COMMAND AND CONTROL, A PHRASE VERY FAMILIAR TO THE military, is subject to much confusion and misinterpretation. What does "command and control" really mean and is the current command and control orientation the proper one for an information-age military?(Note 1) These are important questions as the U.S. military grapples with the potentially revolutionary changes brought on by modern information technology. If information-age technology is indeed contributing to a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), then organizational structures and associated command and control orientation must change. In 1995, the Secretary of Defense stated:

This essay won Distinguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Roman, U.S. Air Force, wrote the paper while a student at the Air War College.

Historically, an RMA occurs when the incorporation of new technologies into military systems combines with the innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations to fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.(Note 2)

These organizational changes are occurring in the business world, but can the same be said for the military? The Air Force Scientific Advisory Boards (SAB) 1995 New World Vistas report notes:

Even the most casual glance at business history makes it clear that each time a new information infrastructure becomes available (e.g., railroad, telegraph, telephone) the entities which are ultimately most successful are also the first to reshape their structures in order to gain maximum advantage of the new information conduits. The new networks emerging today are "geodesic," that is global, non-hierarchical, and without any central node.(Note 3)

The SAB concludes with the optimistic view that "it is a safe bet that our [military] organizations will follow suit."(Note 4) However, this may be easier said than done given the historical resistance of military organizations in adapting to new organizational orientations.

The U.S. military services have thus far failed to create the innovative operational concepts and make the organizational adaptations needed for the information age. The U.S. military remains rooted in an industrial-age command and control paradigm, where control is emphasized over command. As pointed out in the draft Warfighting Vision 2010, "technological enhancements may have made 'control' an anathema to 'command'."(Note 5) This is certainly true of the modern U.S. military. The dilemma is that for an information-age military the correct organizational orientation may no longer be one of command and control, but one of command or control. Centralized control exercised by hierarchical organizations may no longer be possible or desirable in a fast tempo war. Failure to address this dilemma could result in a military not prepared for the operations tempo of information-age warfare. As Major General J.F.C. Fuller points out, "The highest inventive genius must be sought not so much amongst those who invent new weapons as among those who devise new fighting organizations."(Note 6) However, creating new organizational orientations has never been easy. Brigadier J.P. Kiszely expands Fuller's view:

Without originality, let alone genius, the new technologies will merely be grafted on to existing organizations and doctrines in a way designed to cause the least inconvenience and least unpleasantness in peacetime. The risks of having operated on this principle in the past are as nothing to the dangers of doing so in the future.(Note 7)

Unfortunately, by viewing the benefits of information technology within the current military command and control orientation, technology may be used in a manner that is the exact opposite of what is most desired.

The seductive nature of information technology is in stimulating military organizational orientation towards greater centralized control and more rigid hierarchical organizations, instead of the desired orientation of decentralized control and more flexible organizations. Unless the U.S. military recognizes the danger of succumbing to technological temptation, control functions may take priority over command functions, resulting in both a less efficient and less effective military. While this applies to all the U.S. military services, the command or control dilemma particularly impacts those organizations where centralized control is part of doctrine.

This paper will argue that the corrosive effect of an outdated command and control orientation prevents the U.S. military from fully applying the benefits of information technology. Future warfare, characterized by faster operations tempo, requires a new orientation based not on "centralized control," but on greater decentralized control and more flexible organizational orientation. To better understand this, the definitions of "command and control" are examined to explain why there is so much confusion and misunderstanding. Next, organizational orientation theory is discussed to show how the military traditionally responds to new information technology by emphasizing greater centralized control and rigid hierarchical organizational structures. Then, through the use of an information gathering and decisionmaking model, it can be determined why current U.S. military orientation of centralized control and hierarchical organizational structures is not suited for the high tempo operations expected in the information age. Finally, from theoretical and model analyses, some recommendations are given on what the correct military organizational orientation for the future must be.

We are so familiar with the words "command and control" that one may believe no problem exists. After all, these two words sound like a perfect marriage, giving the impression of equal weighting, value, and importance. While few would challenge this observation, there is little consensus on what "command and control" really means.(Note 8)

Attempts to clarify the "command and control" muddle highlight the difficulty in associating these words together. Is this word association healthy, and what happens when certain words fall out of favor? One solution is to invent new word associations.(Note 9) For example, command and control (C2) has expanded to C3 and C4 (communications), C4I (intelligence), and C4I2 (interoperability).(Note 10) One wonders which word will be added next? Perhaps C5I2 (coordination), or C6I2 (cooperation)? Unfortunately, each new word association that tries to describe new thinking or new technology, does so at the expense of the most important word "command," or what Todd calls "C1."(Note 11)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide little help in clarifying the confusion over the term "command and control." JCS Pub 0-2 defines "command" as:

The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.(Note 12)

By definition then, "control" is a component of command. Why then is a distinction made between the word "command and the word "control," and why give preferential treatment to the notion of control but not to those of organizing, directing, or coordinating? Perhaps it is because the U.S. military fails to see the difference.

