

Toward Alliance Reform

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Globalization is forcing everyone to rethink—not least of all the strategic studies and policymaking community. As is true in other areas, our community is still coming to grips with what globalization is, what it means for foreign and defense policy, and how strategic studies and policymakers need to reorient their traditional ways of thinking and working in an increasingly globalized world.

Many of the excellent contributions in this volume are conceptual, historical, or highly empirical. They help illuminate the critical and often detailed issues that are at the center of the globalization debate and that we must grapple and come to terms with if we as a community are to build a consensus on U.S. foreign and defense policy in an increasingly globalized era. My goal in this chapter is somewhat different. It is to step back and be speculative by asking the following questions: What kind of policies would we ideally want to have for the United States in a globalized world? How do they compare to where we are today? Is it possible to close the gap?

My perspective is that of someone who has spent his career in both the think-tank world working on policy initiatives and in the government trying to implement them. Most of that experience has been in the U.S.-European relationship. Our relationship with Europe is particularly interesting, for Europe is a part of the world that is coming together after the end of the Cold War while also going global in a number of areas.

For the United States, Europe remains strategically important but for new and different reasons. It is no longer just a place we are committed to defend, but also a potential global partner at a time when there is a growing imperative in U.S. foreign policy to find partners to manage a global agenda. Europe is an ally that, unlike other parts of the world, has officially embraced the goal of pursuing common goals and interests with the United States on a global scale. It is the part of the world with which we have the most mature alliance relationships and with which we currently have at least the beginnings of a more global dialogue and agenda. It is a natural ally in trying to manage the strategic challenges of globalization.

This is why the Clinton administration made Europe and the creation of a new post-Cold War U.S.-European partnership one of its top foreign policy priorities. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright often said that one of the basic rules of politics is to protect your base, and that, in foreign policy terms, Europe is our base. American support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union

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(EU) enlargement, as well as U.S. proposals to restructure and expand the scope of the U.S.–EU relationship, was driven by several factors. But one of the most important motivations was the desire to move this relationship away from its original Cold War rationale and to create a modern partnership to work together in an increasingly globalized world.

Today our relationship with Europe and the U.S.–European partnership are still largely dominated by the need to finish what one might call the “in-Europe agenda”—the creation of a Europe whole and free in alliance with the United States. As we move forward with this project, we must also continue to lay the foundation for what might be called the “beyond-Europe” agenda—the issue of whether and how a unified Europe and the United States can cooperate on global strategic issues.

Globalization: Is It Good or Bad for the United States?

Strategists and policymakers are trying to understand and cope with two dramatic shifts that have occurred in the last decade. The first was the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War, and the passing of the bipolar system that shaped so much of our strategic agenda for half of a century. The second is the accelerating trend toward globalization. The two are, of course, related. Globalization helped accelerate the collapse of communism as it widened the gap in the economic performance of the West and the Soviet Union. The spread of information fueled the development of civil society and undercut communist rule. At the same time, the collapse of communism unleashed a set of new forces that has helped contribute to globalization’s acceleration in the 1990s.

As someone who approaches the issue as an amateur, I do not pretend to be conversant in the nuances and quasi-theological arguments over how to define, measure, or quantify globalization. In my mind, the key characteristics of this trend are pretty straightforward: the growing surge of economic, cultural, and political cross-border flows; the growing integration and interdependency of markets; and the growing formation of multinational corporations and other institutions in response to these trends. Many of the characteristics of globalization strike me as the same trends that we see and have seen in terms of regional integration, albeit on a global scale and at a new, more accelerated and less controlled pace. This is a trend that, in a macro-sense, is mostly a positive one both for the United States and for the world.

That is an important point to make because integration is almost universally accepted as a positive trend. True, globalization is seen by some critics as being much more ambiguous, if not threatening, but I do not share that skepticism. I think that globalization has had several positive strategic consequences:

- Strengthening and consolidating the core of democratic, market-based countries around the world, especially in North America, the European Union, and Northeast Asia.
- Improving the prospects for the successful transition to democracy and market-based economics in other areas (Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia) as well as key swing states such as Russia, China, India, and Indonesia.

