Fred Charles Ikl(, Every War Must End

This paper was a First-Place Co-Winner in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition. Major John N. T. Shanahan, U.S. Air Force, was a student at the Naval War College at the time it was written.

The no-fly zone is a particularly tempting option for both civilian and military leaders in this era of force reductions and rising aversion to American military casualties, because they are ostensibly inexpensive and low risk when compared to alternative methods of military intervention. Moreover, given the significant advantage in American aviation technology and a general superiority in aircrew training, they appear to promise a high probability of success. The United States will continue to intervene globally in support of national objectives of "enlargement and engagement."(Note 2) Therefore, the no-fly zone will likely again be considered as an intervention option despite disparate political, economic, and military environments. Indiscriminate use of no-fly zone operations, however, vitiates the indispensable connection between strategy and tactics known as operational art.

To date, the overarching strategic objective in no-fly zone operations has been creation of a stable, lasting security zone (a safe haven) for a repressed minority group. For the air forces involved, the tactical objective has been relatively simple: prevention of flight within specific boundaries. In addition to the potential disconnect between these strategic and tactical objectives, the actual situation has become even more convoluted. In contrast to the explicit rationale offered by the National Command Authority (NCA), military leaders at various levels have linked no-fly zones with objectives as diverse as forward presence, economic sanctions, application of political or diplomatic pressure, punishment of rogue leaders and states, and combined force training. While these are important national security issues, they have little to do with the original, explicitly stated strategic goals. For no-fly zones, the consequence can thus be tactical success but strategic failure: a "successful" no-fly zone-as determined by the ability to prevent flight into and provide monitoring above a given area-does not necessarily imply a safe haven on the ground. This highlights the fundamental problem associated with the lack of operational design: absent a connection between results in the air and on the ground, air power risks operating in a political and military vacuum. The no-fly zone then acquires an unacceptably high probability of strategic failure.

This study provide a review of the background of no-fly zone operations and a clarification of terms, then analyzes three current operations and establishes the critical role of operational design when planning no-fly zone operations. (Operational design is the key component of operational art that guides operational commanders toward the most effective method of using available forces and assets to attain tactical and strategic objectives.) In addition, a discussion of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) will show that, while they apply to no-fly zone operations, they are nevertheless incomplete. The strategic success of Operation Provide Comfort,(Note 3) the strategic failure of Operation Southern Watch, and the mixed results of Operation Deny Flight suggest that an additional principle of MOOTW-that of synchronization (and its concomitant, synergy)-is needed. Synchronization is a basic and accepted tenet in large-scale combat operations such as Desert Storm, but when strategic objectives are not so clearly defined or easily achieved, as in no-fly zone operations, this additional principle will provide the operational commander another important tool with which to arrive at the desired outcome (or "end state").

While no-fly zone operations will likely continue to be a preferred intervention option and will enjoy almost certain tactical success, true strategic success-as measured by creation of a bona-fide safe haven on the ground-can be achieved only by the synchronization of efforts among air, ground, and sea forces. A security zone should not be enforced by air power alone. Finally, in most operations other than war, the ground contingent should comprise not only military troops, but also some combination of private voluntary organizations (PVOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Eleven days ago, on April 5th, I announced that the United States would initiate what soon became the largest relief effort in modern military history. . . . I have directed the U.S. military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq.

President George Bush, 16 April 1991

Birth and Development of the No-Fly Zone
The first official no-fly zone was established in northern Iraq in 1991, a result of two momentous products of the hasty end to Operation Desert Storm. The first was a loophole in the cease-fire agreement arranged initially at Safwan (the cease-fire was subsequently expressed formally through United Nations Security Council Resolutions [UNSCR] 686 and 687). The Safwan truce, while banning flight of fixed-wing aircraft, permitted the Iraqis to continue to fly helicopters.(Note 4) Second, the abrupt defeat of Iraq prompted uprisings by the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shi'as in southern Iraq beginning in early March 1991.(Note 5) The Iraqi government took advantage of the cease-fire loophole to suppress both uprisings by brutally attacking the Kurds and Shi'as with aircraft and helicopter gunships.(Note 6) The pitiful scenes of streams of Kurdish refugees fleeing to the harsh mountains of northern Iraq commanded immediate international media attention and a demand for American intervention. The U.S. Government, at first highly reluctant to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs, succumbed to international pressure and in April 1991 declared a Kurdish security zone in northern Iraq.(Note 7)

