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Challenges of the Global Century Executive SummaryThis report presents the results of an 18-month research project designed to assess the strategic consequences of globalization and its implications for U.S. national security and defense policy. The project was conducted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and sponsored by the Department of the Navy. It brought together a diverse, interdisciplinary group of experts from the United States and abroad. The results of their analytical efforts are presented in The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, published in two volumes by NDU Press and furnished on the accompanying CD-ROM. The main judgments of this research are presented herein by three of the project leaders. This executive summary identifies key findings. The appendix lists the contents of the two volumes of The Global Century, which offer in-depth analyses of the issues discussed here. A strategic challenge facing the Bush administration, especially the Department of Defense, is dealing with globalization, which became a matter of widespread public interest only a few years ago. Anchored in economic dynamics, it is a process of growing cross-border flows in many areas that are drawing countries and regions closer together, creating networks of expanded ties. Whereas many observers initially saw globalization as wholly positive, we found that its effects are mixed and uneven across different regions and within various countries, yielding both beneficial and detrimental changes in the international system. Moreover, globalization will continue to interact with old and new geopolitics to help lessen some tensions but aggravate others. The key challenge is shaping the interplay of globalization, old geopolitics, and new transnational threats so that the 21st century, the first truly Global Century, is both peaceful and productive. Globalization has many positive attributes. It helps create a wealthier world economy, promotes communications, and stimulates technological innovation, including sophisticated information systems. It also rewards good governance, fosters more universal political participation, creates new markets, and encourages multilateral cooperation. However, especially in the short term, globalization is associated with a widening income gap and painful social upheavals in many places. It transmits financial information so rapidly that shocks become contagious. In these circumstances, it can both arouse anger at industrial democracies and facilitate the growth of international crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Globalization does not stop wars, prevent aggression, end arms races, erase centuries of hatred, or eradicate power politics. It thus must be kept in perspective and, to the extent possible, channeled by wise policies so that its benefits outweigh its liabilities. Owing to globalization and other trends, the democratic community in North America, Europe, and Asia enjoys peaceful prosperity; several South American countries are making progress as well. Other regions, however, remain unstable and troubled, for example, Russia and Eurasia, the Balkans, the Greater Middle East, large parts of South Asia, Africa, and several countries in East Asia. There and elsewhere, the main danger is not the rise of a new peer rival to threaten the United States, but widespread turmoil of the sort that can create conflict and endanger our national interests in stable global commerce. Factors contributing to this chaos include geostrategic rivalries, political turmoil, economic difficulties, regional aggressors, ethnic strife, failing states, transnational threats, proliferation, and military imbalances. Dampening this turbulence, while creating a climate of greater security where national interests are at stake, will be critical if globalization is to bring sustained progress.
U.S. strategy must employ all the instruments of national power in a more integrated fashion to meet this demanding challenge. In particular, it will need to synthesize policies for guiding the world economy to address the new security environment. Balancing policies in these and other arenas will be critical if the United States is to advance its interests and values in a world where economics and security are increasingly intertwined. Achieving this goal will require a high degree of interagency coordination in Washington and in activities abroad. Appropriate changes in policymaking and implementation will be necessary as well. Securing greater help from America's allies and partners in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere also will be important. The Department of Defense has not yet devoted much attention to global strategic consequences. Globalization will interact with other trends to alter the setting for defense planning. Swift power projection and expeditionary operations will become the dominant requirement. Although sizable U.S. forces may remain stationed in Europe and Northeast Asia, they will often be called upon to deploy elsewhere and to serve as instruments of power projection together with forces deployed from the United States. Military planners will need to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities--from peacetime engagement to regional conflict management and theater warfighting. Handling this strategic agenda, while transforming the Armed Forces for the information era, is key to creating the flexible and adaptive defense posture needed for the 21st century. Maritime affairs are becoming more prominent in the strategic calculus. The global economy is producing a major upsurge of commerce on the oceans and seas. In peace and war, many military operations in the future will be maritime and littoral. An inherent flexibility and broad range of capabilities allow naval forces to transition quickly from peacetime presence and engagement to crisis response and countervailing military action. The sea services are well suited to the challenges of the Global Century, but to remain so they will need to continue the process of transformation. |
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