There are many obvious similarities when comparing "command" with the JCS definition of "command and control":

The exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.(Note 13)

The differences between these two definitions are italicized. The latter describes organizational orientation, which will be discussed later. For now, let us focus on the italicized word "direction." Does this imply control? If so, then one would logically expect that the JCS definition of "control" to be:

The exercise of direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

This would make sense in explaining that command is the exercise of authority while control is the exercise of direction. However, things are not this easy. Control is also exercised by civilian leadership, such as President Kennedy's EXCOM handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis; or military personnel, like air traffic or weapons controllers, as part of their official duties. Thus, control also applies to people in non-command functions.

Unfortunately, the JCS definition of "control" does little to clear up the confusion:

Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.(Note 14)

Is command defined by "authority for full command exercised by a commander," while control is defined as "authority of less than full command exercised by a commander?" And, if so, what exactly does that mean? It would appear that more accurate, unambiguous, and descriptive definitions are the first step in resolving the command or control dilemma.

Perhaps what is needed is a fresher and simpler perspective. The JCS definition of "command" is a good one and already contains all the essential ingredients necessary for accomplishing the assigned mission. Associating command with control is, at the least, redundant, and at worst, creates an incorrect paradigm that impacts how the U.S. military organizes for future warfare. As Todd points out, "If atoms could be split, so could the act of command. Now, commanders would exercise command and control. Eureka! Never mind that command already implied control. Never mind that without control one could not command."(Note 15) JCS Joint Pub 1 reminds us, "The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge of what."(Note 16) Command, by its very eternity, provides that simple orientation that stands the test of time and introduction of new technology.

While Van Creveld points out that the functions of command do not change over time, the means to carry out that command change quite often.(Note 17) He divides the means of command into three categories: organizations, procedures, and the technical means which help determine the degree of control exercised by that commander.(Note 18) For example, sensor and communications technologies have changed at a more rapid rate than has organizational structures and operating procedures for employing them. Today's military services have progressed from the telegraph to modern age micro-burst transmitters, but still operate under the same centralized control and hierarchical organizational orientation employed by Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The danger is that this industrial-age command and control orientation corrodes the benefits offered by this new information technology. The primary impact will be felt if a commander's information gathering and decision making processes do not keep up with the increased operations tempo of future warfare.

A key characteristic of future warfare is an increased operations tempo that stresses a commander's ability to observe and react to changes in the battlespace. JCS Pub 3-0 acknowledges that "the tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements."(Note 19) Thus, the commander operating at a slower tempo than the opposing commander is at a greater disadvantage because there is a greater degree of uncertainty. This happens because the commander operating at a faster tempo will always be one step ahead of an adversary and is actually setting the tempo. John Boyd addresses the commanders decisionmaking process as a continuous four-step mental process- Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA).(Note 20) Using the Boyd model, successful commanders are those with the capability to operate within their adversaries' OODA loop.

The ability to observe, orient, decide and act faster than your opponent is necessary for future warfare. In War in the Information Age, General Sullivan, a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, observes that throughout history the tempo of operations caused by the impact of technology in warfare has accelerated (figure 1).(Note 21)

Information technology has decreased the time available for commanders to gather information and make decisions. Notice that the time differential between Orienting (finding out "What is actually happening?") and Deciding ("What can I or should I do about it?") has compressed to the point that in information-age warfare, orienting and deciding can no longer be sequential actions but must be simultaneous and continuous ones. Thus, organizational orientation and procedures are critical components in determining the tempo of a commander's OODA loop.

FIGURE 1. TEMPO AND COMMAND

Revolu-tionary War Civil War WWII Gulf War War of Tomorrow Observe Telescope Tele-graph Radio/Wire Near Real Time Real Time Orient Weeks Days Hours Minutes Continuous Decide Months Weeks Days Hours Immediate Act A Season A Month A Week A Day

To better understand this process, it is worth considering the OODA loop in a different paradigm; as really two separate cycles, or processes, operating at the same time. The first cycle is the Information Gathering Cycle, which addresses the commander's need to find out "What is actually happening?" The second cycle is the Decisionmaking Cycle, which addresses the commander's need to decide "What can I or should I do about it?" In this model, the information cycle loosely incorporates Boyd's Observation and Orient functions while the decisionmaking cycle incorporates the Decision and Action functions.(Note 22) With the use of this model, one can examine the impact of tempo and technology on organizational orientation.

