First, the United States has been unable to forge an international consensus against Iran with respect to the potential nuclear danger. Without such a consensus, the United States can exercise little meaningful economic pressure to thwart nuclear ambitions.(Note 1) Particularly troubling is Russia's search for cash and its insistence on resuming the nuclear cooperation program begun by the former Soviet Union. By some estimates(Note 2) the program is reportedly worth $800 million to $1.2 billion and involves the sale of nuclear reactors and additional training for Iranian technicians. Additionally, Pakistan's continued assistance in the training of nuclear technicians further complicates the problem.(Note 3)

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, U.S. Air Force, placed as a First Place Co-Winner in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition with this paper, written while he was a student at the Air War College.

Second, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resultant potential Aescape" of fissile materials, technical expertise, and weapons provides a unique opportunity for Iran to procure materials (or complete weapons) not previously available on the open market.(Note 4) For the first time since the birth of the nuclear age, world events highlight the vulnerability of major power nuclear stockpiles. Serious questions now arise over the accountability of former Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the specter of weapons falling into the wrong hands. In addition to "misplacement" of a weapon because of political chaos, we must also concern ourselves with the motivations of Soviet military personnel who returned to Russia and other states only to find a severe lack of housing and food.(Note 5)

Finally, Iran remains a relatively "closed" society, revealing little to the United States in terms of its national policy, strategy, doctrine, and decisionmaking processes. As Shahram Chubin points out, "The Iranian regime is not easy to understand. There is a gap between its rhetoric and its actions; between its sense of grievance and its inflammatory behavior; and its ideological and national interests."(Note 6) With little or no human intelligence resources remaining inside Iran, U.S. analysts must rely on scattered data from potentially unreliable external sources.

Both Defense Secretary William Perry and CIA Director James Woolsey estimated Iran could achieve an indigenous nuclear weapon production capability early in the next century in spite of current efforts to inhibit its program.(Note 7) Circumstances suggest Iran is certainly capable of achieving a clandestine nuclear capability if willing to devote the required resources. While not suggesting the United States abandon efforts to head off what may be an inevitable capability, it is time perhaps to explore the potential implications of a nuclear-armed Iran prior to continuing development of U.S. security policy with respect to the region.

Despite the constant bombardment of rhetoric streaming from Iran, very few analysts focus on the question of Iran's nuclear strategy against the background of changes in the overall political environment. The West still knows very little about Iranian military doctrine and, in particular, Iran's beliefs about nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. Any policy recommendations must therefore be made in the absence of any declared Iranian policy or strategy, let alone definitive knowledge of actual strategy.(Note 8) This leaves few options for policy strategists. Perhaps the best approach remaining involves examining three key aspects of the policy/strategy formulation process: motivations, strategic culture, and the question of governmental rationality in the policy process.

The first step involves speculation on potential motivations. The amount of capital resources devoted to the pursuit of nuclear arsenals these past 40 years is perhaps unmeasurable. Certainly these efforts have been at the economic expense of societies in general. One need only examine Saddam Hussein's multibillion dollar bill (while the population endured shortages to prosecute the Iran-Iraq war) to view the incredible allure nuclear weapons must have. Full understanding of the proliferation problem demands that one attempt to discern what makes pursuit of weapons so desirable.

The second step examines the proposition suggested by Colin Gray that distinctive national styles exist in nuclear strategy and that one can gain insight into strategy by understanding the nature of internal and external influences on national security and the historical precedents shaping policy.(Note 9) This potentially might allow one to speculate on whether Iran perceives nuclear weapons as military instruments, as useful tools of political coercion, as instruments of prestige, or a complicated combination of the three.

Finally, analysts must recognize the issue is further complicated by the dynamics of Iranian strategy and the particular forces at work in policy development. At least three major players exist in Iran's policy and strategy process: the military, the clergy, and "moderate" civilian political leaders. At work within these centers of influence are potentially different process models affecting the outcome of each group's decisions and the perceived rationality of resultant actions. Graham Allison long ago described conceptual models as a suitable framework for enhancing understanding of decision processes.(Note10) So, too, might these constructs prove useful in suggesting probable policy in the absence of empirical evidence or declared Iranian nuclear strategies.

A certain mystique surrounded the possession of nuclear weapons the past 40 years. Nuclear mythology suggests to nations that the "atomic fleece" confers certain powers upon those willing to endure the odyssey. Like most myths in human history, there is a certain vein of truth running throughout the story. As Iranians watched the Titans duel (the United States and USSR) they undoubtedly noticed advantages accruing to each as a result of nuclear programs.

The Quest for Power and a Proposed Framework
Although the superpowers and Iran may share many basic security interests in the contemporary environment, a host of additional incentives define a spectrum as diverse as their respective ideologies. Yet no matter how disparate these motivations appear, one must recognize that ultimately the desire for sufficient "power" to promote specific interests is the crucial objective. As the preeminent political realist Hans Morgenthau suggested, international politics is mostly a struggle for power that permits a state to achieve its goals.(Note 11)

The desire for effective relational power to a large extent defines us as nations.(Note 12) It permeates all aspects of human existence, from birth to death, and business to politics. The pursuit of power is the most publicized and often discussed obsession, but perhaps the least understood. This is because the definition and conceptual framework of power is perceived differently by dissimilar cultures. The West long considered power a matter of quantity, especially in military affairs,(Note 13) perhaps as a byproduct of our Clauzwitzian heritage. In Iran, the concept and utility of power are shaped by the integration of centuries of varying influences provided by conquering nations, religious predominance, and experiences different from our own. Therefore the Iranian paradigm views both the pursuit of power and its relational significance differently from the West.

