The Big Three:
Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them
5. Conclusion
Three overarching risks have been identified that should receive priority in shaping our thinking about national security over the next 30 years:
A major competitor may deprive us of the unusual security we now enjoy and can provide to others. The extraordinary pace of technological change and its ready availability through civilian channels enhances the possibility of rapid development of a highly capable competitor.
Attacks may be launched against us by less than major competitors, including nonstate actors, in an effort to demoralize or disrupt our ability to use our power. The proliferation of NEW weapons expands the availability of means for inflicting trauma on society and renders America’s civilian infrastructure and population particularly vulnerable to attack.
If we achieve our goals of avoiding a major competitor and of avoiding traumatic attacks, the loss of obvious and potent threats will increase the risk that we will not properly sustain our security establishment. This risk is unnecessarily intensified if our officer corps is distanced from society at large by recruitment that is not representative or by separation from civilian society in housing, education and other circumstances. It is further intensified to the degree that DOD is perceived as bloated and inefficient in its operations.
To diminish these risks we need new modes of thought. The task of avoiding the rise of a major competitor is not one of deterrence (causing a capable opponent not to attack), but rather one of "dissuasion" (inducing potential opponents not to arm). It calls for a program of investments weighted differently from a program built around deterrence—for example, it gives greater priority to long-term modernization as compared with near-term force size. It also gives greater weight to diplomatic and economic tools and uses them to integrate, rather than isolate, potential competitors.
Because NEW weapons can be used by second- and third-tier states, dissuasive strategies need to be applied to them and not merely to countries that may become major competitors. Further, because these weapons can be employed by terrorist groups and individuals, new strategies of deterrence will have to be developed beyond those (like nuclear response) that are applicable to states. "Disruption" of these groups will also be an important part of our repertoire of responses: we will rely more heavily on arrests, preemptive strikes, sanctions and efforts to limit the free movement and economic support of our opponents. Disruption is not likely, however, to be as consistently effective against numerous nonstate actors as deterrence was against the Soviet Union. As a result, we will need to place greater emphasis on consequence management. This is especially appropriate because attacks of this type are aimed at affecting perceptions. If the consequences of an attack can be controlled, so can perceptions of its significance.
Civilians are especially vulnerable to NEW weapons. They are likely to become targets when an attack is made to inflict psychological trauma rather than to control territory. Accordingly, greater priority should be given to protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. Sensitivity to NEW methods of attack will also erode the long-standing but now anachronistic distinction between law enforcement at home and warfare abroad. No such distinction is viable in cyberspace or in dealing with weapons such as biological agents that can be delivered with low visibility by individuals inside the United States.
The risk of loss of popular support should intensify efforts to make DOD more efficient. To achieve this, it must move away from a system of command/control/quota management and toward more market-oriented systems that establish correct incentives and guide managers by appropriate pricing. Furthermore, the department needs to recruit officers in a manner that makes them more representative of the public at large.
An array of changes is urged to give these three risks appropriate priority. These propositions are, of course, subject to dispute. Are the identified risks real and properly described? Should they receive the priority urged in this essay? If not, what other risks should predominate in our thinking? Are the programmatic consequences sketched here correct? Would other, less risk-focused methods of provoking discussions of priorities, or other time frames,12 yield more powerful insights or consensus about programs? Whatever differences may be illuminated by pursuing these questions, this essay will have succeeded if it encourages efforts that are both sweeping and particular. The two modes of thought are, and should be, connected. To return to a proposition advanced in the Introduction to this essay we must both "fathom the unfathomable" and then, based on our very imperfect exploration, "pay cash."
The test of this very probably controversial discussion will not be whether others endorse the program presented here, but whether they generate their own programs, strongly rooted in a clear statement about dominant concerns, and quite particularized in the translation of these long-term concerns into near-term priorities. By focusing on what should most concern us for the long term, we can overcome the tyranny of the everyday. Our goal must be to build a national security establishment that is strong in an enduring, and not merely a transitory, way.
Each generation of policy makers sees itself as living in "the best of times and the worst of times." For our predecessors the worst times were when the Soviet Union posed a critical national security risk to the United States and its allies. The best included the achievements of Marshall, Truman, and five decades of other leaders here and abroad in constructing powerfully appropriate strategies to respond to the challenge.
What is special for us is that for the first time since just after World War II, we have the opportunity and the requirement to lay a fundamentally new foundation for the Nation’s security. To do this we must develop a consensus about the range of challenges we anticipate. Then, like our predecessors, we must develop and debate our tactics in light of these challenges.
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