- Creating huge pressure for the opening up of closed societies and for reform in those countries whose leaders are still trying to resist change.

In short, globalization has thus far led to a big improvement in the prospect for a more democratic, peaceful, and prosperous world. If one were to plot a chart of the world, one axis measuring how open or closed societies are and the other how autonomous or integrated a country is, it would show a huge shift toward a more open and integrated world since 1989. If globalization were a product of a consciously pursued Grand Strategy, we would declare it a success. To a degree, this success has been a product of our policy and strategy, but it also has been produced by natural forces of change. In the future, globalization will continue being influenced by natural forces, but conscious and strong government policies will be needed to channel it in the right directions.

For the United States, globalization has been a special bonus. It is not a coincidence that this last decade has simultaneously witnessed the acceleration of globalization and one of the greatest increases in American economic growth, technological innovation, self-confidence, and power. Economically, we are well positioned to prosper from this trend. Politically, our society has shown itself to be more flexible and able to absorb the domestic shocks and backlash of globalization than most other countries, including other Western industrial democracies. Culturally, globalization is an American and English-language phenomenon. Strategically, globalization has reinforced the fact that we are the sole remaining military superpower with a global reach and capability.

At the same time, globalization has produced not only winners in a political, economic, or cultural sense but has also been a double-edged sword; that is, there have been both winners and losers within states and in the international arena. While countries may be doing better in a macro-sense, various sectors or segments of society have clearly suffered. All of our countries have experienced a political backlash against some of the effects of globalization. Even the United States has not been immune to these trends, as was evident in the protests against the World Trade Organization summit in Seattle.

Internationally, the dramatic opening of societies and states in the international system has also been a double-edged sword. While we generally accept the growing interdependence of the world as a net plus, this has also been accompanied by the emergence of new threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. These include, but are by no means limited to, the following: the diffusion of potentially dangerous technologies, especially in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the weakening or failure of states, along with the rise of troublesome nonstate actors; the lack of accountability or democratic control over many of the new transnational global actors; the vulnerabilities to attack that arise from an integrated global infrastructure; and a much more likely contagion or knock-on effect from one part of the world to another.

Proliferation is the most obvious and oft-discussed example of globalism. But it also remains unclear which way important transition states such as Russia or China will go. The inability to adapt to, or cope with, the pressures of globalization can also create instability and produce failed regimes and failed states. While we all pledge

our faith to the market and growing interdependence as a peaceful antidote to nationalism and geopolitics, and cross our fingers that Frank Fukuyama was right in his thesis on the end of history, we are still not 100 percent sure and harbor concerns that maybe he was wrong and that there still may be modern-day dictators who harness nationalism and modern-day capitalism for evil purposes. As one of the greatest beneficiaries of globalization, the United States is also the focal point of much of the envy, frustration, and hatred it has engendered. For that reason, we may be a more vulnerable target for that frustration.

There are also some caveats when it comes to the United States. There is little doubt that the United States has benefited tremendously from globalization. But it also has placed new pressures on the United States to become more involved in issues and in regions where it has not been engaged before. The fact that there is no agreed-upon international framework to manage this process has left a void and created additional pressures for the United States to somehow help fill this void. What some countries see as an enormous benefit to the United States and a chance for the country to maximize its influence by becoming a kind of global policeman, however, is viewed by many U.S. citizens as a significant and almost frightening version of mission creep, which is capable of overtaking our resources and overextending our military forces.

Applying Einstein's *Gedankenexperiment* to Foreign Policy

One of the great pitfalls when one is in government or even when one works in the broader think-tank community that tries to affect policy decisions is the tendency to work from, and at times become intellectually captive or hostage to, the conceptual agenda set by existing government thinking and policy. There is an almost inevitable tendency when in government to use the status quo as the point of departure. Such an approach often makes sense. But at other times, it can be constraining, even counterproductive. Anyone who has served in government has probably witnessed or been involved in a policy review where such an approach was bureaucratically comfortable but led to an intellectual dead end. This is particularly true when governments or branches of government are forced to confront significant changes in their external environment or paradigm shifts of one or the other form.

