1. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining A New Basis for U.S. Military Forces" (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 20.
2. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, untitled news briefing (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1 September 1993), 1.
3. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994), 254-255.
4. On September 1991, Aspin tasked two of his key analysts, Dr. Clark Murdock and Joel Resnick, to develop a methodology for identifying capabilities needed for a post-Cold War security environment. The Aspin white papers were largely the work of these two men, including force Options A-C. Dr. Murdock, author's interview, Washington, DC: 15 March 1996.
5. Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era" (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992), 4.
6. Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options" (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), 2-3. The paper also introduced a building block approach to determining forces required for typical missions. In Aspin's lexicon, a "Desert Storm equivalent" described the capability required to fight a major regional contingency (MRC), a "Panama equivalent" as the force needed to conduct an operation similar to Just Cause and a "Provide Comfort equivalent" as a yardstick for humanitarian assistance missions. A Desert Storm equivalent included "six heavy divisions, an air-transportable early-arriving light division, one Marine division on land and an excess of one brigade at sea, 24 Air Force fighter squadrons, 70 heavy bombers" and four carrier battlegroups. This did not equal the forces that actually deployed to Desert Storm. Aspin excluded a number of Air Force and Marine Corps fighter units that lacked precision attack capability and two carrier battlegroups the theater commander-in-chief had not requested. Ibid., 15.
8. Dr Murdock confirmed this was the underlying strategy for Aspin's force options.
9. Congress, House, National Defense Funding and the Fiscal Year 1993 Budget: Hearing before the House Budget Committee, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., no. 102-41, 25 February 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 11-12. Option A would save $231 billion, Option B $187 billion, and Option D $38 billion. Aspin used the FY92 Bush budget request for FY93-97 as his baseline for calculating savings.
10. Chairman Les Aspin, Reuters transcript of an American Interests interview (Washington, DC: 28 March 1992), 12.
12. Chairman Les Aspin, "New Era Requires Re-Thinking U.S. Military Forces," news release (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 1.
14. Chairman Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," briefing to the Atlantic Council of the United States (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 6.
15. Aspin, "Four Illustrative Options," 20; Chart IV.
16. Aspin was not the only member of Congress who believed deeper cuts were feasible. During the budget debate, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser called for doubling the Bush budget cuts while Senator Edward M. Kennedy indicated $210 billion in defense spending could be saved over the next seven years. Senators Bentsen, Bradley, Roth, Gramm, and McCain also proposed deeper cuts that could pay for domestic initiatives. In fact, a May 1992 Congressional Research Service report indicated a total of sixteen members of Congress had proposed alternative defense spending proposals, including Les Aspin.
18. Reuters transcript report of the Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense, 7 January 1993, 68-69.
19. "Wisner Memo to Aspin on Bottom-Up Review," Inside the Air Force (Washington, DC: 12 March 1993): 16.
22. Frank G. Wisner and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21 April 1993), 3.
24. Ibid., 5. In other words, it was time for a larger peace dividend.
27. A number of service representatives assigned to work BUR issues criticized the analysis underlying the assessment, including the assumption that coalition forces would be present to help U.S. forces during both MRCs.
28. Joint Staff J-8 Division, "Force for 2000," an unpublished briefing presented to Secretary Aspin (Washington, DC: 8 May 1993). AAC" means active component; ARC" means reserve component; ACVBG" is the abbreviation for carrier battle group, and "MEB" is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
29. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Remarks at the National Defense University Graduation," news release no. 291-93 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 16 June 1993), 2.
32. Barton Gellman and John Lancaster, "U.S. May Drop 2-War Capability," The Washington Post, 17 June 1993, A166. The "win-hold-win" option had actually leaked to the press before Aspin's NDU speech.
34. John Lancaster, "Aspin Opts for Winning Two Wars-Not 1 1/2-at Once," The Washington Post, 25 June 1993, A16.
35. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 19.
39. Ibid., 107. Candidate Clinton originally pledged to cut defense spending by about $60 billion over the Bush plan for FY 1993-97. This was later changed to $88 billion, and, finally, $104 billion after the election. Eric Schmitt, "Plan for 'New' Military Doesn't Meet Savings Goal," The New York Times, 15 September 1993, A21.
40. Lt Col Scott Dorff, U.S. Air Force, interview, Washington, DC, 15 March 1996. Lt Col Dorff was a member of Secretary Ochmanek's staff during the BUR.
41. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "FY 1995 Defense Budget," news release 043-94, 7 February 1994, 10.
43. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994), i.
44. National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), i.
46. Johan Benson, "Conversations with William Perry," Aerospace America, October 1994, 11. Cheney has stated that while the U.S. could still win a Desert Storm-size conflict in the Gulf, military forces could not deploy as rapidly, the war would last longer, and casualties would be greater.
47. Defense budget estimates were compiled from The World Factbook 1995 (Washington, DC: Office of Public and Agency Information, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995).
48. Wisner and Jeremiah. Clearly, the world had changed since President Bush first announced the Base Force in 1990. As a result, Secretary Cheney and General Powell had already proposed additional force cuts and program terminations in 1991 and 1992. In fact, General Powell had developed a "Base Force II" by late 1992 but withheld it pending the outcome of the election. Deputy Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Long-Range Planning Dr. Clark Murdock, interview, Washington, DC, 15 March 1996. Dr. Murdock was a key aide to Les Aspin in Congress and during his tenure as Secretary of Defense.