Attempting to comprehend the different forms of power and how they manifest themselves in nuclear ambitions (given unique cultural biases) is a daunting challenge. It was Maslow who suggested human existence is governed by a graduated scale of motivations or a "hierarchy of needs."(Note 14) This author suggested a similar hierarchy exists for examining nuclear ambitions.(Note 15) The "hierarchy of nuclear motivations" model illustrated the predominant reasons why nations might pursue nuclear weapons.(Note 16) These included: survival, deterrence, prestige, security/hegemony, grand autonomy, and superpower status. The placement of each category within the hierarchy suggests increasing levels of motivational and policy sophistication. A nation residing toward the top of the hierarchy purportedly uses its nuclear capabilities differently (politically and militarily) from a player operating on lower levels of the pyramid,(Note 17) a key point for this paper if the intent is to gain insight into potential Iranian policy.

The model is important because it allows analysts to identify key indicators that may point to particular nuclear motivations of a state. Once analysts identify a state's key concerns, one can potentially individually tailor policies to obviate the desire for nuclear weapons. It must be cautioned, however, that "the discriminators and indicators are not always well defined or intuitively obvious . . . and the analysis is further complicated by the fact that the international environment is dynamic."(Note 18) One can anticipate states might move up or down within the hierarchy depending on circumstances and may even appear to operate on more than one level during periods of transition. On examination of the key indicators, where might Iran reside on the hierarchy?

Survival
"Survival is the most fundamental and basic of nuclear incentives. It is based on the perceived need to guarantee the very existence of a nation or culture"(Note 19) Israel's political use of its undeclared nuclear capability creates ambiguity in the minds of its foes, suggesting it retains nuclear weapons as the "ultimate insurance policy."(Note 20) Such concerns about survival understandably stem from a number of historical precedents, including the holocaust and three more recent attempts in the last 30 years to eliminate the Jewish state. Similar survival concerns do not seem appropriate to Iran.

Iran currently faces no foe sworn to eliminate the nation. Following the Gulf War's destruction of most of Iraq's military force, even its historic nemesis no longer has the capability to realistically threaten Iran for some time to come. Although Iranian leaders often mention war with the United States as inevitable,(Note 21) they cannot believe this would lead to annihilation, given that they watched much of Iraq's regime remain intact following coalition action. Clearly Iran faces no threats to its survival as a state, even though it perceives the current environment as hostile to its interests.(Note 22

Beyond survival as a "state" lies the concept of cultural or religious survival. This view often manifests itself in the search for the "Islamic bomb" so often mentioned in the media. Often thought of as the "anti-Israel bomb," the literature suggests motivations go well beyond this issue. Although a former Prime Minister of Pakistan often noted that the Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations each had nuclear weapons and it was time for the Islamic civilization to also have a nuclear capability,(Note 23) there are also those who suggest the desire for an Islamic bomb is tied much closer to oil than to Allah.(Note 24) One finds little evidence to suggest Islam is in much danger of extinction despite Iran's rhetoric.(Note 25)

Deterrence
When considering the possibility Iran seeks its nuclear capability for deterrent purposes, the case grows more interesting. Some of the indicators suggesting a nation seeks nuclear weapons as a deterrent are:(Note 26)

• The procurement of sophisticated and survivable means of weapon delivery, since a credible deterrent must be survivable
• Open declarations and concerns about a "balance of power," especially if the nation expressing the concern is weak in relation to its perceived foes
• Continued rhetoric concerning the "shackles" of great power influence
• Residing in a region with confrontational neighbors with excessive military power(Note 27)
• A history of domination or bullying by a superior power.

• The traditional "balance of power" perspective where Iran might desire to counter a perceived threat(Note 29)
• The concept of a desire for sovereignty within the context of deterrence.

At the end of WWII, it appeared military power could no longer be measured in terms of simple numbers because technology provided the world with a great equalizer.(Note 32) Nations like the United States and the USSR could now conceivably offset the quantitative advantage of an opponent by using the threat of nuclear warfare. "dvocates of deterrence counted on the menacing effects of nuclear weapons.(Note 33) The United States, for example, relied on this strategy in Europe to counter Soviet numerical superiority. Supposedly, the threat of nuclear warfare deterred Soviet military aggression.(Note 34)

A smaller nation such as Iran must also ask, "How can we make conflict too costly for an opponent?" Building and maintaining a large army can often be out of the question and certainly cannot guarantee success.(Note 35) Even the threat of chemical weapons, often referred to as the "poor man's nuclear weapon," did not deter the U.S. from action against Iraq.(Note 36) K. Subrahmanyam, a well-known writer in India on nuclear options noted, "The thesis that nuclear deterrence has sustained peace in the industrialized world will make it difficult for leading nuclear-capable developing nations not to adopt the strategy of the dominant nations of the international system."(Note 37)