Does globalization present that kind of change or paradigm shift for U.S. foreign policy and strategy? Are we adapting or adjusting our policies in the right way to meet this challenge? One way to test the adequacy of our current policies is to conduct a rather simple intellectual exercise. The goal here is to step back, set aside the status quo and its constraints as much as possible, and instead try to sketch out the ideal state of affairs—that is, what the goal of our strategy should be. One can then compare that ideal state to the status quo to see how we are doing. If the two are the same, then we are in pretty good shape. If they are not, then we can identify the gap, the reasons for it, and start thinking about whether and how it is possible to move from Point A to Point B. To employ a phrase that Albert Einstein used for scientific theories, we could conduct a *Gedankenexperiment* (thought experiment) to help us discover something that might or should exist but that we are not aware of at the moment.¹

If asked to try to design from scratch a strategy for the United States in a globalized world, what might it look like? I would suggest that our options should be guided by the following principles. First, we should recognize and accept the fact that globalization is happening whether we like it or not. It cannot be stopped. It has many beneficial aspects, in particular for a country the size of the United States, which has such a dominant position in the international arena. This position, however, imposes a unique responsibility on us to help create and sustain an international system that is equitable, and one that must be seen as equitable if it is to be accepted by the vast majority of other participating states. The point of departure for our strategy should therefore be how we can best shape this system in a fashion that is conducive to our interests as well as those of the world community.

Second, at a time when the United States is more integrated into an increasingly interdependent world, the importance of allies and partners and international institutions should be going up, not down. Globalization is indeed global. The logical goal of globalization in the realms of foreign and defense policy is greater integration. In short, we should seek alliances to help manage the strategic consequences of this trend. The United States cannot and should not aspire to “go it alone” and carry the full responsibility of managing this emerging global system. An imperative of globalization is therefore that we need partners—as much if not more than in the past. This leaves us with a certain paradox. Even though the Cold War is over and we do not face any imminent existential threats (and find ourselves with fewer resources for the conduct of both foreign and defense policy), our strategy should be oriented to building and sustaining alliances and partnerships, not neglecting them. A globalizing world demands them in order to ensure that it produces progress, not troubles and disasters.

A top strategic priority should be to organize the core group of democratic or like-minded countries who benefit from, and are willing and able to shoulder the international responsibilities of creating and managing, a framework in which the challenges of globalization are addressed. There will be, and should be, a great deal of cogitation and debate over how one does this—by strengthening truly global institutions or by transforming existing regional relationships and organizations. But the strategic thrust of our policy is nonetheless clear. In an increasingly interdependent world where the United States is more integrated and exposed to external influences, alliances and partnerships with key players are an asset, not a liability.

Third, there must be an answer to the immediate question: allies and partners to do what? What should these alliances be focused on in terms of mission? Who should be included and who should not? At least part of the answer to this question is that we need alliances whose mission is to provide the international or regional framework for globalization and to address the new risks and vulnerabilities that result from it. Because the nations of the world are so interdependent, the main goal of our strategy should be to keep that world safe by guarding against the risks that do exist. At a time of growing interdependence, when the consequences of crises spread faster, cross more borders, and can affect more people in disparate countries, we need alliances not only to deter or fight wars but also to help shape that interdependent system in peacetime. A higher premium should be placed on what many strategists like to call “environment shaping”; that is, in the absence of an immediate threat, but in a

world where integration and globalization are accelerating, the importance of environment shaping should increase relative to crisis management and war fighting.

Such alliances would, of course, not just be military, but also political, economic, and security organizations. Their goal would not be limited to only creating regional military balances of power or defending countries against an acute military threat. Such thinking is increasingly anachronistic in a globalized world. Instead, they would, ideally, integrate all of our policy tools from money to military power in order to maximize our ability to shape both regional theaters as well as this new global environment. They would bring together “soft” and “hard” power, to use Joseph Nye’s terminology, as part of a grander strategy for shaping a new international system.²

A point that often gets lost in much of the current literature on globalization is the important link between economics and security and the role that security and alliance have played and can continue to play in fostering integration at different levels. To paraphrase a well-known political slogan from the 1992 American presidential campaign, It is not just the economy, stupid! Security matters, and it is often the precondition for successful economic integration and reconciliation. It is a lot easier for a country to trade and integrate across borders if it is not worried about being invaded, securing its sovereignty, or competing militarily with its neighbors.