The balance between the information gathering cycle and decisionmaking cycle is critical, because it defines a commanders operating tempo. As Boyd points out, from an external viewpoint it is critical for a commander to operate faster than an adversary or within an adversary's OODA loop. The means to do so, however, require internal balance between a commander's information gathering and decisionmaking cycles. Faster decisions can be possible because of faster information technology. Of course, faster does not imply better information, or even better decisions. Even under ideal conditions, it is difficult to always have "perfect" information and to always make "perfect" decisions, a state where the information gathering and decisionmaking cycles are working in harmony. While friction will always be a factor, it is technology, organization, and procedures that balances the information gathering and decisionmaking cycles. It is the balance between information gathering and decisionmaking that also determines the amount of uncertainty in the system.

Organizational orientation determines the degree of uncertainty a commander is willing to tolerate. Van Creveld declares that the history of warfare is an endless quest of decreasing the "realm of uncertainty," resulting in a race between more information and the ability of technology to keep up with it."(Note 23) Thus, the choice between centralized or decentralized control involves the distribution of uncertainty. Van Creveld believes that while centralized control reduces uncertainty at the top, it increases uncertainty at the bottom. Decentralized control has the opposite effect.(Note 24) Thus, it is human nature for higher level commanders to reduce their uncertainty, driving organizational orientation to greater centralized control. However, the cost for less uncertainty at the top is more uncertainty at the bottom. The cost for greater control by commanders is less autonomy in the field.

Unfortunately, the greater the level of control, the less opportunities for initiative and flexibility where it is needed most to cope with the dynamics of warfare: at the lower levels of command. Snyder points out that prior to reliable long distance communications, commanders wrote orders with objectives at a level high enough to give lower level commanders the flexibility to adjust their actions according to current events.(Note 25) Commanders expected that communications would be unreliable and planned accordingly. This is not true today because information technology is making communications more available and more reliable.(Note 26) Better information technology decreases the need for flexibility and initiative.

Modern technological advances, particularly in the area of computers and communications systems, increase the likelihood that the information gathering and decisionmaking cycles will be imbalanced. In fact, technology is the contributing factor for having two separate cycles. In pre-industrial warfare, Alexander the Great's personal command style was such that his information-gathering process and decisionmaking cycles were in harmony. He saw what was happening on the battlefield, made decisions and took actions based on his personal observations. This is the classic OODA loop, a very sequential process. In pre-industrial age warfare, technology, organization, and procedures were relatively simple.

One of the major characteristics of industrial-age warfare is movement made possible by the internal combustion engine. Vehicles, and the things they transport, move at high speeds. Armies are mechanized and mounted. There are relevant objects in space and beneath the sea. All these fast-moving objects must be observed for one to properly orient. Thus, faster operations tempo contributes to greater uncertainty. Faster information-gathering capabilities increase the potential for dealing with panoramic, multimedia changes and suspicious, contradictory or incomplete information, making the decisionmaking process more difficult. Technological advances in the information, intelligence, computer, and communications fields are increasing information- gathering capabilities.(Note 27) The result is a technologically driven faster information-gathering cycle, but a decisionmaking cycle that has not gotten appreciably faster since the days of Alexander the Great. Decisionmaking is still very much a human chore.

Unfortunately, advances in decisionmaking technology, such as computer assisted logic tools and artificial intelligence, have not progressed as rapidly as information gathering technology. Technology is making more and more information available, but the commander's ability to process and act on that information is still limited to how much the commander's brain can comprehend. As Van Creveld states,

The paradox is that, though nothing is more important than unity of command, it is impossible for one man to know everything. The larger and more complex the forces he commands, the more true this becomes.(Note 28)

It is organization and procedures that try to reestablish the balance between the process of information gathering and the process of decisionmaking. Technology and operating procedures can either add friction or mitigate it. Both technology and operating procedures are strongly affected by organizational structure and organizational orientation.