Only nuclear weapons seem to possess the magic ingredient required to achieve deterrence. A widely held perspective among smaller nations is that if Saddam Hussein had possessed a nuclear bomb, things might have been different.(Note 38) The evidence these nations point to is almost 50 years of peace between the US and USSR. The suggestion that nuclear weapons can deter conventional conflict is the rationale often used by India and Pakistan to justify their programs.(Note 39)

But the nuclear reality emerging from the cold war and understood by the United States and the USSR is that nuclear weapons only deter nuclear weapons.(Note 40) Furthermore, opponents must choose to be deterred.(Note 41) It was obvious the U.S. nuclear arsenal did little to deter conventional conflict in Korea,(Note 42) Vietnam, or Iraq.(Note 43) But this argument is of little utility to Iranians who believe they face aggressive neighbors. To states like Iran, nuclear weapons have, and always will provide deterrence(Note 44) and therefore remain worthwhile objectives.(Note 45)

To Iran, a desire for some degree of sovereignty also seems a key motivator.(Note 46) "It's the Third World's anti-imperialist revenge on the snooty nuclear club," noted Tina Rosenberg of the Overseas Development Council. (Note 47) The primary utility of nuclear weapons within this context of sovereignty is to provide "freedom of action" with respect to the major powers. The Muslim, a Pakistani newspaper, reflected the general sentiment when it noted, "[our nuclear program] . . . is under attack because we are a Muslim entity with the spine still intact. . . . That's [the call for adherence to the NPT] an excuse to bring us down on our knees, fall in the queue of the vanquished Arabs."(Note 48)

A smaller nation like Iran with nuclear capabilities could conceivably create a significant level of apprehension within a superpower's decisionmaking apparatus.(Note 49) This provides, to some extent, an effective barrier to major power hegemony(Note 50) and intervention, especially in matters judged not "critical to national security interests." The nondeterrent effect of chemical weapons and large armies in the Gulf War undoubtedly sent Iran seeking alternative ways of keeping larger powers out of regional affairs.

Prestige
This is not to suggest that Iran seeks nuclear weapons for the deterrent effect alone. As previously suggested, the dynamics of nuclear motivations are such that a state can transition adjacent levels of the model as internal and external conditions change. The result is a state that simultaneously appears to operate on two levels; such is the case for Iran. If the evidence suggests "deterrence" as a motivator, one can make an even stronger case for "prestige/hegemony" as the more sophisticated motivation. The key indicators of prestige/hegemonic-oriented nuclear desires read as a list tailored for Iran:(Note 51)

• Overt acknowledgment of programs funded for national prestige
• Expressed dissatisfaction with the nuclear double standard
• Growing nuclear programs with significant investment in training and education
• A government controlled by a dictator, monarch, or military regime
• A historic overestimation of the state's regional importance
• The tendency to attribute more influence to one's state than is logically supported by the instruments of national power.

Hans Morgenthau defined the utility of prestige in international relations in his book Politics Among Nations, noting, "Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one's own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses."(Note 53) Thus, Morgenthau suggests prestige can be based on cold hard reality or a creative manipulation of "perceived reality." Historically, the acquisition of powerful, numerically superior military forces served as the primary means of advancing state prestige. But the equation changed somewhat over the past 40 years, a fact certainly verified by the Gulf War in 1991.

Military superiority today is less simply a quantitative measurement, but now includes an important qualitative factor. The affordabilty of modern battlefield technology tends to narrow the gap between large and small military forces.(Note 54) Small forces equipped with technically superior weapon systems now possess an apparent disproportionate degree of lethality and a proportional increase in influence and prestige in some cultures. Iran's drive to modernize its military force serves more than one purpose. Nuclear submarines, advanced fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons conceivably place Iran on par with a number of key states.(Note 55)

To Iran (and others in the region), a nuclear weapon places a nation at the pinnacle of military capability and, consequently, at the pinnacle of military prestige. The view of lesser powers like Iran is that nuclear weapons appear to provide a level of prestige disproportionate to one's true military position. The publicity and notoriety afforded by the media only serve to reinforce this belief.(Note 57) Another author described this need as "a rite of passage out of technological backwardness."(Note 58) Iran's development of an indigenous nuclear program easily becomes a symbol of patriotism and national ability.

On the instigation of the Zionists, the West, particularly the United States, is striving to keep Islamic Iran on the defensive and prevent it from using nuclear energy peacefully. Thus it wishes to keep our elite experts in a state of technical backwardness in this new field of science and technology.(Note 59)

Because the official nuclear club remains so small and refuses to admit new members, Iran undoubtedly perceives a potential gain of an inordinate amount of prestige among envious neighbors. In the corporate mind of Iran, it signals an ability to stand as an apparent equal (or at least a contender) with the "advanced" nations. It serves as a challenge to the nuclear hegemony of major powers and is fueled by the contempt openly exhibited for the restrictions imposed by the Nonproliferation treaty (NPT), a treaty viewed by some as one more example of the "haves" versus the "have nots," imposing a double standard on the world community.(Note 60)

The cornerstone is thus laid and sets the stage for the second component of the equation.