If we look at the European experience, historically and today, security alliances have played and continue to play a crucial role in fostering regional integration and reconciliation. For example, Franco-German reconciliation as well as the start of European integration would have been impossible without NATO and the security umbrella that the Atlantic Alliance provided. NATO enlargement to East-Central Europe has made EU enlargement eastward easier. It has also eased German-Polish reconciliation and is likely, in my view, to be a precondition for the eventual reconciliation between Russia and its Eastern European neighbors. Poland today is far more confident and willing to trade with Russia and to work for Russia’s inclusion in broader Euro-Atlantic structures, now that its own security is protected by NATO. The same concepts and principles can be applied to different regions as well as on a broader, even international, scale.

Fourth, our strategy should, of course, not be limited to the task of environment shaping. It would have to cover the full spectrum, including both crisis management and war fighting. Globalization is likely to increase the pressures on us for early crisis intervention and management of conflicts in order to stop or contain them and to prevent such instability from spreading or escalating into major conflicts. Therefore, we would ideally want to have political support at home, civilian and military capabilities nationally, and coalitions for effective crisis management.

Fifth, we obviously should have the right kinds of military forces, properly trained and equipped, to confront and defeat our adversaries in a globalized world when required to do so. Globalization will not make war obsolete, but it may change the nature of warfare. For example, adversaries may seek to gain advantage over us by exploiting whatever new vulnerabilities we face in a globalized world through asymmetrical warfare.

In short, our strategy should be global in scope, focused first and foremost on shaping the international environment through a better integration of soft and hard

power; more reliant on political, economic, and security alliances with allies and partners, as well as international institutions; outfitted with both the civilian and military capabilities for early and effective crisis management; and, last but not least, equipped with the military forces necessary to deter and fight the kinds of new wars most likely in this new era.

Performance of U.S. Foreign Policy Today

If this list provides a useful approximation of the kind of strategy the United States would want to pursue in an era of globalization, then clearly we have some work to do in order to meet that standard. Neither the policymaking world nor the strategic community that tries to support the policymakers is currently doing a very good job on many of these fronts.

The problem starts with the fact that the strategic issues associated with globalization are not yet well understood, let alone integrated into our work. They have not become part of the mainstream work of diplomats, soldiers, or even think-tankers in the strategic community. They are rarely on the agenda for summits or even regular consultations with key allies. In an era in which governments and bureaucracies are all too often compartmentalized, global issues are all too often handled in newly created bureaus or divisions that are not at the center of, or influential in, the foreign policymaking process. They are still considered trendy, somewhat exotic issues that are to be addressed, yet often only as an afterthought or after the heavy lifting on more traditional issues has been accomplished.

For example, let us take the experience of U.S.-European relations over the last decade. Both the United States and our key European allies have, in various forms, embraced the principle that we should become closer partners in managing global issues. But I suspect that the strategic challenges of globalization would not be high on the list of issues that our leaders have spent their time discussing. We still have to move beyond rhetoric and define the kind of workable agenda that will turn that principle into reality.

Moreover, while we all nod our heads in agreement when someone talks about the need for better environment shaping and crisis management strategies, the reality is that implementing these strategies is easier said than done. For example, there is a growing recognition that we need to better integrate our economic and security policies in order to be more effective in creating or shaping an environment where instability and new threats might arise. But the gap between economic and political or military policymakers in the United States and in Europe remains as wide as ever. The U.S. Government has taken some steps—for example, creation of the National Economic Council—to raise the profile of and integrate economic issues and factors in the national security decisionmaking process. But my sense is that we still have a long way to go in this regard. If one looks at the resources we make available for economic policy tools, one finds that the record is hardly an encouraging one. In view of the very mixed record on sanctions, it is not clear that they are a success story in terms of the interplay between economics and security either.