49. John Isaacs, "Bottoms up," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (November 1993): 12.
50. AFY 1995 Defense Budget," 7.
51. OSD and the Joint Staff conducted their force analyses with an approximate budget in mind, often seeking the minimum required force in order to meet fiscal guidance. The author participated in several such "budget drills" as the Air Force representative to the Joint Staff division responsible for bomber force issues during the BUR.
52. "FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs news release, 27 March 1993, 1, 4.
53. Paul K. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," New Challenges for Defense Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994), 17-18.
54. Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning" Naval War College Review XLVII (Spring 1995): 122.
55. Dr. Clark A. Murdock, "Mission Pull," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 30.
57. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1.
59. Unpublished draft transcript of a House National Security Committee Subcommittee on Military Procurement hearing, Washington, DC: House national Security Committee, 6 April 1995.
60. Nor will planned mobility force enhancements fully compensate for problems created by infrastructure limitations.
61. Joint Staff J-3 Readiness Division, "How We Look At Readiness," unpublished briefing, Washington, DC: 19 September 1995.
62. Reserve Component Programs (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995), 22.
63. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 50-51.
65. National Military Strategy, 18. Two of the sets will be deployed to Southwest Asia and one in South Korea.
66. Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 31 January 1995), chapter 4, 1.
67. "Force for 2000," 8 May 1993.
68. Senator John McCain, "Ready Tomorrow: Defending American Interests in the 21st Century" (Washington, DC, 19 March 1996), 17.
69. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 21.
70. The Bomber Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1992).
71. "Garbage In, Garbage Out: Unwarranted Assumptions Skew I.D.A. Study's Findings; U.S. Still Needs More Bombers" (Washington, DC: The Center for Security Policy, 17 May 1995), 1.
72. Congressional Record 141, no. 138 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 7 September 1995), H8614.
73. Unpublished draft transcript of a HNSC Subcommittee on Military Procurement hearing, 6 April 1995.
74. "Cooking the Defense Books," The Washington Times, 21 March 1996, A20. According to the Times, the first quote was from General Shalikashvili's annual Chairman's Program Assessment of the 1997 defense budget.
75. "Military splits with Clinton on arms," The Washington Times, 14 March 1996, A4.
76. Congress, House, Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997, an unpublished draft hearing transcript (Washington, DC: House National Security Committee, 13 March 1996).
77. Stephen Daggett, "A Comparison of Clinton Administration and Bush Administration Long-Term Defense Budget Plans for FY1994-99," CRS Report 95-20 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 December 1994), 2. Mr. Dagget compared the Clinton budget against the budget President Bush would have submitted to Congress had he been reelected.
78. "Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997," 16.
79. Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain, NSIAD report 95-91 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 June 1995), 2-7.
80. Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, NSIAD report 92-67 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 10 March 1992), 2.
81. Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, NSIAD report 95-80 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 March 1995), 4.
82. Strategic Assessment 1996 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press 1996), 174.
83. Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions, 4.
84. Army National Guard: Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly, NSIAD report 96-63 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 14 March 1996), 3.
85. "Perspectives on the Military Downsizing," Current Messages for Senior Air Force Leaders, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs, 93-01 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, July 1993), 1.
86. BUR analyses were also constrained by the need to issue meaningful fiscal guidance to the services in time for them to adjust their budgets.
87. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 18-19.
88. "Two-War Strategy May Be Abandoned," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 29 January 1996, 40.
Essay on Strategy XIVNOTES
1. President George Bush, "In Defense of Defense," Defense Issues, vol. 5, no. 31 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1990), 1.
2. Colin Powell, and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 440. Towards the end of his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe had also tasked the Joint Staff to develop options for a smaller force.
3. Senator Sam Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," Vital Speeches LVI, no. 13 15 April 1990): 383.
4. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "A 'New Look' At the Bottom-Up Review: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces For A New Century," Strategic Review (Winter 1996): 22.
6. A concurrent OSD review led by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz produced similar strategy and force recommendations.
7. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), 25-31.
8. The final Bush aministration regional security strategy, published in January 1993, added systems acquisition, infrastructure, and overhead to the resource priority list. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1993).
9. Don M. Snider, "Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decisionmaking, Post-Cold War, 1989-91," Professional Readings in Military Strategy no. 8 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute), 29.
10. Stephen Daggett, "The FY1991 Budget Debate: How Much for Defense?" CRS Issue Brief IB90061 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 December 1990), CRS-1.
11. President George Bush, from a DOD transcript of a White House press conference, 27 September 1991.
12. This was a decline of about 4.6 percent from the FY92 baseline budget, after adjusting for inflation.
13. Pat Towell and Andrew Taylor, "Aspin, Cheney Spar Face-to-Face But Stay Far Apart on Budget," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50 (Washington, DC: 8 February 1992): 322.
2. Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options" (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), Chart II.
3. Frank G. Wisner and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21 April 1993), 28-29.
4. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 19.
5. Ibid., 107-108. These figures do not include Department of Energy defense-related funding.
6. National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 4.
7. Data obtained from a briefing prepared by the author for the former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak, updated 16 March 1996.
8. Reserve Component Programs (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995), 13.
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