Colin Gray notes that strategic culture is a direct descendent of political culture.(Note 61) It is the framework within which a state debates strategic ideas and finalizes defense decisions.(Note 62) Strategic culture is subject to a number of unique geopolitical, economic, and historical influences. "In realpolitik terms," suggests Gray, most "strategic cultural traits are rational" given the experiences of that nation.(Note 63 Moreover, one finds that supposedly different cultures often share some common strategic cultural traits. It is this common ground that provided a basis for a certain amount of mutual understanding on nuclear issues between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. However, it was the essential differences in strategic cultures that Gray suggests U.S. policy makers completely misunderstood, differences that led to a potentially cataclysmic U.S. nuclear strategy in Gray's estimation and a lesson the United States must learn with respect to Iran.

Gray found that much of U.S. thought on deterrence, stability, escalation, arms control, and conflict reflected little more than "the character (strengths and weaknesses) of our own culture."(Note 64) Western theorists and leaders paid little attention to Soviet perceptions, wrongfully assuming the USSR viewed nuclear matters through the same set of tinted glasses. As a result, for example, the West viewed escalation as a "process of political bargaining." The Soviets simply "approached war as war, not a bargaining process."(Note 65) But Gray rightfully cautions that cultural empathy is not enough to preclude war.

War, as we learned from Clausewitz, is a political conflict. Understanding cultural influences is useful, but international security problems are usually complicated and not likely to be "defined solely in terms of misunderstanding."(Note 66) What influences do we find affecting Iran's distinctive strategic culture and national style?

The Shah
The current strategic culture and national style is first shaped by the legacy of the deposed Shah of Iran. "His distrust of all potential competing centers of power and the necessity that he remain the center of the state,"(Note 67) his aggressive modernization program, and the strong-arm tactics and repression he condoned became closely associated with the United States, his primary supporter. Additionally, the Shah created an atmosphere where those practicing the art of flattery, pandering, deceit, and treachery survived. "Mistrust became the first line of defense."(Note 68) It came as no surprise when a severe anti-Western backlash took place following the fundamentalist coup. Unfortunately for Iran, the religious revolutionary strategy quickly distanced Iran from not only the United States, but Western technology, military arms, and military strategy as well. This policy inevitably proved disastrous during the Iran-Iraq War.

The War With Iraq
The 8-year war with Iraq also weighs heavily on Iran's strategic culture. The military, political, and psychological damage suffered manifests itself in several postwar programs and almost all rhetoric. After impressively winning early battles and repelling Iraq, the Iranians foolishly pushed on in an effort to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein in what Shahram Chubin suggests was the first step in exporting revolution outside their borders.(Note 69) Iran quickly found itself outgunned by Iraq's western hardware and outmaneuvered by a more realistic operational strategy.

Additionally, Iran found itself the target of two particularly troublesome Iraqi weapons: tactical ballistic missiles (SCUDS) and chemical weapons. Although capable of responding in kind to the SCUD attacks with its limited supply of North Korean missiles,(Note 70) Iran was ill prepared for chemical warfare. Iran's outrage further intensified as it watched the Western world sit quietly on the sideline during what was a clear violation of international law and chemical weapon treaties, a point Iraq never allows the West to forget.(Note 71) After 8 years of war, Iran found itself with few allies (save Syria, North Korea, and Pakistan), no sources of spare parts for its Western arms, limited ability for naval interdiction, (Note 72) a military strategy found lacking, and no way to deter or respond to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons).

The New International Order
Another key factor shaping Iran's strategy and decision process is the new international order. Iran now finds itself in an environment apparently hostile to its interests.(Note 73) Its ideological nemesis, the United States, emerged as the primary power without any apparent counterbalance to its perceived imperial ambitions. Furthermore, the new economic dimensions of power placed the West in even more enviable positions vis-a-vis smaller, poorer nations like Iran. The magnified importance of economic relationships resulted in what Iran perceives as new U.S.-Arab alliances that now thwart additional Arab-Persian ties so critical to Iran's future strategy. All these facts serve only to confirm Iran's suspicions regarding U.S. desires for regional hegemony and permanent basing in the Middle East.(Note 74)

Domestic Failures
Next, Iran's political environment, characterized by internal failures that potentially challenge the fabric of religious beliefs and success of the revolution, also affects its strategic culture. Its strategy of supporting violent religious upheaval and terrorism in foreign states has made Iran a pariah on the international scene. Iran's attempts to disrupt several secular governments and regional monarchies further alienates Iran from those neighbors Iran needs the most. This lack of success, particularly with domestic economic programs, serves as a poor example to those it seeks to attract. The domestic economic decline continues to feed the disruptive effects(Note 75) while undoubtedly diverting critical resources from military to social programs, thus exacerbating security issues even further.(Note 76)

Historical Tradition
Belief that Iran is the best candidate for regional leadership based on a strong historical precedent also pervades the strategic culture. Persian history spans more than 25 centuries and includes periods of conquest over Babylon and Egypt. Persian rule extended to the Nile Valley and almost to Asia Minor before several centuries of Greek, Roman, and Arab invasions shrank the empire. The past grandeur of the Persian Empire, coupled with Iran's geographic position, size, and demographic status, suggests to Iran's leaders that their country rightly deserves the position of dominant state in the region(Note 77) and still has a mission.(Note 78)