I would argue that NATO enlargement was one of the great acts of soft strategic environment shaping of the last decade. We enlarged NATO in order to foster European integration and unification at a time of peace and in the absence of any immediate military threat. We all probably would agree that a coordinated enlargement of NATO and the European Union would have been ideal. In theory, it would certainly have made strategic sense to have an open dialogue, if not coordination, between these two institutions. But that was simply not doable because of institutional sensitivities and competition. Since then, we have progressed to the point where we allow NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU Special Representative Javier Solana to meet for coffee, and we may soon agree to low-level informal working groups. But we clearly still have a long way to go to have an effective impact.

Similarly, it seems obvious that a better integration of soft and hard security instruments as part of a broader, common U.S.-European approach would also necessitate an overhaul of the U.S.-EU relationship. The European Union is a major provider of soft security on a global scale. The United States should want to transform that relationship into one in which it coordinates its approaches on soft security and then backs them up with hard security through NATO and ad hoc military coalitions of the willing. But the U.S.-EU relationship today remains largely nonstrategic and dominated by the management of U.S.-European trade disputes.

When it comes to crisis management, we have obviously learned a lot in the last decade from our experiences in peacekeeping and peacemaking in various parts of the world—Haiti, the Balkans, Africa, or East Timor. But part of what we have learned is that we need to be able to do a much better job at it. Let me highlight two issues that I think are illustrative of the kinds of issues that will become more important, but maybe also contentious, as we move into a globalized world. One is the question of the international legitimacy of different forms of early intervention. Intellectually and strategically, we understand that at times it can be more effective and cheaper to intervene early in a conflict, before it escalates, and thereby nip a crisis in the bud.

But that is often difficult politically, in part because we cannot get the international mandate for intervention, a situation that has prompted increasing debate among international legal experts. The Kosovo conflict highlighted just how important different interpretations of international law can be to flexibility in a crisis. There is also another political reality: it often is not possible for governments to secure a political consensus on early involvement or intervention precisely because the stakes and risks are not immediately apparent to all.

Another challenge is the need for a more robust and effective civilian component to crisis management missions. This is the most conspicuous lesson of our peacekeeping experience in Europe over the last decade. We see, again and again, the clear asymmetry between the military and civilian resources that can be brought to bear in a conflict. While the analytical and policymaking community recognizes this need, again fixing this problem is often difficult.

For example, in 1998, the U.S. Government proposed to create under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe something called Rapid Expert Advisory and Cooperation Teams, or REACT. We recognized the need to have a more robust capability to rapidly deploy civilian resources to crises just like

the U.S. military does. The basic idea was to have a team of civilian experts that either could be deployed rapidly to other countries to help defuse crises in their early stages or could be partnered as a separate unit with military forces in peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. While the program was eventually launched on a very modest basis, trying to build a political constituency for this idea and convincing governments to invest any resources at all in it were painstakingly difficult.

In addition, we do not have much of a strategic dialogue on globalization with our key allies and partners around the world. We have only begun to try to recast Cold War alliances for a post-Cold War globalized world. Again, let us start with our own strategic community and Europe. Considering the fact that annually we have dozens, if not hundreds, of conferences with our European colleagues in the strategic community on a huge number of issues, it is striking how infrequently we see a conference whose agenda is focused on the strategic consequences of globalization for the United States and Europe.

If we look at the official level, our leaders get together and spend great amounts of time going over detailed issues on the Balkans' other hot spots, but rarely do they step back and talk about how we together can shape a strategy to pursue our common interests in an increasingly globalized world. The part of our government that is responsible for tending to our relations with Europe is staffed by Europeanists who are often the wrong interlocutors for a global strategic dialogue. Although policy and planning staffs could and should be thinking about issues that cut across regional portfolios, they find it difficult to perform that function as well. Paradoxically, globalization and the acceleration of information have accelerated the pace of diplomacy, with the result that planners have all too often been pulled into the day-to-day management of foreign affairs.