As mentioned earlier, information gathering is critical to addressing the problem of uncertainty. As John Schmitt explains, there are two possible responses. One is to pursue certainty as the basis for command and control. The second is to accept uncertainty as a fact of war and function with it.(Note 29) The first response is to eliminate uncertainty by creating a highly efficient command and control structure based on the quest for close control:

In such a system, the commander controls with a "tight rein." Command and control is centralized, formal, and inflexible . . . detailed control requires strict obedience and minimizes subordinate decisionmaking and initiative.(Note 30)

Thus, there may be greater certainty at the top but decreased certainty at the bottom. As Schmitt points out, if war is inherently uncertain, then this kind of orientation attempts to overcome a fundamental nature of war; there will always be some level of uncertainty that one cannot overcome.(Note 31)

This makes the second approach, that of operating with a certain amount of uncertainty, a more pragmatic command and control orientation. Schmitt states that "rather than increasing the degree of certainty we achieve, we reduce the degree of certainty that we need."(Note 32) The result is a command and control orientation that is decentralized:

In such a system, the commander controls with a loose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of action and requiring them to act with initiative . . . command and control is decentralized, informal, and flexible . . . [which] seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situation.(Note 33)

Decentralized control allows for some uncertainty at the top to facilitate greater certainty and decisionmaking at the bottom. The greater the degree of control, the less the number of alternatives available to solving a problem.(Note 34) For example, numerous laboratory tests indicate that teams placed under increased stress operate more efficiently and correctly when there is less shared uncertainty coupled with decentralized decisionmaking.(Note 35) Thus, the ability to gather vital information and make appropriate decisions rapidly is very dependent on the command and control orientation.

The two most common types of command and control organizational orientations, and hence structures, are hierarchical and networked. The traditional military command and control orientation is hierarchical, because traditionally hierarchical organizations required less communications and substantially simplified the planning and control process.(Note 36) George Orr describes a hierarchical organization as one that:

Attempts to turn the entire military force into an extension of the commander. Subordinate levels respond in precise and standardized ways to his orders and provide him with the data necessary to control the entire military apparatus. The emphasis is upon connectivity hierarchy, upon global information gathering or upon passing locally obtained information to higher levels, and upon centralized management of the global battle.(Note 37)

The key is that both information gathering and decisionmaking are under the personal control of the commander. Power at each level of command within the hierarchical organization is a function of both how much information and the kind of information controlled.

However, the first problem is that the very nature of controlling information defeats the optimum use of that information. Information gathering and decisionmaking must be made at each level of command before that information is moved on. At each level of command, the information is filtered, added, deleted, and modified. This is a time- consuming process, often resulting in information not reaching the right people or arrving too late to be of use, and creating a cascade effect, as controlled information becomes slow information. This last point is often cited as a failure of "intelligence" not getting to the right people on time. Perhaps the problem is not with the intelligence process, but rather the hierarchical organization it is supporting. Information must move with a degree of freedom at all levels of command to better balance decisionmaking at all levels of command.

A second problem with hierarchical organizations is a tendency to control decisionmaking at the highest levels of the organization. Again, technological advances drive higher levels of centralized control, threatening to stifle ingenuity and initiative at the lower levels. Combating this temptation requires trust in subordinates. During the Civil War, General Grant, though he had the technical capacity to centrally manage the war, was successful because he "trusted subordinates thoroughly, giving only general directions, not hampering them with petty instructions."(Note 38) General Eisenhower seemed to support this approach on the art of high command: "He can and should delegate tactical responsibility and avoid interference in the authority of his selected subordinates."(Note 39) General Schwartzkopf applied this lesson into joint war fighting by attesting, "I built trust among my components because I trusted them. . . . If you want true jointness, a CINC should not dabble in the details of component business."(Note 40) This freedom from interference is extremely important, as Sir William Slim explains:

Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors.(Note 41)

Thus, faster decisionmaking in response to the faster tempo of war requires an orientation of decentralized control.

Unlike hierarchical organizations, networked organizations offer a decentralized control orientation that makes better use of information technology. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, both of RAND Corporation, point out that the advances in computers and information technologies influence related innovations in organization and management theory.(Note 42) This is reinforced by John Naisbitt, in Megatrends, and the Air Force SAB, which predicts that organizational changes will result as industrial-based society transitions to an information-based society.(Note 43)

This trend will drive hierarchical organizations in becoming more networked and centralized control yielding to decentralized control. George Orr defines a networked organization as one that:

views the commander as controlling only in the sense of directing a cooperative problem-solving effort. The emphasis in this style is on autonomous operation at all levels, upon the development of distributed systems and architectures, upon networking to share the elements needed to detect and resolve possible conflicts, and upon distributed decisionmaking processes.(Note 44)

In a networked organization, the information gathering process is more equally distributed and more information is available at all levels of command. A networked sharing of information is much different than that of the hierarchical control of information. A faster decisionmaking cycle is possible with shared information, because all levels of command have the same level of certainty.(Note 45)

Another advantage is that troops engaged will have and generate more information than the "headquarters." If warfare is "chaotic," the chaos arises from adding information or energy to a system. Since troops in contact will be the first to observe that information, they must be empowered to use it for their decisionmaking. What appears to be chaotic and uncertain to the headquarters, may be much less chaotic and much more certain to troops empowered to respond to "local conditions." Headquarters, then, can use information technology, as Boyd suggests, to monitor.