The security zone became part of a massive Kurdish relief operation known as Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort. The operation included a new ban on Iraqi fixed-wing and helicopter flights north of the 36th latitude line. This line was a somewhat arbitrary designation, but nevertheless isolated an area containing the majority of the Iraqi Kurdish population and the northbound flood of refugees. The first specific reference to a "no-fly zone" arose from this ban on Iraqi flights into the airspace overlying the proposed Kurdish safe haven. President Bush used UNSCRs 687 and 688 to justify American military intervention: these resolutions condemned the repression of Iraqi civilians and insisted that "Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance."(Note 8)

The second no-fly zone was created below the 32nd parallel in southern Iraq after the Iraqi government continued to apply ruthless measures against the Shi'a population throughout 1991 and 1992. Unlike the northern no-fly zone, Operation Southern Watch-finally established in August 1992-was not part of a larger humanitarian relief operation. It was simply designed to prevent the Iraqis from using fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft to bomb and strafe Shi'a population centers in the marshlands of southern Iraq. The operation was clearly intended to rectify the disastrous effects spawned by the Safwan helicopter loophole. As with operations in the northern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft still continue to patrol the area south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi military movements and to ensure that Iraqi aircraft do not fly into the exclusion zone.(Note 9)

The most recent no-fly zone, Operation Deny Flight, was established in October 1992 and proscribed military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast to the Iraqi aerial exclusion zones, Deny Flight received explicit U.N. authorization for the no-fly zone through UNSCR 781 and, because the Bosnian Serbs blatantly ignored the U.N. ban on military flights, through UNSCR 816. (Similar in most respects to resolution 781, resolution 816 embraced stronger wording to impress upon the Bosnian Serbs the grave consequences of continued violations of the no-fly zone.) In December 1995 Deny Flight was absorbed into the larger NATO operation now known as Joint Endeavor.

Strategic and Tactical Objectives of No-Fly Zones
While there undoubtedly will be a wide variety of reasons for creating future no-fly zones,(Note 10) we can make a reasonable prediction of likely strategic objectives through an analysis of the three current operations. Strategic objectives are likely to include humanitarian assistance to a repressed minority group and prevention of interference by states who seek political or socioeconomic gains by the continued oppression of such minorities. Furthermore, the tactical objectives are likewise straightforward: prevention of flight within a certain section of airspace and, when deemed appropriate, punishment through air strikes to deter further unacceptable behavior or to secure compliance with American conditions or U.N. resolutions.(Note 11)

Referring to Operation Provide Comfort, President Bush emphasized in early March 1991 that the effort was prompted "only by humanitarian concerns,"(Note 12) and he again downplayed the military aspects of the operation 11 days later:

[Provide Comfort] is an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating need. Our long-term objective remains the same: for Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.(Note 13)

The United Nations expressed similar sentiments in resolution 781, stating that the ban on military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina "constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina."(Note 14) The President's statements and the U.N. resolutions seem to verify that the primary strategic purpose of the no-fly zone has been to protect those on the ground, in effect, to create a de facto safe haven. While no-fly zones have shown manifest success in preventing aircraft from entering prohibited airspace, this success in the air has not equated to security zones on the ground.(Note 15)

To think "operationally" means to have that rare gift to think broadly and to understand how each action fits into an overall design to accomplish a given strategic goal.

Dr. Milan Vego, Naval Operational Art

Operational Design
Operational art gives the operational commander the tools necessary to translate national security objectives into an operational design. Despite an increase over the past 5 years in articles in the military literature devoted to operational art, the emphasis continues to be on the ground campaign rather than on naval or air operations. Operational design, however, is as important to the air campaign as it is to major land or sea operations and must be considered as an integral facet of any military operation.

The operational design "should exist to ensure that one's own forces and assets are employed in a coherent manner, focused on the assigned operational or strategic goals in the theater."(Note 16) An effective operational design allows the theater commander to maintain the "big picture," forcing observation of the operation with a disinterested view to determine if it is attaining not only tactical but also strategic objectives. In essence, operational design provides the means by which the commander gains operational perspective.