Few analysts doubt that Iran seeks "establishment of a Pan-Islamic bloc dominated by Iran, not Arabs."(Note 79) The current regional role Iran envisions is tied closely to its anti-U.S. posture. "Iran should establish a united anti-imperialist front on the regional level from among the countries opposed to the various policies of the West, particularly the United States,"(Note 80) noted one editorial. This Iranian-led collective security arrangement would "become the sole authority for maintaining peace and stability without foreign interference."(Note 81) Should formal security arrangements fail, Iran is not beyond using coercion, subversion, or more subtle variants of its expanding power.(Note 82) As Hoseyn Musavian, Iranian Ambassador to Germany noted: "Iran is a powerful country in the region and has the final say in the world of Islam at present, and is a cultural and political superpower . . .such a country cannot be ostracized."(Note 83)

Islam
Finally, Islam plays a major role in Iran's national style, both to unify the nation internally and isolate it externally. The split that occurred in the later half of the seventh century over Islamic leadership, which resulted in conflict between Shi'ia and Sunni, lives on to today. The tradition of martyrdom among Shi'ias that grew out of the assassination of Ali and later his youngest son, lends Iran's national style a characteristic unique to the region. The belief during the Iran-Iraq war that military success would come from waves of young boys armed only with their faith and a copy of the Koran led to disastrous results.(Note 84) The notion that Islam provides instruction on military affairs, running state economies, and international affairs has landed Iran in a sad condition that some internal pragmatists are just now beginning to recognize.

Whether Iranian patterns of thought, behavior, culture, and national style reside more in the past or are founded on contemporary events is not a large issue. What can be determined are the key characteristics of the strategic culture resulting from these influences, including:

• A political environment characterized by internal failures that potentially challenge the fabric of religious beliefs and success of the revolution
• A seemingly insatiable quest for prestige not only within the region but also as the international banner carrier of Islam
• An assumption that Iran is fighting a struggle against international influences set on the destruction of Islam, a battle worthy of martyrdom
• A belief that Iran cannot have too large or sophisticated a force given the suffering endured, particularly at the hands of Iraq's chemical weapons and missiles
• A belief that the potential for conflict with the US and Israel is high (if not inevitable)
• A military strategy that is dominated by the ill conceived beliefs of religious and civilian leaders rather than sound doctrine.

At issue is which faction within Iran's political apparatus is most likely to have the greatest influence on nuclear matters, particularly with respect to strategy development and whether one can characterize the process involved as "rational."(Note 85) The Iranian revolution has been unable to harness Shi'ite doctrine to a clear structure of political authority. As a result, many competing factions claim legitimacy. As noted in the introduction, three forces currently play a role in Iranian affairs: the clergy (generally fundamentalist or radical), civilian politicos (both moderate and conservative), and, to a lesser extent, the military. What the evidence suggests is a more rational/pragmatic decision making process than previously believed, given Iran's motivations and strategic culture. The test will be to examine the general policies of Iran in three areas: military decisions, foreign policy, and internal affairs.

The Military
Previously under Khomeini, two branches of the military existed. Much of the "regular" army was purged out of mistrust of the officers potentially loyal to the Shah. To balance the regular army, Khomeini created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mostly radicals with little or no military training, the IRGC was placed in charge of most important matters, including nonconventional weapons. Their utter incompetence was clearly demonstrated in battle when they preferred the "human" component to military hardware during the Iran-Iraq war.

A number of key decisions regarding Iran's military emerged following the death of Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, decisions suggesting a more pragmatic decisionmaking process as compared to the rule of Khomeini. First, Iran seems to have developed a comprehensive plan for military modernization based on lessons learned during the wars. Over $10 billion has been invested since 1989 in procurement of air and naval assets, capabilities that proved their worth in the region. Additionally, Iran is investing in longer-range ballistic missiles, developing its own version of a Chinese antiship cruise missile called the Silkworm, and planning for a reconnaissance satellite, also produced with the help of China.(Note 86)

Iran seeks to reduce dependence on third parties for weapons procurement. It has undertaken programs to ease this dependency and recently announced it can produce a modern tank and additional small arms.(Note 87) The indigenous production of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is also a priority and seems to be coming about in a logical manner. Investment in the infrastructure required to support these activities is receiving priority funding.(Note 88) A general reorganization of the military is taking place with an announced consolidation of the regular army and IRGC and a plan to emphasize military professionalism in the new service.

All these events seem consistent with a rational policy and strategy process within the government. Iran seems to be pursuing the type of capabilities it needs given that it believes a war with either Israel or the United States is inevitable.

Our fight with the United States is definite, and the fate of everything will be determined with this fight and conflict" noted the General Commander of the Guard Corps as late as May 1995. . . . One day, ultimately, we must begin our destiny making operations against the United States; hence the forces and the commanders of the Guard Corps must have the necessary capability and readiness.(Note 89)

An additional element of pragmatism within the military has also manifested itself within the context of domestic security. The military, both Regulars and IRGC, failed to respond to recent riots in Iran over economic conditions. One well-known general officer actually lauded the clergy's spiritual guidance and then called for the resignation of incompetent government officials and the staging of free elections. The failures within the economy that force the diversion of funds away from modernization and toward solutions for social problems pose a dilemma for the military. Its conventional forces will be unable to achieve the desired objective, leaving only nuclear weapons as the capability that can make Iran into a major regional power. No analysis suggests any degree of irrationality with regard to military decisionmaking. It seems the rational policy model is at play within the military.