The need to balance legitimate requests for information while allowing subordinate commanders the freedom of action is a difficult one. Prussian leader Von Moltke "the Elder" was one of the first to appreciate the value of the telegraph, but also recognized the increased tendency in using it to find out what was happening at the front.(Note 46) In his Thoughts on Command, Von Moltke writes:

The most unfortunate of all supreme commanders is the one who is under close supervision, who has to give an account of his plans and intentions every hour of every day. This supervision may be exercised through a delegate of the highest authority at his headquarters or a telegraph wire attached to his back. In such a case all independence, rapid decision, and audacious risk, without which no war can be conducted, ceases.(Note 47)

General Patton, reflecting about WWII in his Diaries, complained frequently about being tied to the radio and telephone, noting, "The hardest thing I have to do is to do nothing. There is a terrible temptation to interfere."48 The key to less interference and greater flexibility and initiative lies in an organizational orientation that promotes sharing of information at all levels.

While the principle of sharing information at all levels of command is important, it is modern information technology that makes it possible. With better communications and computer technology, U.S. Central Command forces shared information during Operation Ernest Will in the Persian Gulf with great success. Admiral Tuttle, then Director of the Command, Control, and Communications Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-6), provided communications equipment for sharing information with national and theater level commanders:(Note 49)

With the on-scene commander, Rear Admiral Less, the CINC General Crist in Tampa, Florida), and the Secretary [of Defense] and the Chairman [of the JCS] all having the same picture and same databases, the requirement to communicate diminished markedly. By having red and blue forces depicted in one composite picture, the relative urgency for decisionmaking could be readily determined and priorities set more intelligently(Note 50)

While shared information decreases uncertainty, it has the added benefit of fostering decisionmaking at lower levels of command. General Crist discovered that because the National Command Authority received the same shared information, they did not feel compelled to monitor or control the operation by "skip echelon."(Note 51) As Paul Strassmann writes, "The more people share information, the more its importance will increase."(Note 52)

Shared information provides the means to faster and decentralized decisionmaking. To achieve faster decisionmaking, it is critical that all levels of command are operating from a shared vision or commander's intent. Through a unifying commander's intent, initiative is generated. Boyd supports this assertion:

This is best accomplished by the exercise of initiative at the lower levels within a chain-of-command. However, this decentralized control of how things are done must be guided by a centralized command of what and why things are done.(Note 53)

U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 1-1 echoes this: "We generate tempo by creating a command system based on decentralized decisionmaking within the framework of a unifying intent."(Note 54) Therefore, the commander's role establishes the boundaries within which subordinate commanders can make decisions and increase operating tempo.

However, while a networked organization is better for sharing information, it may prove unsuitable for military commanders dealing with tough decisions in combat. Unlike their business counterparts, military commanders must really make life and death decisions and put subordinates at risk. In a networked organization, who among the collaborators will make those decisions? War requires commanders, not collaborators. Thus, decisionmaking may require a more hierarchical process. Decisions need not always be shared.(Note 55) Thus, some type of hierarchical organization is needed to support the decisionmaking process, though it can be made more effective.

The answer is a flattened hierarchical organization which greatly facilitates a commander's decisionmaking process. The German concept of Auftragstaktic eliminates layers of command between the commander and operational forces, by combining a clearly defined commanders intent with decentralized control at all levels of command for greater flexibility, ingenuity, and initiative.(Note 56) Auftragstaktic allowed the Germans the ability to operate within the OODA loop of their adversary.