Critical Elements of Operational Design
The actions and conditions that determine or define success in MOOTW are typically vague and at times even enigmatic. In large part this is because of the myriad of nonmilitary influences (political, socioeconomic, and so on) that must be considered when developing operational objectives. The operational commander is nevertheless still responsible for determining "the sequence of actions most likely to produce the [military condition] allowing for the attainment of the operational or strategic goals."(Note 17) Moreover it is crucial that the operational commander interact constantly with national- and theater-strategic levels and reassess continuously the relationship between strategic objectives and tactical results. When the assigned objectives are unattainable, the commander is obliged to make that conclusion clear to his superiors.(Note 18)

The operational commander must comprehend fully the cardinal axiom that the desired end state is "not identical and should not be confused with the campaign's military objective. . . . Desired end state refers to both political and military conditions after the military strategic objective(s) were attained" (emphasis in the original).(Note 19) In contrast to most "conventional" war operations, operational commanders in MOOTW must treat the political and military consequences of his operational design to be of almost equal significance, even though it is possible that they are more uncomfortable with the (perhaps distasteful) political dimensions of military operations. By taking account of both military and political aspects, operational commanders will be better equipped to anticipate a potential disconnect between tactical success and strategic objectives.

It is also important that operational commanders coordinate closely with senior military and political leaders to ensure that operational guidance, when issued, includes a "clear set of political objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the strategic vision to become a reality; it should also contain a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the above to happen."(Note 20) Only through such guidance can operational commanders determine if the forces and methods available are sufficient to achieve the overarching, explicit strategic objective-represented thus far by a long-term, stable security zone for a persecuted minority group.

Principles of MOOTW
The principles of war or of MOOTW are valuable not as immutable checklist items to be regurgitated by rote. Instead, they offer convenient reminders to help judge what is needed to enhance the likelihood of operational and strategic success. Combat-seasoned leaders will undoubtedly apply the principles of MOOTW without ever referring to what they might perceive to be pedantic definitions. However, the very novelty of no-fly zones demands that all commanders, regardless of experience and irrespective of service affiliation, address and reassess these six principles-(security, legitimacy, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and objective.(Note 21)

Of the six accepted principles, objective has posed a particular challenge in no-fly zones. Lacking a clear connection between the strategic and tactical goals, military commanders have tended to make assumptions regarding implicit national or theater strategic goals.(Note 22) This refers to the tendency to accept the latent objectives of no-fly zone operations to be application of pressure against rogue states, reconnaissance of enemy territory, and so forth. While very valuable as theater strategic objectives, they do not address the fundamental (and only stated) strategic objective of establishing and maintaining a safe haven on the ground.

An additional MOOTW principle, that of synchronization, is at least as valuable as the other six and must be included when planning security zone operations. Adapted from its conventional definition, which emphasizes solely the military aspects of these operations, synchronization should be added as a principle of MOOTW through the following counsel: Produce maximum relative power at a decisive place and time through the arrangement of military, civil, and political actions in time, space, and purpose. Synchronization demands that "all assets in all elements [be] efficiently combined and co-ordinated against a properly selected, common objective."(Note 23) This synergy applies not only to war but to MOOTW (and hence no-fly zone operations) as well.(Note 24) Synchronization also suggests much more than simply coordination, which can be considered to be a "contributing cause" to synchronization's desired effects.(Note 25) Air power employed in isolation may guarantee tactical success, but to reinforce the prospects of strategic success the operational commander must consider this additional principle when developing the operational design and when negotiating with political and military leaders for the forces required to secure and protect a safe haven.

NO-FLY ZONES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN:
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

[In Southern Iraq] napalm has been dropped on civilian homes, and human rights workers from international organizations report that while air attacks have ceased, ground assaults on the marshes have escalated dramatically since the imposition of the no-fly zone. . . . The ground attacks have been accompanied by widespread arbitrary arrests and the torture or execution of detainees.

			Hamid al-Bayati, Destruction of the Southern Marshes

When enforced by air power alone, a security zone is much more likely to simply preserve the status quo in a given theater than to change significantly those political, religious, or economic grievances that are the root causes of discontent and repression. In addition, such a one-power no-fly zone operation is not likely to halt the persecution of a protected minority group.(Note 26)The absence of a contingent of ground forces to buttress air power's influence can result in half-hearted intervention and a corresponding danger:

A middle course in intervention-especially a gradual and symbolic use of force-is likely to do little but muddy both sides' calculations, fuel their hopes for victory, or kill people for principles only indirectly related to the purpose of war. If deadly force is to make a direct contribution to peace, it must engage the purposes most directly related to war-the determination of borders and the distribution of political power. (emphasis added)(Note 27)

Deadly force is not generally associated with operations other than war, yet the problems associated with such a "middle course" of action are as significant in no-fly zones as they are in more complex and "conventional" combat operations. The application of operational design would illuminate the perils of using air power in a half-hearted manner and would force the operational commander to demand either more explicit strategic guidance or an adjustment to the forces and assets allocated to the security zone operation.