Foreign Policy
Scrutiny of the conduct of Iran's foreign policy indicates a definite change. Iranian support for terrorism appears to be diminishing in Western Europe, particularly in Germany and France, Iran=s major trading partners, which signals a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. New cooperative agreements are being sought with the new states on Iran's northern border in an effort to create a "buffer zone" between Iran and Russia, as well as to head off potential Kurdish issues that might spill over into Iran.

New agreements with China seem evident, perhaps betting on deterioration of U.S.-China relations, a split that might portend a new international counter-U.S. bloc of states. Finally, Iran fully cooperated with the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all requested nuclear inspections.(Note 90) If one could characterize the foreign policy of Ayatollah Khomeini as reactionary and illogical, the recent trend in Iran seems once again to support a rational strategy.

Internal Affairs
Only the decisions made with regard to internal matters seems to suggest a different model of analysis is required. Following the revolution, Khomeini became the head of both government and clergy. In this role he was the final authority in all governmental matters and social issues. In 1979 he stated, "There is not a single topic of human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established norms."(Note 91) In addition to the 270-seat Majlis (parliament), Khomeini established a number of committees and councils to assist in the decision process. These included councils composed of Islamic scholars who passed judgment on legislation, revised the constitution, andoversaw the revolutionary guards and numerous political matters linked to mosques. This period of the revolution can best be described as reactionary, chaotic, and ineffective.

Following Khomeini's death in 1989, the Irani Government took on a slightly different character. Ali Khamenei emerged as the heir to the clergy while Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered a moderate, became President.(Note 92) Additionally, a number of key interest groups maneuvered for power within Iran. A coalition of pragmatists(Note 93) and conservatives(Note 94)initially emerged, only to be replaced after the economic failures with a coalition of conservatives and radicals. These multiple centers of influence have demonstrated a number of characteristics that suggest, at least domestically, Allison's organizational process model is at work. President Rafsanjani's first 5-year plan, representing the government's strategy for reconstruction of the economy, was approved only after years of negotiations and compromise among groups.(Note 95) The sheer number of consultative bodies and bureaucratic organizations established to carryout day-to-day affairs in Iran creates a situation where "bureaucratic arrangements become the principal allocative and distributive mechanisms in the economy" and each desires an input into the decision process.(Note 96)

Although seemingly preoccupied with internal matters, one author suggests, "Bureaucratic factors often form an underestimated set of pressures for going nuclear."(Note 97) In India, it was the scientific community that was behind the nuclear program; Mrs. Gandhi di(Note 98) Iran may be on the same track. To date, only scattered accounts exist as to what pressures are brought to bear and by whom. In spite of the clergy's constant reminders that nuclear weapons are an affront to humanity, (Note 99) it is the clergy seemingly most involved in the process. A former energy advisor to the Shah was reportedly told by advisors to Ayatollah Khomeini, "It is your duty to build this bomb. Our civilization is in danger and we have to do it."(Note 100) We also know that Khomeini decided to keep Iran's 15 percent ownership stake in the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia.(Note 101)

This brief look suggests two policy process models may be involved in nuclear strategy development: a rational actor model and an organizational process model. Internal decisions and policies may be naive, but certainly cannot be characterized as irrational. When taken in the context of Iranian motivations and the strategic culture, potential strategy options emerge.

Three possible nuclear strategies exist for Iran, assuming U.S. analysts perceive the current state of affairs and policy dynamic within Iran correctly. The first closely parallels the traditional East-West deterrent paradigm emerging from the Cold War and is best ascribed to Iranian military planners. The second possible strategy envisions nuclear weapons as tools of compellence, coercion, and hegemony and is conceivably based on a complete misunderstanding of nuclear politics by the civilian leadership. Finally, the third envisions nuclear weapons as logical extensions of Iran's Islamic revolutionary objectives, another tool in the fight against Zionism and the West and for survival of the faith.

Tools of Deterrence
The least interesting strategy is the one US analysts feel the most comfortable withCnuclear weapons as traditional tools of the military for deterrent purposes. The military, more than other components of the Iranian power structure, seemingly took to heart the lessons of the past two regional wars. In this context, nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems seem but a logical extension of Iran's weapons modernization program. Nuclear weapons in this regard, act to counterbalance Israel's capability while complicating the decision process of U.S. military planners.

At least one author suggests that the procurement of nuclear weapons (as tools on the far end of the conflict spectrum) perhaps allows a nation greater freedom of action at the lower end of the spectrum.(Note 102) No longer fearing Israeli nuclear action perhaps provides Iran the opportunity (should it be required) for more aggressive conventional military action, an area where it might prevail. Iran may be taking its cues from its friend Pakistan in this regard. Pakistan, like Iran, believed it faced a hostile, nuclear-armed India capable of thwarting Pakistan's ambitions. Only after achieving its own nuclear capability did Pakistan feel comfortable enough to challenge India in a number of areas.

Whether the Iranian military leadership actually believes nuclear weapons deter major conventional attacks is debatable. It most certainly understands that the possession of a long-range delivery capability reduces the effectiveness of a foe's conventional assets.(Note 103) But whether we could expect Iran to transition swiftly to a nuclear option during a conflict, particularly with Israel or the United States, seems to depend mostly on whether it perceives its nuclear forces as vulnerable, whether either state possesses any strategic defense capability, and how resolute Iran's leadership is with respect to exercising nuclear options.