Thus, the ideal command and control organization combines the shared information-gathering advantages of the networked organization with the decisionmaking advantages of a decentralized, flattened hierarchical organization.(Note 57)John Warden's experiences from the Gulf War support this orientation:

The coalition managed its own information requirements acceptably, even though it was organized in the same way Frederick the Great had organized himself. Clear in the future is the requirement to redesign our organizations so they are built to exploit modern information-handling equipment. This also means flattening organizations, eliminating most middle management, pushing decisionmaking to very low levels, and forming worldwide neural networks to capitalize on the ability of units in and out of the direct conflict area.(Note 58)

Thus, to maximize the advantages from information technology, one must redesign the military organizational orientation, where the emphasis is on command, not control. Modern technology can help redesign a military organization based on a theory of "centralized command-decentralized control and execution," which mirrors the "massively parallel" designs of modern computers.(Note 59) To support information gathering,

Each [Basic Action Unit] BAU has direct access to the situation model. This is achieved by linking all the units together in a single data net. . .The BAU commander can then access the battlefield model and pull out the information they need to accomplish their objectives.(Note 60)

To support decisionmaking,

The command unit does not issue explicit orders but identifies mission objectives and a focus of main effort. . .the BAUs are given wide latitude in conducting their mission. Coherence is achieved because all the units share a common doctrine, a common goal, and a common view of the situation. . .Instead of waiting for exact orders to funnel through intermediate units, each BAU will access its mission order against the common modal and act accordingly.61

This concept of a shared information-gathering cycle and a decentralized decisionmaking cycle is being discussed among the military services, but there is little consensus on which direction to take.

Each military service must respond to the certainty of high-tempo operations in the future, because there is little argument that the operations tempo of Operation Desert Storm will seem slow compared to that of future wars. Yet, among the U.S. military services, organizational orientations for information-age warfare are striking in their contrasts. For example, each military service has a doctrine to define tempo:

Army: "Tempo is the rate of speed of military action; controlling or altering that rate is essential for maintaining the initiative. A quick tempo demands an ability to make tactical decisions quickly, to execute operations that deny the enemy a pause, and to exploit opportunities according to commander's intent."(Note 62)

Marines: "Tempo is a rate or rhythm of activity. Tempo is a significant weapon because it is through a faster tempo that we seize the initiative and dictate the terms of war."(Note 63)

Navy: "Tempo is the pace of action-the rate at which we drive events. One way of doing this is to exploit the dynamics of warfighting by maintaining a high tempo." (Note 64)

Air Force: No mention of tempo in current or proposed Air Force doctrine. However, "speed" is mentioned as a characteristic of airpower.(Note 65)

Why does the Air Force emphasize speed over tempo? Tempo is speed over timeCthe consistent ability to operate fast.(Note 66) One might well argue that a more accurate description of a desired characteristic of airpower is tempo, not speed. For example, a characteristic of airpower technology is speed, i.e., the speed of the aircraft, or how long it takes to hit the target, but a more accurate characteristic of command and control orientation is tempo. In a 1995 speech, the Air Force Chief of Staff stated that, "Not too far in the next century, we may be able to engage 1,500 targets within the first hour, if not the first minutes, of a conflict."(Note 67) This describes speed, not tempo. The real question is what happens after the first strike? Does the U.S. Air Force have a command and control orientation that maintains and even increases the tempo of operations to keep those 1,500 targets at risk? If Air Force doctrine remains one of "centralized control, decentralized execution," then the answer is no. Much worse is the risk of unsynchronized joint high-tempo operations.

With the exception of the Air Force, every U.S. military service recognizes that increased operations tempo requires decentralized control and decisionmaking to the lowest level. These service observations are clear:

Army: "Initiative requires the decentralization of decisionmaking to the lowest practical level."(Note 68)

Marines: "In order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized."(Note 69)

Navy: "A rapid tempo requires that commanders be provided . . . enough decentralization to allow subordinate commanders to exploit opportunities."(Note 70)

Air Force: "To exploit speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality that makes air and space so versatile, their organization must make it possible for missions to be centrally controlled. The need to respond to and exploit unforeseeable events requires that these same forces are capable of decentralized execution."(Note 71)

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Army "Force XXI" and Marine Corps "Sea Dragon" concepts are the respective service's thinking about future warfare that emphasizes decentralized control and decisionmaking. The Air Force has no such new paradigm.

The Air Force is taking a much different direction because it remains rooted to an orientation of "centralized control- decentralized execution," which Eliot Cohen describes as "a catchphrase of Air Force doctrine, much as 'don't divide the fleet' preoccupied American naval strategists in earlier times."(Note 72) Although Air Force doctrine has changed 12 times, based on 50 years of experience (another change is in draft), doctrine is now the basis for increased centralized control through the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process.(Note 73)

The seductive effect of information technology is seen in those proponents advocating stronger centralized control. For example, some have advocated that future aerospace operations not only require greater centralized control, but increasingly centralized execution. Colonel Jeff Barnett, in his book Future War, argues, "Only a centralized C2 system has the potential to deconflict these factors in the chaos of war . . . decentralized execution, effective in past wars, won't answer this challenge."(Note 74) He goes on to suggest that the JFACC has the technology and should conduct all future warfare from the United States. Unfortunately, this thinking increases the danger of military micromanagement at a time when just the opposite is desired. As Eliot Cohen argues:

A general in Washington, an admiral in a command ship or a theater commander in rear headquarters may have access to almost the same information as a forward commander, and in some cases more. Those distant commanders will often succumb to the temptation to manipulate individual units in combat accordingly.(Note 75)

In many ways, the ATO reflects JFACC micromanagement of airpower through centralized control.