The problem is not necessarily convincing leaders or senior officials that in principle there is a need to make the necessary changes. The vast majority of senior U.S. and European leaders and officials would probably embrace the basic hypothesis that the United States and Europe are natural allies or partners in a globalized world, that we have common interests, and that we need to find ways to pursue those interests. They would also probably agree in principle that the United States and Europe should have some kind of common strategy toward Europe's periphery as broadly defined—Russia, the great Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean; that we need a better common strategy on key functional issues such as WMD; and that we should also be trying to work together on regional issues such as China and Taiwan.

But turning that into reality is not easy on either side of the Atlantic. Europe today is a global actor commercially but only a regional actor strategically. Europe today is more insular in its strategic thinking than it was a century ago—the result of two World Wars and the Cold War. Our basic venue for discussing economic and global issues is the U.S.–EU relationship. But neither this relationship nor this dialogue is a strategic one. It is unfortunately dominated by the management of trade disputes rather than the coordination of strategies for putting hard and soft power to use in a common purpose.

Our basic venue for discussing military strategy with the Europeans is NATO. On paper, we have succeeded in transforming it from an alliance that defended the

western half of Europe against a Soviet threat to a post-Cold War alliance between the United States and a Europe that is embracing new democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In addition to defending alliance members' territory, the alliance has now pledged itself to defend common transatlantic interests beyond its immediate borders as well. In the Washington Declaration issued at the NATO 50th anniversary summit in April 1999, alliance leaders underscored a simple but profound principle for the future: it must be as effective in dealing with new threats as it was in meeting the Soviet threat during the Cold War.

The issue of just how far NATO common interests might stretch in the future is clearly a sensitive one. In the negotiations over the new strategic concept, the real issue was whether it would limit itself to language implying that it would go no further than "in and around Europe" or would talk about the security of Europe—thereby leaving the door open to future involvement in regions such as the Persian Gulf. As often is the case, we reached a carefully worded compromise with our allies. But the political and strategic reality is that we have succeeded in stretching the center of gravity in alliance thinking from the Fulda Gap to the periphery of Europe—an important accomplishment in its own right—but not any further. We must still make that vision a reality and then build on it if we are to create this global strategic agenda.

The area in which the United States is probably doing the best in terms of preparing for the future of globalization is in ensuring that we have the military forces needed for this new world. Other contributions in this volume address the specific issues involved for the U.S. military. I would make only two brief observations.

We are in better shape in this regard than in other areas because the U.S. military is working at this issue in its usual professional manner, has a better resource base to prepare for this kind of a future, and, more than most other foreign policy agencies, has the capability and tradition of having to think long term. To be sure, there are many problems, unresolved issues, and fights over the kind of forces and force packages that we need and can afford. Yet progress is being made in the military arena.

But the challenge and problem for the U.S. military is also that it can only function as part of the overall foreign and defense policy team, and that, ideally, we should be able to operate in a coalition of countries with similar capabilities. Many of the challenges and problems laid out here, as well as the changes that would be required, go well beyond the U.S. military or the Department of Defense. They affect the way in which we think, conduct, and manage foreign policy. In many ways, this may be the area in which we are weakest and need to rethink the most.

The reality is that we often turn to U.S. military forces to compensate for our weaknesses in other areas. We turn to them to compensate for our inability to develop or field the appropriate civilian expertise in crises. We expect the glue of our military alliances to help hold together political and economic relationships with key allies. Having denuded ourselves of meaningful policy tools for economic aid and assistance, tools that are likely to be in greater demand as a result of globalization, we often rely on our military-to-military contacts to sustain relationships with developing countries. Other countries often turn to us and the U.S. military because they themselves have not created the capabilities that might allow them to perform a mission

without us or at least to assume a larger share of the burden. This is an unhealthy imbalance that cries out for improvement.

The purpose of this brief survey has not been to criticize. It is always easier to analyze what is wrong or missing in current policy than to come up with the answer. But by drawing the contrast between the kind of strategy we would want for an era of globalization and comparing it with the status quo, we can break out of the existing bureaucratic mindset that all too often limits or inhibits our thinking and illuminate the path we need to take.