Operational Design in Provide Comfort, Southern Watch, and Deny Flight
Although the three current no-fly zone operations were created under widely different politico-military conditions, the strategic objectives are similar enough to permit comparison of their operational designs. While Operation Provide Comfort continues to experience problems in its termination phase (the no-fly zone is still enforced more than 4 years after its inception), it has been nonetheless largely a strategic success. This operation incorporated all of the principles of MOOTW, to include synchronization and, most importantly, the indispensable elements of operational design. It had a clear objective (relief for and protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq), a definitive end state (a Kurdish enclave and transfer of control of refugee assistance to the United Nations), and excellent strategic guidance. General Shalikashvili and his staff successfully translated national objectives-protection of the Kurds-into a mission statement, immediate, mid-term, and long-term operational objectives, and explicit mission tasks. The result was unambiguous operational guidance.(Note 28) Fortunately, General Shalikashvili had available both the political support and the forces and assets necessary to ensure effective synchronization.

In the case of Provide Comfort, the no-fly zone was merely one component of a vast operation that included, at its peak, units on the ground from 11 different countries and comprised American military forces, 50 PVOs and NGOs, and United Nations personnel. The CTF also included three additional, nontraditional components that proved crucial to Provide Comfort's strategic success. The first, Civil Affairs Command, was "tasked to coordinate with the multitude of international relief organizations and private voluntary organizations in providing humanitarian assistance."(Note 29) The second, the Military Coordination Center (MCC), encouraged and established "direct face-to-face" contacts between not only coalition forces and humanitarian relief agencies, but between the coalition, Iraqi military, and Kurdish leaders.(Note 30) Medical Command, as the third component, provided the medical facilities required to cope with the flood of Kurdish refugees.

The aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone provide the necessary aerial umbrella to protect the Kurds from Iraqi air attacks (and provided critical supplies through air drops-a vital task early in the operation), but the operational design was successful in achieving theater strategic objectives only because of the symbiotic relationship between forces on the ground and the aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone.

If Provide Comfort is judged to be a strategic success, then Operation Southern Watch must be considered to be a strategic failure. The repression of the Shi'as has continued essentially unabated since the southern no-fly zone was established in 1992. This failure can be attributed to the absence of operational art when translating explicit national objectives (protection of the Shi'a population and creation of a Shi'a enclave) into an operational design. There is little synchronization in Southern Watch. Air power by itself has prevented the Iraqis from flying into the aerial exclusion zone, but there is no substantial force on the ground to deter the Iraqis from persisting in their repression of the Shi'as. To the contrary: "Saddam's bombardment of the area has, if anything, intensified since the creation of the no-fly zone. Air cover without monitoring on the ground has proved almost as inadequate as not providing any cover." (emphasis added)(Note 31) In fact, the aerial patrols may even have unintended, demoralizing effects upon the Shi'as. They have described "how allied planes imposing the no-fly zone merely observe-many of them use the term 'supervise'-blatant genocidal attacks on people and their homes."(Note 32)

One must then ask if the strategic objective in southern Iraq is, as stated by Presidents Bush and Clinton, to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to the Shi'as, or is it simply "a way to tighten the screws on Saddam"?(Note 33) The very presence of this ambiguity of objectives indicates an absence of sufficient strategic or operational guidance and produces unacceptable confusion. One author boasted that "maneuvers carried out by Operation Southern Watch aircraft over Iraq goaded Iraqi defense forces to shoot at U.S. aircraft on several occasions" (emphasis added).(Note 34) This author apparently has failed to comprehend that there has been little connection between tactical or lower-operational success (prevention of flight across the 32nd parallel and application of military pressure against the Iraqi regime) and the overall strategic objective (a safe haven for the Shi'as). Unfortunately, such expressions of confidence concerning no-fly zone results are far from rare and have been expressed at all levels, from those on the 'tip of the spear' (the aircrews patrolling the exclusion zones) to senior political and military leaders.(Note 35)

Until ground forces were introduced recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a promising application of synchronization), Deny Flight had also experienced mixed results. The strategic objective as proclaimed in UNSCR 781C"a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina"-was certainly not achieved solely through enforcement of the no-fly zone. Without question, "surgical" air strikes in 1994 helped force the Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table, but it remains to be seen if the air strikes simply persuaded two weary opponents to put off fighting for the winter. Furthermore, the no-fly zone had not even been particularly successful at the tactical level. For example, there were over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone between April 1993 and January 1994.(Note 36) This is a direct result of a flawed operational design that allowed the Bosnian Serbs to fly helicopters essentially unchallenged despite their potentially devastating firepower. The Bosnian Serbs also continued to fly fixed-wing aircraft in strikes of their own against Bosnian Muslim and Croat targets even after heavy retaliatory U.N. air strikes in September 1995.(Note 37)