If one believes the military is in firm control of all military matters and the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is within the jurisdiction of military planners in Iran, then there is reason to believe traditional deterrence theory may apply. The new Iranian military planners, being seemingly rational to date, may realize the military disutility of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the available evidence indicates the military has been left out of most WMD decisions.(Note 104)

Tools of Coercion, Compellence, and Prestige
More worrisome is the potential that the civilian leadership might drive Iran's nuclear strategy. As previously discussed, the civilian leadership has been placed in the position of carrying-out key aspects of the revolution. To the extent they have failed, and may seek other paths to glory for Iran on the international scene, they could greatly complicate matters. If one considers the military leadership mostly motivated by the need for a deterrent in the face of more capable foes, it is the civilian leadership that is most motivated by the quest for prestige. In the search for technological prestige, no project remains more illusive (and therefore more desirable) than indigenously developed nuclear weapons.

Because the official nuclear club refuses to admit new members, those nations achieving nuclear capability (in spite of the barriers) perceive a gain of immense prestige among smaller states.

Like the Chinese, Iranian leaders may seek indigenous development of nuclear weapons to provide a significant amount of national esteem and send a clear signal to the United States that they no longer feel hostage to the whims of other powers.(Note 105) To the Chinese, their technological achievement, in the words of Chong-Pin Lin, "whitewashed the stain of past humiliation with the dazzling and purifying light of the mushroom cloud."(Note 106) Technological prowess, in this sense, becomes a counter to semicolonial pasts. In the corporate mind of a country, it signals an ability to stand as an apparent equal (or at least a contender) with the "advanced" nations.

There are two additional objectives of prestige: "prestige for its own sake and prestige in support of the status quo or imperialism."(Note 107) The former objective is less important and most often sought for nationalistic reasons, while the latter objective recognizes the dynamics of the foreign policy environment.(Note 108)

Morgenthau points out that "only foolhardy egocentrics are inclined to pursue a policy of prestige for its own sake."(Note 109) This particular tendency emerges from a dictator's (or in Iran's case, the radicals') monopoly on domestic power where the rulers or key leaders revel in the personal influence they wield (a characteristic of Iran's strategic culture). They tend to confuse the international and domestic scenes, regarding "international politics as a kind of personal sport where in the exaltation of one's own nation and in the humiliation of others, one enjoyed one's own personal superiority."(Note 110) The foolishness, Morgenthau illustrates, is that one can afford this at home, but not in international relations where there are dramatic implications for those whose "power is not commensurate with his belief or pretense."(Note 111)

Such is the case with Iran's civilian leadership. They have created an artificial environment for themselves within Iran, an environment that celebrates rhetoric and caters to their inflated prestige. They believe they have "a mission transcending mere national interests."(Note 112) Shi'ia self-aggrandizement confuses personal glory with the political interests of the nation. Without the power to support perceived prestige, forces can fall to those capable of calling their bluff. The acquisition of nuclear weapons makes it more difficult for states, especially the United States, to call their bluff.

Even more disconcerting is the suggestion one can expect the current radical/conservative civilian coalition to be even more aggressive with regard to military matters than the religious leadership.(Note 113) It is the civilian leadership that most often openly stresses the danger of relying on "the self-restraint of future adversaries or adherence to international commitments."(Note 114) The "political" motive for weapons is at times the more dangerous, because emotion often triumphs over reason. Just as the radicals pressed the attack in the war with Iraq in spite of overwhelming odds, one potentially faces the danger of an emotionally charged leadership desperate to prove their legitimacy.(Note 115) Without a history of intellectual assessment of nuclear politics, nuclear policy under control of an ill-prepared civilian leadership portends disaster. Furthermore, Chubin illustrates a potentially dangerous point with regards to nuclear weapons as political tools: "Attempts to heighten U.S. anxiety and inhibitions by acting irrationally, in order to convert nuclear weapons into a multipurpose instrument of day-to-day diplomacy, would risk releasing the United States from its remaining inhibitions about 'punishing' Iran."(Note 116) Whether Iran's current coalition of radical and conservative leaders is savvy enough to fully appreciate this fact is yet to be seen.

Weapons as Defenders of the Faith
For the clergy, a unique dilemma exists. On one side nuclear weapons and their effects are at great odds with Islamic teachings, and the clergy have noted as much in many official proclamations and sermons.(Note 117) Indeed, Islam's fundamentals stress that God endowed man with the powers and faculties necessary to achieve a life worth living. These powers and resources are intended to be used for the good of others and the work of God on earth.(Note 118) Moreover, much of Iran's clerical leadership "feels that the key to Iran's strategic posture is in an Islamic bloc . . . that would compel the Arab states to gravitate towards Iran's influence;"(Note 119) not alienate them. Competing with the peaceful tenets of Islam is the singular belief of Iran's Shi'ia clergy that the existence of Israel is an affront to Islam. "Because a Muslim land in the heart of dar al-islam (the abode of Islam) can be ruled properly only by a Muslim authority, Israel . . . must be met with jihad (holy war)."(Note 120) The perceived need to confront the Zionists is strong and many clerics believe the battle is inevitable. One clergyman noted, "The Muslim nation will, God willing, fulfill the prayer of Noah [from the Koran]: 'And Noah said, Lord, leave not a single family of Infidels on the Earth for if thou leave them, they will beguile thy servants and will only beget sinners, infidels.' A(Note 121)

While Islam does not recognize divisions between secular and religious matters (they are "two sides of the same coin"(Note 122)), in Iran the beliefs of the religious clergy and desires of the political clergy (my characterization) seemingly appear at odds. Ayatollah 'Ali Hoseyni Khamene'i's transition from President (replaced by Rafsanjani) to head of the clergy illustrates this point.

