1. In War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe the differences among agrarian, industrial, and information age societies and militaries. While some have criticized this categorization as oversimplified, the Tofflers' writings are influential within the U.S. military.
2. William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 107.
3. New World Vistas: Communications, Scientific Advisory Board draft (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1996), 17.
5. Warfighting Vision 2010 , Joint Warfighting Center, draft (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 August 1995), 19.
6. Maj Gen J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1945), 158. Of note, on page 146, Fuller gives a scathing critique of Guilio Douhet's motives by stating, "The secret which Douhet could not grasp was that inventive genius when stirred by the instinct of self-preservation knows no bounds. He was a wonderful salesman, and like many peopleCa prophet of the ridiculous."
7. Brigadier J.P. Kiszely, MC, "The Contribution of Originality to Military Success," The Science of War, edited by Brian H. Reid (London: Routledge, 1993), 44-45.
8. In Command and Control for War and Peace, Thomas Coakley addresses some of the origins behind these two words. He notes that there is little mention of "control" by the early biographers of the great captains of battle. Control was viewed as an organic function of command. However, the word control appears in literature during World War I and more frequently in WW II literature, possibly from the increased automation and sophistication of weapon systems. This led to a belief that one commands people but controls things. For example, a distinction can be made that one commands the aircrews who, in turn, control nuclear weapons. Others make the distinction that command is strategic and operational, while control is tactical. Analogies have been made with the human nervous system with the command brain controlling the rest of the body. Another view is that command is an art while control is more a science. John Boyd wrestles with the differences in describing the epitome of command, which is to direct, order, or compel, while control means to regulate, restrain, or hold to a certain standard. Boyd goes on to suggest that "leadership and monitoring" are more accurate and descriptive than are "command and control."
9. This word association may be more psychological than practical. My thanks to Lt Col Chancel T. French (ret.) for educating me on a possibility of our habit of word association having historical origins dating to the Battle of Hastings in 1066. One outcome was the mingling of English, French, and Latin words on legal documents and in every day usage. As a result, word associations like Cease and Desist, Have and to Hold, Search and Destroy, and Command and Control are now common jargon. My thanks also to Col Dick Szafranski for explaining the Russian usage of "duty terms" when talking about certain military subjects. "Command and control" is a "duty term."
10. The U.S. Marine Corps is advocating an orientation of "command and coordination" as part of their future warfighting concept called "Sea Dragon," while the Air Force is championing an orientation called C4ISR (surveillance and reconnaissance).
11. Greg Todd, "C1 Catharsis," Army (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, February 1986), 14.
12. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 February 1995), GL-4 (italics added).
13. Ibid., GL-4 and 5 (italics added).
14. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 May 1995), GL-6.
16. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 January 1995), III-9.
17. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Howard University Press, 1985), 9.
19. JCS Pub 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III-15.
20. Col John Boyd, "Organic Design for Command and Control," excerpt from A Discourse on Winning and Losing, a selection of unpublished notes and visual aides, compiled from 1976-1992, 5-12.
21. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 4 June 1994), 5.
22. Although Colonel Boyd cautioned against separating these functions in a telephone interview on 20 March 1996, it is just this kind of "analysis" (or destructive deduction) he argues for in his 3 September 1976 "Creation and Destruction" notes, 5-17.
23. Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993), 148.
26. Martin Van Creveld, in Command in War, points out that the number of radio sets rose from one for every 38.6 soldiers in World War II to one for every 4.5 soldiers in Vietnam, an 857 percent increase. Communications are also more reliable. Campen, in The First Information War, points out that During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military had a 98 percent communications reliability rate in handling 700,000 telephone calls, 700,000 messages per day, and over 30,000 radio frequencies.
27. The volume of data processing is growing exponentially, with capacities doubling approximately every 18 months. The maximum communications throughput of 2 megabits/second in Operation Desert Storm will seem slow when compared to the impending capacity of 30 megabits/second.
28. Martin Van Creveld, The Tranformation of War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991), 109.
29. John F. Schmitt, "A Concept for Marine Corps Command and Control," in Alexander H. Levis and Ilze S. Levis, eds., Science of Command and Control: Part III (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1994), 17.
34. John P. Crecine and Michael D. Salomone, "Organization Theory and C3," in Johnson and Levis, 50.
35. Proceedings of the 1992 Symposium on Command and Control Research,Naval Post Graduate School, CA, 12-14 June 1992 (Science Applications International Corp., McClean, VA.). Some of the better studies include: J.E. Bake, L.P. Clare, J.R. Agree and W. Heyman, "A C3 Workstation Utilizing Value-Based Message Scheduling;" Clint A. Bowers, Paul B. Kline, and Ben B. Morgan, Jr., "Horizontal and Vertical Structures in Small Teams: Team Performance and Communication Patterns;" Peter D. Morgan, "The Application of a Model of Adaptive Decisionmaking to the Collection and Analysis of Domain Expertise;" and Dr. Paul J. Hiniker and Dr. Elliot E. Entin, "Examining Cognitive Processing in Command Crises: New HEAT Experiments on Shared Battle Graphics and Time Tagging."
37. Major George E. Orr, Combat Operations C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 1983), 87-88.
38. Major John M. Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," Parameters (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Summer 1987): 11.
39. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership (Novato, CA: Presidio Press), 229.
41. Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London: Cassell & Company, 1956), 292.
42. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming," Rand Corporation Study P-7791, Air University Library, Document No, M-U 30352-16 no. 7791, 2.
43. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1982), 1-2.
45. It also eliminates irritants. For example, Admiral Metcalf, Task Force 120 Commander during Operation Urgent Fury, remembered his experiences from Vietnam with the "long distance screwdriver." To prevent reccurrence, he worked hard at increasing the confidence and certainty of his superiors by providing them with masses of information during the operation to liberate Grenada. This accomplished the desired effect in allowing Admiral Metcalf to accomplish the mission with minimal interference.
46. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, 108.
47. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke an the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 77. Italics added to highlight the relationship between technology (i.e., the telegraph) and rapid decisionmaking.
48. Roger Beaumont, The Nerves of War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1986), 28. Another viewpoint from Major General Fuller's WWII experience, "The General became more and more bound to his office, and, consequently divorced from his men, he relied for contact not upon the personal factor, but upon the mechanical telegraph and telephone. They could establish contact, but they could accomplish this only by dragging subordinate commanders out of the firing line that they may be at the beck and call of their superiors. In the World War, nothing was more dreadful to witness than a chain of men starting with a commander and ending with an army commander sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, in place of leading, leading, leading."
50. Vice Adm Jerry O. Tuttle, "C3, An Operational Perspective," Johnson and Levis, 4.
51. Raymond C. Bjorklund, The Dollars and Sense of Command and Control (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 83.
53. Major David S. Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower's Quest for Strategic Paralysis" (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, February 1995), 15.
54. U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 1-1, Campaigning ( Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 25 January 1990),73.
55. For example, the success of a deception plan usually requires fooling your own troops. During Operation Desert Storm, the U. S. Marines afloat off the coast of Kuwait may have conducted their daily preparations and routines differently, even subconsciously, had they been aware that their amphibious landing preparations were only a ruse. Their subtle changes in behavior or an inadvertent communications transmission might have been detected by the Iraqis, thus compromising the deception plan.
56. During WWII, German counterattacks were often conducted within 30 minutes after losing a position, while American, British, Russian, and French counterattacks usually took hours.
57. I am deeply indebted to Major Patrick Pope, a fellow Air Force 2025 colleague, whose wise counsel, shared interest, energy, and computer wizardry helped channel many of my random thoughts into a coherent pattern.
58. Barry R. Schneider, "Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future," Battlefield of the Future, edited by Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1995), 36-37.
59. lLt Gary A. Vincent, "A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design," Airpower Journal (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Review, Summer 1993), 29 and 31.
64. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 28 March 1994), 40-41.
65. Speed is referenced in both the draft Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 15 August 1995, 24, and AFM 1-1, Vol. I, March 1992, 18 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force). Of interest, the 1986 version of AFM 1-1 reflects the Air Force thinking about Timing and Tempo as a possible new principle of war, but any discussion of timing and tempos was dropped in later versions of AFM 1-1.
66. FMFM 1-1, 32.
67. Gen Ronald R. Fogelman, "Getting the Air Force into the 21st Century," speech to the Air Force Association's Air Warfare Symposium, Orlando, FL, 24 February 1995.
71. AFDD 1 draft, 24 (italics added).
72. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC: Council of Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1994), 389.
73. It is interesting that during Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force correctly identified Saddam Hussein's hierarchical organizational orientation with its highly centralized control as a vulnerability. Destroying or disrupting key control facilities and communications paths was key to inducing strategic paralysis at all levels of Iraqi command. Yet, ironically, American-led airpower had a similar organizational orientation and, likewise, similar vulnerabilities.
74. Col Jeffrey R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 33.
76. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993),247.
77. John P. Hyde, Johann W. Pfeiffer and Toby C. Logan, "CAFMS Goes to War," in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, October 1992), 44.
78. Major J. Scott Norwood, Thunderbolts and Eggshells (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1994), 24.
82. Col Stephen J. McNamara, Air Power's Gordian Knot: Centralized Control versus Organic Control (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1994), 131.
83. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 320. Vice Adm Stanley Arthur, senior Navy officer in the Persian Gulf, said that his intelligence officers were telling him that the Iraqis were moving what combat planes remained in Iraq every day or so, having discovered that it took three days to get all but the most critical targets on the allies' target list.
88. Lt Col Michael Straight, "Commander's Intent: An Aerospace Tool for Command and Control?" Airpower Journal (Spring 1996): 48.
90. One of my fondest memories of the Air War College experience is of spirited arguments in the seminar room. None was more heated than over the Air Force doctrinal (or to some, "dogmatic") issue of "centralized control." I am deeply indebted to Lt Col Pivo Pivarsky, Lt Col Joe Sokol, and Lt Col Gary ColemanCscholars and warriors all. Their intelligent, and usually emotional, debate helped keep me focused.
91. Maj Michael E. Fischer, Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, May 1995),55.
92. Maj James P. Marshall, Near-Real-Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 1994), 66
93. Lt Col J. Taylor Sink, Rethinking the Air Operations Center (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1994), 42.
94. The only officers more stupid than Saddam Hussein were his sons-in laws. They were killed "by angry relatives" shortly after returning from self-imposed exile for denouncing their father-in-law.
95. Mentioned by Carl Builder, a RAND analyst, during one of his many visits to Air University in support of the Air Force 2025 study.
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