The loss of an American F-16 and a French Mirage aircraft was even more significant than these violations of the exclusion zone. As events in fall 1994 demonstrated, the capture of the French pilots almost caused a complete breakdown of the Dayton peace agreement.(Note 38) If the American pilot had been captured, the results would have been at least as serious (if not more so), as a result of emotions certain to be generated by television coverage of the captured airman. The no-fly zone, as enforced by aircraft and backed up by meager U.N. forces on the ground, also could never have prevented widespread "ethnic cleansing"-chillingly illustrated by the massacre of refugees near Srebrenica in 1994.(Note 39)

The prospects for achieving the desired end state in Bosnia-Herzegovina-a more peaceful, stable partition-have been enhanced by the introduction of NATO ground forces into the region. New operational guidance is establishing the necessary synergy of ground and air forces. Air power prevents flight into the no-fly zone and provides air cover for ground forces, while troops on the ground provide the hammer against air power's anvil. Civil-military agencies can help rebuild the region's shattered infrastructure. The United States may not relish the complex role of nation building (particularly in such a volatile area), but adherence to the elements of operational design will help guide NATO's efforts toward creation of a stable and enduring partition on the ground. While surely a difficult task, it is one that would be virtually impossible to achieve by air power alone.

Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer the pleasures of gratification without the burden of commitment.
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf

The United States will continue to intervene around the world to enhance global stability and protect its own vital interests. As a result of an ongoing retrenchment and a continuing reduction of military force levels, air power, viewed as precise, "neat," and relatively low risk, invariably will be one of the first (if not the first) military intervention options to be considered when trouble flares up somewhere in the world. Air power is highly visible, credible, and usually flexible. Insofar as America preserves its considerable lead in technology and aircrew training, its air power will have enormous intimidation value.(Note 40)

By definition most military operations other than war will demand not only a synchronized effort between air, ground, and maritime (to enforce the blockade portion of an exclusion zone) combat forces, but also between military forces and humanitarian relief agencies, PVOs, and NGOs. The United States military has made considerable progress toward accepting this necessary synergy of civil and military organizations, but must continue to emphasize the inter-agency coordination demanded of MOOTW.(Note 41)

As the military's new kid on the block, the no-fly zone offers a seductive option. Air power has become the feel- good method of intervention, called upon for its limited liability and high probability of success. Indisputable successes enjoyed at tactical-operational levels must not be allowed to obscure strategic failure, however. The application of operational art, through adherence to both the critical elements of operational design-objective, guidance and end state-and the principles of MOOTW (to include the additional principle of synchronization) will allow operational leaders to consider in advance the difficulties associated with enforcing a security zone solely with air power. In addition, early interaction with the JCS and NCA and frequent operational reassessments are key facets of the operational design. The success of Provide Comfort demonstrated the benefits of such a well-crafted, synergistic operational design. Without question, air power provides a vital forward presence and can apply pressure against rogue states most effectively; however, if these are the true objectives of the operation then they must be stated as such and not simply implied.

Finally, application of operational art will highlight the problems associated with the termination phase of no-fly zone operations. This issue is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves.(Note 42) The desired end state must be articulated by the NCA to determine when and how to end the operation. All three no-fly zone operations continue today with no end in sight. It is disheartening to consider that when the United States finally withdraws from northern or southern Iraq, for financial reasons or as a result of increasing military commitments elsewhere, it will be Saddam Hussein, and not the United States, the Kurds, or the Shi'as, who will emerge as the victor.

Despite the novelty of no-fly zones, operational design must be applied throughout the spectrum of military activities. At least for the near future, this spectrum will, perhaps ironically, emphasize operations other than war. A thorough study of the "Fundamentals of Campaign Planning" in Joint Pub 5-0 provides an excellent starting point when considering the feasibility of the no-fly zone as a military intervention option. Operational art may not guarantee strategic success or prevent an ungraceful exit in no-fly zone operations, but it will reveal to political and military leaders the conditions for success and the potential for (and consequences of) strategic failure. Moreover, early application of operational design will identify the need for synchronization when enforcing security zones, of which the no-fly zone should be but one complementary component. If the operational commander does not have the assets available to ensure strategic success, he can either insist on an adjustment to the number and type of forces available or recommend that the United States not intervene at all. While the latter would be a difficult choice in this CNN age, it is perhaps better than, as in southern Iraq, a half-hearted intervention.

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