Highly centralized, the ATO is the tool of inflexibility. The Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary (GWAPSS) Report notes, "The ATO process used by the air planners and commanders in Riyadh merely modified an approach long used within NATO; it also bore a striking family resemblance to the way American planners had constructed and executed air campaigns as far back as WWII."(Note 76) A common understanding was, "An airplane didn't fly unless it was in the ATO."(Note 77) The reaction of one squadron commander to the ATO was typical: "By day three, the ATO was basically a historical document that described what we were supposed to do after we have already done it. Virtually all our tasking was received by phone and changes were the rule."(Note 78) Twenty percent of all air missions were changed during the few hours between the printing of the ATO and the time the aircrews launched. Still more changes were made before the ATO was officially released or after the aircraft had left their bases.(Note 79) Much as our model predicts and as Cohen points out, "Sometimes these decisions made sense; other times they did not. In all cases they created great uncertainty among the pilots flying the missions."(Note 80)

The reaction of other services to the slow ATO process was equally harsh. One U.S. Marine experience described the ATO process as "an attempt to run a minute-by-minute air war at a 72 hour pace."(Note 81) U.S. Marine Corps General Moore comments:

It [ATO] does not respond well to a quick-action battlefield. If you're trying to build a war for the next 72 to 96 hours, you can probably build a pretty good war. But if you're trying to fight a fluid battlefield like we were on, then you need a system that can react.(Note 82)

There was even criticism from a U.S. Navy Admiral claiming that the Iraqis had figured out the 72-hour schedule of the ATO and were moving aircraft around within that window.(Note 83) That Saddam Hussein was able to operate within the OODA loop of the Air Force gives him more credit than he deserves and is probably more reflective of service parochialism about the JFACC and ATO process than an accurate characteristic of one of the world's worst generals. However, the Admiral is correct about the ATO process being a dinosaur of industrial-age warfare, because the timeliness of the ATO calls into question its value in a high-tempo war.

Perhaps the concept of "centralized command- decentralized control and execution" is an idea whose time has come. Fast tempo warfare, with the need for balanced information sharing and decisionmaking, requires a new command and control orientation. Cohen describes "a new concept of high command, one that acknowledges that technology inevitably diffuses authority, will have to take root.(Note 84) Certainly, if technology provides the means for transmitting a 300-page ATO, that same technology could be applied in making airpower more responsive. The GWAPSS Report points out that "coalition commanders relied on an air-tasking system whose cycle times. . .had not changed appreciably from the Vietnam era."(Note 85) It is little wonder then that the U.S. Air Force had much greater success against stationary targets than against the mobile SCUD launchers; and this was against a relatively benign enemy with a snail-like operations tempo. As U.S. Navy Captain Bien observes, "The 48-hour ATO cycle did not permit rapid response to mobile targets."(Note 86) This becomes critical in the future if the number of mobile targets increase, or if enemies become more agile.

What is required is an organizational orientation that will take advantage of this information technology for faster information gathering and faster decisionmaking cycles. As General Sullivan points out, "The present, regular, >conveyor-belt' pace of the machine age is over. Only fast-paced, adaptive organizations will succeed."(Note 87) This requires greater emphasis on decentralized decisionmaking at all levels of command. As Lt Col Michael Straight points out,

Decentralized decisionmaking, guided by command's intent, can help keep decentralized execution focused on the JFACC's centralized priorities as the information revolution increases the number of decision-action cycles that occur inside the ATO's two-to-three-day limits.(Note 88)

Are there disadvantages to an organizational orientation that emphasizes less control and decentralized decisionmaking? Of course there are. There are those who argue that airpower is different from land and sea forces, justifying the need for greater, not lesser, centralized control. Straight emphasizes that the Air Force works with a much narrower span of control with less emphasis on a doctrinal concept meant to guard tempo, flexibility, and initiative.(Note 89) However, he also points out that without an Air Force commander's intent, higher operations tempo is difficult because subordinate initiative is limited.