Performing Better: A National Agenda

Can we do better? The answer to this question is that we must. How? We are clearly in the midst of a kind of paradigm shift, the implications of which we are still in the process of sorting out. Against this backdrop and without any claim to definitiveness, here is nevertheless a short list of steps we can take to help produce better policies in the future.

First, we must obviously expand and accelerate the intellectual and strategic dialogue on globalization and what it means. The issues involved in globalization must move from the periphery to the center of the strategic and policymaking debate. The globalization debate has heretofore been largely nonstrategic. It should become part of our mainstream work and debate in the foreign policy and strategic studies community, not an add-on often done as an afterthought to check a box. For a whole host of reasons, governments are going to find it hard to do this alone. They are not set up to do it; indeed, the way they are organized often inhibits it. Nor is it always their strength to look beyond the horizon or to integrate issues that cut across bureaucratic fiefdoms.

The necessary change can only happen in the context of an intellectual and analytical partnership between the government and the strategic community. That partnership must include not only the Department of Defense but also other parts of the government. As we have seen as a result of this cursory exploration, one of the key challenges we face is whether and how we not only can better integrate foreign and defense policy in a globalized world but also do a better job of bringing economic and security together as well.

Second, we need a more systemic exploration and understanding of a set of key issues that this chapter has unearthed. One special need is better identification of the new vulnerabilities—political, economic, and military—that the United States faces as a result of globalization to provide a basis for better thinking about strategies needed to counter them. Another is better policy tools and better integration of the tremendous nonmilitary resources of the United States in order to pursue a more conscious and effective environment-shaping strategy. Equally important, we need to think about how we can contribute to and help create the kind of international institutions and systems that are needed in a globalized world. In this context, we also need to tackle the question of how we can continue or start to transform existing alliance systems whose origins are rooted in the Cold War and adapt them to the challenges of globalization. We have made a solid start on that in the case of Europe; we have not really started that discussion when it comes to Asia.

Third, we must be aware that this debate is not an abstract or a merely intellectual one. It is also about resources, organization, and turf. In many cases, we have a reasonably good idea, at least in principle, of some of what is needed, be it in the area of civilian crisis management or how to apply the lessons of the revolution in military affairs to a globalized world. But it is still a long way from developing a good concept on the drawing board to creating the kinds of capabilities that are deployable on the ground. One has to build constituencies in order to forge the consensus necessary to acquire the resources. My view is that we, for a variety of reasons, are in much worse shape when it comes to the civilian component than the military one.

Fourth, while our priority must be getting our own strategic house in order, we must also realize that it is in our own interests to start the dialogue on all of these issues with our allies and partners. There is no escaping the fact that in a globalized and increasingly interdependent world, the United States will have to rely more, not less, on coalitions to pursue our goals. Cooperation with allies and partners will become more important, our own strength notwithstanding. And our alliances will have to change, in some cases radically. There will and should be lots of legitimate debate over how best to do this, but in an age in which new global alliances and partnerships are being established every day in the area of politics, commerce, and culture, why should we think that our field will be any different? A primary challenge for the United States will be to come up with creative incentives to get our allies to work with us to continue to transform Cold War relationships into post-Cold War alliances.

Fifth and finally, let me state the obvious. While we need a broader and more integrated portfolio of foreign and defense policy tools, we also need to ensure that we have the right kind of military wherewithal at the end of the day to protect our territory and interests, and that our allies and partners have sufficient forces so that we do not have to bear this burden alone.

This is an ambitious but exciting agenda. Some will look at it and say it cannot be done. Others will look at it and say we have no choice. The best answer is to get started and see how far we get and how good a job we can do. In the final analysis, we have no alternative. 🌐

Notes

¹ The point is that Einstein, as a theoretical physicist and mathematician, was skilled at creating conceptual systems in the absence of major empirical data portraying their operations or even their existence. See Nigel Calder, *Einstein's Universe* (New York: Viking Press, 1979).

² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), 22–35.