four Party Talks," the relationship between U.S. and Chinese objectives for the Korean peninsula over the longer term, and the factors promoting cooperation and preventing cooperation on the peninsula.

It is important to note that not only does China have a policy for the peninsula, but indeed, its Korean policy is fairly well developed, because Korea is a vital national interest for China. China believes that the Republic of Korea has "won" and China is now trying to implement policies that will protect its vital interests and enable it to develop its equities. Further, the intensity with which China focuses on the peninsula will ultimately impart a higher degree of competitiveness to U.S.BChina relations.

Chinese objectives for the "Four Party Talks" point to full, responsible, and helpful participation by Beijing. China's major purpose is to establish a long-term, possibly drawn out, process of slow, gradual change on the peninsula that will provide China increased opportunities to shape not only the process itself but also its outcome. This involves maintaining stability as change occurs and the reduction of what the Chinese call "negative consequences."

In particular, as the "Four Party Talks" continue, China wishes to avoid stressing in any way the North Korean political system. This objective is manifest in Chinese admonitions to the U.S. side to "really talk to the North Koreans" and to "avoid the Cold War way of thinking." What the Chinese are really saying is that the North Korean regime is in an extremely tenuous position and if the United States demands major concessions and places heavy responsibilities on the North Koreans, they will be unable to respond. The Chinese also feel a need to underpin and reinforce the North Korean position. If it were feasible, Beijing would strengthen the North Korean political institutions, but because that is largely impossible, China instead pushes the United States to engage North Korea directly, but only within certain limits and parameters.

A primary Chinese objective is to enhance its own position as this process develops, and this has become clear over the past 5 to 6 years. China's relations with the Republic of Korea are deeper, broader, and more intense than is generally understood. Beijing does have a strategic relationship with the ROK, and the two countries have initiated a range of interactions on the "negative consequences" such as refugee flows. In other words, China's strategy is to nurture and develop an ongoing process and to do so in ways that maximize China's ability to alter and to shape that process and its outcome.

The Chinese insist that the United States and China have overlapping objectives on the peninsula and, in the short term, this is largely so. Both sides want a process of stable change, neither side wants nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and to that end, both sides have agreed not so much to cooperate in the traditional sense but rather to each pursue their interests and to let the "natural overlap," as it were, take its course.

Over all, China's vital interests require the removal of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula and a major reduction in U.S. influence there. In the longer term, the Chinese would see it as in their interest to attenuate, if not actually destroy, the U.S.BROK security relationship.

Looking to the future, the Chinese will be unable to completely eliminate U.S. presence and influence on the Korean peninsula, and thus more intense Sino-U.S. competition will emerge. Chinese influence will combine with other factors to bring about a major reduction in the U.S. force presence in Korea; at the same time, the Chinese will continue to create economic, diplomatic, and even security counters to the remaining U.S. presence. Factors for U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean peninsula are few in the long run, except at the most aggregated level. The model for development is more likely to be a competitive one, although not necessarily a conflicting or adversarial one.

Turning to Japan, it is clear that China will never be satisfied with a regional security architecture in which China plays a role subordinate to Japan's. China simply would never feel secure if its influence in the security architecture were inferior to Japan, particularly a Japan allied to a third party.

China believes that time is on its side. That is, given current developmental trends and barring major reverses, in the long run China's comprehensive national strength will exceed that of Japan. The Chinese believe that all they need is to plant the seeds for the future and wait. The Japanese seem to share the Chinese view; as a result, there has been a hardening of Japan's attitudes and perceptions of China's long-range strategic intentions. Furthermore, the reason that the revised Defense Guidelines were adopted so smoothly is that there is a broadening base of support for developing a new way of dealing with China in Japanese politics.

What this points to is a major fault line in East Asia, and in Asia more broadly. It may well be beyond the abilities of the U.S.BJapan alliance to deal with this fault line.

China's long-term objective for Japan is very straightforward-to constrain Japanese power, to contain Japan. China seeks to neutralize Japanese military power and to counter Japanese political influence in the region. In short, China would prefer a Japan that resembled the Japan of the 1970s and 1980s. Unfortunately for China, however, that is unlikely to happen. China has little leverage over Japan, excepting a few economic levers and the "history card," which is less and less effective today. The Chinese are casting about for levers they can use to influence Japanese behavior and are likely to continue to do so until they are successful.