As President, Khamene'i indicated on several occasions his preference for nuclear weapons. As early as 1987, he urged Iranian nuclear scientists to intensify their work "in defense of your country and your revolution."(Note 123) Bodansky reported that Khamene'i later dispatched several teams to Central Asia in search of nuclear weapons for sale following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Once such a purchase became potentially possible in Kazakhstan, Khamene'i convened a high-level commission to study the validity of the offer. He reportedly put Sayyid Atta'ollah Mohajerani, the Vice President, personally in charge of the effort.(Note 124) Mohajerani aggressively championed the need for nuclear weapons in Iran "as a pan-Islamic undertaking to confront Israel."(Note 125) "This regime wants to continue to have the upper hand; one way of doing this is to have a nuclear capability . . . all Muslims, including Iran must reach a high level in the nuclear field in order to confront the Israeli nuclear challenge."(Note 126)

At issue is whether Khamene'i now sees nuclear weapons as a theological or political issue and what might a clergy-centered strategy look like. The available evidence suggests a disconnect between the ideals of the common clergy and those actually wielding power. It is hard to believe much beyond pure power politics is at work in this regard. Influenced by the inevitability of a confrontation with Israel and the United States, Khamene'i undoubtedly seeks nuclear weapons to ensure the survival of the faith. As the bastion of Shi'ism, Iran could ill afford to lose face or battles against either state. With nuclear weapons, he potentially achieves a "draw" vis-a-vis Israel. Iran (and Shi'ism) is free therefore to continue the revolution in incremental steps with some certainty it will not be destroyed. A clergy-centered strategy is one of survival and creating an environment of greater freedom of action.

Given the existing circumstances in Iran and the historical propensity for some states to seek out new capabilities first and develop strategies only as an "after thought," it is possible Iran's leadership has no comprehensive strategy with regard to nuclear weapons.(Note 127) While suggesting possible nuclear strategies in this paper, it is perhaps not possible to identify the "official" strategy to any degree of certainty. What is known is the influence of motivation, strategic culture, and perceived rationality result in potentially common threads that weave a picture suggesting a "probable" strategy. The common points are:

• Concern with the political and spiritual survival of Iran in a world changing so fast the revolution is in danger of becoming irrelevant
• A quest for leadership based on political, spiritual, and military prestige
• A decision process that appears rational given Iran's perspectives, but one which probably gives the military no voice with respect to policies involving unconventional weapons.

Neither president Hashemi nor Supreme leader Ali Khamenei has the stature to dominate decision making as Ayatollah Khomeini did. The two leaders are more and more at odds, and the conservative-dominated legislature, the Majlis, is increasingly obstructionist. The ruling elite is no longer concerned with effective governance, but with ensuring the survival of the regime(Note 128)

In all likelihood, Iran's coalition of power elites seeks a nuclear weapon strategy that is designed to limit the ability of the United States to operate freely in the region without potentially high costs. Additionally, Iran's strategy must encompass its concerns with regard to potential nuclear attack by Israel. Since it cannot reasonably expect to hold the military capabilities of these two states at risk, the most likely strategy must center on "counter-value" targets. In a crisis, the ability to threaten the destruction of cities of U.S. coalition members could potentially create rifts in alliances that are already tenuous at best. To implement such a strategy, one would expect to see Iran focus on survivable long-range delivery systems. The current emphasis on mobile ballistic missile systems certainly supports this orientation.

Policy makers may take comfort with regard to key points in this argument. First, as has been discussed, one sees little to suggest Iran is irrational in its approach to most key policy issues. No one accuses its government of being particularly brilliant or insightful, but to date Iran's decision authority generally demonstrates it understands the fundamentals of power and political maneuvering. Second, because of the points outlined in this paper and the likelihood Iran is approaching nuclear policy in a rational manner, those concerned with countering a nuclear-armed Iran may find traditional tools and strategies useful for the challenge. Although often discussed, the suggestion of nuclear terrorism as an Iranian strategy is widely discounted.(Note 129)

There is a clear link between Iran's domestic politics and its foreign and security policies. Whether it is still possible to thwart Iran's nuclear desires is highly questionable; however, the recent success in turning back North Korea's nuclear clock seems to suggest all is not lost. Much depends on the stability of particular power centers within Iran. If the radical-conservative coalition continues, only additional confrontation may have any effect. Should the pragmatists succeed in moving issues towards the middle ground, Chubin suggests an "olive branch" approach might work. (Note 130)

Bodansky rightfully noted a profound change in Pakistan's nuclear policy from Ali Bhutto's quest for an "Islamic Bomb" to Zia ul-Haq's view of nuclear weapons as the last resort in Pakistan's survival against India.(Note 131) The evolution of Iran's nuclear doctrine owes its initial development to its experiences during the war with Iraq, its observations of the Gulf War, and the harsh realities of the new international environment. Should peace endure between Israel and the Arab states, Iran's strategy will undoubtedly mature.

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Last Update:  October1, 2002