Any discussion of decentralized control immediately brings forth historical failures of airpower, such as "penny packets" during the North African campaign of WWII and "route packaging" of Vietnam.(Note 90) Less control and greater decentralized decisionmaking increase the danger of fratricide, air-space coordination problems, and missed opportunities. However, these tactical level problems that the ATO addresses need to be balanced with the operational-level benefits. Boyd points out that, at the operational level, the JFACC's primary role is that of "monitoring" and not "controlling." Information technology has come a long way in 25 years, calling into question a 50-year-old process. A fresh organizational orientation is needed that will increase operations tempo and initiative without sacrificing the ability to concentrate effect.

The advantages of decentralized control in the fast-paced tempo of future wars makes it essential for the Air Force to reexamine the ATO process. Former Air Force CSAF General Larry Welch said, "I believe we overcontrolled in Desert Storm. We did focus on the CINC's intent . . . but it took us 5000 pages and 72 hours to produce an ATO."(Note 91) General McPeak, the CSAF during Operation Desert Storm, expressed interest in exploring mission type orders to shorten the ATO cycle:

It is a disgrace that modern air forces are still shackled to a planning and execution process that lasts three days. We have hitched our jets to a hot air balloon. Even when this lackluster C2 system works properly, we are bound to forfeit much of the combat edge we know accrues to airpower because of its flexibility and speed of response.(Note 92)

As one Air Force officer notes, "Mission-type orders are the laxative for constipated communications."(Note 93) However, institutional orientation continues to be that the ATO must be centralized at the top. Thus, the only improvements sought will be in shortening the ATO cycle, rather than looking at alternatives. In any case, there appears to be little interest in the Air Force joining the other services in advocating a new command and control orientation. The high operations tempo of future wars demands the Air Force take a fresh organizational orientation perspective.

Technology is a tool and humans decide how they will organize and how they will use those tools. A screwdriver can be used as an icepick and one can pound nails with a laptop computer. Information technology-computer machines and communications devices-enables us to fight more effectively. If fighting more effectively is the goal, the correct organizational orientation-one of more command, less control-is needed. The following actions must be taken:

• Establish useful definitions clarifying the distinction between "command and control." By reinforcing the importance of "command," and decreasing the need for "control," the U.S. military can eliminate the confusion and misunderstanding. In its present context, "command" embraces planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling. Command is also timeless, in spite of organizational and technological change. The U.S. military must resist efforts to hang additional attributes on the function of command because it dilutes the most critical component of war: Command.
• Recognize that information, by its very nature, is most useful when not controlled. A characteristic of military hierarchies is control of information. The U.S. military must take advantage of networked organizational orientation in providing access to shared information at all levels of command. Shared information reduces uncertainty and improves a commander's decisionmaking cycle. Given the danger of information overload, new technological innovations such as computer smart agents and data mining allows commanders to tailor their information gathering capabilities to meet their specific needs. Shared information gathering allows for increased operations tempo.
• Create flattened hierarchical organizations that promote decentralized decisionmaking. Eliminating layers of command provides the means for operating at higher tempos. Decentralized control, with the unifying vision of commander's intent, also encourages innovation and initiative at the lowest levels of command.
• Reexamine the doctrine of "centralized control, decentralized execution" doctrine against an information-age adversary. The JFACC and ATO concepts are a product of hierarchical organizations and centralized control, perhaps the last vestiges of excessive concern over "independence." While effective in industrial-age warfare, the limitations centralized control places on timeliness, flexibility, and tempo create potentially serious problems against an adversary operating at a faster operations tempo. The same technology that promotes greater centralized control also applies to decentralized control. Future enemies will be smarter than Saddam Hussein.(Note 94) Defeating them requires synchronized joint operations that promote decentralized decisionmaking and initiative.

Centralized control, exercised through hierarchical organizations, reflects old and dangerous thinking against future enemies operating at a faster decisionmaking cycle. As Carl Builder reminds us, "Each age of warfare required different treasured capabilities. In agrarian-age warfare, strength and cunning were valued. In industrial-age warfare, organization and discipline were valued. In information-age warfare, the treasured capabilities are knowledge and creativity."(Note 95) Tapping that knowledge and creativity requires greater access to shared information and decentralized decisionmaking, which are key to operating at the higher tempos required in information age warfare. The U.S. military must have the organizational orientation to take advantage of these treasured capabilities, which requires more emphasis on command and less on control. Failure to do so may result in a U.S. military ill-prepared for information-age warfare.

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Last Update:  October1, 2002